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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the impact of translating as experience, metaphor and influence 
for the two writers featured in this study, George Eliot and Mary (Mrs Humphry) Ward. I 
argue that the emotional and intellectual requirements for translation, sympathetic 
identification and critical judgement, are significant and under-investigated influences on 
their creative practice.    
Although it is well known that both writers translated works which challenged 
prevailing religious understandings, I emphasise that their approach to their translations was 
itself one of hermeneutic and stylistic fidelity, and explore the process of translation 
conceived as a series of human relationships. I argue that both women explored the capacity 
of the ideas and language of their translations to provide conceptualisations of human 
relationship as the fulcrum and guarantor of emotional value in a Godless world.  The 
considerable critical interest in Feuerbach’s influence on Eliot has focused mainly on  
subjectivity and the duty of understanding others, but I consider her emphasis on human 
relationships as acts of faith. Critical interest in Spinoza has been far more limited, and this 
thesis champions the importance of this relationship for Eliot’s writing in relation to the 
process of psychological change, the role of intuitive knowledge, and the subjectivity of 
ethical understanding. The influence of Amiel’s portrayal of the intellectual and 
psychological experience of losing faith on Ward’s fiction has been largely unexplored in 
criticism, an oversight this thesis is intended to correct.  
Chapter 1 contextualizes Ward and Eliot in relation to Victorian conceptualisations of 
translation more widely, and stresses the context of nineteenth-century translation conceived 
as a search for fidelity, (in distinction from more recent critical models imposing currents of 
conflict and mastery). Chapter 2 examines the impact of Eliot’s translation of Feuerbach’s 
Essence of Christianity on ideas around the sacred nature of human relationships, and in 
particular the influence of Feuerbach’s metaphor of translation on Eliot’s narration.  Chapter 
3 considers Eliot’s translation of Spinoza’s Ethics, arguing that Spinoza’s ideas about 
processes of psychological change and the subjectivity of good and evil are more fully 
integrated into Eliot’s fiction than has traditionally been thought.  Chapter 4 considers Mary 
Ward’s translation of Amiel’s Journal Intime in relation to her most famous novel, Robert 
Elsmere, tracing how Amiel’s sense of multiple psychologies and his own analyses of other 
philosophers contribute to Ward’s delineation of the loss of faith. Chapter 5 considers his 
influence on Helbeck of Bannisdale and Eleanor, and how those novels use metaphors related 
to translation to consider the gaps between the languages of individuals, and between emotion 
and its recognition. Ward’s role as translator is examined with reference to hitherto 
unpublished letters to her father during the final editing of Helbeck of Bannisdale, along with 
the significance for Eleanor of Ward’s introduction to Joubert’s Pensées and her 
collaboration with Katharine Lyttelton on its translation.  
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1 
 
Introduction 
Also, in a perverse way, I just enjoy translating, it’s like opening one’s mouth and 
hearing someone else’s voice emerge.1  
 
 
In his apologia for his profession, Jake Donoghue, Iris Murdoch’s fictional translator 
in Under the Net (1954), suggests how translation demands an almost visceral identification 
with the author of the original text at the same time as an equally visceral awareness of 
difference. His words are a metaphor for the Janus-like experiences of empathy and judgment 
essential to the act of translation. Edith Grossman, a contemporary translator of Spanish and 
South American literature, describes the interaction between translator and translated text as 
an interaction between ‘deep involvement’ and ‘penetrating’ criticism:   
 
[....] the translator is the most penetrating reader and critic a work can have. The very 
nature of what we do requires that type of deep involvement in the text. Our efforts to 
translate both denotation and connotation, to transfer significance as well as context, 
means that we must [....] bring to bear everything we know, feel, and intuit about the 
two languages and their literatures.
2
  
 
 
For Grossman, the act of translation demands, as well as linguistic and contextual knowledge, 
a consciousness of style, and an identification of the text’s appeal to a much more complex 
and shifting cultural significance beyond its limits. No wonder that Jake Donaghue exclaims, 
on being made to think more exactly about the process of translation, that: 
 
The activity of translating, which had seemed the plainest thing in the world, turned 
out to be an act so complex and extraordinary that it was puzzling to see how any 
human being could perform it.
3
 
 
 
The excitement and difficulties of entry into the ideas of another human mind, a mind 
defined by a different culture and language from the translator’s, and bringing them ‘over’ 
into the translator’s culture, are also described by Grossman:  
[....], at a certain point in the translation of a book, [....], I can begin to imagine that 
the author and I have started to speak together – never in unison, certainly, but in a 
                                            
1
 Iris Murdoch, Under the Net (Bungay: Richard Clay & Co., 1955), p.22. 
2
 Edith Grossman, Why Translation Matters (London: Yale University Press, 2010), p.73.  
3
 Murdoch, pp.65, 66. 
2 
 
kind of satisfying harmony. [....]. The experience is exhilarating, symbiotic, certainly 
metaphorical, and absolutely crucial if I am to do what I am supposed to do – 
somehow get into the author’s head and behind the author’s eyes and recreate in 
English the writer’s linguistic perceptions of the world.4 
 
 
Her emphasis on empathy, and the indefinable, subjective nature of the process when 
successful, gives rise to the many synonyms for translation used by translators. Translate, 
render, bring over, transpose, transfuse, rewrite, transfer meaning between, transmute, 
transform – the list of alternative definitions of the activity is extensive in itself, showing how 
difficult it is to convey with any precision that mixture of receptivity and creativity which 
must inform the action of transferring meaning and impact from one language to another.  
In this thesis, I examine how two Victorian novelists, George Eliot (Mary Ann/Marian 
Evans), and Mary (Mrs Humphry) Ward, both conceptualized and engaged in the ‘complex 
and extraordinary’5 act of translation, with its combination of involvement and criticism, 
identification and judgement; and how they transformed this thinking into motifs, currents, 
and methodology within their own fictional writings. Eliot’s initial, but abandoned, 
translation project, begun in 1842, was of Vinet’s Liberté des Cultes.6 She later completed 
translations of David Strauss’s Leben Jesu (1846), Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des 
Christentums (1854), and Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethica (1856). A translation of the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus is also mentioned in her letters
7
, although her translations of Spinoza 
remained unpublished. Ward translated Frédéric Amiel’s Journal Intime (1885), and later 
collaborated with Katharine Lyttelton on a translation of Joseph Joubert’s Pensées (1898). 
What Eliot and Ward shared (and why they are the twin subjects of this thesis) was a hope 
that their translations of European philosophy would reveal to a British public, much of it 
unaware of significant scholarly and religio-philosophic developments in Europe, a sense of 
how the foundations of religious thought and belief were being altered by such philosophy, 
and by the historicist analysis and anthropological and psychological deconstructions found 
within it. Both writers’ novels rise to the challenge posed by their translations, the urgent 
need to work out alternatives to traditional dogmatic religion, and to understand the 
significance of human relationship in a re-orientated human moral universe. Both writers 
                                            
4
 Grossman, pp.82, 83. 
5
 Murdoch, pp.65, 66. 
6
 Ruby Redinger, George Eliot: The Emergent Self  (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1975), p.130. 
7
 GEL.I , to Mr and Mrs Charles Bray, 4 December 1849, p.321. 
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 probe the relationship between external authority and the process of internal understanding, 
and both explicitly engage in a search for a fluent, convincing language for the ideas 
emerging from the intellectual religious revolution of the nineteenth century.  
In The Victorians, Philip Davis analyses the processes at work within Victorian 
society and the literature of the period as it struggled to find a new type of language to 
express underlying spiritual and psychological realities: 
 
Initially the new order has not had time to become the expression of anything more 
than the logic that banishes its predecessor. Emotional experience that found 
expression within the old symbols now seems silenced. The new way seems to offer 
less meaning than before, because it has not yet worked its way into becoming 
conceivable to the general mind as a form of life. Thus, the old ways have to linger, 
and have to be banished, alternately, until a new language of symbols and associations 
can serve as a replacement.
8
 
 
Davis also quotes the analogy with translation used by Karl Marx for the replacement of old 
ideas and their symbolic expression by a new system of  ideas and symbols: 
 
Just so does the beginner, having learnt a new language, always retranslate it into his 
mother-tongue; he has not assimilated the spirit of the new language, nor learnt to 
manipulate it freely, until he uses it without reference to the old and forgets his native 
language in using the new one.
9
 
 
 
The task of developing satisfactory new languages and new translations for what 
Ward called the enduring ‘needs of the soul’10 proved challenging. There was also a lingering 
sense that some significant concepts were endangered. In her introduction to the translation of 
Joubert’s Pensées, Ward had written of the intellectual climate in France following the 
revolution: 
 
[....] that new and stormy life of Europe which was none the less conscious of all that 
it had conquered because it returned so passionately, so remorsefully, to much that it 
had overthrown; [....].
11
 
 
                                            
8
 Philip Davis, The Victorians, in The Oxford English Literary History, Vol.8  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p.126. 
9
 Davis, p.129, referring to The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, by Karl Marx. 
10
 MW HB, V. 1. p.333. 
11
 JJ ST, ‘Introduction’ by Mary Ward, p.xii. 
4 
 
The revolutionary and post-revolutionary sequence of passion and remorse, of the destruction 
of the old by the irresistible new, was what interested Ward, and it is a defining note in the 
writings of both women; iconoclastic, radical, but simultaneously full of yearning towards the 
emotional and moral consciousness of their former beliefs. Cara Bray, Eliot’s friend, wrote of 
Eliot’s ‘Strauss-sickness’ while ‘dissecting’ Strauss’s analysis of the ‘beautiful story of the 
crucifixion’,12 and her need, while engaged on it, for the reassurance she drew from a cast of 
Thorwaldsen’s statue of the risen Christ, which she kept in front of her as she worked. The 
mitigation of an act of intellectual deconstruction by one of artistic reaffirmation epitomises 
the ways in which the grief caused by tenacious intellectual rigour in relation to matters of 
former faith had to reverse its destruction and dissection through attempts to detain, re-
examine and re-explore the underlying ideas and emotions, the symbols, the metaphors, the 
images, and the language of the lost faith.  
In this thesis, this process of intellectual overthrow, the internal drama of 
disillusionment, and the subsequent longing for what has been lost, will be examined through 
both writers’ letters, autobiographical writings, and fiction. Eliot’s attacks on Christianity’s 
intellectual foundations softened, as she said in a letter of 1859, into a gentler acceptance of 
‘any faith in which human sorrow and human longing for purity have expressed 
themselves’.13 Ward’s historicist rejection of Christian dogma was complicated by her 
longing for a community which combined the ideas of new scholarship with the symbolic 
forms, language, and emotion of the old faith. 
Ward and Eliot stand together in the nineteenth century as female translators of 
European male philosophers, who also combined what they saw as the making of ‘faithful’ 
translations with writing fictions. In this, they contrast with Harriet Martineau (who is not 
substantively examined in this thesis), who had successfully translated Auguste Comte’s 
Cours Philosophe Positive (1853). Despite the success of earlier novels such as Deerbrook 
(1839), and fictions such as The Illustrations of Political Economy, she dismissed her ‘small 
imaginative and suggestive powers’,14  and fiercely rejected the connection between fiction 
and philosophy, arguing that popularizing ideas through ‘story’, would ‘smother’15 their 
clarity. Martineau had taken a characteristically incisive editorial stance towards the 
                                            
12
 GEL.I, Mrs Bray’s letter to Sara Hennell, 14 February 1846,  p.206. 
13
 GEL.III, Letter to Francois d’Albert Durade, 6 December 1859,  pp.230, 231. 
14
 Harriet Martineau, ‘Self-Estimate’, from Harrriet Martineau’s Autobiography, ed. by Maria Weston 
Chapman, 3 vols  (London: Smith Elder and Co., 1877), III,  p.469. 
15
 Harriet Martineau, Harrriet Martineau’s Autobiography, ed. by Maria Weston Chapman,  I, 3rd Period, 
Section III, p.138. 
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translation of Comte’s Cours, which she called a condensation, reducing it to a quarter of its 
original length. In contrast, Ward’s and Eliot’s intention to provide close and faithful textual 
translations  of works of European philosophy or theology is uniquely combined with their 
secondary translation of those ideas into fiction, dramatising the human impact of the radical 
ideas which had been addressed in their translated works. The translator’s subjective 
involvement with, and objective criticism of, the ideas they translated, and their experience of 
being a mouthpiece for another person’s ideas, became the novelist’s secondary, additional, 
translation of those ideas through the process of fictional dramatization in the realist mode. 
Moreover, translation as a metaphor for gaining understanding, for communication, and for 
decoding other characters’ languages is a major preoccupation of both novelists.  
In 1849, seven years before completing a translation of Spinoza’s Ethics, Eliot had 
already considered that a secondary or additional translation would be necessary to render the 
meaning contained within its format of geometric analysis: 
 
After one has rendered his Latin faithfully into English, one feels that there is another 
yet more difficult process of translation for the reader to effect, and that the only 
mode of making Spinoza accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut 
them, and give an analysis.
16
 
 
There is a recognition here that a ‘faithful’ translation was not enough to secure 
understanding, and that another stage might be needed – a stage which became, for both Eliot 
and Ward, the writing of fiction.  By taking analysis a step further and imaginatively 
inhabiting human characters and situations, alternative ideas about how to live might be 
examined. Eliot was adamant that her novels were ‘experiments in life’ and that no 
‘formulae’, a word she used consistently to imply any empirical theorisation, were valid 
unless evolving from and tested against human experience.  
If Eliot attends explicitly to the process of gaining understanding, Ward focuses on 
the ‘human and emotional crisis’17resulting from intellectual processes. Her Writer’s 
Recollections record that it was ‘the shock of indignation’ caused by John Wordsworth’s 
‘grotesque account’ of the correlation between ‘unbelief’ and ‘sin’, applied to the lives of 
people she revered and loved, such as Matthew Arnold, Benjamin Jowett, and T H Green, 
which ‘led directly – though after seven intervening years’ to writing Robert Elsmere, an 
                                            
16
 GEL.I, to Mr and Mrs Charles Bray, 4 December 1849, p.321. 
17
 MW Rec, Ch.XII, p.231. 
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exploration of the loss of religious faith without any loss of ethical endeavour.
18
  Elsewhere 
in the Recollections, she explained that she had determined to deal with the subject through a 
novel, ‘in order to reach the public’.19 The emotional significance of loss of faith or changes 
in faith was personal: she had lost her own faith to historical and historicist analysis, and had 
experienced the destructive impact of her father’s changing beliefs on her parents’ marriage.  
This thesis will demonstrate in more detail than has hitherto been the case how Eliot’s 
own philosophy developed and defined itself as she embarked on the work of translating 
Strauss, Feuerbach and Spinoza, and how she addressed not only the implications of the ideas 
she was translating, but the process of engagement itself. For Ward, reading and translating 
Amiel’s Journal Intime provided her with a day by day account of fighting for and losing a 
religious faith.  Ward’s debt to Amiel has received little attention critically.  
 
The Relationship of Ward’s and Eliot’s Writing 
 
Eliot’s and Ward’s lives and writing careers were separated by thirty years: Eliot a 
writer of the mid-nineteenth century and Ward of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century. Nevertheless, Ward’s concerns were close to Eliot’s, so close in fact that she was 
accused by Oscar Wilde in the early 1890s of addressing the theological controversies of 
twenty to thirty years’ earlier:  
 
It [Robert Elsmere] is simply Arnold's Literature and Dogma [1873] with the 
literature left out. It is as much behind the age as Paley's Evidences [1859], or 
Colenso's method of Biblical exegesis [1862-79].
 20
 
 
 
However, the public success of her work demonstrated that these controversies were still 
intensely relevant. Eliot had made key works of German Higher Criticism accessible in the 
English speaking world, and the disputes of Ward’s youth in Oxford in the 1870s reflected 
the University’s unique role in crystallising the ensuing debate between religious tradition 
and liberalism:  
                                            
18
 MW Rec, Ch.IX, p.168. 
19
 MW Rec, Ch.XII, p.229. 
20
 Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying – An Observation’, in Intentions, ed. by Percival Pollard (New York: 
Brentano's, 1905), p.16. BiblioBoard. Web.  
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[....]; we who were still within sight and hearing of the great fighting years of an 
earlier generation, and still scorched by their dying fires. Balliol, Christ Church, 
Lincoln: - the Liberal and utilitarian camp, the Church camp – with Science and the 
Museum hovering in the background, as the growing aggressive powers of the future 
seeking whom they might devour: [....].
21
 
 
Both Ward’s and Eliot’s translatorly interests were initially conditioned by interest in 
scholarly historical and psychological analyses of religion and its function. As is well-known, 
by the time Eliot began to translate Strauss in 1844, she had already abandoned her belief in 
dogmatic Christianity. For Ward, the major issue (even post-Darwin) was essentially the 
same, and related to the evidential basis of Christianity, the changing profile of ‘testimony’ as 
she called it, and the implications of changing religious perspectives on moral action, and 
what she termed ‘the needs of the soul’.22 Both women’s early evangelicalism with its 
ascription of pre-eminent value to biblical text led to a painful loss of a faith in their twenties 
associated with challenge to that textual authority. The impact of textual criticism and how 
that criticism impacted on the moral and emotional consciousness of traditional Christianity 
became their major concern. Their textual awareness was clearly formed in their experiences 
as translators of texts centrally concerned with the validity and impact of textuality on 
religious belief.  
Ward and Eliot also shared professional and personal trajectories. Both women 
expanded the normal repertoire of the languages taught to middle-class girls to become expert 
linguists, not only in other modern European languages but in classical languages too – 
challenging an area considered to belong exclusively to male expertise. As a young woman, 
Eliot had acquired expertise in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Latin, and classical Greek. 
She learnt Hebrew later in life from her friend, Emanuel Deutsch.
23
 Ward originally learnt 
German, Latin and French at school, and added to these an ability to read early mediaeval and 
renaissance Latin, Spanish and mediaeval Spanish, and modern Italian.
24
 Eliot wrote for and 
edited The Westminster Review, and wrote for The Leader: Ward wrote for The Times and 
Macmillan’s Magazine. They both translated works by philosophers or theologians before, or 
just as, they were considering embarking on careers writing fiction. At thirty-seven, just as 
                                            
21
 MW Rec, Ch.VII, p.131. 
22
 MW HB, V. 1.  p.333. 
23
 John Walter Cross, George Eliot’s Life as related in her Letters and Journals  (London: William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1902), pp.14, 17, 33; and Oscar Browning, Life of George Eliot (London: Walter Scott, 1890), pp.28, 
96. Bibliolabs (Biblioboard core) 
24
 MW Rec, Ch.IX, p.163. 
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she completed her unpublished translation of Spinoza’s Ethics, Eliot wrote her first fiction, 
Scenes from Clerical Life. The genesis of Ward’s second and most successful novel, Robert 
Elsmere, (also published when the author was thirty-seven), was intertwined with her 
experience of translating Amiel’s Journal Intime. Some of the parallel aspects of their 
careers, ‘the magnitude of the achievement and the nature of the spiritual and intellectual 
struggles depicted’,25 were debated by some Victorian critics.26 There are other more personal 
parallels too; the importance of their relationship with their fathers despite profound religious 
differences with them, and their ‘qualified feminism’27 which has brought both of them 
criticism in recent years.  
In terms of their treatment of intellectual and religious issues, they focused on very 
different aspects of the transformations of faith. With the exception of Romola, Eliot rarely 
foregrounds the experience of loss of faith explicitly. Her characters for the most part 
experience positive transformations of understanding, and the sympathy to transcend 
difference. What divides them or causes them pain are failures in understanding and 
sympathy, and pain is a stage in the process of gaining a more just and embracing 
understanding of other people. Relationship fills the space vacated by the sacred. However, as 
well as her emphasis on self-discovery through relationships, Eliot also considered the impact 
of cataclysmic social change on the small conceptions of individuals, the ‘terrible moment 
[....] when the great movements of the world [....] enter like an earthquake into [....] lives.
28
 
This was also the moment which Ward identified as her prime interest, the drama of the 
impact of new ideas on the individual: 
 
It is in these conflicts between old and the new, [....] that we moderns find our best 
example of compelling fate, - and the weakness of the personal life in the grip of great 
forces that regard it not, or seem to regard it not, [....].
29
 
 
Ward’s novels depict a world where ideas are charged with a destructive necessity and 
relationship is their victim. For her, differences in belief and self-recognition bring painful  
                                            
25
 MAH, ‘Mrs Humphry Ward’ in Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, ed. by John Rignall (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), Oxford Reference online. 
26
 Eg. Charles Townsend Copeland, ‘George Eliot and Mrs Humphry Ward’, (The North American Review 
1892, 154(425)).  pp. 1-3. Bibliolabs. 
27
 MAH, ‘Mrs Humphry Ward’. 
28
 GE DD, VIII. 69. pp. 747, 748. 
29
 Janet Penrose Trevelyan, The Life of Mrs Humphry Ward, letter to C E Maurice (London: Constable & Co., 
1923), p.150. 
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adjustments to relationships or destroy them. The emotional experience of loss of faith is a 
major concern in both Robert Elsmere and Eleanor, and Ward’s novels tend far more than 
Eliot’s to show the diminution and even destruction of relationship resulting from the 
irreconcilability of ideas. Nevertheless, the structural dynamic of idea and life, of text and 
context, remains the same.  
The two writers’ social interaction was limited. Mary Ward met George Eliot only 
once in Oxford in 1870, according to her Recollections, where she recorded Eliot’s kindness 
to her as a young woman in awe of the established novelist, and recalled Eliot’s conversation 
with her about Spain which created an ‘impression’ which was like ‘the best of her work’.30 
Ward, who had written perceptive introductions to Charlotte Brontë’s novels, declined to 
write anything about Eliot when invited to do so by William Blackwood, saying that she did 
‘not feel naturally drawn to it, great as my admiration for her is’.31  William Peterson 
identifies some of Ward’s reservations about Eliot, accepting them at face value. Her 
‘Introduction’ to Amiel’s Journal compares Amiel’s poetry with Eliot’s in its absence of 
‘plastic power’ and ‘incommunicable magic’.32 A letter to George Smith described finding 
Adam Bede boring and the hero a prig.
33
 And yet Ward’s ambiguity about Eliot is also clear 
from the comparisons she invoked and elicited. James Knowles told Gladstone that Ward 
reminded him of George Eliot: ‘[....] she gives me the impression of wishing to be Elisha to 
Geo. Eliot’s Elijah - & I cannot see why she may not become so’.34 Her reticence about Eliot, 
given their similar ethical and religious interests and similar formal choices, is indicative of 
intriguing personal creative issues at the very least. 
The Critical Context for Eliot and Ward 
 
When Ward eventually published her first novel, Robert Elsmere, in 1888, similarities 
between the two authors were noted by reviewers. The French critic, Taine, thought it the 
best English novel since George Eliot’s death.35 One of the earliest reviews, from The 
Scotsman,
36
 compared Robert Elsmere with the novels of George Eliot: The Pall Mall 
                                            
30
 MW Rec, Ch.VI, p.108. 
31
 William S Peterson, Victorian Heretic: Mrs Humphry Ward’s Robert Elsmere (Leicester University Press, 
1976), p.102. 
32
 HFA JI, ‘Introduction’ by Mary Ward, p.xxxiii. 
33
 Peterson, p.102. 
34
 Peterson, p.103. 
35
 Peterson, p.162. 
36
 Peterson, p.170, refers to ‘New Novels’ in The Scotsman, 5 March, 1888. 
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Gazette noted the frequency of such critical comparisons but dismissed them.
37
  But such 
comparisons between the two writers continued to be made during Ward’s creative lifetime: 
Frederic Harrison wrote that one of Ward’s later novels, The Case of Richard Meynell, (1911) 
was ‘as fine as anything since Adam Bede’.38 Prefiguring later critical attention, Charles 
Townsend Copeland, one of the nineteenth century reviewers to link Ward and Eliot, 
concluded that they were linked as moralists rather than novelists:  
 
George Eliot began writing fiction as a novelist, and ended as a moralist: Mrs Ward 
began as a moralist, and has she yet become a novelist?
39
 
 
 
A limited number of more recent critics have addressed similarities between the 
oeuvres of Ward and Eliot. U. C. Knoepflmacher has persuasively argued that, in Robert 
Elsmere, Ward was consciously emulating Eliot’s later novels, as well being influenced by 
the ideas of Matthew Arnold.
40
 MAH, in the entry relating to Ward in The Oxford Reader’s 
Companion to George Eliot, identifies parallels between the work of the two women in the 
‘ethical and marital’ dilemmas faced by their heroines.41 Peter Collister, in an essay for 
English Studies on the linkages between Eliot’s and Ward’s depictions of women’s moral 
choices, and of the ways in which both writers used realism, also argues that Eliot’s influence 
on Ward is perceptible in their female characters and suggests that:  
 
In the aesthetic outline rather than the specifically moral impulse, that is, Mary Ward 
owed much to George Eliot [....]. The correspondence extends beyond this shared 
basis of interest into the practical problems of giving dramatic and narrative form to 
crises arising from an identifiably similar range of moral uncertainties and 
convictions.
42
 
 
Little else appears to have been written about Eliot and Ward and the overlapping interest and 
achievement of both women. A number of critics have explored the congruent or contrasting 
interests and experiences of Victorian intellectual women writers, and, while Eliot often 
features in these studies, Ward does not. Rosemary Ashton’s The German Idea: Four English 
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Writers and the Reception of German Thought 1800-1869 (1980)
43; Deirdre David’s 
Intellectual Women and Victorian Patriarchy: Harriet Martineau, Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning, George Eliot (1987)
44; Lesa Scholl’s Translation, Authorship and the Victorian 
Professional Woman: Charlotte Brontë, Harriet Martineau and George Eliot (2011)
45
 (which 
I will discuss in some more depth later) each recognise Eliot’s achievements as an intellectual 
and as a creative writer, but omit consideration of Ward. Lesser known Victorian women 
translators and travel writers are considered in Judith Johnston’s Victorian Women and the 
Economies of Travel, Translation and Culture 1830-1870 (2013),
46
 covering the work of 
Sarah Austin, Mary Busk, Anna Jameson, Charlotte Guest, Jane Sinnett and Mary Howitt.  
The critical literature on Ward remains limited, and convinced of the lasting value of 
her achievement only in relation to the light it casts on the crises of faith in late Victorian 
England. Too successful, too involved with the anti-suffrage movement, too earnest, too 
moral: these seem to encapsulate critical misgivings about Ward which still survive.  In 1970, 
Knoepflmacher concluded that Robert Elsmere’s ‘historic significance exceeded by far its 
intrinsic merits.’47 John Sutherland’s 1990 literary biography of Ward attempts to steer a 
course between objective accounts of contemporaneous critical and popular reception of her 
work and acceptance of the justice of critical relegation of some of her work, suggesting that: 
 
 Most critics who allow Mrs Humphry Ward any literary achievement at all assume 
that it is confined between the years 1888 to 1898 and that she falls off as a novelist 
after Helbeck.
48
 
  
Earlier literary appreciations by Enid Huws Jones
49
 and Stephen Gwynn suggest that, 
in books such as Robert Elsmere, ‘[....] even with developing artistic power she has never 
learnt to subordinate thoroughly the accidental to the essential interests of her craft.’50 
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William Peterson’s Mrs Humphry Ward: Victorian Heretic (1976) amends the damning 
emphasis on respectability and popularity, and probably provides one of the most generous 
and perceptive judgements of Ward’s daring, and the intellectual honesty in conflict with ‘the 
bittersweet quality of Victorian religious nostalgia’51 which her novels present, arguing that:  
[....] in her best novels – particularly Robert Elsmere and Helbeck of Bannisdale – she 
brilliantly captures the pain of spiritual loss so characteristic of the century.
52
 
 
 
Peterson’s book emphasises Robert Elsmere’s role as a deeply authentic account of that crisis 
of religious belief, the story of ‘both an individual and an age’.53 His judgements have been 
supported more recently by Davis (2004), who regards Robert Elsmere as ‘the great, 
culminating, recapitulatory novel of the [nineteenth] century’s religious experience’.54  
The impact of Ward’s translation of Amiel’s Journal, a portrait of a lifetime’s 
agonising metamorphosis and disintegration of faith, on the development of her fiction is 
touched on only in the context of biography. However, the impact of Amiel’s work on Ward 
was, I argue, profound. It gave her the expression of a sensibility and experience she saw as 
symptomatic of her age, and it influenced aspects of her work extending beyond the creation 
which she confessed to, the character of Langham in Robert Elsmere. The links between 
Ward’s novels and her translation of Amiel have not been examined in depth before.  
Eliot’s fictional achievement has, in contrast, been the subject of considerable critical 
interest in relation to her translations of Strauss and Feuerbach, and, to a more limited extent, 
in relation to her translation of Spinoza. There are studies of her role as an intellectual and of 
her European context (Valerie Dodd
55
, John Rignall
56
). There have been interventions by 
philosophers (Martha Nussbaum,
57
 James Arnott,
58
 Moira Gatens
59
) in relation to the function 
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of the realist novel as an alternative mode of philosophic exploration of nuanced moral 
response to ethical issues arising out of  ‘the complex particularities of a situation’. 60  
Eliot’s engagement with the ideas of Feuerbach and Strauss has received significant 
attention. Her endorsement of Feuerbach’s interpretation of the human religious impulse 
(‘[....] with the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree’61) was both self-defining and 
influential. Particular interest has focused on such aspects as Feuerbach’s emphasis on 
Christianity’s capacity to endorse the significance of feeling (Knoepflmacher, E S Shaffer62), 
while Shaffer also notes Feuerbach’s identification of theology with pathology. The 
narrator’s persona or personas and their relationship with  a Feuerbachian ‘consciousness of 
the species’ or an apparent immanence has been analysed by J Hillis Miller,63 and the 
narrator’s use of free indirect speech and its relationship with Feuerbachian sympathy 
explored by Suzy Anger.
64
 Eliot’s use of Straussian and Judaeo-Christian mythical resonance 
in novels such as Daniel Deronda has been considered by Barry Qualls,
65
  Shaffer has written 
about Daniel Deronda’s reflection of Feuerbach’s and Strauss’s emphasis on the ‘oriental’ 
origins of European and Christian thought, and both Shaffer and Anger have considered how 
Eliot’s novels deal with subjective knowledge and intuition in the light of Feuerbach’s 
identification of Christian myth and dogma as a reflection or projection of human needs.  
Eliot’s interest in the limits of subjectivity and the need to transcend it in the effort to gain 
less unreliable knowledge, and the relationship of this to Feuerbach’s views of the function of 
internal dialogue (the ‘I/thou’ genesis of thought) to the definition of self and non-self is an 
area of critical debate (Hillis Miller
66
, Anger
67
). A further related area of critical interest 
focuses on the nature of Eliot’s understanding of sympathy or empathy and its relationship  
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with judgement, which many critics (Davis
68
, Armstrong
69
, Ermarth, Anger
70
, Gatens
71
) 
identify as crucial,  Anger arguing that Eliot ‘learnt’ from Feuerbach ‘two hermeneutic 
modes, the sympathetic and the critical’.72  
Qualls has drawn attention to the importance of visionary moments in Daniel 
Deronda.
73
 Areas where there is still ongoing debate are on the theories of knowledge 
relating to the limits of subjectivity for Feuerbach and to the hierarchy of cognition proposed 
by Spinoza culminating in intuitive cognition, and of the way in which Eliot interprets and 
critiques Spinoza’s views of the functions of imagination and intuition in Ethics.74 In 
addition, Dorothy Atkins considered aspects of Spinoza’s theory of cognition, and his 
concepts of human bondage and freedom in relation to Adam Bede,
75
 and Isobel Armstrong 
has written about Spinoza’s analysis of the emotions in Part III of the Ethics, arguing that his 
analysis provides  ‘a structural and organizing principle’ of both Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda.
76
 
Critical discussion of Eliot’s views of translation covers both Ermarth’s identification 
of the way in which multiple languages identify a ‘multiplicity of systems within a social 
network’77 to Susan Hill’s78 more detailed study of translation as a metaphor for 
understanding others in Middlemarch, focusing on Eliot’s consideration of the translation of 
desire into the moral obligation of others. A sense of the significant personal impact of Eliot’s 
translations can also be detected in the importance for her of those moments identified by 
many critics, but not explicitly linked to her experience of translation, where characters 
endure a destabilisation (Caroline Levine
79
), or removal of illusion (Barbara Hardy
80
), or 
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collapse of their world view (David Carroll
81). Eliot’s experience of translating Strauss was a 
painful one as her letters reveal, and the emotional impact of the removal of illusion 
reverberates in her novels.  
The parallels between the work of Ward and Eliot, though accepted by their 
contemporary critics, have been explored only to a very limited extent by more recent 
criticism. Ward’s debt to Amiel remains to be explored further by this thesis. I intend to add 
to the debate about Feuerbach’s influence on Eliot through relating it to her method of 
challenging the reader to think as well as to sympathise, and to the way in which she 
responded to the challenges of redrawing the space for understanding of the sacred. In 
relation to Spinoza’s influence I shall be analysing his ethical theory, and his analyses of  the 
will and of active and passive psychological states in relation to Eliot’s later novels.  
 
Modern Translation Theory  
 
Some feminist translation theorists have argued that the conceptualisation of the 
translator’s role as subservient originated in a patriarchal culture. According to this theory, 
women were permitted to be translators because that role was perceived as subordinate to the 
originating, frequently male, author. Her role was to nurture the male author’s fame and 
international impact. For example, in Gender and Translation, Sherry Simon argues that: 
 
Translators and women have historically been the weaker figures in their respective 
hierarchies: translators are handmaidens to authors, women inferior to men.
82
 
 
 
In her study of three Victorian women translators (Eliot, Brontë and Martineau), Lesa Scholl 
characterises the act of translation as part of a ‘struggle’ for ‘mastery’ with the power of the 
original author.
83
  Some aspects of this analysis may be illuminating, but it simplifies the 
psychological nexus of Victorian translatorly attitudes. Eliot and Ward saw fidelity to the 
intentions of the source author as paramount, but were just as explicit in their contemporary 
letters or the introductions to translations about their judgement of the author and his text as 
                                                                                                                                       
80
 Barbara Nathan Hardy, The Novels of George Eliot: a Study in Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967), p.198. 
81
 David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations, a reading of the novels  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), Cambridge Books Online. 
82
 Sherry Simon, Gender in Translation: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Transmission (London: Routledge, 
1996), p.1. 
83
 Scholl, p.61. 
16 
 
they were about their sympathy with aspects of his views. Nevertheless, the metaphors of 
mastery and subservience haunt discussion of the act of translation. Despite the ambiguous 
significations of ‘mastery’, the metaphorical outreach of the word is seen to imply the 
bivalency of the master-pupil or master-subordinate relationship. Simon’s use of the 
metaphor of translator as ‘handmaiden’ to a source author concentrates on an analysis of the 
anthropological role of a female translator. Scholl, working within the overarching metaphor 
of mastery and subservience, finds in the process of translation what she calls a ‘dialogical’84 
relationship which develops its own dynamic arc from initial intellectual subservience, 
through self-identification with the source, followed by criticism of it, to reach subsequent 
intellectual independence or ‘mastery’. In considering how the experience of translation 
developed for writers such as Eliot, she locates the mastery metaphor in the struggle for final 
authority between pupil and master: 
 
This relationship [pupil and master] becomes a metaphor for the way the translator 
appropriates the authority of the original text before rewriting it as her own.
85
 
 
Scholl’s model of struggle for authority or ‘mastery’ evades arguments about whether 
it is inevitable that a source text is viewed as uniquely different from and inherently superior 
to any translation. But in interpreting translation for these writers as a struggle for mastery 
with the source text, and as an ‘intimate discourse with him [the author] often challenging 
and critiquing the ideas presented so they become nuanced by her translation’,86 she 
nevertheless suggests the intensity of the engagement which has to take place to ensure what 
Eliot called fidelity to and interpretation of ‘another man’s mind’.87  
In contrast, I argue that the model of pupil – teacher struggle does not fully reflect the 
conceptualisation of the relationship by the women writers in my study. Eliot began to have 
reservations about Strauss’s work comparatively early on in the process of translating Leben 
Jesu, her views of the emotional limitations of Spinoza’s system are explored in Daniel 
Deronda, and her endorsement of Feuerbach’s ideas was combined with a critique of his 
expression of them, particularly in his Preface and Appendices, and a scepticism about the 
role of sympathy. Ward’s psychological analysis of Amiel in her introduction to his Journal 
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was just as complex and nuanced, but his personality provided her with a template for the 
exploration of the emotional experience of doubt, as well as of its intellectual sources.  
Other recent theorists have portrayed translation both as a dialogic activity and an 
inherently creative act. Louis Kelly, for example, suggests that translation is in itself ‘a form 
of literary creation’, the offspring of a dialogue between author and translator.88 There is a 
struggle to find wording which will describe, without denigration, an activity which theorists 
are reluctant to conceptualise as subordinate or derivative but which, equally reluctantly, they 
are unable to claim is as analytical, synthesising or creative as the original work. Lawrence 
Venuti focuses on alternative issues arising from a translation, those of the ‘domestication’ of 
a text, so that it is ‘no longer inscrutably foreign but made comprehensible in a distinctively 
domestic style.’89 He argues that good translation should aim to: 
 
[...] limit this ethnocentric negation: it stages “an opening, a dialogue, a cross-
breeding, a decentering” and thereby forces the domestic language and culture to 
register the foreignness of the foreign text.
90
 
 
 
For him, ethnocentricity, ‘no matter how seemingly faithful, no matter how linguistically 
correct’91 a translation seems to be, makes fidelity problematic. Victorian assumptions about 
the fidelity required for translation and the cultural uniqueness of a source language oeuvre, 
which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 1, continue to be debated and redefined by 
modern and postmodern translation theory, which, in attributing increasing ‘strategic choice’ 
to the translator’s  reconciliation of the potential discontinuities between precise wording and 
cultural significance, could emphasise, in Scholl’s words, ‘the very real power the translator 
possesses to subvert the original author’s message’.92 Postmodern critics interrogate the 
claims to uniqueness or to origination by considering the value of all works as constructions 
not only of their contemporary culture at the time of origination but also of the trans-temporal 
culture influencing the minds, imaginations and available frames of reference of later readers. 
This rebalancing of the relationship between original text and translation in the more general 
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rebalancing of textual authority and creative interpretation is exemplified in Susan Bassnett’s 
summary of the arguments: 
 
[....] Barthes sees the place of the literary work as that of making the reader not so 
much a consumer as a producer of the text, while Julia Kristeva sees the reader as 
realizing the expansion of the work’s process of semiosis. The reader, then, translates 
or decodes the text according to a different set of systems and the idea of the one 
‘correct’ reading is dissolved. At the same time, Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality, 
that sees all texts linked to all other texts because no text can ever be completely free 
of those texts that precede and surround it, is also profoundly significant for the 
student of translation. As Paz suggests [....] all texts are translations of translations of 
translations and the lines cannot be drawn to separate Reader from Translator.
93
 
  
The assumptions here are radically different from Eliot’s and from other Victorian 
translators.  The perceived power relationship or ‘mastery’ of a language system resulting 
from ‘subversion’, ‘decoding’, ‘expansion’ or ‘production’ seems alien to Eliot’s ‘rigid 
fidelity [....] in interpreting another man’s mind’.94  In ethical terms, it seems to replace an 
obligation to understand others with a theoretical solipsism. The ‘rigid fidelity’ in itself was 
however nuanced by considerations dealt with more fully in Chapter 1, those of sensitivity to 
intention, style, and impact.  
 
European Philosophy and its English Reception 
 
 
In The German Idea, Rosemary Ashton charts the start of the British engagement with 
German philosophy in the nineteenth century, arguing that:  
 
[....], it was Germany, with its pioneering methods in philosophy, history and 
aesthetics, which contributed most to English thinking in the later nineteenth 
century.
95
 
 
Ashton identifies Coleridge, Carlyle, Eliot and G H Lewes as the most influential thinkers 
who ‘knew that in philosophy, aesthetics, and the higher criticism of the Bible, Germany had 
produced more original and important writers than any other country’, and introduced those 
writers to the British public. In an 1865 essay, Eliot wrote: 
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Accordingly no one in this day really studies any subject without having recourse to 
German books, [....]; and the footnotes of every good French or English book that 
appears, whether in scholarship, history, or natural science, are filled with references 
to German authors.
96
 
 
 
 Ashton assigns to Coleridge’s influence the initial diffusion of German metaphysical and 
romantic ideas – and the first tentative engagement with the ideas of Spinoza - , and to 
Carlyle’s influence the increasing significance of Goethe as both philosopher and novelist 
within English speaking cultures. Discussion of Kant’s ideas was initiated by Coleridge and 
De Quincey in the 1820s,
97
 with English translations of The Critique of Pure Reason 
appearing from 1838 onwards.
98
 (Eliot reviewed J M D Meiklejohn’s version in her essay on 
‘Translations and Translators’ in 1855.) Among Eliot’s acquaintance, John Sibree had 
translated Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History in 1849,99 Lewes had written an 
article about Hegel’s Aesthetik in 1841/2, but Ashton ascribes the major introduction of 
Hegelian thinking into Britain from the 1850s onwards to English Hegelians such as Jowett 
and T H Green.
100
 Translation of the works of German Higher Criticism (Strauss and 
Feuerbach) was initiated by Eliot, and although unpublished, her translation of Spinoza’s 
Ethics was the earliest to be completed.
101
  
The audience for European philosophy and historicist criticism and its demand for 
translations is associated by Knoepflmacher with Unitarian and Deist thought. He argues that 
Charles Hennell’s Inquiry concerning the Origins of Christianity reflected the views of ‘a 
small Unitarian minority still leaning toward the deism of the eighteenth century’,102 and such 
groups were in touch with radical European biblical scholars. In 1841, Eliot entered such a 
scholarly Unitarian circle with her move to Coventry and her friendship with the Bray and 
Hennell families.  The Brays and the Hennells had invited her to work on the translation of 
Strauss, and continued, principally through Sara Hennell, to provide her with support during 
her work on Feuerbach, a translation initially commissioned by John Chapman, editor of the 
Westminster Review. But outside such like-minded circles, Eliot’s 1846 translation of 
Strauss’s Life of Jesus and her 1854 translation of Feuerbach’s analysis of the psychological 
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function of religion, The Essence of Christianity, proved controversial. Despite the work of 
writers such as Coleridge and Carlyle in transmitting German ideas, Hilary Fraser argues that 
it was Eliot’s translation of Strauss, perhaps because of its iconoclasm, which initiated a 
much wider knowledge of German philosophy and biblical historical criticism within 
England. She concludes, in line with contemporary accepted critical orthodoxy, that it had ‘a 
devastating effect on Victorian faith’.103 Lord Shaftesbury, the philanthropist, demonstrated 
what was probably the typical reaction of the religiously conservative, when he called Eliot’s 
translation of Strauss "the most pestilential book ever vomited out of the jaws of hell."
104
 
Charles Kingsley called her the ‘the infidel esprit fort’105 [strong spirit]. Her reputation as 
translator of such texts, combined with her decision to become Lewes’ partner outside 
marriage, may have been among the pragmatic reasons for Marian Evans’ transformation into 
the new persona of ‘George Eliot’ when she commenced her career as a novelist.  
Eliot’s interest in Spinoza was equally radical. Conventional seventeenth and 
eighteenth century views of Spinoza had seen him as a dangerous heretic, a view 
disseminated through Bayle’s influential Dictionary (1697), which had characterised Spinoza 
as a ‘perverse atheist’, and criticised his doctrines of substance and determinism.106 The 
limited recognition and dissemination of Spinoza’s ideas in England during the century which 
followed the appearance of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) and the Ethics (1677) 
stemmed mainly from his role as a natural philosopher and scientist, known to his immediate 
English contemporaries in the Royal Society.
107
 Apart from Deist and subsequently Unitarian 
groups of thinkers, Valerie Dodd identifies Coleridge, through the Biographia Literaria of 
1817, and Hallam, through An Introduction to the Literature of Europe of 1837-39,
108
 as 
important gateways to Spinoza’s ideas. Lewes had heard lectures on Spinoza’s ideas in 1836, 
which had prompted him to begin his own uncompleted translation of the Ethics. His 
awareness that Spinoza’s ideas were ‘at this time hardly known in England’109 led to an essay 
for the Westminster Review in 1843. This argued that Spinoza had anticipated German Higher 
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Criticism in the Tractatus, with its emphasis on treating the Bible as a historical document, 
the product of a particular time and culture. The essay evaluated the romantic, predominantly 
German, enthusiasm for Spinoza’s ideas, challenging earlier interpretations of Spinoza’s 
ideas as reductively atheistic. His championship of Spinoza lasted throughout his life, with a 
second essay appearing in the Fortnightly Review in 1866.
110
 
The importance of German thought is also emphasised by Ward. In her introduction to 
Amiel’s Journal (1884), she quotes the views of a French critic, Darmstetter: 
 
To study philology, mythology, history, without reading German [....] is to condemn 
one's self to remain in every department twenty years behind the progress of 
science.
111
 
 
 
The cross-fertilization of French and German ideas is echoed by another French critic, 
Quinet, quoted by Ward. He perceived the pre-eminence of German culture, ideas and writing 
to French intellectuals, a pre-eminence which, in echoes of the roles of classical texts in 
developing style, led to French ‘imitation’ as well as translation: 
 
German systems, German hypotheses, beliefs, and poetry, all were eagerly welcomed 
[....]. Under the Restoration, France continued to study German philosophy and poetry 
with profound veneration and submission. We imitated, translated, compiled, and then 
again we compiled, translated, imitated. 
112
 
 
 
The Swiss philosopher, Frédéric Amiel, whose Journal Intime (1883) she translated, 
had studied in Germany, and Ward attributes aspects of his more ‘technical philosophical 
language’ in his Journal to his German training. 113 His book embraces critiques of a wide 
range of late eighteenth century and contemporary European writers, Rousseau, 
Châteaubriand, Joubert, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer amongst others, and therefore 
provides an assessment of Europe’s philosophic and literary culture, as well as providing a 
confessional self-portrait of a man painfully divesting himself of traditional forms of religious 
faith. Her translation of Amiel was, she claimed, initially prompted by Mark Pattison,
114
 
Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford, and a close friend of the Wards, and Ward clearly saw 
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herself, her writings and translations in alliance with Lincoln and Balliol Colleges’ Liberal 
religious sympathies
115
, as well as deriving from the Arnold family tradition of liberal 
thought, in particular anti-traditionalist religious essays such as Literature and Dogma (1873) 
and God and the Bible (1875) by her uncle, Matthew Arnold.  
 
The Status of Women Translators  
In a letter to Sara Hennell, Eliot described another friend as ‘so judicially blinded as 
to think translation and nothing but translation would be an easier life than that of a 
governess’,116 and in a following letter exclaimed that ‘there are not even the devil’s wages 
for a translator – profit and fame’.117 The letters were written towards the end of her work on 
translating Strauss, during which she had also felt ‘inclined to vow’ that she would never 
translate again.
118
 Yet she did. The rewards which she perceived in translation were therefore 
such as to offset the unremitting work and the lack of financial gain. 
Whether consciously or subconsciously aware of the difficulties of an entry into 
literary life by means of fiction, or just initially uncertain of their own ability to create and 
shape stories, both Eliot and Ward commenced their careers as intellectual writers through 
translation as well as through journalism, possibly because, as Scholl suggests, the Victorian 
journalistic convention of anonymity allowed women to enter on journalistic and then literary 
careers ‘on relatively equal professional terms with the men of letters’,119 and, as Judith 
Johnston emphasises, the role of print technology expanded the general opportunities for 
employment in journalism and publishing.
120
 Scholl
121
 and Ermarth
122
 emphasise the more 
general point that educated middle class women who gained the ability to  read and translate 
other modern European languages had access to the ideas and cultural norms expressed in 
that language. Such access inevitably led to evaluation, critique and counter-critique of each 
culture’s ideas. 
For both women, translation proved to be an intense and protracted experience, 
mediated as it was by friends and advisers such as Sara Hennell and Lewes in Eliot’s case, 
                                            
115
 MW Rec, Ch.VII, p.126. 
116
 GEL.I, (April?1846), p.212. 
117
 GEL.I, (April?1846), p.215. 
118
 GEL.I, to Sara Hennell, April 1844, p.176. 
119
 Scholl, p.1 
120
 Johnston, p.6. 
121
 Scholl, p.1. 
122
 Ermarth, p.160. 
23 
 
and by Edmund Scherer, Amiel’s French editor, in Ward’s case. Eliot’s translation of Strauss 
took two and half years, and her translation of Feuerbach took at least five months.
123
 Her 
first mention of translating Spinoza was in December 1849, and her translation of the Ethics 
was completed between November 1854 and February 1856. Ward’s translation of Amiel 
began in September 1883 and took her until April 1885 to complete.
124
    
Through their translations, Eliot and Ward could use the force of more commonly 
recognised male intellectual authority to augment their audience’s receptivity to ideas in 
which they themselves believed passionately.  The choice of original texts in German and 
French reflects their own judgement, as well as that of their friends and mentors, of the 
significance of those texts to crucial contemporary debates. The points of view were ones to 
which they had already committed themselves intellectually, in Ward’s case through a 
published response to the attack on ‘unbelief’ in John Wordsworth’s 1881 Bampton 
Sermon.
125
 Eliot’s remark that ‘with the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree’ sounds   
measured when compared with Ward’s recollection that, on her first reading of it, Amiel’s 
Journal Intime ‘laid its spell upon [her] at once’.126 These dynamics – often gendered in 
unusual and interesting ways - between translator and translated, and the way that both Eliot 
and Ward conceptualize this ‘fidelity’ is a particular point of focus.  
What they were seeking, through translation and wider dissemination of their chosen 
works of scholarly male authority was support from the European mainstream and a 
broadening of the base of the argument. Scholl describes the contribution of Eliot and the 
other writers in her study as follows:  
By translating foreign perspectives on issues [....], they significantly widened the 
debates and became, to an extent, the English spokesperson for these ideas. 
127
 
The type of recognition identified by Scholl is exemplified by the fact that Eliot’s translation 
of Feuerbach was prefaced as being by ‘Marian Evans, Translator of Strauss’s Life of Jesus.’ 
(She had remained the anonymous translator of Strauss on first publication.) Eliot’s role as de 
facto editor of, and contributor to, the Westminster Review, and Ward’s journalism for The 
Times and Macmillan’s Magazine could also ensure that the radical ideas with which they 
were associated and their own translations were the subjects of public debate. Margaret 
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Homans’ argument that Eliot’s translations were a suppression of her self-expression seem to 
ignore both  Eliot’s irony and her commitment to securing increased exposure of European 
ideas, but the interplay of authority and ownership of ideas between a translator and the 
translated text is summed up by her in relation to Eliot’s writing: 
[....] the independence of her own words from Strauss’s acquires, paradoxically, the 
sanction of the weight of Strauss’s argument.128 
 
 
That Ward and Eliot were fortunate in choosing routes which brought them recognition as 
creative writers is confirmed by one of Bassnett’s reflections on the ambiguous status of 
translation among the general public: 
 
Who now remembers that George Eliot was a distinguished German translator and 
translated a number of important philosophical works, including Spinoza’s Ethics? 129 
 
Through their experience of a foreign culture and intense immersion in its literature, 
Scholl argues that writers such as Eliot became ‘[....] double agents, working both for and 
against the home culture and the foreign, speaking to both but belonging to neither.’130  
Instead of conflict, Elizabeth Ermarth emphasises the enhanced perspective of access to more 
than one language and culture: 
 
To learn a second language is to discover a second system for formulating everything. 
The gain in perspective is powerful.
131
 
 
I argue, however, that the experience of translating, and of knowledge of other European 
cultures, gave both Eliot and Ward the confidence to express alternative ways of thinking, 
which then led them to retranslate the otherness of European ideas back into the medium of 
English society, to see how new ways of belief in relationship might work, and what sort of 
community might result from them.  
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Choosing Fiction 
 
 
There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown 
to be questionable, [….]. Our religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the 
supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it.
132
 
 
 
Arnold’s celebrated suggestion that the collapse of dogmatic Christianity meant that it must 
be to poetry that people turn for interpretation and consolation forms a significant 
counterpoint to the writings of both Ward and Eliot, and in this study I refer frequently to his 
parallel quest to find a new way of responding to the needs for interpretation and consolation. 
But after the active engagement of translation, and its expansion of understanding, both Eliot 
and Ward turned to the novel to interpret and actively create practical, possible alternatives to 
those endangered assumptions which seemed to have underpinned personal choice and 
society’s interrelationships. Their novels used the realist mode to explore the alternative 
scenarios and perceptions of what would happen as new understandings superseded the old. 
Hina Nazar has analysed Eliot’s move from translation to fiction as follows: 
 
Eliot’s discomfort with Strauss’s method indicates why she turned to fiction to further 
the critique of religion begun by the Left Hegelians: fiction tempers criticism with 
sympathy. It helps us understand how things came to be in addition to what is wrong 
with them.
133
 
 
 
Valerie Dodd argues that the transition from translation of philosophy to the creation of 
novels acknowledges a dialogue; and that Eliot’s oeuvre developed out of earlier dialogues 
between philosophy and art:  
 
In turning from philosophy to the novel, which implicitly celebrated life’s resistance 
to theory, Marian Evans tacitly acknowledged this dialogue between speculation and 
fiction.
134
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Eliot’s experimentation with and then embrace of fiction to consider and embody ideas, to 
transform them from theory into empirical reflection on the living of life - human experience 
- produces a depth and resonance of fiction which is particularly her own. Davis argues that 
Victorian realist writers had a ‘wider moral aim of committing imagination first to realizing, 
and then to rescuing, the inherent value of human life upon earth’,135 and that Eliot makes her 
novels a final place of meaning for the small significances of human lives and choices: 
 
[....] a moral holding ground for meanings that all too often, in a world without the 
traditional God, would otherwise be unjustly underused or unappreciated, denied, and 
lost.
136
 
 
 
Georg Lukács’s analysis of the novel form’s ironic expression of the struggle between 
idea and reality, and the ‘profound hopelessness of the struggle but also to the still more 
profound hopelessness of its abandonment’,137 also identifies the novel’s ironic purpose as 
seeing ‘where God is to be found in a world abandoned by God; [....].’138 His analysis, 
focusing on the struggle to find meaning and strategies to deal with the reluctance of meaning 
to be identified, provides a model for my examination of the fiction of Eliot and Ward.  
Fiction was fraught with issues for a woman writer, as Eliot famously discussed in her 
essay ‘Silly Novels by Lady Novelists’.139 In describing her tentative transition from critic, 
translator and journalist into novelist, Eliot deferred to Lewes’ estimate of her potential 
success: 
 
His prevalent impression was that though I could hardly write a poor novel, my effort 
would want the highest quality of fiction – dramatic presentation. He used to say, 
“You have wit, description and philosophy – those go a good way towards the 
production of a novel.”140 
 
 
Eliot appears to have concurred with Lewes’s analysis of the fundamental building blocks for 
a work of fiction, and the idea that philosophy, and Eliot’s own abilities as a philosopher and 
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presenter of ideas, were one of the vital components. To examine ideas through the drama of 
human interaction was also Ward’s purpose as the writer of fiction. Her Recollections cite the 
moment she decided that the impact of new ideas about religion and the ways in which they 
could affect people’s lives could best be explored through use of the novel form: 
 
How could one show England what was really going on in her midst? Surely the only 
way was through imagination; through a picture of actual life and conduct; through 
something as ‘simple sensuous and passionate’ as one could make it.141 
 
 
The complex adjustments of idea which the Victorian realist novel could express 
through its cast of interacting characters became, in Eliot’s and Ward’s hands, the vehicles 
for exploring how individuals and communities should or could relate in a post-orthodox 
Christian world. Its capacity to explore the interplay of ideas through characters’ generation 
and decoding of each other’s languages has been identified by critics such as Bakhtin.142 At a 
tangent to this view of language and meaning as social and cultural transactions, Amiel 
described the psychological and emotional constraints resulting from the mismatch between 
language and experience: 
 
In all the chief matters of life we are alone, and our true history is scarcely ever 
deciphered by others. The chief part of the drama is a monologue, or rather an 
intimate debate between God, our conscience and ourselves. Tears, griefs, 
depressions, disappointments, irritations, good and evil thoughts, decisions, 
uncertainties, deliberations, - all these belong to our secret, and are almost all 
incommunicable and intransmissible, even when we try to speak of them, and even 
when we write them down. What is most precious in us never shows itself, never 
finds an issue even in the closest intimacy. Only a part of it reaches our 
consciousness, it scarcely enters into action except in prayer, and is perhaps only 
perceived by God, for our past rapidly becomes strange to us.
143
 
 
 
Amiel’s insistence on the limited capacity of our individual language to translate ourselves to 
ourselves both at a conscious and subconscious level, or to others at a conscious level, and on 
the solitary significance of our internal monologue in suggesting our deepest and most 
insistent thoughts illuminates the difficulties of dramatising, through the medium of 
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language, the intellectual and spiritual crises which were the subjects of both of the women 
novelists of my study. Their use of realism’s free indirect speech, the method of making a 
character’s conscious and sub-conscious internal monologue or dialogue apparent, turning 
characters ‘inside out’,144 is a mirror image of Feuerbach’s outside-in insistence on 
translating religion’s objectifications and projections back into the human psyche. Moreover, 
their novels also describe the inadequacy of language to translate complex emotion and truths 
which lie beyond the expression of language, and their inevitable replacement by signs and 
symbols. The heteroglossia of contesting translations of reality, and the impossibility of 
translation except through the slipperiness of non-verbal signification are both incorporated 
into Eliot’s and Ward’s novels, even as they attempt to translate into novelistic practice the 
implications of their European philosophers’ ideas. 
 
Summary 
The scrupulous search for and release of meaning from their translations reverberates 
through the ideas and language used by the narrators and the characters of both Eliot’s and 
Ward’s novels, not just in the immediate aftermath of translation, but as I will show, even in 
novels written fifteen to twenty years later. Eliot’s novels, as I will demonstrate, used ideas 
derived from her translations in order to explore the difficulties of learning to translate each 
other’s individual languages, of finding the sacred in human relationships, and of 
understanding the human place in the world. Ward’s novels use her experiences and materials 
as a translator to probe the experience of doubt, the scope of individual conscience, and the 
gaps or gulfs which lie between the languages of individuals, and even between emotion and 
its recognition and understanding.  
In the first chapter, I contextualize Ward’s and Eliot’s theories of translation in 
relation to ideas about translation in Victorian culture in general. The chapter traces, through 
letters and autobiography, the emotional pendulum of the task of translation, often from 
initial enthusiasm to more sober assessment and introspection. This chapter aims to provide a 
counterpoint to Scholl’s influential conceptualisation of the dynamics of the translation 
process, and instead examines the Victorian translator/translated relationship through the 
critical lens of a search for fidelity, rather than ‘mastery’.  
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In Chapter 2, I move to examine specific instances of translating practice. This 
chapter considers Eliot’s translation of Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity. While critical 
attention has mostly focused on the impact of Feuerbach’s ideas on Eliot’s own and on those 
explored in her novels, particularly the concept of the construction of self through dialogic 
interaction, I also explore Feuerbach’s own use of translation as a metaphor for his project, 
and the influence of this conceptualization on Eliot’s narration.  In Chapter 3, I consider 
Eliot’s translation of Spinoza’s Ethics, which has received far less critical attention than her 
other translations. I argue here that Spinoza’s ideas are more fully integrated into Eliot’s 
fiction than has traditionally been thought.  In Chapter 4, I move to Ward, and consider her 
translation of Amiel’s Journal Intime in relation to her most famous novel, Robert Elsmere. I 
trace both how Amiel’s sense of the multiplicity of his identities and his analyses of other 
philosophers form major contributory strands in Ward’s delineation of the emotional 
experience and consequences of losing faith. In Chapter 5, I consider not only the influence 
of Amiel on later novels dealing with themes of faith and doubt, particularly Helbeck of 
Bannisdale and Eleanor, but also how those novels address translation as a metaphor for 
finding understanding in the clash between differing languages of faith and culture. Ward’s 
role as translator and mediator between her father’s Catholicism and the Arnold family’s 
liberal convictions is examined with reference to hitherto unpublished letters sent to her 
father during the final editing of Helbeck of Bannisdale. In relation to Eleanor, Amiel’s 
continuing influence on plot, character and language is explored alongside the interwoven 
influence of another translation project, Joubert’s Pensées, for which Ward collaborated with 
Katharine Lyttelton, and wrote the introduction. The importance of her continuing attempt to 
translate Catholicism’s symbolic rituals into a faith for modernity is considered with 
reference to her novel Eleanor. 
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Chapter 1  
Interpreting Another Man’s Mind 
  
I do not think it was kind to Strauss (I knew he was handsome) to tell him that a 
young lady was translating his book. I am sure he must have some twinges of alarm to 
think he was dependent on that most contemptible specimen of the human being for 
his English reputation.  
George Eliot to Cara Bray, June 1844
1
 
 
 
The playful, self-protective ironies of Eliot’s response to her friend, Caroline (Cara) 
Bray, written about six months after she had started work on translating David Strauss’s  
Leben Jesu, suggest how keenly these two women must have perceived the radical nature of 
their ambitions for Eliot’s translation. Eliot’s ironic reduction of the relationship between 
eminent theological scholar and intellectually ambitious young translator to something which 
fuses popular romantic imagination with popular misogynistic prejudice (‘I do not think it 
was kind to Strauss (I knew he was handsome) to tell him that a young lady was translating 
his book’) disguised her own much more complex relationship with the original text and her 
own task. Her initial enthusiasm for work which could make a significant contribution to 
religious and philosophic debate became diluted by growing reservations; about its potential 
impact on a wider public (‘Glad I am that someone can enjoy Strauss! The million certainly 
will not, and I have ceased to sit down with him with any relish’2), about Strauss’s approach 
(‘leathery Strauss’3), and, perhaps more disconcertingly, about aspects of the application of 
his theory to specific instances: 
 
[....] in many cases I think him wrong, as every man must be in working out into detail 
an idea which has general truth, but is only one element in a perfect theory, not a 
perfect theory in itself.
 4
 
 
 
In the letter to Cara of June 1844, which both mocks and recognises the intensity of 
the translator’s relationship with her source and also mocks but resents the widespread 
assumptions about women’s abilities, Eliot’s representation of a relationship between male 
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and female intellectuals implicitly suggests an expectation that an intellectually or 
stylistically demanding work should find a worthy translator. This chapter will look at what 
theories the two translator novelists that are the subject of this thesis held about their work, 
and what their experience of the process of translation proved to be. In an 1855 essay on 
Translations and Translators for The Leader Magazine, Eliot in particular was forthcoming 
in her condemnation of:  
 
[....] all young ladies and some middle-aged gentlemen who consider a very imperfect 
acquaintance with their own language, and an anticipatory acquaintance with the 
foreign language, quite a sufficient equipment for the office of translator.
5
  
 
 
By the time she wrote the article, she had completed translations of Strauss’s Leben 
Jesu and of Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums, and was in the act of translating 
Spinoza’s Ethics. Modern theorists, as already discussed, have debated the relationship 
between a translator and his or her translated text, dissecting the powers of hermeneutic 
analysis, emotional identification and linguistic creativity involved. Scholl in particular has 
emphasised the translator’s power to ‘challenge’ and ‘critique’ the source author: 
 
As mediators between cultures, and between authors and a distanced readership, 
translators manipulate and direct their readers through their dialogue with the original 
text [....] often challenging and critiquing the ideas presented.
6
 
 
 
Scholl’s is an extreme statement of the power of the translator to determine how far a target 
audience should be exposed to a faithful translation. None of Eliot’s decisions provide 
evidence of ‘challenge and critique’, although they do show a sensitivity to the cultural 
expectations of an English readership. She considered adopting a more editorial role by 
omitting some sections of Feuerbach’s appendices as too abstract for an English audience, but 
ultimately retained them.
7
 Susan Hill demonstrates that Eliot omitted a specific sentence 
about adultery (‘Even a glance toward another is already adultery’8) from her translation of 
Feuerbach, hypothesising that the omission might have been editorial, and based on a 
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judgement that Feuerbach was here overstating a case, or that it reflected a personal caution 
about how it related to her own and Lewes’s predicament. (They left together for Belgium the 
month after the publication of The Essence of Christianity.) The reason for such a small act of 
omission in meeting the demands of absolute fidelity to the author remains hypothetical. In 
relation to Strauss, he had endorsed her translation of Leben Jesu as ‘et accurata et perspicua’ 
in his Preface.
9
  The only issues which Ward raised in connection with Amiel related to 
possible obscurities -  the ‘technical philosophic language’, influenced by German 
philosophic terms
10
 - of some of Amiel’s Journal, and she chose to render such passages in a 
more literary than a scientific, philosophic language. She justified her decision as reflecting 
what Amiel had himself done in those passages which had been published in his lifetime.
11
  
None of these temperings of absolute fidelity amount to challenging the original author, 
although they may seem to attach considerable significance to the translator’s judgements of 
the target readership.  
Where the roles of translator and editor become fused ‘manipulation’ and ‘direction’ 
become more overt. Eliot considered that such a role of double translation – of language and 
of meaning - might be necessary to make Spinoza’s Ethics more accessible to an English-
speaking audience: 
 
After one has rendered his Latin faithfully into English, one feels that there is another 
yet more difficult process of translation for the reader to effect, and that the only 
mode of making Spinoza accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut 
them, and give an analysis.
12
 
 
 
Such an approach alters the relationship between translator and translated, where the 
translator-editor has the power to exclude and interpret. Harriet Martineau’s condensation of 
Auguste Comte’s Philosophe Positive provides an extreme example of a transference of 
power between originator and translator. Martineau reduced Comte’s six volume work to 
about one quarter of its original length, publishing it in 1853 as The Positive Philosophy of 
Auguste Comte (freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau). Comte had accepted 
the advantages of Martineau’s shorter, more accessible version over his own before its 
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publication, and recommended it to his students as the best introduction to his ideas. Frederic 
Harrison, the editor of the 1895 edition of Martineau’s translation, observed that: 
 
It is a singular fact in literary history and a striking testimony to the merit of Miss 
Martineau that a work of a French philosopher should be studied in France in a 
French retranslation from his English translator - and that at his own formal desire.
13
 
 
The process of condensation clearly placed Martineau in a more powerful relationship with 
the emerging text than would have been possible with a more rigidly faithful translation. Her 
Preface made it clear that, as well as condensing his ideas, she had omitted sections in the 
‘Book on Physics’ which failed to reflect scientific advances and had removed 
‘recapitulations’ and ‘redundancies’ in Comte’s writing arising out of its evolution from 
lectures.
14
 In business terms, the power of patronage was hers, as she offered Comte a 
proportion of the proceeds of the sales of the translation.  
Martineau’s bold editing of Comte to ensure the Cours was accessible and up-to-date 
scientifically is an extreme example of a confident mid-Victorian departure from faithfulness. 
Another departure, Robert Willis’s translation of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 
was criticised both as a poor translation and as unfaithful to the source author. Matthew 
Arnold’s review condemned Willis for:  
 
[....] putting himself a great deal too forward by notes and observations, and of even 
sacrificing his author’s opinions to his own.  [....] his English editor has thought fit, 
[....], to “condense and somewhat modify” – ie., totally to alter, -  because they do not 
agree with his own notions [....]. What Spinoza’s reader wants to know is what 
Spinoza thought of the English revolution, not what his editor thinks.
15
 
 
 
Most others, including Eliot and Ward, devoted themselves to the difficult problem of 
achieving and defining a ‘faithful adherence’, rather than a subversion of the original text.  
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Eliot’s Theorisation of Translation 
 
Eliot’s 1855 essay on Translations and Translators was written after publication of 
her translations of Strauss and Feuerbach, and during her translation of Spinoza’s Ethics. In 
it, she distinguishes between different types of translation and their importance: 
 
[....] very modest qualifications will suffice to [....] translate a book of ordinary 
travels, or a slight novel, while a work of reasoning or science can be adequately 
rendered only by means of what is at present exceptional faculty and exceptional 
knowledge.
16
 
 
 
Excluding the ‘modest’ and ‘slight’ books, utilitarian or trivial, dismissed by Eliot, there 
remains an ambivalent area, where relative values are debated and revised, separating the 
intrinsic nature of a source text, its originality of ideas and expression, its particular wealth of 
cultural cross- reference or poetic voice, from the intellectual analysis and stylistic 
sophistication which enable the source’s particular thoughts and particular stylistic expression 
to be reproduced convincingly within the cultural assumptions and traditions of another 
language. Addressing these problems and trying to illuminate the relationship of mutual 
interdependence between translator and translated, Eliot herself turned to the language of 
metaphor, drawing on a range of analogous activities and relationships.   
The imagery of mastery is among a number of metaphors used  in discussing the act 
of translation, but only in relation to eliciting the meaning of the text, and demonstrating 
expertise in reproducing that meaning. But her usage does not suggest Scholl’s concept of a 
contest for reassignment of authority: nor does initial subservience appear to be part of Eliot’s 
conceptualisation of the relationship between translator and translated. Her essay does not 
underestimate the challenges of translation both in rendering complex ideas and in conveying 
stylistic or poetic impact, nor the scale of the achievement if a translator was successful. She 
commends John Miller Dow Meiklejohn’s 1855 translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, which she sees as ‘the very hardest nut - [....] - for a translator to crack so as to lay 
open the entire uninjured kernel of meaning’,17 praising it in terms of ‘mastery’: ‘Mr 
Meiklejohn’s translation - [....] - indicates a real mastery of his author’.18 But the word 
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mastery here is used to indicate the authority and competence with which Meiklejohn 
approached a complex task rather than indicating any hierarchical ranking. The metaphor of a 
‘kernel of meaning’, concealed and protected by the external shell of language, suggests the 
potential for meaning and form, for both hermeneutic and linguistic elements to be evaluated 
independently of each other. In developing the metaphor, Eliot is able to suggest the potential 
for disaster which must be negotiated and the effort and care involved in the act of translation 
as revelation.  The subsequent metaphor of ‘mastery’ exposes the dynamic challenges of the 
task of translation, challenges which - Eliot suggests - increase with the complexities of the 
subject matter to be translated. The metaphor also invokes the latent power waiting to be 
released by any effective transference of the ideas of one culture into another’s, and the 
exchange of authority and empowerment to the translator where their work is successful.  
Her essay contains a number of other metaphors for translation in relation to poetry, 
all based in other art forms and all emphasising the qualities of skill and equivalence of 
impact, a requirement which Arnold was also to emphasise in his criticism of translations of 
poetry. A good translation, Eliot proposes, should be like ‘the same music played on another 
but as good an instrument’19 rather than a ‘feeble echo’, and its ‘faithful adherence to the 
original’ should be ‘just as it is to examine a fine engraving of a favourite picture’.20 The 
combination of the two metaphors suggests not only the way in which the same subject 
matter can be represented through different crafts, but also the translator’s need to analyse 
and define the essence of form and meaning (‘a fine engraving’), and to recreate the sensuous 
effect of the original (‘same music [....] on [....] as good an instrument’). The interplay 
between the different art forms suggests the intellectual skill and creativity which are 
essential to good translation. The similes used by Eliot also suggest the sacrifices or 
modifications which may have to be made to the sensuous impact of an art work in order to 
prioritise the transference of meaning from one language to another. An engraving prioritises 
line, but loses depth and colour. An alternative instrument prioritises musical line but 
inevitably alters its tone and expressiveness. 
Eliot’s essay closes with a suggested hierarchy of recognition, which prioritises 
originality and artistry: 
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Though a good translator is infinitely below the man who produces good original 
works, he is infinitely above the man who produces feeble original works. We had 
meant to say something of the moral qualities especially demanded in the translator – 
the patience, the rigid fidelity, and the sense of responsibility in interpreting another 
man’s mind. But we have gossiped on this subject long enough.21 
 
 
For her, originating thought and originating writing has greater intrinsic artistic or intellectual 
value than the complex cultural and intellectual operation involved in transferring that 
thought effectively into a different language, although both great writing and its translation 
are considered ‘infinitely above’ ‘feeble’ original work.  
Scholl argues in relation to ‘Translations and Translators’ that, because the essay’s 
hierarchy challenges any perceptions of the inferiority of good translation, it also implicitly 
challenges ‘the apparent inferiority of women’,22 and because Eliot’s essay advocates the 
superiority of German translation of English works to English translations of German works, 
she suggests that Eliot may be using this ‘as metaphorical of the nations’ attitudes towards 
women and the roles available to them’.23  In fact, the essay is highly critical of women’s 
translations.  ‘All young ladies’, and Miss Burt’s translation of Goethe’s Zueignung in 
particular, receive Eliot’s dismissive criticism of their efforts. German translations she notes 
are ‘more often undertaken by men of genius’,24 mentioning Schlegel’s and Tieck’s 
translations of Shakespeare, which she still faults for their occasional ‘gross inaccuracies’,25 
and weakening of the ‘concreteness’ of Shakespeare’s language. 26 What she does argue is 
that when even writers ‘of genius’, such as Schlegel and Tieck, make mistakes with 
connotation and denotation, it: 
 
[....] might well make less accomplished persons more backward in undertaking the 
translation of great poems, and by showing the difficulty of the translator’s task, 
might make it an object of ambition to real ability.
27
 
 
 
It is difficult to see how Scholl’s interpretation can be made to apply to this essay, 
which clearly argues that excellence in understanding, faithful adherence to the original, and 
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skill in creating poetical equivalents are the high goals and infrequent achievements of 
translation, and that this applies whether the translation is by a woman, a man or a German 
genius.  
The essay assumes an assertive and confident voice delivering what seem to be male 
discriminations and judgement, but the final sentence of the quoted extract (‘we have 
gossiped on this subject long enough’) is one of Eliot’s playful, unsettling intrusions into the 
thoughts of this apparently male voice by a mocking female voice. The word ‘gossip’ 
immediately subverts earlier pretensions to serious analysis of the translator’s role, and at the 
same time satirises the prejudices of readers who might be surprised to see translation theory 
from a woman writer. The multiple ambiguities of this voice of female irony have a 
subversive effect on the preceding analysis of the products of male (‘the man’s’) endeavour, 
which emphasised the primary importance of moral, rather than intellectual, qualities in a 
good translator. The language of ‘faithful adherence’ and of ‘patience’, ‘rigid fidelity’, and 
‘responsibility’ suggests religious virtues (patience, diligence and humility) and a 
correspondence in value and approach between interpreting ‘another man’s mind’ and 
rigorous, ‘rigid fidelity’. Not that Eliot expected that there could be definitive translations. 
The problems of fidelity in biblical translation inform Eliot’s attitudes to translation in the 
essay. At its beginning, she quotes, with some irony about the lessons to be inferred, the 
legend of the seventy translators of the Old Testament into Greek who, despite working 
separately, apparently all produced identical translations. However, the quasi-religious 
obligations to the relationship involved in translation suggest the significance with which 
Eliot later invested the humanist, Feuerbachian lessons about the importance of ‘interpreting 
another man’s mind’ for the characters in her novels. She may be ironic and self-aware in 
talking about the task of translation, but this is always balanced against her clear intention to 
attach to translation a sense of the significance and seriousness of approach, the ‘rigid 
fidelity’ and responsibility originally derived from biblical models which, even if she did not 
necessarily trust the stories or the outcome, stressed the transcendental importance of the 
task.   
In 1856, Eliot wrote again about the difficulties of transferring meaning from one 
language and culture to another in her essay, ‘The Natural History of German Life’. She 
argued that it was its idiosyncrasies and irrationalities which gave each language its richness, 
its allusiveness and complex resonances, and which also constituted the greatest difficulties 
for translation to capture and transfer from one culture to another: 
39 
 
[....] the great sections of the civilized world are only approximately intelligible to 
each other, and even that, only at the cost of long study; one word stands for many 
things, and many words for one thing; the subtle shades of meaning, and still subtler 
echoes of association, make language an instrument which scarcely anything short of 
genius can wield with definiteness and certainty. Suppose, [....] that the effort [....] to 
construct a universal language on a rational basis has at length succeeded, [....] which 
effects the purpose of communication as perfectly and rapidly as algebraic signs. 
Your language [....] will never express life, which is a great deal more than science. 
With the anomalies and inconveniences of historical language, you will have parted 
with its music and its passion, with its vital qualities as an expression of individual 
character, with its subtle capabilities of wit, with everything that gives it power over 
the imagination; [....].
28
 
 
Eliot’s sense of the complex transaction in meaning and value represented by 
translation, set out in these essays, was also explored in later letters to Charles Ritter, who 
had translated selections of her work into French. In 1872 she wrote of her sense that a 
translation could never convey the totality of suggested meaning and emotional significance 
adhering to any group of words, wherever they were used ‘with any closeness of intention’. 
 
One sees [....], that you must be keenly aware of the incommunicableness, even by the 
best translation, of the subtleties which cling to the native phrases of an author – at 
least when that author writes with any closeness of intention.
29
 
 
 
In 1875, she again wrote to Ritter:  
 
[....] the evident care with which the meaning is rendered has been not seldom repaid 
by a felicity. [....]. I understand your discontent with your own rendering. No one 
language is completely furnished with verbal and idiomatic equivalents for another, 
and it is easier to produce something better than the original than what is everywhere 
exactly equivalent to it.
30
  
 
 
Eliot’s puzzling comment that ‘it is easier to produce something better than the original’ may 
reflect courtesy, diffidence, or a distillation of her feelings about the difficulties of finding 
words in one language which transfer the ideas and associations of another. But the letters 
clearly suggest the subtle power interplay between author and translator. Eliot is always 
courteous, but her tentative circumlocutions of judgement (‘not seldom repaid by a felicity’) 
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also suggest that his translations had not tempted her to revise her 1855 essay’s judgement of 
relative values and that the work of translation was ‘infinitely below [....] good original 
work.’ 
 
Matthew Arnold’s Translation Theory 
In an 1861 essay on ‘Translating Homer’, Matthew Arnold,  writer, critic, translator 
and translation theorist considered themes of intellectual control and artistic creativity, and 
his conclusions are broadly similar to Eliot’s. He considered that the aims of translation were 
both faithfulness and ‘to reproduce [....] the effect’31 of the work being translated, thus 
suggesting participation in a parallel re-creative act to that of the original. It demands not 
only that a writer understands as fully as possible the variety of impacts of a complex work of 
art, but also that he or she has the ability to deliver those impacts. However, in relation to 
Homer, Arnold argued that the only adequate judges of a translation’s faithfulness to the 
effect of the original were scholars of classical Greek. He used the essay to criticise some 
translations of Homer, particularly Francis Newman’s 1856 translation of the Iliad, because it 
failed to transfer Homer’s essence, his original ‘rapidity of style’, directness of expression, 
and ‘nobility’ of thought.32 What evolved into the Arnold and Newman debate reveals just 
how complex and ambivalent the arguments for fidelity in translation could become – ‘in 
what faithfulness consists’,33 in Arnold’s words. Both combatants recognised that a 
translation should be faithful. The contrast between them over the politics of translation 
resolves itself into how far a sense of its foreign culture should be embodied in or should 
inform a translation. Newman chose a popular metre and an obscure vocabulary to express 
his priority to: 
 
retain every peculiarity of the original [....]. So also the English translator should 
desire the reader always to remember that his work is an imitation [....].
34
  
 
Arnold advocated hexameters and a simple vocabulary. Although neither suggested what 
Venuti terms the English ‘regime of fluent domestication’,35 Arnold’s essay has become a 
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focus for criticism of his views as elitist, because of his argument that the arbiters of a 
successful translation had to be relevantly skilled academics.
36
  
Arnold recognised, as Eliot did, an intrinsic superiority in any original creative act, 
while also arguing that a translator must provide an equivalent power of intellectual 
understanding and range of language with which to translate it. In contrast with Eliot’s 
essay’s metaphors of artistic and sensuous transformation, from painting to etching, from one 
musical instrument to another, Arnold’s essay uses a more startling image to convey the 
mystery and opacity of the transformation and coalescence which has to be made between 
one language and culture and another. He uses - perhaps mischievously - a quotation from 
Coleridge: 
 
Coleridge says, in his strange language, speaking of the union of the human soul with 
the divine essence, that this takes place 
 
Whene’er the mist, which stands ‘twixt God and thee, 
Defecates to a pure transparency; 
 
and so, too, it may be said of that union of the translator with his original, which alone 
can produce a good translation, that it takes place when the mist which stands 
between them – the mist of alien modes of thinking, speaking, and feeling on the 
translator’s part  – ‘defecates to a pure transparency’, and disappears. 37 
 
 
Arnold seems to anticipate some modern theorists in suggesting that the interchange between 
source author and translator must reflect ‘denotation’ and ‘connotation’, that it involves 
contextual knowledge and wider cultural awareness. He goes further than Grossman’s claim 
that translators must achieve ‘a kind of satisfying harmony’38 and demands a quasi-religious 
and mystical ‘union [....] with the original’. Equally his adaptation of Coleridge’s metaphor of 
a meeting in the ‘mist’ suggests the impossibility of rigidity about transference of literal 
meaning and prescriptiveness about method.  By implication, the analogy between the source 
text and the divine essence implies a clear hierarchy of value. 
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Shifting Values of Text and Translation 
 
Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere
39
 argue that a diametrically opposed intellectual 
trend in attitudes to translation was initiated during the Victorian era. Rather than subsuming 
a quasi-religious reverence into translation of the works of ‘another man’s mind’ during the 
nineteenth century, they argue that there was a gradual withdrawal of literal significance from 
interpretations of the Bible, and its replacement by a metaphorical or poetic significance, a 
transition in understanding for which, ironically, Eliot’s translation of Strauss and Arnold’s 
essays, influenced by writers such as Renan and Strauss, were catalysts. Similarly, Hilary 
Fraser argues that Eliot’s translation of Strauss and Arnold’s subsequent arguments in 
Literature and Dogma (1873) saw the substitution of ‘dynamic work of poetry and 
metaphorical description’ in place of an ‘unalterable sacred text’.40  
Certainly Eliot’s attitudes to the value of experience of reading a translation relative 
to that of reading an original text were ambiguous and shifting. Displaying a somewhat 
pessimistic attitude to the possibilities of translation capturing nuances of meaning, insight 
and cultural cross-reference, she is recorded as advising people that in order to be able to read 
the most important texts of another language, it was worthwhile to learn that language. 
William Hale White (Mark Rutherford) described her viewpoint when writing about her in 
1885: 
 
[....] she really was one of the most sceptical, unusual creatures I ever knew. [....] she 
told me that it was worthwhile to undertake all the labour of learning French if it 
resulted in nothing more than reading one book – Rousseau’s Confessions.41  
 
 
Judith Johnston draws attention to similar views expressed by Jane Sinnett, Eliot’s 
predecessor at The Wesminster Review. Sinnett argued that complex works by ‘distinguished 
writers’ needed to be read in their original language. She compared this process of 
acculturation to a ‘gradual approach to a distant country’, and contrasted it with reading a 
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translation where ‘we are, as it were, dropped by a balloon into the strange city, and walk 
about puzzled and bewildered as in a dream’.42   
Scholl’s identification of the arc a translator navigates from initial subservience to 
critique, challenge and final independence, and Bassnett and Lefevere’s arguments about the 
replacement of literal faithfulness by metaphorical or poetic significance has to be assessed 
against the nuances of the language of Victorian translators themselves. Recognising the 
supremacy of origination, as well as emphasising the skill and creative capacity any translator 
needs to transmit the meaning and impact of a work into their own language, they emphasise 
the significance of fidelity to the ideas and expression of another. Eliot’s attitude to 
translation and to the identification with a source text required for any effective translation 
can be deduced from the impact which her translations had on her novels, and the continued 
dialogue with the ideas of Feuerbach and Spinoza which the novels represent. It is in her 
novels that exploration, critique and challenge take place. The process of translation itself 
becomes one of the motifs of her final novel, Daniel Deronda, as translation moves towards 
transformation and transmutation. One of its images considers how the intensely felt and 
comprehended existence of other people, such as that experienced by a translator, 
‘transmutes’ each individual: 
 
“But was it beautiful for Bouddha to let the tiger eat him?” said Amy. [....]  
Deronda [....] defended the myth. “It is like a passionate word [....]. It is an extreme 
image of what is happening every day – the transmutation of self.”43 
 
 
If Mordecai’s hope is for faithful adherence to his original mission by a new life, what 
Deronda offers him is love, faithfulness, and reinterpretation of purpose, rather than its 
reproduction. Eliot’s image of the costs and inevitability of transmutation resulting from 
exposure to other people’s ideas and experience, but of transmutation of those ideas 
themselves, is echoed by the Brazilian translator Augusto de Campos writing about the 
process of translation: 
 
Translation for me is [....] to get into the pretender’s skin to re-pretend everything 
again, each pain, each sound, each colour. (Augusto de Campos, 1998: 186) 
44
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For Eliot and, as we shall see, Ward, translated texts may have contained ideas which 
were already sympathetic explorations of her own (‘with the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere 
agree’), but the intensity of the endeavour to translate, the detailed examination of 
‘denotation and connotation’ ensured that the texts they had translated with such fidelity were 
then transmuted for critique and challenge, as their fictional representations experimented 
with how their radical, potentially culturally disruptive ideas could become recognised as part 
of the range of human experience reflected in the ‘midst’ of the realist novel.   
 
Eliot’s Experience of Translation 
 
In later years, Eliot was to assure John Cross, her husband and biographer, of the 
‘debt she felt that she owed to the Miss Franklins for their excellent instruction [....].’45  The 
Miss Franklins ran the school she attended between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, and by 
the time she left their school she had learnt French as well as English, history, arithmetic, 
music and drawing. Her adolescent letters, such as those to Maria Lewis,
46
 already displayed 
a formidable range of reading, scholarship, and spiritual aspiration, but she was fortunate that 
her father’s generosity continued to provide her with a widening range of language skills. She 
had Italian lessons from 1839 onwards, German lessons from 1840 onwards, and taught 
herself Latin. Access to the library at Arbury Hall, the home of her father’s employer, 
allowed her to read Latin texts, as well as a wide range of European writings.
47
 Even so, her 
views on the frustrations and injustices of a girl’s education may also be deduced from her 
narrator’s descriptions and judgements of the triviality of the educations experienced by 
many of her female characters, notably Rosamond Vincy, and the longing for a better 
education and greater opportunities shown by Dorothea Brooke, Gwendolen Harleth, and 
Maggie Tulliver.   
Although Eliot appreciated the role of her educators, the scale of her struggle both to 
appreciate her own powers - and to have them appreciated fully by others - can be gauged by 
the recommendation of her former schoolmistress, Miss Franklin, to the families who, she 
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hoped, would welcome Marian Evans into cultivated, middle class society in Coventry. The 
following is an extract from Mrs John Cash’s account: 
 
Miss Franklin dwelt with much pride on Miss Evans’s mental power, [....]; but the 
great recommendation [....] was the zeal for others which [....] had led her to visit the 
poor most diligently [....].
48
 
 
 
Her transformation from promising but misunderstood student began with her move 
to Coventry, where her friendships with other educated women assumed an emotional depth 
and offered an intellectual stimulus which changed her life. Her letters track her transition 
from gifted pupil to intellectual authority, as she moved out of adolescence and abandoned 
her orthodox religious education for a world of more diverse and intellectually stimulating 
friendship. The families with whom she established close friendships were in a position to 
offer her ideas, interests, opportunities and acquaintanceships through which she eventually 
evolved her literary career. The Brays and Hennells, themselves related through marriage, 
offered intellectual challenge, combined with the capacity for passionate friendship. After her 
father’s death, Eliot wrote to them from Geneva that she had not ‘found any one who can 
bear comparison with you; not in kindness to me - ça va sans dire [that goes without saying] - 
but in solidity of mind and in expansion of feeling’.49  
The Brays and Hennells, both Unitarian families, were at the centre of Coventry’s 
intellectual life. Eliot’s early letters mention meeting Harriet Martineau (‘one of those great 
people whom one does not venerate the less for having seen’50), as well as visits by Robert 
Owen and Ralph Emerson.
51
 Cara Bray’s brother, Charles Hennell, was the author of An 
Inquiry regarding the Origin of Christianity, published in 1838, which had been translated 
into German with a preface by David Strauss, and Charles Bray was the author of The 
Philosophy of Necessity, published in 1841.  Eliot’s friendships with the Bray and Hennell 
families’ women not only meant that she confronted and responded to the religious 
radicalism and the scholarly, scientific, and philosophical interests of their published male 
authors, but also that she entered into a life of shared reading, translation and discussion of 
recent scientific, philosophical or literary texts, and attending lectures with Cara Bray or Sara 
Hennell. The following extract of a letter sent to Cara demonstrates her expectation that 
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friendship should be an educational experience, and also shows how confident Eliot was of 
her own and others’ ability to read and translate a variety of European languages (and to 
criticise other people’s translations). Her image of Manzoni’s meaning being encased in one 
form and transferred to an inferior (‘out of silver into pewter’) anticipates her other 
metaphors of translation’s literal transformation of form, meaning and value in her essay on 
Translations and Translators: 
 
I send you the first part of Wallenstein with the proposition that we should study that 
in conjunction with the Thirty years war [....]. [....] you shall have Joan of Arc [....] 
when you have got through Wallenstein, which will amply repay you for any trouble 
in translating it, and is not more difficult than your reading ought to be now. I have 
skimmed Manzoni, who has suffered sadly by being poured out of silver into pewter 
[....].
52
 
 
 
Despite the emotional and intellectual importance of these female friendships, and the 
practical support they provided during her translations of Strauss and Feuerbach, Eliot did not 
write about friendship of this sort in any of her novels. The tutelary, intellectually and 
spiritually expanding friendships are always, in her fiction, between men and women.  In 
their intensity and response to the character’s need for an exchange of ideas which may 
rescue them intellectually or morally, they become charged with the subversion of 
expectations, the difficulties and the drama of maintaining an emotionally crucial and 
intellectually rich friendship which defines itself as outside conventional expectations of 
relationship between the sexes. Her heroines appear, for the most part, isolated from other 
female characters with more conventional abilities and ambitions, and isolated, either by their 
abilities, moral awareness, or aspirations, from their society’s conventional expectations of 
them. Their bonds with other women arise out of episodes of heightened emotional need or 
resolution, such as Dorothea’s mission to help Rosamond save her marriage or Gwendolen’s 
seeking reassurance from Mirah about Deronda’s character. Ermarth suggests that this lacuna 
in Eliot’s portrayal of friendship was because she: 
 
Insist[s] on doing full narrative justice to the isolation of women and to the obstacles 
their training carefully provides against their forming strong female ties.
53
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It was through the Bray and Hennell web of friendship and acquaintance with 
European intellectuals that Eliot acquired her commission to translate Strauss’s Das Leben 
Jesu. Strauss himself had publicly welcomed Charles Hennell’s work, and the task of 
translating Leben Jesu was originally undertaken by Charles Hennell’s fiancée, ‘Rufa’ 
Brabant, but, after the Hennells’ marriage in 1844, it was suggested that Eliot be asked to 
undertake and complete the task. Sara Hennell acted as go-between and wrote that she was 
convinced that Eliot would ‘give the meaning faithfully and spiritedly’.54 In Charles 
Hennell’s memoir, he states that he found a ‘real pleasure from its [Eliot’s translation] 
showing [him] with what delicacy the meaning was being made to transfuse itself.’55 Both 
friends’ descriptions of Eliot’s approach to translation emphasise qualities such as her fidelity 
and creative intelligence (‘faithfully and spiritedly’) which have already been discussed in 
relation to Eliot’s own theories. That this combination of qualities was a relatively frequent 
term of praise can be deduced from the fact that Matthew Arnold also praised Ward’s 
translation of Amiel as ‘at once spirited and faithful’.56 Charles Hennell’s description of the 
‘delicacy’ with which meaning was ‘being made to transfuse itself’ suggests not only the 
complexity of the process of translation, but also the organic change of meaning from one 
state to another. 
Eliot’s letters contain no explicit rationale for her decision to undertake the 
translation. The project was, however, one which would establish her in the Bray/Hennell 
circle as more than the intellectually gifted friend, and would moreover cement the links of 
this circle with a world of like-minded intellectual endeavour in Europe. The work also 
offered her an opportunity, following her loss of faith in orthodox Christianity and the 
transfer of her enthusiasm to agnostic inquiry, to play her part in increasing the accessibility 
of scholarly re-evaluations of orthodoxy.  
Strauss’s style and method, with its relentless exposure and deconstruction of the 
historicity of the Gospel narrative and of supernatural interpretation, his critical scrutiny of 
rationalist explanations, and substitution of an understanding of the Gospels as myth, was to 
prove a sometimes dispiriting task. In his preface to the first edition of the book, Strauss (as 
translated by Eliot) had defined his objectives as follows: 
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The exegesis of the ancient church set out from the double presupposition: first, that 
the gospels contained a history, and secondly, that this history was a supernatural one. 
Rationalism rejected the latter of these presuppositions, but only to cling the more 
tenaciously to the former, maintaining that these books present [....] history. Science 
cannot rest satisfied with this half-measure: the other presupposition also must be 
relinquished, and the inquiry must first be made whether in fact, and to what extent, 
the ground on which we stand in the gospels is historical.
57
  
 
 
Eliot’s early enthusiasm for Strauss’s ideas and the translation project is clear from the letters 
between her and Sara Hennell. Sara’s letter to Rufa Hennell of January 1844 mentions that 
the proposal that Eliot should complete the translation was ‘very cordially received’.58 Both 
she and Mary Ann had looked through the early sections of translation, (those carried out by 
Rufa) and concluded that: ‘it is remarkably difficult, but we both think it very interesting’.59 
Eliot later wrote to Charles Hennell that: 
 
I am glad for the work’s sake, glad for your sake, [....], that matters have turned out so 
well.  
Pray think no more of my pens, ink and paper. I would gladly give much more 
towards the work than these and my English if I could do so consistently with duty.
60
 
 
 
Eliot’s commitment both to the work and to the Bray Hennell group of friends is clear from 
this extract. From her wording it appears that she was willing to bear costs and provide time 
demanded by the process of translation herself, ‘consistent’ with her ‘duty’, presumably not 
only to running her father’s household but also to avoiding any awkward confrontation with 
his religious views. According to Haight
61
, by the time the letter was written, John Chapman 
had agreed with Charles Hennell to fund half of any expenses and half of any profit from the 
completed translation. A few months later, in April 1844, Eliot was still assuring Sara that 
while she could work fast, she had no regrets about undertaking the work,
62
 and all the letters 
between her and Sara show how seriously they both took her responsibilities as translator, 
and how much she relied on Sara’s emotional as well as intellectual support.  
Sara was involved in checking the minutiae of both German and Greek translation, 
discussion of the more arcane aspects of the references, and the management of proofs. 
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Eliot’s letters between January 1844 and June 1846 discuss issues such as the inclusion and 
translation of Greek quotations,
63
 scholarly abbreviations, and detailed stylistic issues (such 
as the relative advantages of using ‘as if’ compared with ‘as though’).64 In other letters, Eliot 
discusses, apparently in response to Sara’s comments, the precise meanings of certain words 
or phrases and how they should be translated. Some of these generated requests for a Hebrew 
lexicon or help with the Hebrew quotations from Charles Hennell,
65
 and involved an 
understanding of the ritual and anthropological function of the Israelites’ scapegoat, the 
Passover meal, the sacramental meal instituted by Christ, and the operation of the Jewish 
calendar.
66
 Another letter considers how closely to keep to the original where problems such 
as repetition of a particular German word raise stylistic issues in English:  
 
It will not do to translate the words always the same though that might seem the 
proper plan at first. For sometimes the introduction of them is of real and obvious use 
and has some influence on the sense, and at another time they are a mere pleonasm or 
else could not be strictly represented in English without committing an arrant 
Germanism.
67
  
 
 
Eliot’s wish to avoid any ‘Germanism’ in her translation is clear from her use of the word 
‘arrant’ and the vehemence with which she attacks Strauss’s style as unnecessarily repetitious 
(‘mere pleonasm’).   
Eliot’s letters repeatedly thank Sara for her help and psychological support. A few 
instances stand out as representing what Sara offered Eliot not only in terms of scholarship 
but also in friendship: 
 
You do not guess how much pleasure it gives me to look over your pencillings – they 
prove so clearly that you have really entered into the meaning of every sentence, [....]. 
I am quite indebted to you for your care and I feel greatly the advantage of having a 
friend to undertake the office of critic.
68
  
 
 
Here Eliot seems to value Sara’s role as surrogate translator. Her phrase ‘you have really 
entered into the meaning’ reminds the reader of the absolute primacy for Eliot of the ‘fidelity’ 
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and ‘responsibility’ needed ‘in interpreting another man’s mind’,69 but it also suggests the 
importance of involvement and self–identification. Elsewhere in the letters, it is clear that 
Sara was raising minor grammatical issues, and also advising Eliot to keep to as close a 
translation as possible: 
 
You are quite right about the ausser den [‘except the’ or ‘out of the’] etc. Please to 
alter it and strike out the interpolations of the faithless Dr Pollian [Eliot’s 
nickname].
70
 
 
 
Eliot treated Sara’s comments seriously, and accepted them, after due consideration, in 
instances like this: 
 
I do not think my use of the words etymologically improper, and they correspond 
better than any other to Bezeichnung [designation] and bezeichnet [designates], but I 
see the nature of your objection and I have felt it in other connexions so that on the 
whole I adopt your suggestion as the less exceptionable phrase.
71
 
 
 
The seriousness of the latter extracts contrasts with the comic, teasing spirit of others, one of 
which alludes to the version of multi-tasking which Eliot had adopted to run her father’s 
household and complete the translation of Strauss:   
 
I have not the German of §81. I gave you from §64 to 84. I cannot therefore alter the 
passage which you have copied and which I have just this moment had the misfortune 
to drop into the pie.
72
  
 
 
Despite Sara’s support and encouragement, the work was beset by periods of 
dissatisfaction. By April 1845, Eliot was calling the task ‘soul–stupefying labour’,73 was 
deeply discouraged by the difficulties of funding publication,
74
 and had developed personal 
and scholarly reservations with Strauss’s interpretations of his sources:  
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I am never pained when I think Strauss right – but in many cases I think him wrong, 
as every man must be in working out into detail an idea which has general truth, but is 
only one element in a perfect theory, not a perfect theory in itself.
75
 
 
 
Eliot’s irritations with the work and its pressures, and her recurrent doubts about its worth are 
clear from this outburst: 
 
It is very laughable that I should be irritated about a thing in itself so trifling as a 
translation, but it is this very triviality of the thing that makes delays provoking. The 
difficulties that attend a really grand undertaking are to be borne, but things should 
run smoothly and fast when they are not important enough to demand the sacrifice of 
one’s whole soul.76 
 
 
Her initial attitude of self-sacrifice for the good of the work has been replaced by cynicism or 
irony towards the value of the translation and the personal cost to her which work on it has 
necessitated. The dramatic reversals of feeling suggest the potential conflicts which can arise 
between the twin intellectual attitudes of a translator, which combine sympathy, even 
empathy with a source, with a rigorous critical reading. It reveals how intensely she had  
invested her ‘whole soul’ in the project, but discovered through the exercise of critical 
intelligence that the book had flaws as well as significant arguments. Two years into the 
project, in February 1846, Cara Bray observed that Eliot was ‘Strauss-sick’,77 but the work 
was finally completed by May of that year. As the pressures of completing the work eased, 
Eliot wrote to Sara with a more balanced assessment of the strengths of Strauss’s book: 
 
I do really like reading our Strauss – he is so klar und ideenvoll [clear and full of 
ideas] but I do not know one person who is likely to read the book through, do you?
78
 
 
 
Her words reveal the debt she felt to Sara. ‘Our Strauss’ cements an intellectual 
intimacy and recognises Sara’s contribution, and the centrality of their relationship to the 
project. The German of her final assessment of Strauss as ‘klar und ideenvoll’ is a further 
recognition of the joint language she and Sara have been using during the work. In June that 
year, the translation was published by John Chapman without a reference to its translator. A 
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review of it in The Prospective by Charles Wicksteed, indicates the notoriety which Strauss’s 
book, ‘the far-famed Leben Jesu’,79 had accumulated even before its publication in English. 
The review in the main addresses and criticises Strauss’s arguments, but in relation to the 
translation itself speculated that ‘the passages of a specially scholastic character, at least, 
have received their version from ‘a discerning and well-informed theologian’.80 Wicksteed 
commends the translation as ‘faithful, elegant and scholar-like’81 and praises the ‘easy, 
perspicuous and harmonious force’82 of the English style, which nevertheless renders the 
original ‘word for word, thought for thought, sentence for sentence’.83 Despite its praise for 
all those aspects of translation which Eliot aspired to provide and valued so highly, she 
distanced herself from the review in a letter to Sara: 
 
The review of Strauss contains some very just remarks, though, on the whole I think it 
shallow and in many cases unfair. The praise it gives to the translation is just what I 
should have wished – indeed I cannot imagine anything more gratifying in the way of 
laudation. Is it not droll that Wicksteed should have chosen one of my interpolations 
or rather paraphrases to dilate on? The expression “granite,” applied to the sayings of 
Jesus is nowhere used by Strauss, but is an impudent addition of mine to eke out his 
metaphor.
84
 
 
 
Scholl argues that this last remark confirms Eliot’s sense that she has outgrown 
Strauss and claimed mastery. I would argue instead that it rather indicates her misgivings 
about the reviewer’s expertise, and moreover that her fidelity to Strauss could encompass and 
celebrate a small creative act of her own, which, against her standards of rigid fidelity, she 
nevertheless still judged ‘impudent’.  
The positive critical reception for Eliot’s translation combined with the dramatic 
impact of the work on English intellectual life enabled her to commence her journalistic 
career with the Westminster Review. Her now recognised expertise in translation, as well as 
her scholarship enabled her to write on a wide range of topics while at the Review, including 
reviews of other translations, literary, artistic and philosophic topics. Through her editorial 
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work combined with her published translations, she began to gain acknowledged status 
amongst writers and intellectuals.  
The translation of Leben Jesu and the death of her father marked a watershed in 
Eliot’s life. But she did consider translation again, although with some scepticism about the 
degree to which a translation is an adequate vehicle to ensure the accessibility of a complex 
work for a wider audience. While in Geneva, recovering from the strain of translating Strauss 
and from the grief of her father’s death, she began translating Spinoza’s Ethics from the 
Latin. In an 1849 letter to Charles and Cara Bray, already quoted, she writes that:  
 
Spinoza and I have been divorced for several months. [....]. If you are anxious to 
publish the translation in question, I could, after a few months, finish the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus to keep it company - but I confess to you, that I think you would 
do better to abstain from printing a translation. What is wanted in English is not a 
translation of Spinoza’s works, but a true estimate of his life and system. After one 
has rendered his Latin faithfully into English, one feels that there is another yet more 
difficult process of translation for the reader to effect, and that the only mode of 
making Spinoza accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut them, 
and give an analysis.
85
 
 
 
The language she uses adopts ironic metaphors of relationship to indicate the intensity of 
emotional involvement between translator and translated (‘Spinoza and I have been 
divorced’) which develop the ironic language of male and female relationship in her letter 
about Strauss to Cara Bray. In considering the case for making a writer – in this case Spinoza 
- ‘accessible to a larger number’, Eliot argues that any ‘faithful’ translation would still 
necessarily leave an obscure gulf of understanding between a reader and Spinoza’s meaning. 
She calls this challenge to comprehension a ‘yet more difficult process of translation for the 
reader’, implying that the reading of a complex work in translation demands a further act of 
imaginative acculturation and comprehension, as suggested by Jane Sinnett. Eliot’s 
recognition that any rendering of meaning is inevitably a process which involves the source 
author, the translator and the reader in an effort to transfer meaning anticipates the debates 
about  the value of translation and the role of the reader of more recent times. Chapter 3 
considers her translation of Spinoza in more detail, but, in a more general sense, Eliot’s view 
that complex arguments presented in an abstruse form required some other way of making 
them accessible to the public is clear, and reveals her sense that she was in a position to 
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provide the intellectual bridge building which might be necessary. In the letter, she proposes 
that a ‘true’ analysis and estimate of Spinoza’s ideas was preferable to a literal or ‘faithful’ 
translation, but I will argue that, once she had completed her translation of the Ethics in 1856, 
she chose instead - and not just in relation to Spinoza - to use her novels to explore the ideas 
she had considered as she translated and moreover think through carefully some of the issues 
involved in the politics of translating them.   
After the experience of translating Strauss, Eliot’s views of translation as the best way 
of making European ideas more accessible underwent a number of variations. Sometime 
within five years of her 1849 advice to Charles Bray about the need for ‘an estimate’ of 
Spinoza’s ‘life and work’ rather than a translation, she was advising Hale White to learn 
French in order to read Rousseau in the original. Yet in June 1853
86
, she agreed to undertake 
another translation, that of Ludwig Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums [The Essence of 
Christianity], a book first published in Germany in 1841. However, it was not until January 
1854 that discussion of the work surfaces in a letter to Sara Hennell.  Eliot’s letter expresses 
an early ‘reluctance’ to involve her friend, concerned that Feuerbach’s argument might 
‘repel’ her, but once she was confident that Sara understood and sympathised with the 
significance of the book, she wrote to her to say that she would ‘feel it a real comfort to have 
your prospective sympathy while I am writing, so be assured you shall have a whole cargo of 
MS’.87 Their working method appears to have been similar to that adopted during Eliot’s 
translation of Strauss. Sara checked the manuscript and made pencil comments or suggested 
amendments, which the two discussed by letter when it was necessary.  
The letters reveal discussions about what constituted faithfulness to the source author, 
where Sara was apparently arguing the case for a closer and perhaps more literal fidelity to 
the original text and Eliot was considering its readability for an English audience: 
 
I don’t think a translator is bound to reproduce the occasional offensive defects of 
taste in a writer. I confess I have not gone on that principle of damaging faithfulness. 
Indeed I have felt it necessary in the part you have read to omit a whole sentence. I 
could not do otherwise – and indeed German sarcasm may be fairly said to be 
untranslatable. I think you would agree with me if the whole case were before you.
88
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In February, she was sharing concerns about the style of the Preface to the Second Edition 
with Sara, and emphasising how important it was as a statement of Feuerbach’s ideas. The 
style of the book itself was – she noted ironically -  “– for a German – concise, lucid and 
even epigrammatic now and then”.89 However, she was concerned about the Germanisms of 
style and the abstract nature not only of the Preface but also the Appendices. Clearly she 
wished the Preface to reflect the ‘lucid’ and accessible style of the book itself, and Sara was 
asked to be the judge of her translation’s readability: 
 
I shall send you Feuerbach’s Preface soon. [....] his Preface reads like a caricature of 
the faults of German writing generally, one sentence is nearly a page and a half long.  
[....] I wish you to pay particular attention to the Preface and to mark everything 
which seems odd and does not flow easily – as it is very important that this preface 
should be read.
90
 
 
English perceptions of German style had been strongly influenced by Thomas Carlyle’s 
Sartor Resartus (1834) which satirised the abstraction and length of sentences to be found in 
the writings of German Idealism. Eliot seems to be referring to this type of caricature as 
being relevant to Feuerbach’s Preface. In one otherwise undated March letter, she shared a 
cognoscente’s joke with Sara about one of the Preface’s long sentences, obviously spanning 
two pages, (‘I send you the original of the Preface to amuse you with the long-winded 
sentence pp. ix and x.’91) and, then, in a postscript, asked for advice about how to render into 
English what was, presumably, Feuerbach’s more usual style of short sentences: 
Feuerbach’s sentences are too uniformly short. Would you weave them together at all, 
or leave the style intact?
92
 
 
 
By the end of March, her nervousness and reservations about her achievement and its 
reception had commenced, as sections of the manuscript started to be sent off to the printers. 
A letter of 31st March is evidence of a similar type of despair to that which had afflicted the 
later stages of her translation of Strauss. She feared that no-one would ‘read the book, still 
less understand it’,93 and that Sara herself might be ‘bore[d]’ or find her effort ‘a labour’.94 At 
                                            
89
 GEL.II, Letter 1, 6 February 1854,  p.141. 
90
 GEL.II, Letter 1, 6 February1854, pp.140, 141. 
91
 GEL.II, (March1854), p.147. 
92
 GEL.II, (March 1854),  p.147. 
93
 GEL.II, (31 March 1854),  p.147. 
94
 GEL.II, (31 March 1854),  p.147. 
56 
 
one moment at the end of April she was in despair about the probable reception of the book 
and her translation: 
 
I am too entirely without hope about the book to be sensitive. The press will do 
nothing but abuse or ridicule it [....].
95
 
 
 
Three days later (29
th
 April), she was addressing the problems of translating the appendix. 
Her letter to Sara indicates her misgivings, not only about the haste with which she was 
forced to translate, and the stylistic consequences, but also about the significance of certain 
sections to an English public: 
 
[....] read as quickly as you can the portion of the appendix which I send to you [....], 
and to tell me how far it will be necessary to modify it for the Eng[lish] public. I have 
written it very rapidly and have translated it quite literally so you have the raw 
Feuerbach – not any of my cooking. I am so far removed from the popular feeling on 
the subject of which it treats that I cannot trust my own judgement. With the ideas of 
Feuerbach I everywhere agree, but of course I should, of myself, alter the phraseology 
considerably. Before I do this however, I want you to tell me what I must leave out. 
Mind, I want to keep in as much as possible. [....] don’t think of the style but only of 
the matter and the crudity of expressions.
96
 
 
The style of the Appendix clearly caused her concern due to the laxity of Feuerbach’s style 
and vocabulary, as well as the concerns arising from the enforced literalness of her 
translation. To convey the difference between her initial translation of the Appendix and her 
more finished translations of the main body of the book, she used the binary opposition of 
cooked and raw, a metaphor which immediately suggests the haste and scarcely digestible 
nature of the translation, compared with the care which had gone into translating the main 
text. Her reservations about Feuerbach’s ‘phraseology’, and ‘crudity of expressions’, as well 
as the nature of her reservations about the accessibility of the content of the appendix for the 
English reader are clarified in a letter of 7th May. While both letters emphasise her 
commitment to the book’s ideas (‘with Feuerbach’s ideas I everywhere agree’97 and ‘the 
Appendix [....] contains a great deal of important and accessible matter’98), in the later letter 
she specified which sections of the Appendix were problematic due to their ‘Germanised’ and 
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abstract nature, and asked Sara’s advice about whether they should be omitted.99 She also 
gave examples of the ‘laxity’ of Feuerbach’s language in the second section of the Appendix, 
where he had used the same German word in different semantic contexts: 
The laxity of Feuerbach’s language is particularly tiresome in the 2d §. I am obliged 
to translate sensation in one place and emotion in another.
100
 
 
Just as with her translation of Strauss, Eliot suffered various crises of confidence 
about the reception of Feuerbach’s book, but once the work was at proof-reading stage she 
rediscovered her admiration for Feuerbach’s ideas and his expression of them in the book 
itself:  
 
The proof-reading of Feuerbach is really a pleasure to me and opens up afresh to me 
what there is of truth and beauty in the book.
101
  
 
Again she frequently expressed her appreciation of Sara’s role, (‘It is such a comfort to have 
at least one person who can appreciate one’s work’102) and of the significance of her 
contribution to an intellectual achievement: 
I feel your reading of Feuerbach as a real act of friendship to me - but it is something 
still better than that – a contribution towards the perfecting of a mental product 
[....].
103
 
 
The translation was published in July 1854. It was reviewed, hardly impartially, in 
The Herald by Sara Hennell herself, who praised the way the ‘tough metaphysical 
German’104 had been rendered. G H Lewes, another scarcely neutral reviewer, noted the 
book’s publication as ‘a bombshell thrown into the camp of orthodoxy’,105 but his departure 
with Eliot for ‘Labassecour’,106 Weimar and Berlin107 was a further bombshell to their 
friends, and effectively concluded Eliot’s reliance on Sara Hennell’s advice and judgement in 
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relation to translation. Despite friendly reviews, Eliot’s misgivings about its initial reception 
were vindicated. Mathilde Blind noted that Chapman ‘lost heavily’ by the publication of The 
Essence of Christianity because ‘there was no demand for it in England.’108  
There are no letters which shed any light on the translation of Spinoza completed in 
1856 while in Europe with Lewes. It had also been one of Lewes’ projects, and it is likely 
that any consultations about Spinoza’s style would be with him. However, the judgements of 
her 1855 essay on translation, written while she was translating Spinoza, that translation 
demanded ‘the patience, the rigid fidelity, and the sense of responsibility in interpreting 
another man’s mind’109 reflect the type of deliberation and attentiveness to ‘denotation and 
connotation’ displayed in her letters about her translations of Strauss and Feuerbach. What is 
missing is how far the translation of Spinoza was accompanied by similar frustrations and 
elations to those she experienced during her other translations. The act of ‘translation’ offered 
the opportunity to enter into and interpret ‘another man’s mind’, and it also offered the first 
disciplined steps in that combination of erudition, philosophical inquiry and imagination 
which later enabled her to create each of her fictional characters and worlds.  
 
Ward’s Experience of Translation 
 
While Eliot’s volatile experience and evolving attitude to the process of translation 
has to be pieced together from her letters and essays, Mary Ward, born thirty years later than 
Eliot, left her own edited presentation of her life in her Writer’s Recollections. Her letters are 
now held in the Special Collections and Archives of the Honnold/Mudd Library at Claremont 
University, California. Her Recollections are both a record of her intellectual development, of 
the way her religious, spiritual and social convictions were formed, and of the intellectual 
milieu in which she lived. In addition, there are a limited number of letters, most undated, 
quoted in Janet Trevelyan’s biography of her mother, The Life of Mrs Humphry Ward.110  
When Ward was recalling and judging her education and route into a literary life, she 
was forthright about the deficiencies in girls’ schooling prior to the introduction of the 1870 
Education Act, and the growth in secondary schooling for girls which followed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century: 
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I learnt nothing thoroughly or accurately, and the German, French and Latin, which I 
soon discovered after my marriage to be essential to the kind of literary work I wanted 
to do, had all to be re-learnt before they could be of any real use to me; nor was it ever 
possible for me [....] to get that firm hold on the structure and literary history of any 
language, ancient or modern, which my brother William [....] got from his six years at 
Rugby, and his training there in Latin and Greek.
111
  
 
 
Ward was the symbolic and physical offspring of the great religious debates which 
had so bitterly divided Christian intellectuals in the nineteenth century. Her Recollections 
struggle to be just and generous to a much loved father and mother but they reveal the fragile 
dependence of the family on the spiritual scruples of their father, which took him into the 
Catholic Church, out of it for an eleven year period, and then finally back into it again. She 
got her first sight of Oxford, the scene of her intellectual awakening, during her father’s 
return to the Anglican Church and therefore to the possibility of working once again in 
Oxford. In 1867, when she was sixteen, she left the school she found so unsatisfactory and 
embarked on her self-education. Its romance is captured in the Recollections, and later 
influenced her description of the education of Laura Fountain in Helbeck of Bannisdale. She: 
 
[....] slipped into the Oxford life as a fish into water. [....]. There was in me [....] a real 
hunger to learn [....]. But [....] I had no definite teaching, and everything I learnt came 
to me from persons – and books - sporadically, without any general guidance or plan. 
It was all a great voyage of discovery, organised mainly by myself, on the advice of a 
few men and women very much older [....].
112
  
 
Through the academic connections of her father, Tom Arnold, and those of her uncle, 
Matthew Arnold, by the time she was twenty she had met many of the leading English 
scholars and translators of the day and was aware of and expected to participate in the worlds 
of French and Spanish scholarship lying beyond Oxford. Her mentoring by Mark Pattison and 
J R Green demonstrates that her abilities with language and scholarship were recognised 
early in her life. Somewhat like Mme de Stael, of whom she quoted with approval that she 
‘wrote her books out of the talk of the distinguished men’,113 Mary Arnold absorbed and 
interrogated the ideas and controversies of intellectual Oxford.  
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Her childhood had meant that she was aware of the contemporary arguments about 
biblical and ecclesiastical authority, as well as feeling the human cost of intellectual decision 
in relation to them, a cost she was later to dramatise in Robert Elsmere, Helbeck of 
Bannisdale and The Case of Richard Meynell.
114
  Through her marriage at nineteen to 
Humphry Ward, a Brasenose College tutor, she had committed herself to the Oxford milieu 
with which the Arnold family were so identified. She had become part of an academic society 
where those she met expected to develop intellectual argument through written publications, 
and where the ability to read foreign literature in the original language was an anticipated part 
of an academic career. Her account of her early married life makes it clear that she married 
Humphry, academia and literature in equal measure. 
It became plain very soon after our marriage that ours was to be a literary partnership. 
My first published story, written when I was eighteen, had appeared in the 
Churchman’s Magazine in 1870, and an article on the ‘Poema del Cid’, the firstfruits 
of my Spanish browsings in the Bodleian, appeared in Macmillan early in 1872. [....]. 
Our three children arrived [....], and all the time I was reading, listening, talking, and 
beginning to write in earnest – mostly for the Saturday Review.115 
 
 
In her Recollections she mentions a wide range of European thinkers and scholars, mainly 
French, whom she had met and heard during her twenties, both in Oxford and during a visit 
to Paris with her husband, in 1874: 
 
We took with us some introductions from Oxford – to Mme Mohl, the Renans, the 
Gaston Parises, the Boutmys, the Ribots, and, from my Uncle Matthew, to the 
Scherers at Versailles. M. Taine was already known to us and it was at their house, on 
one of Mme Taine’s Thursdays, that I first heard French conversation at its best 
[....].
116
  
 
 
In 1878, when she was twenty seven, she received her first academic commission, a 
request from Dr Wace to contribute work on the West Goths for Smith’s Dictionary of 
Biography. Her presentation of the challenges of Dr Wace’s commission subtly transform it 
from an apparent statement of modest diffidence into an assertion of her scholarly 
achievements, of her expertise in French, Spanish, the Latin of two different, non-classical 
periods and German, and of her confidence in her scholarly and critical acumen: 
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The French and Spanish reading it involved was no difficulty. But the power of 
reading Latin rapidly, both the degraded Latin of the fifth and sixth centuries, and the 
learned Latin of the sixteenth and seventeenth was essential; and I had only learnt 
some Latin since my marriage, and was by no means at home in it. I had long since 
found out too, in working at the Spanish literature of the eleventh to fourteenth 
century, that the only critics and researchers worth following in that field were 
German; and [....] the prospect of a piece of work which meant, in the main, Latin 
texts and German commentaries, was rather daunting.
117
  
 
 
In 1881, she received the impetus to integrate her involvement in the Oxford religious 
debates of her youth, her family’s historic and current engagement with these debates, and 
her love of mastering the ideas and styles of other cultures than her own. She heard a sermon 
by John Wordsworth, a religious conservative, which moved her to publish, almost 
immediately, a pamphlet rebutting its theme that agnostic positions were incompatible with a 
moral approach to living. Seven years later she published the famous transformation of the 
pamphlet’s debate into her third work of fiction, Robert Elsmere, as described in more detail 
in Chapter 4. The book’s long gestation was influenced by an adventitious approach from M. 
Scherer, a French critic, whom she had met on her visit to Versailles in 1874. They had 
discussed contemporary French religious thought, and, in 1884, according to Ward, he sent 
her his French edition of Frédéric Amiel’s Journal Intime, which, as Amiel’s literary 
executor, he had published in France in two volumes, volume I in 1883, a year after Amiel’s 
death, and volume II in 1884. An article about Amiel by Ward appeared in Macmillan’s 
Magazine (May, 1884) making it clear that, at that point, the second volume was still to be 
published.
118
 Sutherland notes that Ward read the Journal Intime while she was on holiday in 
Switzerland in the summer of 1883 and proposed to provide a translation for Macmillan on 
her return in September 1883.
 119
  Her Recollections note that she had been sent a copy, 
presumably of volume II of Amiel’s Journal Intime, by Scherer, in 1884. From then on she 
was engaged on its translation, completing it for publication by the end of 1885. Sutherland 
also records that Ward told Macmillan, the future publisher of Robert Elsmere, that she had 
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first read Amiel due to the dying Pattison’s recommendation that ‘in importance it seemed to 
him that nothing of its kind had equalled it since Rousseau’s Confessions’.120  
 
She described her reaction to first reading the Journal Intime in the Recollections:  
The book laid its spell upon me at once; and I felt a strong wish to translate it. M. 
Scherer consented and I plunged into it. It was a delightful but exacting task. At the 
end of it, I knew a good deal more French than I did at the beginning! For the book 
abounded in passages that put one on one’s mettle, and seemed to challenge every 
faculty one possessed. M. Scherer came over [....] - and we spent hours [....], turning 
and twisting the most crucial sentences this way and that.
121
 
 
 
The language Ward uses about the act of translation highlights the differing ways in which 
she  responded to its challenge compared with the intellectual and moral discipline of Eliot 
(‘patience’, ‘fidelity’, and ‘responsibility’). Ward’s recollection of her emotion on first 
reading Amiel’s Journal is conveyed in romantic terms. It engaged her imagination (‘laid its 
spell’) and her emotions (‘felt a strong wish’). Ward’s language, ‘plunge’, ‘exacting’, 
‘mettle’, ‘twisting and turning’, is more dynamic and confrontational than Eliot’s references 
to ‘patience’ and ‘rigid fidelity’, and compares with Grossman’s description of ‘plunging’ 
into the ‘dynamic’ and ‘hallucinatory’ process of translation:  
 
When one tries to grasp it [a single language] long enough to create a translation, the 
Byzantine complexity of the enterprise is heightened and intensified [....], for the 
second language is just as elusive, just as dynamic, just as recalcitrant as the first. The 
experience of plunging into the maelstrom of signification and intention that whirls 
and boils between them as we attempt to transfer meaning between two languages, to 
hear the effects, the rhythms, the artfulness of both simultaneously, can verge on the 
hallucinatory.
122
  
 
Ward’s friendship with Edmond Scherer (his daughter Jeanne became Ward’s French 
translator) meant that he advised her about the translation of crucial sentences, although Ward 
implies that this was more a matter of style than of meaning. In her Preface she thanks 
Scherer for his ‘help and advice through the whole process of translation’, and also Bernard 
Bosanquet, the translator of Lotze, for his advice on the translation of the more technical 
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philosophic passages. 
123
 Trevelyan describes the work on the translation as ‘long and 
exacting’, 124 and considered that her mother: 
 
[....] enjoyed the struggle with the precise meaning of the French phrases and always 
maintained she owed much to it, both in her knowledge of French and of English.
125
  
 
In her preface to the Journal Intime, Ward also elaborated the difficulties for which 
she had needed to find solutions, which lay in the predominantly private tone of the Journal 
in conjunction with its technical or abstract German philosophic language. She also considers 
the strategic choices open to translators of philosophic thought between technical expressions 
and ‘more literary’ representations of the same ideas, and justifies her approach on the 
grounds that Amiel himself ‘softened his phrases’ for publication: 
 
The difficulties of the translation have been sometimes considerable, owing, first of 
all, to those elliptical modes of speech which a man naturally employs when he is 
writing for himself and not for the public [....]. Every here and there Amiel expresses 
himself in a kind of shorthand, [....] for which an English equivalent, at once terse and 
clear, is hard to find. Another difficulty has been his constant use of a technical 
philosophical language, which, according to his French critics, is not French - even 
philosophical French - but German. Very often it has been impossible to give any 
other than a literal rendering of such passages, if the thought of the original was to be 
preserved; but in those cases where a choice was open to me, I have preferred the 
more literary to the more technical expression; and I have been encouraged to do so 
by the fact that Amiel, when he came to prepare for publication a certain number of 
Pensées, extracted from the Journal, [....] frequently softened his phrases [....].
126
  
 
Ward’s decision about how to deal with the abstract philosophic terms may have been 
justified too by her awareness that Amiel’s French speaking friends thought of his 
Germanised philosophic expressions as defects of style, which otherwise they greeted as 
subtle, sublime and exhilarating.
127
 Her Preface also concedes that she ‘allowed myself to 
transpose a sentence bodily’ in ‘two or three cases’, and ‘in a few instances’ added 
‘explanatory words to the text’, which are ‘indicated by square brackets’.128 
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The ‘spell’ which the book had laid on her, in its articulation of ideas with which she 
already had intense sympathy, clearly influenced the debate she presented in her novel, 
Robert Elsmere. As with Martineau and Comte, with Eliot and Strauss and later Feuerbach, 
Ward saw Amiel as presenting the major issues and encapsulating the human predicament of 
his age:  
 
He speaks for the life of to-day as no other single voice has yet spoken for it; in his 
contradictions, his fears, his despairs, and yet in the constant straining toward the 
unseen and the ideal which gives a fundamental unity to his inner life, he is the type 
of a generation universally touched with doubt, and yet as sensitive to the need of 
faith as any that have gone before it; [....].
129
 
 
 
What she identified in Amiel was the range and variousness of his psychological states: his 
voice and its manifestations enunciated the complexity of contemporary life and the variety 
of emotional responses possible. The year of the publication of Amiel’s Journal (December 
1885), she began work on Robert Elsmere, and, in writing it, plundered the characters she had 
met in Oxford, and that of Amiel himself, and his sense of his psychological multifariousness 
and intellectual richness, as it emerges from Journal Intime.  
In her Recollections Ward claims that her translation of Amiel’s Journal ‘obtained a 
warm welcome both here and in America’130, and that its reputation has ‘maintained its place 
until now’.131 She quotes two appreciative letters, one from Jowett and one from Walter 
Pater. She had asked Matthew Arnold to review her translation, and this he eventually did, 
but not until twenty-two months later, for Macmillan’s Magazine in September 1887. 
Sutherland describes the review as a ‘bombshell’.132 He claims that Arnold was ‘tepidly 
polite’ about Ward’s translation and ‘silently and quite extensively corrected her renderings 
from the French’.133 In fact, Arnold’s essay describes the translation as ‘at once spirited and 
faithful’,134 the terms Sara Hennell had used in relation to Eliot’s translation of Strauss. 
Certainly Arnold characterised Amiel’s psychology as a ‘morbid pathology’.135 Amiel is the 
antithesis of the qualities which Matthew Arnold admired, those of disinterested calm and 
wholeness, and Amiel’s confessional struggle between faith and doubt would have appeared 
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to Arnold as full of the ‘doubts’ and ‘discouragement’ which, his 1853 Preface demanded, 
must be so represented as to avoid the poetically ‘morbid.136 His essay dismissed those 
aspects of Amiel’s thought influenced by Buddhist nihilism and a ‘bedazzlement with the 
infinite’,137 but praises Amiel as a critic of ‘real power, originality and value’, ‘well informed, 
just and penetrating in an eminent degree’,138 not only in relation to books but also in relation 
to his analyses of social, political, and religious issues. Amiel’s religious views Arnold 
recognised as ‘water to our mill’,139 but in addition he recommended that any further critical 
writings to be found amongst Amiel’s surviving papers would be of public interest.140A few 
months after writing the review, in August 1887, he decided it should appear in the second 
series of essays in criticism
141
 and this expectation may have been uppermost in his mind in 
balancing the original review towards an analysis of Amiel’s thought rather than any more 
extensive appreciation of Ward’s translation.  
Sutherland claims that Arnold ‘silently and extensively corrected her [Ward’s] 
renderings from the French’142 in his review. R H Super’s notes suggest that Arnold began his 
review by using Ward’s translation, but ‘gradually took to emending it, often extensively, and 
his alterations are instructive lessons in style’.143Super highlights a number of examples 
where Arnold used his own variant translations rather than Ward’s. It is difficult to 
understand why he did so, except as a move to integrate his translation into his intended 
essay. Apart from one instance, both translations are faithful to the French original, though 
choosing valid alternatives to render it. Some examples will show the range of variation. 
Amiel writes ‘calme comme un dieu’. 144 Ward translates this faithfully as ‘calm like a 
god’:145Arnold translates it as ‘calm like God’.146 Amiel writes of ‘la mortification 
interieure’.147 Ward translates this as ‘mortification of spirit’:148 Arnold as ‘inward 
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disappointment’.149 In a further passage, Amiel describes the training of a critic, ‘Alors 
seulement il a fait le tour de toutes les manières d’être et possède toutes les nuances de 
l’appréciation’.150 Ward translates this as ‘By then only can he hope for insight into all the 
modes of being, and for mastery of all possible shades of appreciation’,151 whereas Arnold 
translates it as ‘Not till then has he compassed all modes of being, and made every shade of 
appreciation his own’,152 which is admittedly more concise and elegant than Ward’s 
rendering. In the same journal entry, Arnold’s choice of word to translate ‘la coupelle’ is 
perhaps more accessible than Ward’s, where he translates it as a ‘crucible’, and Ward 
translates it as ‘refining rod’. 
Although the review is not as tepid as suggested by Sutherland, her uncle’s approach 
to the review and to Amiel was not as enthusiastic as Ward might have hoped. It is interesting 
to consider the parallels between Arnold himself and Amiel. He recognised Amiel’s 
excellence as a critic and he suggested that some of the Amiel’s themes, his ‘fascination with 
the infinite [....] lend themselves well to poetry’.153 Some of Amiel’s themes were similar to 
those of Arnold’s own poetry – doubt, a sense of the unknowable depths of human 
personality, even a sense that there was a spiritual robustness missing from his experience. 
These were the themes which Arnold had begun to reject as lacking the vigour, simplicity, 
and optimism of classical models. Perhaps it is not surprising that he found difficulties in 
appreciating Amiel’s intimate and confessional writings.  
Ward’s only other involvement in a published translation was that of Joseph Joubert’s 
Pensées. The translation was published as Joubert: Selected Thoughts, translated by 
Katharine Lyttelton.  Lyttelton was a friend of the Ward family, and Ward provided the 
preface to the translation. However, it appears that she and Lyttelton worked together on the 
translation during the summer of 1898. Peter Collister cites a letter from Ward at that time 
telling her son that ‘Katharine and I are doing Joubert 6 hours a day and there is no room for 
anything else.’154 It is therefore clear that she was providing more than a preface, she was 
very heavily involved in the translation and management of the project. Lyttelton’s 
translation acknowledges the permission of Matthew Arnold’s wife to use his translations of 
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those of the Pensées quoted in his essay on Joubert (1863).
155
 The use of a limited number of 
Arnold’s translations in place of Lyttelton’s and Ward’s own may obliquely suggest the 
effects of Matthew Arnold’s review of Amiel’s Journal with its ‘emendations’ of Ward’s 
translations. But it certainly reflects the intention of making the book an ‘Arnold’ family 
project.  
The translation was completed in 1898, in advance of the publication of Eleanor 
(1900). Work on the translation and the writing of Eleanor were therefore intertwined in the 
same way that the translation of Amiel and the writing of Robert Elsmere had been a decade 
earlier. Her interest in Joubert had commenced much earlier, however. Ward had written to 
her father, probably during 1884, (the letter is undated), that she had been reading Joubert’s 
Pensées and Correspondance as background research for her introduction to Amiel’s Journal, 
which suggests that even at that stage she saw that there were important parallels between the 
two writers, a possibility suggested in the Journal Intime’s analysis of Joubert’s achievement. 
She recommended Joubert’s writing as charming and ‘extraordinarily acute’.156 But what she 
extracted from the Pensées was neither the charm nor acuteness of Joubert, but the doomed 
story of his friends, Châteaubriand and Mme de Beaumont, in other words a ‘human and 
emotional crisis’.157 If Robert Elsmere and Helbeck of Bannisdale explore the consequences 
of intellectual difference on emotional bonds, Eleanor, as well as revisiting the theme of loss 
of faith, explores what happens to an existing intellectual bond when threatened with 
emotional distancing.  
Ward, like Eliot before her, responded to the ideas she translated and to her empathy 
with and judgement of her source author in her fiction. Spinoza’s life influenced Eliot’s 
fiction as did his system, and Ward’s analysis of Amiel’s enigmatic personality entered her 
novels along with his ideas and language. In Robert Elsmere, she succeeded in making a 
debate about authenticity, tradition, and the nature of personal religion and morality, which 
had been up to then largely conducted within intellectual and ecclesiastical circles, a topic of 
consuming interest to a huge reading audience. Her presentation of the many nuances of the 
Victorian religious debate and its impact upon the lives of her protagonists is a vindication of 
her belief in her power to present one of the great issues of her day through ‘a picture of 
actual life and conduct’. 
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Experiencing the way ideas were conditioned by the possibilities and limits of another 
language was also clearly very important to both Eliot and Ward. Then as now, translators 
needed to resolve competing aims, that of rendering the meaning of writing in a source 
language as nearly as possible, of suggesting its complex cultural connotations, and that of 
determining how they could transfer as nearly as possible the uniqueness of the experience of 
reading the product of an alien language and culture.  When trying to describe the demands of 
this indefinable intellectual process, both Eliot and Ward, and their contemporary Matthew 
Arnold, chose to try to suggest what it involved through metaphorical language. Eliot’s 
metaphors focus on tangible examples of exchange but, in most cases, accept that it 
necessarily involves diminishment; pewter for silver, an engraving instead of a painting, a 
Jew’s harp instead of a piano.158 The difference between a literal, hasty translation and a fully 
worked one is like the difference between raw and cooked food.
159
 Only in one place, does 
her metaphor of cracking a nut with care to release the ‘kernel’ of meaning suggest the focus, 
force and caution needed to translate and the nature of the reward if successful. Ward’s 
description of translation gives far greater sense of the drama of its enactment and challenges, 
and of the dynamism of the exchange between two languages. Her language of ‘twisting and 
turning’ anticipates the multi-dimensionality of descriptions such as Grossman’s of ‘the 
maelstrom of signification and intention that whirls and boils between’ the two interacting 
languages. Grossman’s attempt to identify what happens in the space between the two 
languages is also anticipated by Matthew Arnold’s description of the mist of ‘alien modes of 
thinking, speaking and feeling’, in which the translator meets and seeks union with his source 
writer and which has to dissipate before an effective translation can be made.  
The feminist theorist, Barbara Godard, tries to make this space definable, claiming 
that ‘equivalence is located between the coding-decoding operations of two text systems 
rather than between the contents or words of two messages.’160 Investigating that space 
between languages, of ambiguity or non-linearity of signification, the space of cultural 
difference, the space between differing understanding of intentions, and between attempts to 
reach relationship became the project of the novels both women wrote. Godard argues that 
‘feminist discourse presents transformation as performance as a model for translation’.161 The 
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transformative, dramatic power of novels opens up other ways of perceiving and reacting to 
the ideas of the dominant male discourse of nineteenth century theology and philosophy, 
allows for irony, irreverence, subversion – for life, which as Eliot said is  ‘a great deal more 
than science’.162 
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Chapter 2 
Eliot And Feuerbach: Translation And Transmutation 
 
Ludwig Feuerbach’s intellectual importance and the continuing range of ambivalent 
and contradictory responses to his thought even today are suggested in Marilynne Robinson’s 
novel Gilead (2004). Her protagonist, John Ames, is composing his dying thoughts on his 
family’s and country’s history and religion for his young son to read when grown up:  
 
Ludwig Feuerbach says a wonderful thing about baptism. I have it marked. [....]. 
Feuerbach is a famous atheist, but he is about as good on the joyful aspects of religion 
as anybody, and he loves the world. [....]. But he is marvellous on the subject of joy, 
and also on its religious expressions. 
[....] he unsettled the faith of many people, but I take issue as much with those people 
as with Feuerbach. It seems to me some people just go around looking to get their 
faith unsettled. That has been the fashion for the last hundred years or so. My brother 
Edward gave his book to me, ‘The Essence of Christianity’, thinking to shock me out 
of my uncritical piety, as I knew at the time.
1
 
 
 
Robinson’s fictional eighty year old John Ames is writing in 1956, a hundred and fifteen 
years after the German publication of Das Wesen des Christentums, and just over a hundred 
years after the 1854 publication of George Eliot’s translation of it, the only English 
translation available for John and Edward Ames to read. Robinson demonstrates its variety of 
impacts.  John Ames remains able to respond spiritually to Feuerbach’s apparently passionate 
empathy with those needs and experiences which generate human religious impulses, keeping 
this mentally detached from the book’s parallel and destructive analysis of the psychological 
and anthropological rationale for religion. But the novel makes it clear that it was the power 
of the latter analysis which tore apart the Ames family when John Ames was a young man of 
seventeen or eighteen (about forty years after Eliot’s translation had appeared); that Edward 
and their parents lost their faith as a result of it, then moved away, leaving John to his faithful 
but isolated, backwater life. Nevertheless his life demonstrates that a book, which had once 
so radically deconstructed the religious impulse, contributing to a hundred year ‘fashion’ for 
the ‘unsettlement’ of faith, has the capacity to be integrated into a life of faith, its radical 
reverberations re-interpreted and re-accommodated by Judaeo-Christian theology. 
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The lives of the Ames family suggest the wide range of religious and politico-
philosophical impacts stemming from The Essence of Christianity. The book’s atheism, its 
conception of man’s psychological self-definition based in his or her relationship with others 
and his or her understanding of the human species as an ‘object of thought’,2 its demand for a 
‘confession, that the consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the 
species’3 which will usher in ‘a turning point of history’,4 its emphasis on empirical realism 
rather than impirical idealism, as well as its dialogic method of argument are thought to have 
helped to define such disparate intellectual developments as the materialism of Marx and 
Engels and the psychological analyses of Freud. It is also seen as influencing strands of early 
twentieth century theology, along with the Higher Criticism, through the work of existential 
theologians such as Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and others.
5
 Barth epitomises 
the contradictoriness of responses to Feuerbach. In his 1957 introductory essay to Das Wesen 
des Christentums, he argued both that Feuerbach’s subjectivism was a significant liberating 
influence on nineteenth century theology and the development of his own theological views, 
and also (as Rosemary Ashton notes) that Feuerbach’s theory was ‘a platitude’, and ‘at 
bottom trite beyond compare’.6 
What Eliot found stimulating in Feuerbach’s ideas was his attempt not only to 
highlight Christianity’s contradictions, but to reconstruct out of its sense of the sacredness of 
human life and relationship, shorn of the illusions of religion, a type of humanist religion; a 
reinterpretation of Christianity as a religion of feeling which had started with philosopher-
theologians such as Schleiermacher.
7
 Feuerbach’s book provided Eliot with a less dessicated 
scepticism than Strauss’s view of Christianity’s claims. It combined a rational analysis of the 
psychological functions of religion with an acceptance of and interest in its emotional and 
psychological significance. It celebrated the central meaning of those human needs, 
emotional, rational, and behavioural, which found such resonance in the claims of 
Christianity, while still exposing their human basis and trajectory and rejecting their claims to 
a supernatural reality. Feuerbach claimed that religion was not an unveiling of the divine, but 
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was instead ‘the solemn unveiling of a man’s hidden treasures, the revelation of his intimate 
thoughts, the open confession of his love-secrets’,8 a revelatory function with parallels both 
with translation and with the type of psychological exploration Eliot was committed to 
writing in her novels, her ‘endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be capable 
of’,9 as she explained to Dr Joseph Paine in 1875. Feuerbach’s aim was to construct a way of 
making human relationship carry the force and emotional wealth of resonance which was 
once carried in and through the idea of the ‘sacred’. His ideas and their impact on European 
thought mirror Eliot’s own influence on the English novel, with her exploration of human 
relationship as the fulcrum of change both in wider society, and on individuals, through the 
depth, intensity and life-changing quality of relationships.  
Feuerbach’s belief in the sacred nature of relationship and its capacity to replace the 
function of the divine –‘Homo homini Deus est’10 - is reflected in Eliot’s narrators’ 
comprehensive understanding and judgement of their characters, and the narrators’ insistence 
on the necessity of readers thinking analytically about the processes of their thoughts and 
feelings. Feuerbach’s interest in the psychology of relationship left a lacuna over the nature 
of moral action itself. Eliot, however, was interested on the nature of ‘goodness’. Her 
exploration of a good life and its relationship to Feuerbach’s ideas of the ‘sacred’ are 
discussed later in this chapter, but principally in Chapter 3, dealing with her novels’ 
exploration of the implications of Spinoza’s ethical system.  
In this chapter, I will assess how Eliot responded to Feuerbach’s ideas as she worked 
on her translation, and explore the way in which Feuerbach used translation as a metaphor for 
his argument, contrasting this with Eliot’s own ideas and metaphors about translation, those 
of transmission and transmutation. I will explore  how Feuerbach’s dialogic presentation of 
his argument through identification followed by criticism reflects ideas about translation 
discussed in the introduction, and how this approach is echoed and reinterpreted in Eliot’s 
fiction. Finally, I will discuss how Feuerbach’s ideas about feeling, understanding, 
relationship and the new humanist sense of the sacred are given secondary translation and 
reinterpretation in Eliot’s novels.  
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Eliot’s Response to Feuerbach’s Ideas as his Translator 
  
In The Essence of Christianity, Eliot found a development of Strauss’s idea of 
substituting humanity for the figure of Jesus, whose metamorphosis into a divine figure was, 
Strauss had argued, derived from human myth-making tendencies and expectations: 
 
[....] is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far 
higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realisation, than when I 
single out one man as such a realisation?
11
  
 
 
Feuerbach’s intense engagement with the human religious impulse and his hypothesis about 
the psychological roots and anthropological function of religion had already created a stir in 
Germany. In 1854, as the translation got underway, Eliot told Sara Hennell that: 
 
Your impression of the book exactly corresponds to its effect in Germany. It is 
considered the book of the age there, but Germany and England are two countries. 
People here are as slow to be set on fire as a stomach.
12
 
 
 
No doubt she hoped that an effective English translation would liberate the same powerful 
response as in Germany.  Her letters to Sara between January and May 1854 discuss some of 
the challenges in translating Feuerbach’s ideas effectively, revealing a translator’s 
combination of identification and judgement.  The identification was with Feuerbach’s ideas, 
and the judgement emerges through her frustration with his expression of them, particularly 
in his Preface and Appendix, as discussed in the previous chapter. Her letter hints that she 
was already thinking about how she, in contrast, would choose to express such ideas: 
 
With the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree, but of course I should, of myself, 
alter the phraseology considerably.
 13
 
In May, she was more specific about her criticisms of the style of the Appendix as ‘abstract 
and Germanised’ and imprecise:  
 
The laxity of Feuerbach’s language is particularly tiresome in the 2d §. I am obliged 
to translate sensation in one place and emotion in another.
14
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Eliot’s emphasis on ‘the important and accessible matter’ in the ‘2d 3d and 4th sections of the 
Appendix’15 is significant as the ideas amplified there relate to many of the concepts which 
proved to be most interesting to her. Feuerbach’s Appendix, Section [§] 2, discusses the 
significance of feeling, and its function in creating social relationships, in validating 
individual experience, and in providing an apparent, subjective assurance of God’s existence. 
Eliot’s emphasis on the laxity of Feuerbach’s language in relation to important distinctions of 
meaning indicate how troubling she found her decisions as translator, where literal 
equivalence needed to be sacrificed in order to express Feuerbach’s meaning with precision 
and with ‘fidelity [....] in interpreting another man’s mind’.16  
 
Sensations man has in isolation; feelings only in community. Only in sympathy does 
sensation rise into feeling. [....]. 
The last refuge of theology therefore is feeling. God is renounced by the 
understanding; he has no longer the dignity of a real object, of a reality which imposes 
itself on the understanding; hence he is transferred to feeling; in feeling his existence 
is thought to be secure. [....].  
The certainty of God is here nothing else than the self-certainty of human feeling, 
[....].
17
 
 
 
Eliot’s obligation ‘to translate sensation in one place and emotion in another’18 relates to this 
section.  Susan Hill argues that these discriminations demonstrate her fidelity to the original, 
but also ‘the translator’s desire creatively to transform that text’.19 While this is a possible 
interpretation, I would argue that Eliot’s concern here is not with transformation but with 
clarity. Her emphasis on the distinctions in English meaning is reinforced by a translator’s 
footnote which she added to section 4. It underlines her interest in Feuerbach’s discussion of 
feeling and her sense of the inconsistencies of his nomenclature: 
 
Here follows in the original a distinction between Herz, or feeling directed towards 
real objects, and therefore practically sympathetic; and Gemüth, or feeling directed 
towards imaginary objects, and therefore practically unsympathetic, self-absorbed. 
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But the verbal distinction is not adhered to in the ordinary use of the language, or, 
indeed, by Feuerbach himself; [....].
20
 
 
 
Eliot’s efforts to render Feuerbach’s thought with more consistent differentiation than 
that provided in the original text suggest how important the ideas seemed to her. Feuerbach’s 
analyses of feeling and its definition of the individual through social interaction have an 
immediate relevance to novels such as Silas Marner, describing the protagonist’s 
diminishment by solitude and rehumanisation through relationship.
21
 Hill comments that 
these explicit choices by Eliot indicate ‘her role as faithful translator and reveal[s] her 
interpretive presence in the text.’22 However, I would argue that they also indicate Eliot’s 
personal emphases, the nexus of her interests in Feuerbach’s ideas and her attempt to 
confront them precisely. 
Section 4 of the Appendix discusses the relationship between reason and feeling and 
provides a counterpoint with Eliot’s writings which suggest a Spinozistic immanence in 
creation. Feuerbach’s discussion of the nature of reason seems here to have parallels with the 
‘blessedness’ of Spinoza’s ‘intellectual love of God’,23 and, in ways similar to Spinoza’s, to 
fuse the language of philosophical analysis with the terminology of religion:  
 
Reason is the self-consciousness of the species, as such; [....].
24
  
Reason is thus the all-embracing, all-compassionating being, the love of the universe 
to itself. To reason alone belongs the great work of the resurrection and restoration of 
all things and beings—universal redemption and reconciliation. Not even the 
unreasoning animal, the speechless plant, the unsentient stone, shall be excluded from 
this universal festival. But how would it be possible that reason should interest itself 
in all beings without exception, if reason were not itself universal and unlimited in its 
nature? 
25
 
 
 
Feuerbach’s celebration of reason’s transcendence of materiality is transformed later in the 
section to suggest that fusion of intellect and emotion which Eliot advocates in novels such as 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda:  
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And, in fact, feeling, the heart of man as a rational being, is as infinite, as universal as 
reason; since man only truly perceives and understands that for which he has 
feeling.
26
 
 
 
The significance of the early appendices and their ideas can be judged from the close 
translation Eliot made from Feuerbach’s imagery conveying reason’s aspirational embrace of 
‘the unreasoning animal, the speechless plant, the unsentient stone,’ into the narrator’s 
famous and ambiguous meditation in Middlemarch about the consequences of fusing ‘vision 
and feeling’.  
 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing 
the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies 
on the other side of silence.
27
 
 
 
The Middlemarch meditation uses the same categories as Feuerbach, but infuses them with a 
greater particularity and specificity. It translates them from scientific categories into 
particular lived experiences. I shall be using this famous passage from Middlemarch to 
explore, in this chapter and the next, the ways in which Eliot transforms both Feuerbach’s 
and Spinoza’s ideas, giving them particular and specific fictional life and interpretation. 
 
Metaphors of Translation, Transmission and Transmutation 
 
 
The Essence of Christianity examines a range of Christian doctrines and their 
emotional and intellectual impact, before analysing how these doctrines fulfil human 
psychological needs. Identification with religion’s role and emotional resonance is followed 
by a rationalising deconstruction of its psychological function: subjective experience is 
deconstructed by objective analysis of it. Just as Strauss had demythologised religious text 
and dogma, before resurrecting the ideas as mythic truths, Feuerbach explained subjective 
experience as an objective psychological phenomenon, an approach which was developed in 
the work of psychologists and anthropologists, such as William James (The Varieties of 
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Religious Experience),
28
 and James Frazer (The Golden Bough)
29
 at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
In his Preface to the second edition of his book, Feuerbach’s justification of his 
arguments in the face of the furore they had already produced uses the metaphor of 
translation to explain his refutation of any supernatural or divine elements of religion.  
 
[....] it is to be hoped that readers whose eyes are not sealed will be convinced and will 
admit, even though reluctantly, that my work contains a faithful, correct translation of 
the Christian religion out of the Oriental language of imagery into plain speech. And it 
has no pretension to be anything more than a close translation, or, to speak literally, 
an empirical or historic-philosophical analysis, a solution to the enigma of the 
Christian religion.
30
 
 
 
His defence that his work ‘contains a faithful, correct translation of the Christian religion’ 
claims an attention to original biblical texts and liturgy analogous to that of their translations 
into vernacular languages from the 14
th
 century onwards.  His additional self-deprecating 
claim that his work had ‘no pretension to be anything more than a close translation’ implies 
that translation is able to provide a ‘close’ or exact equivalence between the original ‘oriental 
imagery’ and contemporary ‘plain speech’. In considering this claim, Susan Hill argues that 
his ‘equation of  “faithful translation” with “analysis” and “solution” denies that translation 
can be a simple linguistic process’.31 Rather, I suggest, it anticipates descriptions of the 
complexity of the process of translation, such as Grossman’s description of it as a 
‘penetrating [....] critic[ism]’.32  Translation, in Feuerbach’s defence of his motives and 
position, is portrayed as a secondary, faithfully derivative activity, re-veiling the radical and 
unsettling significance of his ideas and deflecting accusations of a direct assault on religion. 
Further on, the nature of the project to translate ‘oriental imagery’ into ‘plain speech’ 
is  elaborated, as one which also translates or ‘interprets’ actual human experience into 
thought about its psychological significance. His analysis claims to speak ‘in the language of 
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men, not an empty, unknown tongue’,33 and to be based on scientific empiricism, rather than 
Idealism, ‘in direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy’.34  
 
This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of Spinoza, not the ego of 
Kant and Fichte, [....] not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract, merely 
conceptional being, but a real being, the true Ens realissimum – man; its principle, 
therefore, is in the highest degree positive and real. It generates thought from the 
opposite of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses [....].
35
  
I, on the contrary, let religion itself speak; I constitute myself only its listener and 
interpreter, not its prompter. Not to invent, but to discover, ‘to unveil existence,’ has 
been my sole object; to see correctly my whole endeavour.
36
 
 
 
On one hand, he represents his work as a derivative translation of Biblical and exegetical 
metaphor, and, on the other, as a translation of religion’s manifestations into an 
understanding of the human needs from which they arose.  Feuerbach aimed to reveal the 
sources and meaning of actions and attitudes which had become detached from their origins 
in subjective experience.  His adoption of  ‘a faithful, correct translation’ [eine getreue, 
richtige Übersetzung] or ‘a close translation’ [eine sinngetreue Übersetzung]37 as appropriate 
metaphors for the task of retrieving cogent, contemporary meaning from the language of 
religious metaphor, human psychological truth from the belief systems and practice of 
religion, and, in particular, his insistence on the primacy of lived experience in ‘unveiling’, as 
well as ‘generating’ and validating deductions quasi-scientifically, found resonance in Eliot’s 
own thought.  In an 1875 letter to Dr Joseph Frank Payne, she set out her belief that novels 
should ‘generate thought from the opposite of thought’ or, in her own formulation, be ‘an 
endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be capable of [....] clothed [....] in some 
human figure and individual experience’, and alluded to the dichotomies between empirical 
science, theorisation, and the synthesis of art: 
 
[....] my writing is simply a set of experiments in life -  an endeavour to see what our 
thought and emotion may be capable of - [….]. I become more and more timid - with 
less daring to adopt any formula which does not get itself clothed for me in some 
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human figure and individual experience, and perhaps that is a sign that if I help others 
to see at all it must be through that medium of art.
38
   
 
 
It is clear that both Feuerbach and Eliot rejected any simple imposition of an 
intellectual pattern on human experience. Ideas had to be derived, empirical, find their own 
metaphors, provide ‘translations’ of human experience from one medium to another. In 
Feuerbach’s case, translation was also revelation, an exploration of the roots of dogmatic 
teaching, not in the divine, but in psychological truth and human experience. In Eliot’s case 
the formula, the diagram, the engraved outline had to be retranslated through the complexities 
of human experience, psychological self-discovery, and interchange between the mental 
languages of other human beings.  They both saw literal and metaphorical translation as the 
key to broadening understanding and finding equivalence.  
In her final novel, Daniel Deronda, Eliot transfers Feuerbach’s intellectual process of 
translation, or the revelation of the psychological rationale for religious ideation, into the 
embodied dramas of ‘transmission’ and ‘transmutation’. The words identify how people’s 
lives can be changed by each other, by novels, or even by incomprehensible Hebrew poetry. 
Transmission is presented as a creation of shared meaning, born out of relationship, a 
mysterious process, part intellectual, part emotionally intuitive. Mordecai talks of the ‘great 
Transmitters’39 in the history of Judaic thought, and his life is devoted to finding a worthy 
recipient to whom to transmit his own visionary ideas. ‘Transmutation’, on the other hand, is 
how Deronda describes the impact one person can have on another’s life. 
 
“But was it beautiful for Bouddha to let the tiger eat him?” said Amy. [....] 
Deronda [....] defended the myth. “It is like a passionate word [....]. It is an 
extreme image of what is happening every day – the transmutation of self.”40 
 
 
The novel traces the transmissions, or creations of shared meaning between Mordecai, Mirah 
and Deronda, and the changes, or transmutations, characters generate in each other. 
Grandcourt and Deronda are the negative and positive catalysts for change in Gwendolen’s 
life. Mordecai and Mirah transmit their ideas and also deliver the transmutation of Deronda 
from an adopted member of the English upper class into a Jewish political leader. In contrast, 
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Grandcourt’s spiritual and emotional atrophy remains aloof from any shared meaning, or 
receptiveness to transmutation. 
The sharing of meaning by individuals and societies is explored through Mordecai’s 
attempts to transmit the significance of a cultural and religious tradition through teaching a 
Hebrew poem to young Jacob Cohen. The subject of the poem, presented in an English 
translation described as ‘something like’ the meaning of the Hebrew original, is the 
mysterious internality of human conscience and its perception of the sacred, (‘Shut beneath in 
silent awful speech/   The Law lies graven’41), lines which in their conjunction of 
contradictory sense images dislocate rational understanding and demand intuitive 
comprehension. They parallel the epigraph of the novel, ‘Let thy chief terror be of thine own 
soul’,42 and the novel’s treatment of Gwendolen’s and Deronda’s spiritual crises. 
Transmission for Mordecai becomes an attempt to establish a language within which the 
meanings of ‘silent awful speech’ become perceptible; the language he uses –Hebrew - is 
‘unintelligible’ to Jacob – and its approximate translation (‘verses with a meaning something 
like this’43) is into a solemn and hieratic language which, the narrator suggests, is like the 
poetry of Yehuda Halevi.
44
 
Such transmission is a process by-passing the reason and involving a complex 
emotional osmosis:  
 
“The boy will get them engraved within him," thought Mordecai; "it is a way of 
printing." 
None readier than Jacob at this fascinating game of imitating unintelligible words; 
[....]. Yet he [Mordecai] waited with such patience as a prophet needs, and began his 
strange printing again undiscouraged on the morrow, saying inwardly — 
"My words may rule him some day. Their meaning may flash out on him. It is so with 
a nation —after many days."45 
 
 
Just as his poem talked of the internal Law lying ‘graven’ beyond human attempts to 
articulate a language for it, words which also echoed the biblical imagery of the revelation of 
ethical law to humanity, Mordecai uses the metaphor of ‘engraving’ to describe 
transmission’s  process of assimilation and internalisation, with its meaning realised through 
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contingent association.  The words ‘engraved’ and ‘graven’ suggest clarity of outline, 
indissoluble impact, and the capacity for reproduction and wider transmission.  They recall a 
metaphor used by Eliot in her 1855 essay on translation in relation to her commendation of 
Schlegel’s translation’s ‘faithful adherence’ to Shakespeare:   
 
[....], and it is a high pleasure to track it in its faithful adherence to the original, just as 
it is to examine a fine engraving of a favourite picture.
46
 
 
 
The degree to which Eliot achieved a successful ‘transmission’ of ideas through her 
integration of individual experience with thought about its significance has been the subject 
of critical ambivalence. Henry James notably managed both to acclaim her success and to 
remain equivocal about its impact. In an 1873 review of Middlemarch, noting Eliot’s 
commitment to realism and its theoretical and intellectual sources, he wrote: 
 
The author has commissioned herself to be real, her native tendency being that of an 
idealist, and the intellectual result is a very fertilizing mixture. The constant presence 
of thought, of generalizing instinct, of brain, in a word, behind her observation, gives 
the latter its great value [....]. 
47
 
 
 
In contrast with Eliot’s own emphasis on the primacy of ‘some human figure and individual 
experience’, 48 James’s 1885 review of her life claimed that:  
 
[....] she proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; [....] her figures and situations are 
evolved, [....], from her moral consciousness, and are only indirectly the products of 
observations. They are deeply studied and elaborately justified, but they are not seen 
in the irresponsible plastic way. The world was, first and foremost, for George Eliot, 
the moral, the intellectual world; the personal spectacle came after; [....].  
 
 
Yet the same article identifies Eliot’s combination of moral vision with sympathy for the 
individual as the essence of her success:  
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Nothing is finer, in her genius, than the combination of her love of general truth and 
love of the special case; [....].
49
 
 
 
James’s ambiguous views about Eliot’s creation of worlds where thought about the 
significance of experience is integral to and delimited by that experience, in a parallel 
movement to that of Feuerbach’s anti-Hegelian generation of ‘thought’ and meaning from 
‘existence’ and from the ‘activity of the senses’,50 points to an area which remains critically 
debated, the tensions between realism, form, and some of the ideological intentions informing 
Eliot’s fiction. Amanda Adamson has defended Eliot’s ‘conscious enactment’ of moral and 
philosophical thought:  
 
Beyond her critique of undesirable forms of theory and abstraction, then, stands a far 
more demanding attempt to represent her moral-philosophical views as a consciously 
enacted form of life [....]. Across the novels, a number of individual characters 
represent [....] a significant moral struggle to enact ideals, one punctuated by errors or 
lapses.
51
 
 
 
Such defences are underlined by the views of philosophers themselves. Iris Murdoch argued 
compellingly in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals that the novel ‘is an ethical form 
dedicated to truth of seeing.’52  A contemporary philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, has also 
argued that fiction has a unique role to play in the analysis of certain ethical problems, and 
that the particularities of the conjunction of moral choice with circumstance can best be 
explored through fiction:  
 
[....] there may be some views of the world and how one should live in it, [....] that 
emphasise [....] its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty, 
that cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophic 
prose, [....], but only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more 
allusive, more attentive to particulars.
 53
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The Influence of Feuerbach’s Style 
 
Feuerbach’s book is divided into two parts. The first traces, then unpicks, the 
congruence of human feeling, understanding and will (‘to will, to love, to think, are the 
highest powers, are the absolute nature of man as man, and the basis of his existence’54) with 
Christian revelation and doctrine; the second aims to expose the contradictions and 
psychological self-deceptions inherent in religious faith, with specific reference to 
Christianity. The construction of Part 1 of the book as a dialogue between sympathy and 
analysis, between an intense engagement with the viewpoint and feelings of the religious, 
followed by an intellectual distancing and a critique of that viewpoint, offered Eliot the ‘truth 
of feeling’55 she required as well as intellectual rigour. It also underlines Feuerbach’s 
conception of it as an act of translation – the presentation of the original religious language 
with its human emotional resonances followed by its reasoned translation into the 
psychological projections of human need it represents. 
Knoepflmacher comments that Feuerbach’s language retained ‘some of the poetry of 
the old belief’.56 Just as in prophetic books and epistles, Feuerbach’s style is designed to 
inspire, convince, and engender a sense of shared emotion. Robinson’s character, John Ames, 
mentioned earlier, celebrates his response to the ‘wonderful’ or ‘marvellous’ presentations of 
religious emotion in The Essence of Christianity. As discussed in the introduction, Eliot also 
makes use of the allusive richness of the vocabulary of Judaeo-Christianity in order to 
suggest the enduring realities of human experience to be inherited by post-Christian ideas. 
Aspects of Feuerbach’s style are also crucial to his ideas and are a way of realising them. I 
shall consider the influence of two aspects on Eliot; his dialogue with the reader, and his 
advocacy of interruption as a route to experiencing the ‘uncommon significance’ of ‘the 
ordinary course of things’.57 
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i) The Dialogue with the Reader 
 
The dialogic nature of Feuerbach’s argument suggests the internal ‘I and thou’ 
conversation, identified in his ‘Introduction’ as the dynamic of thought and creator of 
objective self-understanding:  
 
Man is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this 
reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is 
an object of thought.
58
 
 
 
This internal dialogue of thought is translated into a conversation between the author and the 
reader, whose putative views are alternately invoked and satirised, in a process of clarifying 
and revising existing misconceived patterns of thought and feeling. Feuerbach demands 
agreement through his use of the first and second persons of ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’, as well as setting 
out a more impersonal, analytical argument mainly expressed in the third person. In Part 1, he 
frequently enters into a persona, both impassioned and manipulative, a proselytising, 
subjective, feeling ‘I’, apparently convinced of traditional understandings of Christian 
dogma, only to withdraw sharply and deconstruct or translate its assumptions later in the 
chapter or even section. In the chapters, ‘The Mystery of the Incarnation’ and ‘The Mystery 
of the Suffering God’, he writes: 
 
[....]: God is a God who loves me – who loves man in general. Here lies the emphasis, 
the fundamental feeling of religion. The love of God makes me loving; the love of 
God to man is the cause of man’s love to God; the divine love causes, awakens human 
love. “We love God because he first loved us.” 59 
 
 
These emotionally-charged first-person sentences are followed by a more detached and 
questioning reflection: 
 
Is not the love of God to man – the basis and central point of religion – the love of 
man to himself made an object, contemplated as the highest objective truth, as the 
highest being to man?
60
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A similar pattern of passionate identification followed by a move to rational detachment is 
found in discussing Christ’s suffering: 
 
Is not what God my Lord does my model? [....]. Do I not also know the history of his 
suffering? Should it be an object of cold remembrance to me, or even an object of 
rejoicing, because it has purchased my salvation? Who can think so—who can wish to 
be exempt from the sufferings of his God? 
61
 
 
 
These sentences are answered a paragraph later by a more detached, third person voice: 
 
        God suffers, means in truth nothing else than: God is a heart. [....]. The mystery of the 
suffering God is therefore the mystery of feeling, sensibility. A suffering God is a 
feeling, sensitive God. But the proposition: God is a feeling Being, is only the 
religious periphrase of the proposition: feeling is absolute, divine in its nature.
 62
 
 
 
In this latter quotation, Feuerbach again makes explicit that his switch from first to 
third person voices, from the language of religious emotion to the language of psychological 
analysis, from the mode of sympathy and feeling to the mode of detachment and thought, is 
analogous to a translation or ‘periphrase’ of one to the other, and a representation of the 
demands of the act of translation, empathy and judgement. His use of the process of 
translation as an image for his project has clear parallels with Eliot’s own quasi-religious 
language describing her conception of translation and its emphasis on combining fidelity and 
interpretation: 
 
[....] the rigid fidelity, and the sense of responsibility in interpreting another man’s 
mind [....].
63
 
 
In his critique of Colin McCabe’s argument that Eliot’s narrator’s metalanguage 
controls readers’ reactions,64 David Lodge suggests, without elaboration, that ‘the narrator’s 
discourse in Eliot’s fiction is modelled on the ‘I-thou speech situation [.…]’.65 I would argue 
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further that Feuerbach’s rhetorical machinery, his transitions between passages of 
sympathetic feeling and passages of detached commentary is reflected in the alternations of 
narrative stance displayed in Eliot’s fictional presentation of her ‘experiments in life’. 
Whereas Feuerbach’s third-person voice is one of detached human understanding in dialogue 
with, and often in contrast to, the impassioned feeling of his first-person voice, Eliot’s third-
person narrative voice is a synthesis of sympathetic feeling and rational judgement. It is, as I 
have suggested, the voice of the translator emerging from behind the translation.  
The voice has been the subject of considerable critical attention, with debates about 
omniscience, polyvocalism and its implications for Eliot’s use of realist conventions, and 
with Lodge and McCabe debating the extent to which it controls readers’ reactions or insists 
on their engagement in thought.
66
  Eliot’s technique of free indirect discourse and her views 
about the role of sympathy have been explored by critics such as Suzy Anger.
67
 I would argue 
that as well as being the voice of the translator behind the text, it is a representation of the 
‘emotional intellect’ at work, Eliot’s translation of Feuerbach’s identification of feeling and 
understanding as human ‘perfections’ which allow the perception of ‘the perfection, the 
infinitude of his species, [....] whether as an object of feeling, of conscience, or the thinking 
consciousness’.68 The main flow of Eliot’s narratives is presented through just such a voice of 
the ‘thinking consciousness’, but they are interrupted by passages of another narrative voice, 
that of an ‘I’ who demands a direct engagement with readers, and exaggerates, satirises, or 
demands that readers analyse their responses. Just as Feuerbach demands that the reader 
reconsider the focus and nature of their emotions objectively to gain self-understanding, so 
Eliot also demands that her reader becomes ‘an object of’ his or her own ‘thinking 
consciousness’, and achieves a greater measure of self-understanding.  
 
ii) Interruption 
 
Hardy’s identification of moments of disillusion,69 Carroll’s analysis of the collapse 
of Eliot’s characters’ world view,70 and Levine’s emphasis on the experience of 
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destabilisation
71
 all point to those moments in Eliot’s novels where characters lose a habitual 
way of thinking and growth or change is enforced upon them. In my introduction, I suggested 
that this could echo the pain of Eliot’s loss of faith and her troubled experience of translating 
Strauss, but it is also for her a way of shedding misconception and discovering the real.  It 
echoes Feuerbach’s insistence that the ‘uncommon significance’ or a sense of the sacred in 
the ‘ordinary course of things’72 can only be discovered  through ‘interruption’ of a sense of 
normality, through entering into the perceptions and world of another, as would a translator, 
according to Edith Grossman.   
Eliot’s narrator’s switch of person and voice, and use of sudden interruptions to the 
flow of narrative, and the dramatic switches between subjective and objective within 
Feuerbach’s dialogues thus reflect similar authorial purposes. Eliot argued that a 
reinterpretation of the ordinary through a realistic picture of human life: 
 
[....] such as a great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that 
attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the raw material of 
moral sentiment.
73
 
 
 
Both she and Feuerbach emphasised the function of ‘interruption’ or ‘surprise’ as a method of 
finding significance or even meaning ‘to that which is apart from themselves’.  Where Eliot 
seems to further develop Feuerbach’s idea is in linking attention to ‘what is apart from 
themselves’ to a growing moral awareness.  Feuerbach argues that sympathy and love negate 
‘abstract moral rectitude’.74 Eliot’s novels are concerned with translating good from 
abstraction into the reality of human experience, but in mysterious ways they also emphasise 
the contribution of human action to the requirements of an abstraction, formulated  by 
Mordecai, for example, as ‘Eternal Goodness’.75 
One of Eliot’s methods of securing surprise uses the alternation of voice and address 
used by Feuerbach. One such alternation of third person, free indirect discourse, expressing 
detached understanding, with a challenging direct address to the reader, can be found in 
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Middlemarch’s famous description of Dorothea’s emotional chaos during her honeymoon in 
Rome.  
 
[....]: all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and spiritual, mixed confusedly 
with the signs of breathing forgetfulness and degradation, at first jarred her as with an 
electric shock, and then urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of 
confused ideas which check the flow of emotion. [....]; and in certain states of dull 
forlornness Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St. Peter's, [....], the 
excited intention in the attitudes and garments of the prophets and evangelists in the 
mosaics above, and the red drapery which was being hung for Christmas spreading 
itself everywhere like a disease of the retina.
76
  
 
 
Both Scholl
77
 and Hardy
78
 have noted the conflation of Dorothea’s response to Rome with 
her sexual disappointment, but I would argue that the complex imagery suggested by a third-
person narrator, who seems to understand Dorothea’s emotional confusion and to expect the 
same understanding from the reader, also provides an epic analogy for her disappointed 
ambitions for a life of loving intellectual endeavour, through its descriptions of analogous 
disjunctions of spiritual and intellectual experience, and contrasts of past intention (‘the 
excited intention [....] of the prophets’) with a present pathological perception (‘disease of the 
retina’) offered by western Christendom and western civilisation itself. The 
comprehensiveness of psychological understanding and cultural allusion displayed by this 
third person voice and its commentary is disrupted by a more challenging and subversive first 
person voice:  
 
Nor can I suppose that when Mrs. Casaubon is discovered in a fit of weeping six 
weeks after her wedding, the situation will be regarded as tragic. Some 
discouragement, some faintness of heart at the new real future which replaces the 
imaginary, is not unusual, and we do not expect people to be deeply moved by what is 
not unusual. That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not 
yet wrought itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could 
hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, 
it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die 
of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk 
about well wadded with stupidity. 
79
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I have already noted the much more specific echoing of Eliot’s translation of Feuerbach’s 
Appendix, section 4. But this voice, just like Feuerbach’s first person voices, addresses the 
reader directly, drawing them into a collusive relationship with its conclusions (‘we do not 
expect’, ‘if we had a keen vision’, ‘we should die’, ‘the quickest of us’), yet simultaneously 
distancing and ironising that collusion. In contrast to the detached understanding of the third 
person narrator, and its analogies suggesting a tragic-heroic scale to Dorothea’s 
disappointment, the first person voice challenges sympathy as too facile and conventional 
emotional wisdom as too cynical, destabilising and enforcing the reader to work out how his 
or her views are being manipulated. This voice ambivalently diminishes the scale of 
Dorothea’s tragedy, and the reader’s capacity for sympathy. Simultaneously requiring and 
denying the possibility of the reader attaining Feuerbachian ‘keen vision and feeling of all 
ordinary human life’, the narrator finally enforces a further recognition of a shared emotional 
‘stupidity’. Yet again, reflecting the demands of translation and Feuerbach’s analyses, Eliot 
seems to demand both identification and judgement, emotional vision and rational 
assessment, and the disconcerting switches between these modes are designed to make the 
reader think about the origins and effects of sympathy, and to question him or herself as well 
as the narrative. Lodge argues that Eliot’s authorial commentary ‘constantly forces’ the 
reader ‘to think for himself, and constantly implicates him in the moral judgements being 
formulated’.80 But in the Middlemarch passage quoted above, it is the very uncertainty about 
viewpoint which is significant. The reader is forced to hold in tension an understanding of the 
ordinariness of characters or their fates, besides an understanding of their subjective 
significance.  
A similar dislocation of attitudes occurs in Adam Bede where Hetty’s emotional 
triviality is initially emphasised by the narrator in direct addresses to the reader. This 
impression undergoes subtle change as minor characters describe her during her journeys in 
hope and in despair.
81
  Hetty, like Gwendolen in Daniel Deronda, becomes the ‘slenderer, 
more insignificant thread’82 of vain egoism on which Eliot assembles her accounts of deepest 
human grief and despair, of the enormity of moral responsibility and punishment, and 
invokes, like Feuerbach, mankind’s psychic need of a ‘Suffering God’ to provide strength in 
the tasting of ‘the bitterest of life’s bitterness’. 83 I suggest that Eliot’s determination to make 
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the reader think is intensified by the interchange between third person indirect narrative and 
first person interrogation of reaction and viewpoint, and that we, as readers, have to 
understand that our views are always contingent and may have new perspectives enforced on 
them. 
As discussed in my introduction, Eliot’s engagement with Feuerbach’s ideas, and the 
ways in which her novels examine their implications for the lives of individuals and their 
communities, has been the subject of considerable critical discussion. I shall look at the ways 
in which Eliot both embraced and critiqued a number of his ideas, including the internal 
dialogue of thought, the dialogue between ‘I and thou’ as a catalyst of change, and the sacred 
nature of relationship. 
 
The Influence of Feuerbach’s Internal Dialogue of Thought  
 
As I have demonstrated, the dialogue with the reader as a ‘thou’, with ideas to be 
adjusted through exposure to the various voices of the author or narrator, is a manifestation of 
one of Feuerbach’s central ideas about the significance of human relationship in defining 
ourselves and our ideas about our world.  In his introduction to The Essence of Christianity, 
however, he identifies another type of dialogue which, he argues, demarcates human 
consciousness from that of the rest of the animal kingdom, the ability to engage in a creative 
internal dialogue, producing ideas, abstractions, and an understanding of the world beyond 
the self because of the human ability to conceptualise what it is to be human. ‘Man thinks - 
that is he converses with himself’,84 says Feuerbach and continues: 
 
Man is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, for this 
reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality, is 
an object of thought.
85
 
 
 
He ascribes to the internalised ‘I and thou’ dialogue the dynamism behind intellectual 
understanding of the world of the sensations; the sympathetic understanding or translation of 
the inner lives of other individuals and the recognition of the limits of selfhood; but, above all 
in this work, the ability to project from individual experience a conceptualisation of the 
capacities, emotional, intellectual and behavioural, of humanity as a whole, ‘the idea of man 
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as a species, [....], of humanity as a whole’.86 In The Essence of Christianity, the dual or even 
triple voices reflect the dissonances of the human internal dialogue, the dynamism and 
empowerment which can result from a divided self, and the creatively difficult relationship 
which humanity experiences in its attempts to reconcile the feeling unconscious with the 
reflecting, thinking consciousness.  Eliot’s translation of this division and dynamic can be 
detected in Daniel Deronda’s descriptions of Gwendolen’s emergent understanding of 
herself, from a perception that she has limitations which are the subject of Daniel’s critical 
intelligence, to a passionate internal questioning undermining her public self-possession,  a 
bravura which gives way to the sudden emergence of irrational yet premonitory states of 
subconscious dread. Similarly Eliot shows, through the merging of a character’s own 
articulation of his thoughts into the free indirect speech of the narrator, that process of 
internal question and answer of thought, described by Feuerbach: 
 
At least, Deronda argued, Mordecai's visionary excitability was hardly a reason for 
concluding beforehand that he was not worth listening to except for pity’s sake. 
Suppose he had introduced himself as one of the strictest reasoners: do they form a 
body of men hitherto free from false conclusions and illusory speculations? The driest 
argument has its hallucinations, too hastily concluding that its net will now at last be 
large enough to hold the universe. Men may dream in demonstrations, and cut out an 
illusory world in the shape of axioms, definitions, and propositions, with a final 
exclusion of fact signed Q.E.D. No formulas for thinking will save us mortals from 
mistake in our imperfect apprehension of the matter to be thought about. 
87
 
 
 
The voice changes from an apparent direct reportage of a character’s ideas (‘At least, 
Deronda argued, [....].’) to one which could be interpreted as a direct presentation of an 
internal dialogue (‘Suppose he had [....]. Do they form a body of men [....]?’) and, through 
these transmutations, to a voice which could be a fusion of indirect reportage of Deronda’s 
continued internal dialogue with the voice of the narrator.  Deronda’s dialogue with himself 
is initially presented through short questions, but the answer (‘The driest argument has its 
hallucinations, too hastily concluding that its net will now at last be large enough to hold the 
universe’), which could still be interpreted as Deronda’s own thoughts, begins a transition to 
a series of generalisations which increasingly take on the authority of a universalising 
philosophic voice, the voice of ‘us mortals’, the human species. Deronda’s voice has 
metamorphosed into that of a critical philosopher outside the narrative structure of the novel, 
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and the merging of both voices finally confronts and identifies the reader as one of ‘us 
mortals’, concluding that any of ‘our’ attempts at rationality hold their own pitfalls. The 
frequent merging of the narrator’s voice with that of Deronda’s thoughts and suppositions 
allows Deronda’s conversion from the rational analysis of an uncommitted ‘outsider’ to a 
perception that Mordecai might be an exemplar of a better way of unifying feeling and 
intellect, and ultimately to an identification with Mordecai’s cause.  
The ‘dialogue of the mind with itself’ was what Matthew Arnold detected at the root 
of the questioning of old certainties and the pessimism of ‘modern problems’, ‘the doubts’, 
‘the discouragement’ of ‘Hamlet and of Faust’.88 In contrast, Feuerbach presents the internal 
dialogue as the vehicle for and catalyst of human consciousness, of the capacity to imagine 
and generate abstract ideas, and, through the capacity to imagine, to act generously and even 
altruistically towards other people. The power of the idea of an internal dialogue, to Eliot as 
to Arnold, lay not only in its exploration of the springs of intellectuality, but also in its 
inherent dramatic qualities. The internal ‘I and thou’ dialogue of dramatic soliloquy had 
proved one of the most powerful methods of exposing a character in the act of thought, self-
discovery or self-revelation and of enticing an audience into understanding, judgement, or 
complicity. The act of translation had demanded, as Eliot had discovered, a conscious 
discipline in the ‘solemn unveiling’,89 the faithful understanding and judgement, of the mind 
of another human being, another ‘thou’. If Feuerbach had invoked Catholic imagery to 
describe his translation of the metaphors of religion into the psychological, ‘solemn 
unveiling’ of the human mind, Eliot’s 1855 essay on translation, published a year after her 
translation of The Essence of Christianity, transmutes this Catholic imagery through her more 
Protestant sensibility, but retains the solemnity of the engagement in an ‘I-thou’ relationship, 
in this case, the relationship of translator to source author:  
 
[....] the moral qualities especially demanded in a translator - the patience, the rigid 
fidelity, and the sense of responsibility in interpreting another man’s mind. 90 
 
 
Eliot’s experience, as translator, of the solemn duties of inhabiting and interpreting 
‘another man’s mind’ can be seen informing her construction of the lives of others in her 
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novels. For her, the novel offered a form sympathetic to the exploration and unveiling of the 
interplay between maturing comprehensions of selves and others, and a practical exercise in 
putting oneself ‘in the place of another’.91 It could present its characters judging, 
sympathising and changing viewpoint just as in drama, but it also allows a reflective 
interaction between narrator and reader, a capacity which Eliot exploited. Feuerbach’s sense 
of the complexity of human society and its interactions, as well as the possibilities of the self-
realisation of the human species, could also find expression through the novel’s capacity to 
explore both internal mental lives and their external, social interactions. 
Feuerbach argued that self-definition is a response to a consciousness of what it is to 
be human:  
 
It is true that the human being [....] can and must [....] feel and recognise himself to be 
limited; but he can become conscious of his limits, his finiteness, only because the 
perfection, the infinitude of his species, is perceived by him, whether as an object of 
feeling, of conscience, or the thinking consciousness.
92
 
 
 
The denouements of Middlemarch, Daniel Deronda, and Adam Bede all present a moment of 
realisation for a major character – Dorothea, Gwendolen, Adam, –  that their visions of 
themselves require a new consciousness to respond to the external forces of events, other 
people, and their own self-discoveries. The emergence of this adjustment is an epiphany 
coinciding with a humble recognition of the smallness of the claims of individual lives in 
comparison with the lot of humanity as a ‘species’. Suzy Anger argues that Feuerbach’s aim 
of ‘unveiling’ a shared reality between human beings became Eliot’s artistic aim also.93 
However, rather than driven by a Feuerbachian recognition of the ‘perfection, the infinitude’ 
of the species, Dorothea’s moment of decision as to how to act selflessly in relation to 
Rosamond, Lydgate and Will is accompanied by a vision of a suffering humanity’s life of 
‘labour and endurance’:  
 
"What should I do—how should I act now, this very day, if I could clutch my own 
pain, and compel it to silence, and think of those three?"  
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It had taken long for her to come to that question, [....]. [....]; and she felt the largeness 
of the world and the manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance.
94
 
 
In Daniel Deronda, Deronda similarly urges Gwendolen to look beyond herself and to 
address her life to the needs of others: 
 
But if you [....] made the unalterable wrong a reason for more effort towards a good 
that may do something to counterbalance the evil? [....]. Feeling what it is to have 
spoiled one life may well make us long to save other lives from being spoiled.
95
 
 
 
In Deronda’s own response to Mordecai, he himself exchanges his sense of personal ennui 
and the comfortable identity of ‘an English gentleman’ for service to a separate community, 
that of the European Jew, which Eliot uses as a microcosm of the ‘idea of man as a species, 
[....] of humanity as a whole’,96 where individualism gives way to community:  
 
Nay, it was conceivable that [....] Deronda might receive from Mordecai's mind the 
complete ideal shape of that personal duty and citizenship which lay in his own 
thought like sculptured fragments certifying some beauty yearned after but not 
traceable by divination.
97
 
 
 
The I - Thou Relationship as a Catalyst of Change  
A number of critics have been intrigued by the moments in Eliot’s novels in which 
characters apprehend a new understanding of their situation.  Barbara Hardy focuses on the 
moments in Eliot’s novels where day-time ‘disenchantment’ marks a ‘stage in 
metamorphosis’ from ‘the centre to the periphery, from the dream of self which filled the 
world to a reduced consciousness”.98 David Carroll locates the existential crisis in the 
collapse of a character’s ‘world view’ or preconceptions. Eliot’s experiments in life, he 
argues, ‘proceed by the testing, juxtaposing, comparing, and contrasting different ways of 
making sense of the world until coherence reaches its limit and breaks down into 
incoherence.’99 Caroline Levine argues that Eliot: 
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[....] shows herself persistently drawn to moments when imaginative habits are 
brought to a sudden stop, moments when readers and characters are startled into new 
perceptions of alterity [....], her realism works when it jolts the imagination into a 
properly feeling and knowing orientation toward the otherness of the world.
100
  
 
 
I suggest that each of these separate analyses identifies the moment when the ego discovers 
its limits. Feuerbach describes this discovery as being dependent on recognising the reality of 
a ‘thou’: 
 
[....]; but the first stone against which the pride of egoism stumbles is the thou, the 
alter ego. The ego first steels its glance in the eye of a thou before it endures the 
contemplation of a being which does not reflect its own image. My fellow-man is the 
bond between me and the world.
101
 
 
 
Eliot’s own allusion to surprise, mentioned earlier, forms part of the artist’s project to initiate 
in the reader ‘that attention to what is apart from themselves’ [my italics] which will form 
‘the raw material of moral sentiment.’102 In her novels, it is a destabilising discovery that 
there is more than the ‘I’ of unconstrained subjectivity, there is a Feuerbachian ‘thou’. In 
many of Eliot’s novels, characters become conscious of their limitations at a moment of 
critical self-reappraisal, precipitated as their personal myths are undermined by the stubborn 
refusal of reality or other people to play their expected parts.  Eliot echoes Feuerbach’s 
perception of these moments as also constituting a character’s move towards ‘bonds’ with the 
world beyond. 
The novels demonstrate the suffering caused by unchallenged, self-generated illusion, 
unchecked by the external reality of a ‘thou’, and also the humanity that evolves in 
confronting illusion and facing its moral consequences. Dorothea sets aside her illusions to 
find sympathy with the diminished reality of her husband’s predicament; and Arthur 
Donnithorne and Hetty are stripped of their frivolous illusions through the tragic impact of 
their actions on themselves and others.
103
 In Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen expects to charm 
and manipulate whomsoever she wishes on her own terms. The dramatic failure of her 
marriage and her betrayal of her husband’s former mistress precipitate the beginning of her 
own internal dialogue of self-discovery. The two male protagonists, Deronda, whose own 
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internal dialogue exploring his selfhood is incomplete, and Grandcourt, with his impermeable 
egotism preventing any exchange of understanding, function as her ‘thous’, offering a 
different vision from her own of her possibilities and limitations. While Deronda’s positive 
function is to open her eyes to the claims of the rest of humanity, Grandcourt, who, even 
more than Gwendolen, sees the world on his own terms, without any ‘thou’ allowed to 
intrude except as an instrument of gratification, is a warning of the dangers of extreme 
egotism: 
 
[....]; it [his marriage] had really brought more of aim into his life, new objects to 
exert his will upon; and he had not repented of his choice. His taste was 
fastidious, and Gwendolen satisfied it: [....].
104
 
 
 
His manipulative egotism forces her to recognise her own self-centredness:  
 
 
Any romantic illusions she had had in marrying this man had turned on her 
power of using him as she liked. He was using her as he liked.
105
 
 
 
The collision of their egos is portrayed as leading to Grandcourt’s death and, in Gwendolen’s 
case, a re-evaluation of her moral consciousness. Deronda’s becomes her ‘thou’, combining 
sympathy and judgement, helping her to translate her failure into a new sense of how to live.  
 Eliot explicitly alludes to Gwendolen’s ‘feelings’ about Deronda translating him 
‘without the aid of sacred ceremony [....] into a priest’.106 Their relationship suggests not only 
Feuerbach’s ‘I – thou’ path of self-discovery but also his insistence that types of human 
relationship assume sacred roles - ‘the relations of [....] man to man  - in short, all the moral 
relations are per se religious’.107  In her suggestions about how to understand the post-
Christian sacred, Eliot shows the evolution of relationship. In some novels, this role is 
translated through the intervention of one character on behalf of another, presented as a 
quasi-religious act requiring change of attitude: Dinah’s death cell prayers focus on Hetty’s 
illusions,
108
 Mrs Winthrop’s invitation to Silas is to rejoin the human community of Raveloe 
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and confront the injustices of the past,
109
 Philip Wakem continues his loving belief in Maggie 
after her involvement with Stephen.
110
 Eliot’s approach to the Feuerbachian concept of self-
definition through exposure to the reality of another person, and its depiction as a sacred 
recalibration of value, transcends the more usual nature of relationship within many novels, 
where illusions about self and others are presented as amusing stages en route to greater 
maturity. Austen, for example, relieves her heroines of their illusions about their own 
emotions and other people without the consequences becoming tragic. Gwendolen’s marital 
opportunities in relation to a rich, cold, contemptuous man have tragic, violent consequences, 
which transform her from a brilliant but vain young woman into a tragic heroine, whereas the 
reader is invited to share in Lizzie Bennet’s more optimistic assessment of the romantic and 
material possibilities of Darcy and his Derbyshire estate.
111
 
 In Middlemarch, Dorothea’s disillusion with her early hopes of an emotionally and 
intellectually rewarding marriage, and her inner rebellion against the arid control of her future 
by the dying Casaubon lead to an intense rethinking of her beliefs and underpinning of her 
life’s purpose, which Eliot characterised as a continuing ‘devotedness’:  
 
It was too early yet for her [....] to have readjusted that devotedness which was so 
necessary a part of her mental life that she was almost sure sooner or later to recover 
it. Permanent rebellion, the disorder of a life without some loving reverent resolve, 
was not possible to her; [....].
112
 
 
 
Dorothea’s emotional recalibration is from an over-identification with the lives of others to a 
more just assessment of their needs and of her own. Ermarth observes that ‘she is the altruist 
whose example recommends egoism.’ 113 Dorothea’s journey is both a critique and a 
corroboration of that process of putting herself ‘in the place of another’,114 and of considering 
the ‘essential nature’ of those around her, 115 identified by Feuerbach as an essential capacity 
of human consciousness. She turns from her own sense of emotional loss to put herself in the 
place of Casaubon, and to experience his perception of his limitations beside her own, 
translating her initial mistaken illusions into a more prosaic and unheroic purpose:  
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And here Dorothea's pity turned from her own future to her husband's past—nay, to 
his present hard struggle with a lot which had grown out of that past: the lonely 
labour, the ambition breathing hardly under the pressure of self-distrust; the goal 
receding, and the heavier limbs; [....]! And had she not wished to marry him that she 
might help him in his life's labour?- But she had thought the work was to be 
something greater, [....].
116
 
 
 
The experience of the failure of sympathy and understanding within her marriage becomes 
for her an initiation into a new ‘religion’, one which appears to owe its conceptions only 
partially to Feuerbach and Spinoza:  
 
“That by desiring what is perfectly good, even when we don't quite know what it is 
and cannot do what we would, we are part of the divine power against evil—widening 
the skirts of light and making the struggle with darkness narrower.”117   
 
 
Dorothea’s idea of the ‘perfectly good’, and the ‘growing good of the world’118 claimed on 
her behalf by the narrator is an ambiguous anticipation of Mordecai’s metaphysical 
awareness of a moral world of ‘Eternal Goodness’ informing the world of human action, in 
this case Deronda’s and Mrs Meyrick’s care for Mirah: 
 
“The Eternal Goodness has been with you,” [....]. “You have helped to fulfil our 
mother’s prayer.”119 
 
 
A Critique of I-Thou 
 
Feuerbach had argued that it is through the social interaction that humans achieve 
self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and, even more importantly, the ability to make ‘his 
essential nature, and not merely his individuality, [....] an object of thought.’120 Eliot 
emphasises, in both Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, the practical difficulties of this 
process of imaginatively entering into the mind and life of another. Her characters are shown 
misunderstanding others, and wrestling with the limitations of their own ‘thinking 
consciousnesses’. These misunderstandings affect both individuals and communities, from 
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Adam’s and Arthur’s misunderstandings of Hetty, from Maggie’s sense that she is 
misunderstood by her family and community, from the perception that ‘people are almost 
always better than their neighbours think they are’121 articulated by Dorothea, to Deronda’s 
failure to imagine the nature of Gwendolen’s and Grandcourt’s relationship: 
 
[....] his imagination was as much astray about Grandcourt as it would have been 
about an unexplored continent where all the species were peculiar.
122
 
 
 
Grandcourt, in some respects the arch-manipulator, has no imaginative resources to identify 
with any precision the nature of Gwendolen’s despair: 
 
Grandcourt [....] had no imagination of anything in her but what affected the 
gratification of his own will; [....] and [....] was not likely to be infallible in his 
judgments concerning this wife who was governed by many shadowy powers, to him 
non-existent. He magnified her inward resistance, but that did not lessen his 
satisfaction in the mastery of it.
123
 
 
 
Each of the novels therefore shows characters and communities emerging from 
misapprehensions about each other, but not before these have been recognised as the cause of 
life-changing harm. If Feuerbach’s manifesto is essentially optimistic, assuming 
transformation is possible, Eliot shows how difficult it is, and how cruel illusions about 
others can be, in a way that owes much to Spinoza’s analyses to be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Eliot also explores the limits and focus of sympathetic understanding of another. I 
have already discussed the Middlemarch narrator’s ambiguous attitude towards the need for, 
and the difficulties of, achieving a balanced sympathy. In Daniel Deronda it is also seen 
ambivalently.  Characters who feel no responsibility or sympathy for the predicaments of 
others are judged by the novel, but Daniel also judges himself for his inconclusive and 
undirected sympathetic imagination.  
 
His imagination had so wrought itself to the habit of seeing things as they probably 
appeared to others, that a strong partisanship, unless it were against an immediate 
oppression, had become an insincerity for him. His plenteous, flexible sympathy had 
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ended by falling into one current with that reflective analysis which tends to 
neutralize sympathy. 
124
 
 
 
Eliot seems to be suggesting that sympathy loses its positive charge unless it can be 
prioritised by decisions based on understanding. But the process of prioritisation which, in 
Daniel’s case, is secured through his identity as a Jew also causes pain. Gwendolen is left 
without a structure of ‘sacred bonds’ to provide a network of hope for her future. Qualls has 
argued that Gwendolen is left with no tangible hope beyond endurance. He suggests that: 
 
God and the idea of Israel shape Deronda’s romance; Gwendolen lives in the 
“realism” of a deadened world.125 
 
 
Transmutation and Sacredness 
 
Characters in Eliot’s novels sense the power of other people’s ideas over them and 
how those ideas may transform them and their preconceptions. Some of these expected 
transmutations are based on delusions or illusions, as in the cases of Dorothea and Casaubon. 
In Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen and Deronda both discover their future through the moral or 
prophetic visions of others. In Gwendolen’s passionate search for a way of escaping her 
hatred of Grandcourt and her ‘terror of her own soul’, it is to Deronda’s combination of 
sympathy and judgement she turns for advice. Deronda’s own search for a cause to which to 
dedicate his life gradually and cautiously embraces Mordecai’s transformative vision of a 
future role for him as a surrogate spiritual and political leader. The emphasis in Daniel 
Deronda on the transmutation of self in the violent parable of Bouddha and the tiger suggests 
the pain and moral ambivalence of the process. The pain of transmutation is emphasised in 
Gwendolen’s moral and spiritual readjustment, which she recognises as an ‘uneasy, 
transforming process –all the old nature shaken to its depths’,126 flowing from her sense of 
guilt and initial attempt to imagine what Deronda might think of her: 
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No chemical process shows a more wonderful activity than the transforming influence 
of the thoughts we imagine to be going on in another.
127
 
 
 
Her attempt to anticipate and translate his possible judgement of her objectifies her own self-
distaste. Her attempted translation of the views of another person becomes an external 
validation of her inner concerns and a first step in the transformation of her moral awareness.  
The interaction of projection and internal transformation continues, Eliot showing that in 
human relationship, men and women fulfil Feuerbachian roles, almost literally as priestlike 
confessors without any ‘blessing of the priest.’128  
 
Without the aid of sacred ceremony or costume, her feelings had turned this man, only 
a few years older than herself, into a priest; [....]. 
Those who trust us educate us. And perhaps in that ideal consecration of 
Gwendolen’s, some education was being prepared for Deronda.129 
 
 
Eliot’s replacement of the concept of idealising consecration by that of transformative 
education is just one of her many adjustments of Feuerbach’s ideas, through translation of the 
idealising illusions and projections involved in establishing a human relationship into a more 
adequate Spinozan process of gaining knowledge. Shaffer argues that Deronda’s relationship 
with Gwendolen is evasive and treacherous.
130
 This is an extreme reading of the willing 
mutual deceptions and unarticulated clarifications of the relationship, but it is evident that 
Eliot did intend it to be read as a painfully transformative relationship for both characters.  
Up to his meeting with Mordecai, Daniel assumes roles which fuse priest, moral 
saviour, fairy tale hero, teacher, rescuer - both metaphorically and literally - of two women 
whom he either sees drowning (Mirah) or imagines to be metaphorically drowning 
(Gwendolen). His function as both confessor and counsellor is undertaken without any overt 
implication that they should be seen as expressing sacredness. His lessons focus on human 
interconnectedness: 
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“[....] - you know more of the way in which your life presses on others, and their life 
on yours. I don’t think you could have escaped the painful process in some form or 
other.”131 
 
 
This humanist, Feuerbachian mode of relationship, with its insistence that ‘there is no other 
essence which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as 
the absolute, than the essence of human nature itself’,132 is transformed by his meeting with 
Mordecai. The solemnity of Mordecai’s language of faith reinforces the ambiguities and 
possibilities of a mysterious alternative spiritual reality beyond the world of realist materiality 
which in turn alters perception of mundane human existence. Mordecai appeals to this other 
dimension, enmeshed with ordinary existence, as that of ‘the Eternal Goodness’,133 and his 
language of faith translates events in one world into indications of the purposes of the other: 
 
[....] bound together in that Omnipresence which is the place and habitation of the 
world, and events are as a glass wherethrough our eyes see some of the pathways.
134
 
 
 
The intersections of the world of faith with Eliot’s realist novel is reflected through 
relationships which assert human faith in each other, through acts to reclaim individuals from 
their isolated illusions, and through individuals perceiving that others believe they can 
transform themselves for the better. In Middlemarch this can be seen in Fred’s dependence on 
securing Mary Garth’s faith that he can be transformed. In describing Mrs Bulstrode’s 
decision to continue to share the life of her disgraced husband, Eliot provides a subtle 
translation of what neither character could translate for themselves, the imperfect, 
inarticulable nature of human sympathy and belief bridging an unattainable understanding 
and transcending any judgement: 
 
His confession was silent, and her promise of faithfulness was silent. [...]. She could 
not say, “How much is only slander and false suspicion?” and he did not say, “I am 
innocent.”135   
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A sacred, human relationship, Eliot suggests, consists not only in the Feuerbachian exchange 
of understanding, but an exchange of belief. Gwendolen embodies this conviction, explaining 
to Deronda that his belief that she could become a woman who could act to mitigate the pain 
of others was crucial to her becoming that woman: 
 
"Your saying that I should not go on being selfish and ignorant has been some 
strength to me. If you say you wish you had not meddled—that means, you despair of 
me and forsake me. And then you will decide for me that I shall not be good. It is you 
who will decide; because you might have made me different by keeping as near to me 
as you could, and believing in me."
136
 
 
 
With Mordecai, Eliot’s interest in the idea of the significance of faith between human 
beings is developed further. Mordecai’s life is one of solitary faith in his own vision until he 
meets Deronda and fixes on him all his prophetic expectation of an alternative ‘I’, who, 
though completely different, will share his intense vision and be capable of fulfilling it:  
 
[....] his imagination had constructed another man [....] who would be a blooming 
human life, ready to incorporate all that was worthiest in an existence whose visible, 
palpable part was burning itself fast away.
137
 
 
 
In expecting, recognising and then convincing Deronda to be a partner in his idealistic 
project, he commits himself to ‘transmission’ of ideas as a form of osmosis, or even 
possession of one person by the ideas of another. His influence over Deronda makes the latter 
question his own perceptions of reality, and begin to think in terms of destiny and the power 
of faith: 
 
“[....] some strong relation there must be between me and this man, since he feels it 
strongly. Great heaven! what relation has proved itself more potent in the world than 
faith even when mistaken—than expectation even when perpetually disappointed? Is 
my side of the relation to be disappointing or fulfilling?—well, if it is ever possible 
for me to fulfil, I will not disappoint."
138
 
 
 
Deronda’s role of ‘thou’ to Gwendolen is transformed as he is forced to perceive 
Mordecai as both ‘thou’ and an alternative ‘I’, his Jewish alter ego. As he is transformed into 
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Mordecai’s ‘I’, Deronda ceases to be Gwendolen’s ‘thou’. In the relationship between 
Deronda and Mordecai, Eliot explores Feuerbach’s concept of sacred human relationship 
through a friendship, which becomes brotherhood and ends in a type of substitution. 
Mordecai’s power and claim over Deronda, and Deronda’s hesitant acceptance of aspects of 
his intense vision, portrays it as an extreme example of the benign ‘transmutation of self’ as 
substitution, already told in the story of the Bouddha and the tiger: 
 
"That is not all my trust in you. You must be not only a hand to me, but a soul—
believing my beliefs—being moved by my reasons—hoping my hopes - seeing the 
vision I point to—beholding a glory where I behold it!" [....] he went on—"You will 
be my life: it will be planted afresh; it will grow. You shall take the inheritance; it has 
been gathering for ages. The generations are crowding on my narrow life as a bridge: 
what has been and what is to be are meeting there; and the bridge is breaking. [....]. 
You [....] will take the sacred inheritance of the Jew."
139
 
 
 
In Mordecai and Deronda, Eliot fuses two ways of seeing the world. Mordecai’s vision, 
immersed in the sacred, still points towards a pragmatic action on behalf of humanity’s life of 
‘labour and endurance’: Deronda’s rationality retains the space for identification with a wider 
good and transforms him from a ‘bored’140 young man into a leader who can enact 
Mordecai’s vision. Through Deronda’s self-identification with Mordecai, and through his 
understanding of Mordecai’s ‘denotation’ as well as ‘connotation’, he becomes his 
translation.  
 
Translating the Sacred 
 
In The German Idea, Rosemary Ashton argues that Eliot’s novels: 
 
[....] testify to her unchanging belief that ‘the idea of God [....] is the ideal of a 
goodness entirely human’ [....].141 They do so in predominantly Feuerbachian terms, 
the language of the I-Thou relationship, the ‘divine’ efficacy of human love, the 
redeeming influence of man on man, personality as revelation, the possibility of 
‘baptism and consecration’ by contact with other natures.142 
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As a commentary on this view, I will be analysing Eliot’s emphatic interest in Spinoza’s 
ethical ideas in the next Chapter. While both Feuerbach’s and Eliot’s humanism is clear, it is 
presented through language which relies on suggesting the emotional significances of the 
faith they had – rationally – rejected. One word in particular was detained by Feuerbach to 
see how it could be re-applied to human life, once God’s mediation of it had been rejected. 
His ‘Concluding Application’ repeatedly affirms the sacredness of human relationship, of 
friendship, and of the rituals of everyday life, but demands ‘let them be sacred in and by 
themselves.’143 Eliot’s reconceptualisation of the sacred, up to now discussed in the 
Feuerbachian terms of relationship, was primarily an ethical rather than a metaphysical 
conception. Her characters have or develop consciences, which translate an abstract language 
of ethics into a sense of the sacredness and mystery of the inner law ‘graven’ in their own 
minds. Gwendolen’s birth of conscience follows her decision to do what she had earlier 
decided against in marrying Grandcourt, and her psychic terror invests her intuitions of 
‘calamity’ with a mythic significance: 
 
It was new to her that a question of right or wrong in her conduct should rouse her 
terror; [....]. But here had come a moment when something like a new consciousness 
was awakened. 
[....] the deeper impressions of something awful and inexorable enveloping her 
seemed to concentrate themselves in the vague conception of an avenging power.
144
 
 
 
The ways in which Eliot describes the development of characters’ just perception of 
themselves is analysed in the next chapter, but the just perception emerges from suffering, 
from trust in another person to judge but also to show a way forward, and from relationship 
with another human being. However, the metaphysical and transcendent has not been 
banished completely. It emerges fleetingly in Middlemarch, through the role and beliefs of 
Dorothea, and it hovers behind the narratives of Daniel Deronda. Knoepflmacher argues that 
in this final major novel:    
 
[....] events are determined not by the cumulative will of all characters, but by an 
omnipresent destiny: “all things are bound together in that Omnipresence”.  
[....] she [Eliot] enlists her relativism to reintroduce the possibility of nonverifiable 
and nonperceptual truths. She tries to hew belief out of disbelief, affirmation out of 
denial.
145
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The novel portrays a ‘nonverifiable and nonperceptual’, possibly transcendental, world 
enmeshed with the world of rationality and realism, a world which emanates warnings, 
enables answers to prayer, and initiates prophetic fulfilments. The English narrative reflects 
realism’s sophisticated imitation of cause and effect, the world of Spinoza’s concatenated 
determinism, and the confusion of this world when presented with evidence which seems to 
counter it. Mordecai’s narrative offers alternative interpretations of reality through its 
attentiveness to prayer and its answers, to coincidence, and to reversals of cause and effect 
which allow his prophetic expectations to intervene in and disrupt the other, English world of 
realism. Eliot’s experimental projection of a dimension which offers a sacralised reading of 
reality was a break with her previous novels, where human relationship alone carried the 
possibility of that interchange of sympathy, understanding and judgement which could 
transfigure the lives of their characters, the possibility which Feuerbach considered the 
essence of ‘sacred’ human relationship. In his consideration of the tension which Eliot’s 
typology of prophet and deliverer, Mordecai and Deronda, exerts upon the realist convention 
and on reality itself, Carroll notes that: 
 
The hypothesis creates the reality it predicts, the type foreshadows the antitype 
through which it is fulfilled. Both reverse the logic of cause and effect, and it is upon 
this reverse logic that the Jewish reality is constructed (and all that this implies for the 
realistic novel).
146
 
 
In Daniel Deronda the depiction of sacredness, while still grounded in a Feuerbachian  
sympathy, also emphasises the faith needed, by Gwendolen in Deronda and by Deronda in 
Mordecai, to realise their ‘pathway’ to goodness.  Instead of an emphasis on a sequencing of 
action through time, and through cause and effect, the novel offers a sequence of events 
which moves backwards and forwards, tracing and retracing cause and effect, discovering 
retrospective objective causes for subjective longings. Its approach echoes that of scripture, 
fairy tale or Shakespeare’s late plays. Knoepflmacher argues that Eliot’s choice of the Jewish 
theme reflects Judaism’s combination of ‘ideal and actual’.147 I suggest it offered an idea of a 
society whose pre-eminent ethos is one of Feuerbachian community rather than 
individualism, one of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’, and one which sees its present and its history as a 
retrospective interrogation of a transcendent will.  
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Eliot’s later novels show her continued engagement with the ideas in Feuerbach’s 
‘Concluding Application’ about the inherent sacredness of ‘the essence of human nature 
itself’.148 The appeal to his readers to rediscover the human sacred, stripped of religious 
illusions, in life and relationship, and through ‘interruption’ of the ‘ordinary course of things’ 
to see the ‘religious import’149 of life and of everyday objects and actions transmits, through 
its repeated assertions, a shadowy unease about how sacredness can be retranslated into a 
demythologised, secularised world, when the ‘illusions’ of religion are gone.   
As discussed earlier, Eliot’s novels portray a realistic world interrupted by the 
narrator’s switch of person, withdrawal and intrusion into the narrative. The world of realism 
is also interrupted by figures or events which, through intensifying their central characters’ 
transformative birth of feeling for other people and their duty to them, clothe the novels’ 
psychological analyses with suggestions of mythic human patterns. These religio-mythic 
interruptions of the surface flow of Eliot’s realism are embedded in narrative rather than 
presented though the commentary or overt speculative interventions of the narrator. The 
apocalyptic flood at the end of The Mill on the Floss,
150
 the journeys by boat taken by Maggie 
(in The Mill on the Floss), Romola (in Romola)
151
 and Daniel (in Daniel Deronda),
152
 where 
rational control seems submerged by subconscious processes of psychological reorientation 
and receptivity; Mirah’s rescue from the river153 and Gwendolen’s ambivalent attempts to 
save her husband from drowning
154
 -  all draw their mythic power and suggestiveness from  
antecedents in biblical writings and romance, where such incidents are emblems of 
transfiguration, salvation or judgement. The plot of Daniel Deronda is explicitly clothed in 
suggestions of biblical epic and fairy tale romance, suggestions which are further translated 
into the story of the creation of a modern political leader.  Mordecai, with his belief in a 
mysterious dimension which can create a new reality out of hope and expectation, and which 
exists beyond the individual human and the material world, anticipating and empowering 
their transactions, irrupts into the realist narrative with the challenge and urgency of an Old 
Testament prophet announcing a new order of values.    
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Daniel Deronda’s exploration of what the secular sacred might mean builds on the 
exploration of relationship of the earlier novels. I have already discussed the relationships 
where faith in the other’s redeemability or inherent goodness is presented as crucial. 
However, Daniel Deronda insistently emphasises the importance of those relationships 
identified by Feuerbach as sacred (the relationships of ‘child and parent, of husband and wife, 
of brother and friend’155) in his ‘Concluding Application’. The unveiling of identity through 
relationship, and the power of such an identity, emerging from the past to determine the 
future, ‘the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change’,156 is one of the novel’s main 
themes. The legitimacy and power of bonds between and across generations is a presiding 
motif both in the Gentile world, where it guides the disposal of estates and forging of 
alliances, and in the Jewish world where it transmits obligations about the way to live and 
face the future.  
 Within a world where fathers are absent, detached or irresponsible, patriarchy still 
wields controlling or arbitrary power, despite the wishes, contrivances and influence of 
mothers. Gwendolen’s resistance to the significance or demands of relationships makes an 
exception for her mother, for whom she is prepared to make sacrifices; and it is through 
ignoring a mother’s claims on behalf of her children that Gwendolen enters into her period of 
suffering and transformation. Daniel’s mother’s mysterious absence from his life focuses his 
hopes and attention on the sacred nature of the bond:  
 
To Daniel the words Father and Mother had the altar-fire in them; and the thought of 
all closest relations of our nature held still something of the mystic power [....].
157
  
 
 
Mirah’s reverence for the memory of her lost mother provides the guarantee of her identity as 
a Jewess, her cultural and ethical grounding, and the reconceptualisation of her experiences 
of suffering and alienation as a sacred destiny. Daniel’s search for Mirah’s mother and 
brother and his own conjectures about his own mother drive the Jewish strands of the plot. 
The texture of the novel interweaves references which strengthen the sense of the 
significance of motherhood and the emotional depth of kinship; Mrs Meyrick’s role as ‘little 
mother’, and her reminders to both Daniel and Mirah of the depth and tenacity of a mother’s 
                                            
155
 LF EC, Ch.XXVII, p.271. 
156
 GE DD, VI. 42. pp.490, 491. 
157
 GE DD, V. 37. p.437. 
110 
 
love: ‘Mother’s love begins deeper down’158 are echoed in variations by the Cohens and by 
Mordecai.  
In comparison with this pattern of maternal influence and sacredness, Deronda’s 
mother’s attempt to ensure that her son lives the life of a Gentile assumes a more ambiguous 
significance. It seems that here the depth of the sacred maternal bond can be vitiated by the 
impersonal, conservative forces of patriarchy. Eliot’s portrait of the Princess Halm- Eberstein 
crystallises the book’s internal debate about the fate of women in patriarchal societies, 
whether in the religious culture of Judaism or the materialistic culture of the English middle 
and upper classes. She epitomises the ironies of women’s existence in these worlds. Despite 
her earnest intentions to secure her child’s assimilation into the Gentile world, her role as his 
biological mother ironically guarantees Daniel’s Jewishness, and allows him to pursue a 
destiny which overturns all her hopes for him. But in turn she has destroyed Daniel’s illusions 
of the sacredness of the maternal bond:  
 
[....] the moment was cruel: it made the filial yearning of his life a disappointed 
pilgrimage to a shrine where there were no longer the symbols of sacredness.
159
 
 
 
The narrative thrust of the novel extrapolates Feuerbach’s secularised sacred of relationship 
into a historic sense of the ‘deeper roots’ of ancestry and of the responsibility of the present 
to the past and future.  
Through Mordecai, Eliot portrays an idealised sacred relationship of brother and 
friend, but the uncertainties and tensions he generates in realism’s Gentile society are made 
explicit by the ironic narrator:  
 
        [....]; but the romantic or unusual in real life requires some adaptation. We sit up at 
night to read about Çakya-Mouni, St. Francis, or Oliver Cromwell; but whether we 
should be glad for any one at all like them to call on us the next morning, still more, to 
reveal himself as a new relation, is quite another affair.
160
 
 
 
Mordecai therefore suggests a level of human interaction through which Eliot, albeit with an 
ironic awareness of its conflict with realism, suggests the ‘sacred’. Both the novel and its 
characters attempt to reduce and rationalise his impact at the same time as being unable to 
                                            
158
 GE DD, IV. 32. p.346. 
159
 GE DD, VII. 53. p.615. 
160
 GE DD, VI. 46. pp.527, 528. 
111 
 
dismiss his claims. Deronda’s early conjectures about Mordecai’s belief in him attempt to 
rationalise, but do not entirely dismiss, Mordecai’s prophetic expectations: 
 
What I can be to him, or he to me, may not at all depend on his persuasion about the 
way we came together. To me the way seems made up of plainly discernible links.
161
 
 
 
Amanda Adamson, in her essay on the role of the narrator, argues that the 
ambivalence of characters such as Mordecai reflects Feuerbach’s technique of empathy with 
an ideal followed by its analysis and ‘deflation’: 
 
Eliot’s [....] presentation plays out Feuerbachian elements: inhabiting the projection of 
a human ideal, and then deflating it through analysis (exposing not only the all-too-
human character of the idealized figure, but also the projective idealizations of the 
heroic protagonist). It is worth noting, moreover, that even while the heroic 
protagonists of Eliot’s fiction are typically drawn to these visionary figures, their 
attitude toward them is fundamentally a disenchanted one, even as they display 
ongoing impulses to idealize.
162
 
 
 
I suggest that this analysis fails to illuminate the ambiguities of Mordecai’s impact within the 
novel, which leave an unresolved sense of the sacred. His claim to see the world in 
interaction with transcendent purposes entices certain characters but is also resisted by them. 
The narrator’s voice seems to empathise with aspects of Mordecai’s vision and respect his 
fate. The description of his death which closes the novel explicitly evokes the fate of Milton’s 
Samson, and thus absorbs him into a heroic poetic tradition and a historic tradition of Jewish 
martyrdom. As he dies, Mordecai chooses to relate to the Jewish communal we-thou 
relationship with ‘the divine Unity’, and he has no more to say to his other human, ‘sacred’ 
companions: 
 
[....] Deronda waited, thinking there might be another word for him. But slowly [....] 
Ezra [....] raised himself and uttered in Hebrew the confession of the divine Unity, 
which for long generations has been on the lips of the dying Israelite.
163
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The ending of the novel defines ideas that hover around the novel’s structure and thematic 
material. Mordecai’s final assertion of faith and the narrator’s implicit identification of him 
with an epic heroism recalibrate any Feuerbachian humanist reading of the novel, and 
indicate once again Eliot’s resistance to accepting any understanding which is not embraced 
by ‘intellect as well as [their] emotions’.164 Frank Kermode165 identified the irresolvable 
dilemmas of the realist novel seeking to portray the unpredictability and contingency of 
experience yet needing to provide a consoling sense of closure. The endings of Middlemarch 
and Daniel Deronda do not offer any simple consoling sense of closure. Instead, some of the 
tensions between the novel’s conception and its realist portrayal of character seem to acquire 
new and more puzzling emphases.  
The characters inhabiting the realist world in Daniel Deronda do in the end make 
space for Mordecai and his visionary, intuitive approach to the world. Deronda approaches 
him both through his intellect and through affection. During one of his musings about 
Mordecai’s claims on him, he considers the nature and scope of Mordecai’s vision in terms 
which align it with Feuerbach’s balance of thought and feeling, or of Spinoza’s intuitive 
knowledge. However, the use of terms such as ‘passionate vision’ places this type of intuition 
firmly into a Feuerbachian context rather than a Spinozan one. Deronda (and Eliot) describe 
Mordecai’s ‘emotional intellect’, the fusion of Feuerbach’s feeling and understanding: 
 
And since the unemotional intellect may carry us into a mathematical dreamland 
where nothing is but what is not, perhaps an emotional intellect may have absorbed 
into its passionate vision of possibilities some truth of what will be - the more 
comprehensive massive life feeding theory with new material, as the sensibility of the 
artist seizes combinations which science explains and justifies.
166
 
 
 
Mordecai himself questions the nature of rationality, and redefines it in his own terms, 
as a process which refuses assimilation by the rationalities of other cultures but asserts 
‘divine reason’. Divine reason perceives the hidden forces at work in shaping history, and 
these forces are those of Feuerbachian sacred relationship: 
“I, too, claim to be a rational Jew. But what is it to be rational—what is it to feel the 
light of the divine reason growing stronger within and without? It is to see more and 
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more of the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change as a dependent growth —
yea, consecrate it with kinship: the past becomes my parent and the future stretches 
towards me the appealing arms of children.”167 
 
 
It is clear that Mordecai’s conception of rationality embraces Spinoza’s highest knowledge, 
intuition, ‘divine reason’ in his words, rather than Western Enlightenment rationality, but 
fuses with this Feuerbach’s emphasis on the sacredness of human relationships, ‘of child and 
parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend’168 as ‘the great axis on which revolves the 
history of the world’.169 His mystical vision of human relationships and the ways in which 
they are interlinked with a transcendent purposive goodness differs from Feuerbach’s God-
free religion of humanity, but nevertheless Mordecai’s vision of the inherent sacredness of 
human relationships, and everyday human actions, translates Feuerbach’s ideas back into a 
religious language, in this case of Judaism:  
 
“But it is true, as Jehuda-ha-Levi first said, that Israel is the heart of mankind, if we 
mean by heart the core of affection which binds a race and its families in dutiful love, 
and the reverence for the human body which lifts the needs of our animal life into 
religion, and the tenderness which is merciful to the poor and weak and to the dumb 
creature that wears the yoke for us”. [....]. 
Where else is there a nation of whom it may be as truly said that their religion and law 
and moral life mingled as the stream of blood in the heart and made one growth -
[....]?”170 
 
 
Daniel Deronda’s commentary on Feuerbach’s claim that:  
 
The necessary turning-point of history is therefore the open confession, that the 
consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species; [....].
171
 
 
provides its characters with an active strategy for raising individuals above their limitations 
and reconstructing their past and future. Qualls describes it as follows: 
The novel is her last rewriting of that story she had told so often: the story of men and 
especially women seeking texts by which to live, sources in historical and cultural 
memory that would sustain the private life and allow one to be a part of a moral 
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community. In the end she is still rendering characters who would discover in human 
history sources of the sacred, who would find in the historical past a vision of how to 
live.
172
 
 
 
Qualls emphasises the continuity of Eliot’s perceptions and vision for the future, the 
interlocking of past with present and future which feature in the vision announced by both 
Mordecai and Deronda, discussed in the next chapter. However, I suggest that what is 
important in the novels is that moment when characters become aware that they must 
articulate a new understanding which revises their past and re-envisions their future. Despite 
the support of the faith in them of others, in order to live they need a new faith articulated to 
themselves by themselves when all external supports seem to have gone. Dorothea has to find 
new ways to justify her devotedness, and Gwendolen has to find the resources to affirm that 
she will ‘live. I shall be better.’173 The internal dialogue of thought comes full circle from 
embracing a more just understanding of others to creating a new self out of the dialogue with 
humanity’s ‘essential nature.’174  
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Chapter 3  
Eliot And Spinoza: Emotion And Intellect  
 
If Eliot’s language in relation to her translation of David Strauss’s Leben Jesu had 
satirised popular romantic illusions about relationships between young lady translators and 
male text creators, her project to translate Benedict (originally Baruch) de Spinoza’s Ethics or 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus involved a different intensity of engagement with its subject. 
Her use of the word ‘divorce’ (‘Spinoza and I have been divorced for several months’) in an 
1849 letter to Cara and Charles Bray, however ironically intentioned, indicates, if not an 
experience of love and hate, the personal intensity involved in the translating relationship, as 
well as the depth of the perceived problems between the potential translator and the 
translated. Chapter 1 has already considered the implications of the letter in some detail in 
relation to the best method of transferring the meaning of a text such as that of the Ethics. 
Eliot’s conclusion that any translation of Spinoza’s Scholastic Latin would then require a 
second, ‘yet more difficult process of translation’ on the part of any reader meant, in her 
view, abandoning any project of a ‘faithful’ or literal translation of his words and liberating 
his meaning through an account of ‘a true estimate of his life and system’.1 The phrase ‘a true 
estimate’ anticipates the language Eliot was to use in her essay on ‘Translations and 
Translators’ in relation to the hermeneutic responsibilities of a translator to interpret ‘another 
man’s mind’2 with fidelity to the thoughts, as well as to the linguistic signs expressing them.  
Her views about Spinoza’s presentation of his arguments broadly reflect the 
conclusions of a number of other Victorian writers on Spinoza.  J A Froude’s 1854 essay for 
the Westminster Review provided an analysis and criticism of the argument of the Ethics, 
commenting on Spinoza’s ‘peculiar opinions’,3 on the ‘very beautiful’ but ‘elaborate and 
full’4 language used, and arguing that its thought ‘addresses itself, not to the logical intellect, 
but to the imagination, which it affects to set aside’.5 The essay discusses Spinoza’s 
determinism, and takes issue with his idea of evil as a subjective conception. Matthew Arnold 
wrote two essays on Spinoza. The first was an 1862 review of Robert Willis’s translation, 
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dwelling on the deficiencies of that translation rather than Spinoza’s argument. 6 The second 
essay (1863)
7
 pays tribute to the significance of the philosopher’s achievement overall, in 
providing ‘the central point of interest’ ‘in the history of modern philosophy’, but emphasises 
the problems inherent in the chosen form of the Ethics: 
In [....] spite of the repellent form which he has given to his principal work, in spite of 
the exterior semblance of a rigid dogmatism alien to the most essential tendencies of 
modern philosophy [....].
8
 
 
 
The Challenges of Translating Spinoza 
 
Spinoza’s ideas have, in essence, to be translated out of three layers of language. The 
first, Latin, was the lingua franca of scholarly discourse, and remained so until the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. Particular Latin vocabularies had developed, as they have within 
contemporary languages, to express specialised scientific or philosophical ideas. Charles 
Jarrett argues that although Spinoza’s Latin vocabulary was that of late medieval 
scholasticism, this vocabulary had developed ‘a traditional seventeenth century use’, and that 
Spinoza’s re-understanding of contemporaries’ usage was radical and contested.9 Alan 
Donagan summarises the subversion of language and idea Spinoza was introducing: 
 
That diction is scholastic-Cartesian,- and, as he must have been aware, much of what 
he wrote, although not all, makes sense if his words are taken in their scholastic-
Cartesian senses. However, he assigns new senses to many of the expressions he uses, 
sometimes explicitly, and sometimes implicitly by the structure of his reasoning or by 
his examples. Readers who have persuaded themselves that Spinoza is the last of the 
medievals or the first of the absolute idealists are apt to overlook the passages in 
which he does so.
10
  
 
The second layer of language therefore arises from Spinoza’s development of a very 
specific philosophic and still contested terminology to express his arguments. Examples of 
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this from Eliot’s translation of the Ethics would include terms which Eliot translated as 
‘intuitive cognition’ 11 (‘scientiam intuitivam’), the need to see things ‘under the form of 
eternity’12 (‘sub aeternitatis specie’), ‘transitions’13 ‘(‘transitiones’), ‘affection’14 (affectus), 
and terms identified by Jarrett including ‘substance’15 (‘substantia’), ‘mode’16 (modus) and 
‘mind’17 (‘mens’).  
The third is constituted through his method of analysis and argument. Spinoza chose 
to transmit his conception of the context and process of human thought, nature, emotion, 
relationships, conduct and purpose through a structure of dispassionate Euclidean scientific 
proposition and proof, a ‘prolix geometrical method’18 in his own words. The Ethics proceeds 
from Part I’s demonstration of the existence and attributes of an immanent God sive Natura 
[or Nature], through Part II’s analysis of the process of human thought and knowledge 
(cognition in Eliot’s translation) and Part III’s analysis of human emotions, to Part IV’s 
analysis of human ‘servitude’ to emotions and finally Part V’s proposals for how to 
understand the forces at work and achieve the mind’s ‘highest happiness’.19 
 It was Spinoza’s choice of a quasi-scientific, quasi-scholastic method and language 
which Eliot and others considered made the ideas inaccessible to a wide readership. The 
proposed alternative of ‘a true estimate of his life and system’, set out in the 1849 letter to 
Charles Bray, is significant because although Eliot ultimately produced a translation of the 
Ethics, completed in 1856, she also went on to provide, through her novels, a presentation of 
‘life[’s]’ interplay with ‘system’. Her 1875 letter to Joseph Payne,20 rejecting ‘formula’ in 
favour of a novel’s ‘experiments in life’ casts some retrospective light on her 1849 intuition 
that the ideas confined to disembodied abstraction and schematisation, in the Ethics, needed 
to be tested and animated through other media, such as the capacity of novels, to explore the 
specificities of human experience. 
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The Decision to Translate Spinoza 
Eliot provided no introduction to her translation of the Ethics or any extended written 
reasons for her initial or continuing interest in Spinoza’s thought. Letters to Sara Hennell, 
which are a rich resource in relation to Eliot’s views on Strauss and Feuerbach, refer to 
Spinoza’s works only in passing, such as with requests for copies of Spinoza’s works. 
However, one letter to Sara, written eight months after her letter indicating an initial interest 
in translating Spinoza’s ideas, seems to sum up Eliot’s underlying attitude to intellect and 
emotion, perhaps indicating why she was drawn to both Feuerbach and Spinoza, with their 
interest in the interplay of these processes. It marks a personal watershed in her own espousal 
of radical ideas without any corresponding ‘cautious weighing of consequences’- emotional 
and moral:  
 
Speculative truth begins to appear but a shadow of individual minds, agreement 
between intellects seems unattainable, and we turn to truth of feeling as the only 
universal bond of union. [....]. It is the quackery of infidelity to suppose that it has a 
nostrum for all mankind [....].
21
 
 
 
What may have attracted her to Spinoza was his reputation for radically heterodox 
views and a type of biblical criticism anticipating German Higher Criticism, a reputation 
which had also prompted G H Lewes’s enthusiasm for him and that of Coventry’s Rosehill 
Circle. Ashton identifies Spinoza as a significant influence on the thought of other influential 
contemporaries of Eliot and Lewes, such as John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte.
22
 Joe 
Hughes points to the mid-century group of intellectuals writing for the Westminster Review 
while Eliot was working there as, effectively, its editor, whose interest in Spinoza stemmed 
from his influence on German Idealism.   
 
William Hale White, a major figure in late‐nineteenth century Spinoza criticism and 
translator of both the Emendation and the Ethics, worked at the Review from 1852 to 
1854; George Henry Lewes published a series of anonymous essays on Spinoza for 
the Review and for other periodicals throughout the 1840s and 50s; and in 1854 
Froude published an article for Eliot which Frederick Pollock described in 1880 as the 
“the best general view of Spinoza” in English. [....]. For all of these writers Spinoza 
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appears not as an unrepentant atheist, but as a fearless thinker who intrepidly pursued 
truth.
 23
 
 
Of all these influences, it is likely that Lewes’ influence on Eliot was the most 
significant. Apart from purely intellectual sympathy, Rosemary Ashton
24
 argues that Lewes 
felt a strong sympathetic bond with Spinoza because of the personal cost to him of his own 
radical ideas. Spinoza had lived as an outcast from his Jewish community, an ‘outlaw’, and ‘a 
theological pariah’ as Lewes described him,25 and Lewes had tasted some of the bitter 
disadvantages socially and professionally of holding sceptical views and living an 
unorthodox personal life in a morally conservative society.  Equally, Jane Irwin
26
 points out 
that Eliot might have seen her own painful extrication of herself from the ‘wretched giant’s 
bed’27 of Christian dogma as an echo of Spinoza’s history of intellectual emancipation and 
excommunication from Amsterdam’s Jewish Community. 
While the interest and enthusiasm of intellectual friends may have exercised an 
influence, Valerie Dodd argues that Spinoza’s ideas coincided with many of Eliot’s own 
interests:  
 
Spinoza’s [....] stringent method of biblical criticism was tempered by piety; the 
doctrine of Substance allowed for scientific scrutiny [....]. He proposed freedom of 
thought and a theory of progress. [....]. Spinoza formulated a theory of the emotions 
which was akin to the project undertaken by Spencer, and which he discussed with 
Marian Evans.
28
 
 
 
Dodd’s analysis of the areas of congruence between Spinoza’s thought and Eliot’s 
intellectual interests omits some of the areas of potential emotional and psychological interest 
for her. Spinoza’s claim that his system could reduce emotional suffering through intellectual 
understanding may have offered Eliot an integration of her capacities for feeling and for 
thinking. What she continued to view critically was his method, the dispassionate analysis of 
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the emotions, ‘human actions and appetites’, as though they were, in the terms of her own 
translation, ‘lines, surfaces or solids’.29 She ultimately rejected Spinoza’s logical approach, 
which she described as the ‘unemotional intellect’. What she sought was a fuller human 
realisation of the ‘emotional intellect’,30 which she suggested through characters such as 
Mordecai, and her fictions provide a direct critique of Spinoza’s view of the pointlessness of 
suffering. For Spinoza understanding limited the passivity, and therefore the pain, of 
suffering: for Eliot suffering builds understanding. But in Daniel Deronda, even her rejection 
of Spinoza’s idea is expressed through specifically Spinozan terminology, that of 
determinism and the antitheses of action and passivity. Suffering is viewed as constituting 
action not excluding it: 
 
[....] the hidden pathways of feeling and thought which lead up to every moment of 
action, and to those moments of intense suffering which take the quality of action – 
like the cry of Prometheus [....].
31
 
 
Eliot’s Translation of the Ethics 
 
Despite the increasing interest in Spinoza’s ideas, there had been no translation of the 
Ethics into English until Eliot’s work. Later English translations by William Hale White and 
R H M Elwes were not published until 1883, with a further translation by Drake Smith in 
1888. Apart from any considerations of heresy, Latin was still so widely used in scholarly 
writing until as late as the mid nineteenth century that the ideas would have been available to 
educated men. It is thought that Eliot’s initial work on Spinoza in 1843 was through a copy of 
a Latin edition of either Part I of the Ethics or the Tractatus, (according to Gordon Haight, it 
is ‘impossible to tell’ which work it was),32 borrowed from Dr Brabant’s library. Eliot 
claimed that she had first started this translation of ‘a part of Spinoza’s works’ in 1843 
(before she started the translation of Leben Jesu) at the request ‘of a friend’, probably Cara 
Bray. After completing her translation of Strauss in 1846, and after returning this or a further 
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copy in 1847, she asked John Chapman to secure her a replacement copy.
33
 Her letter to Sara 
Hennell stresses how important it was to her: ‘Mind, I really want this’.34   
In 1849, while nursing her dying father, she worked on a translation of the Tractatus 
which has never, so far, been found. Cara Bray had written to Sara Hennell in March 1849: 
 
I suppose M.A. writes to you, and tells you her great desire to undertake Spinoza. She 
can find time now and the occupation is just what she longs for.
35
 
 
And a little later she wrote that ‘M.A. is happy now with this Spinoza to do; she says it is 
such a rest to her mind’.36 Eliot had also written to Sara in April 1849 implying that she 
needed Sara’s role in seeing what ‘to praise or blame’ in a translation of the Tractatus, and 
needed: 
 
[....] the satisfaction of feeling that another mind than your own sees precisely where 
and what is the difficulty – and can exactly appreciate the success with which it is 
overcome.
37
 
 
Nine months after the letter to Sara, the letter to the Brays of December 1849 makes it clear 
both that this work had gone into abeyance after her father’s death, and that, despite her 
reservations in principle about a translation, she felt that work on both the Ethics and the 
Tractatus could be finished within a ‘couple of months’.38  
However, it was not until her translation of Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of 
Christianity had been published in 1854, that she recommenced her earlier work on the 
Ethics, completing it in February 1856. The translation became one of the intellectual 
offspring of her travels in Europe with Lewes, confirming their unorthodox partnership to a 
socially conventional English public. ‘For reasons which it would be “too tedious to 
mention”’,39 she was unwilling to have the name Marian Evans appear as the translator, 
possibly judging that it would be counterproductive to Spinoza’s cause, and would provide 
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further opportunities to those willing to be publicly scandalised by her relationship with a 
married man and her notoriety as the translator of Leben Jesu. 
Her resumption of the translation appears to have stemmed from Lewes’s entry, as he 
believed, into a contract with the publisher, Bohn, to provide a translation of the Ethics, 
although Bohn later denied any such understanding.  Following an increasingly acrimonious 
debate, Lewes and Eliot accepted that the translation was to remain unpublished. Eliot’s 
manuscript translation is held in Yale University Library
40
 and was edited by Thomas Deegan 
and published in a limited edition by the University of Salzburg in 1981. According to 
Deegan, Eliot’s manuscript shows evidence, although limited, of some continuing 
involvement by Lewes, perhaps editorially (his writing appears on the contents page and on 
each of the pages prefacing the five parts of the Ethics).
41
  
As considered in Chapter 1, Eliot’s 1855 essay on Translations and Translators, 
where she reviewed a translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, was written just after she 
had finished revising her translation of Part IV the Ethics. The challenges of translating a text 
such as Spinoza’s must have been vividly in her mind, and the essay obliquely reveals how 
challenging Eliot found the potential conflicts stalking a translation respecting ‘rigid fidelity’ 
to text, while also displaying an ‘entire uninjured kernel of meaning’.42 Despite Eliot’s 1849 
letter, with its misgivings about the potential inaccessibility of a literal translation, Ruby 
Redinger argues that her early work on either the Tractatus or the Ethics had been governed 
by the intention: 
 
[....] to render him (Spinoza) as literally as possible, as is suggested by Cara’s early 
remark, ‘I am sure I could understand his Latin better than her English’.43 
 
Apart from the discussion of the challenges of translation contained in the 1855 essay, 
and possibly because the translation was a project in partnership with Lewes, Eliot’s Journal 
does not discuss any theoretical problems of fidelity versus accessibility in translation, it 
merely records that her translation is progressing and that she is reading books about Spinoza, 
such as Briefe uber Spinoza by Jacobi. 
44
 The Deegan edition of her manuscript cites a 
bibliography that includes a Dutch edition of Spinoza’s correspondence, and translations into 
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German (by Auerbach in 1841) and French (by Saisset in 1842). She predominantly referred 
to a German translation of the text (Bruder’s from 1843-46), but she also used Latin editions 
from 1803 and 1830, as well as the Latin of the Opera Posthuma (containing the Ethica, the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and Epistolae) of 
1677.
45
 Deegan’s Preface tells us that the manuscript of her translation was ‘substantially 
complete [....] with all but a few of the translation problems settled’.46 His textual notes 
provide a commentary on the manuscript’s omissions or variant translations of the Latin, on 
her ‘significant choices of wording’, and on variations between Eliot’s translation and Carl 
Gebhart’s translation, cited as Deegan’s contemporary standard edition.47  
 
Spinoza’s Life and Ideas 
 
In the same 1849 letter to Charles and Cara Bray where she had made clear her doubts 
about Spinoza’s intellectual accessibility and the public success of any translation, Eliot had 
written:  
 
For those who read the very words that Spinoza wrote, there is the same sort of 
interest in his style as in the conversation of a person of great capacity who has led a 
solitary life, and who says from his own soul what all the world is saying by rote, but 
this interest hardly belongs to a translation.
48
 
 
Her words here do not suggest that identification with a source author’s words which I have 
been discussing up to this point. They do however suggest the sympathy and judgement of a 
future novelist. They underline her interest in character, motivation and situation, contrasting 
paradoxically with Spinoza’s own approach of strict rationality, emotional detachment, and 
impersonal analysis of the human condition. Through his stylistic mask of a geometrical 
logical method she found corroboration for those aspects of his personal circumstances and 
putative mental state which had elicited Lewes’s personal sympathy and identification; his 
social and intellectual isolation. Her sympathetic yet ironic analysis of Spinoza’s situation 
finds some exaggerated and unkindly distorted reflections, most obviously in Middlemarch’s 
Casaubon, pursuing an idea in intellectual solitude while, unbeknown to him, the rest of the 
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world repositions its context and relevance.  I shall argue in this chapter that more kindly 
refractions appear in the characters of Mordecai and of Daniel Deronda himself.  
Eliot’s perception that the style betrayed the life of the man is her personal 
interpretation of the links that were made by Lewes and others such as Froude and Arnold 
between Spinoza’s ideas and the way he lived his life. Garrett identifies Pierre Bayle’s 
Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) as influential in propagating ‘the image of an 
absurd and heretical metaphysician who nonetheless lived an exemplary life.’49 While 
German and English Romanticism celebrated his pantheist theology, the nineteenth century 
celebrated his historicism, psychological and ethical teachings, and his exemplary life. 
Matthew Arnold’s 1869 essay sets out this case:  
 
Spinoza led a life the most spotless, perhaps, to be found among the lives of 
philosophers; he lived simple, studious, even-tempered, kind; declining honours, 
declining riches, declining notoriety.
50
 
 
Three of the significant areas of Spinoza’s thought as set out in Ethics need to be 
considered in relation to any consideration of them within the texture of Eliot’s novels. The 
first area relates to God’s immanence in Nature, or the sum-total of knowable reality (‘deus 
sive natura’), and to the nature of human understanding of God, possible only through the 
attributes of ‘extension’, or the material universe, and ‘thought’. Since all that exists 
participates in this concept of Nature, reality, adequately considered through the reason and 
therefore ‘under the form of eternity’ (‘sub specie aeternitatis’), reveals itself operating 
through necessity rather than contingency,
51
 and this perception of infinite causality precludes 
human free will.  
The second area of argument concerns the processes of human thought. If everything 
is a reflection of the mind of an immanent God, then the human mind must, if it is to operate 
‘adequately’,52 address reality as it perceives, experiences and understands it. Spinoza argued 
that human thought at its most unreliable is based only on the operation of the senses (‘vague 
experience’) or through responses to signs (‘opinion or imagination’). Even though the 
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imaginer may be aware that these imaginings do ‘not in fact exist’,53  they produce 
‘mutilated, confused, unorderly’, and ultimately ‘inadequate’ conceptions, Spinoza’s first 
type of ‘cognition’.54  The second kind of thinking or ‘cognition’ is based on reason derived 
from ‘adequate’ established knowledge. The third type of thinking, with which Eliot seems to 
have been intrigued, is what Spinoza terms ‘intuitive cognition’ (scientia intuitiva), where the 
mind can identify connections between ‘isolated specifics and the totality of existence’,55 as 
Dodd describes it. Spinoza describes it as proceeding from: 
 
[....] an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate 
cognition of the essence of things.
56
 
 
Spinoza’s explanatory example of the ways in which the mind can identify sequences of 
numerical ratios focuses on the ability of the third type of cognition to infer new examples of 
relationship based on an initial, adequate perception of the essential nature of the 
relationship.
57
 Margaret Wilson describes the analogy and the distinction between the second 
and third type of thinking as follows:  
 
The appropriateness of the mathematical example, I suggest, lies [....] just in the 
differences among the procedures. On this interpretation, the second kind of 
knowledge differs from the third both in requiring steps of reasoning, as distinct from 
direct mental vision, and in failing to arrive at the inmost essences of things.
58
  
 
She later argues that: 
 
[....] the third kind of knowledge involves an intuitive grasp of the relation of things' 
essential, individual force of persistence to God's power.
59
 
 
Spinoza asserts that the second and third types of ‘adequate’ thinking are ‘necessarily true’.60 
Both Genevieve Lloyd
61
 and Jarrett
62
 emphasise that Spinoza’s concept of intuition as the 
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highest form of knowledge in Part II is understood as expressing the intellectual love of God 
(or Nature), the understanding of ourselves and reality in relation to God, in Part V. Sanem 
Soyarslan argues that Spinoza considered intuition the highest form of knowledge because: 
 
[....] intuitive knowledge descends to a level of particularity, including the adequate 
knowledge of one’s own essence as it follows directly from God. By attaining this 
superior form of self-knowledge, intuition also ascends to a higher level of affective 
power that reason cannot access.
63
 
 
Eliot’s own definition of ‘intuitive cognition’, or intuition, in an 1875 letter to Mrs Ponsonby, 
could be interpreted as an understanding of Spinoza’s conceptualisation. She identifies 
intuition as way of understanding sense impressions and their relationships in a way which 
leads to active thought: 
 
The most thorough experientialists admit intuition – i.e. direct impressions of 
sensibility underlying all proof - as necessary starting points for thought.
64
  
 
The third area of argument, and perhaps the most radical part of Spinoza’s work, is 
his redefinition of the concepts of good and evil, underpinning his revolutionary system of 
ethics. The Ethics replaces a priori ideas of good and evil with a subjective and intellectual 
process, a continuing transition in knowledge from inadequate ideas to adequate ideas– ‘We 
know nothing certainly to be good or evil, except that which really conduces to understanding 
or which can impede understanding’.65  His definition of ‘good’ is ultimately dependent on 
subjective assessments based on individual understanding. ‘Good’ is what is ‘certainly’ 
known ‘to be useful to us’, and, in turn, ‘useful’ means ‘that which we know to be a means of 
approaching nearer and nearer to that exemplar of human nature which we propose to 
ourselves’.66 Even the appeal to an external ‘exemplar’ is one that is chosen by a subjective 
process of proposal ‘to ourselves’, although as the Ethics progresses Spinoza provides more 
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detail about how a person achieves ‘salvation, or blessedness, or liberty’67 and the ‘repose of 
mind’68 derived from the adequate ideas arising to some extent from the second, but pre-
eminently from the third types of cognition.  ‘Evil’, for Spinoza, is based on a subjective 
assessment about what might ‘hinder’ or ‘impede’ an individual from achieving his – or her - 
‘exemplar’ good:  
 
By evil I understand that of which we certainly know that it hinders us from 
participating in some good.
69
 
 
In his conceptualisation of evil as an impediment to realising the good, Spinoza redefines 
Augustine’s concept which had emphasised evil as a ‘privation of some good’.70 
Spinoza’s analysis of emotion is also knowledge-based. Understanding the component 
dynamics of an emotion allows an active role in its management. Lack of understanding turns 
mankind into victims of their emotions, and those emotions into ‘passions’. He argued that:  
 
[....] every one has the power, if not absolutely, at least in part, of clearly and 
distinctly understanding himself and his emotions and consequently of causing 
himself to suffer less from them.
71
  
 
And earlier in Part V of the Ethics that: 
 
 
An emotion which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and 
distinct idea of it.
72
 
 
Michael della Rocca characterises Spinoza’s ethical standpoint as ‘egoistic’: 
‘preserving self’ was the ‘only foundation of virtue’. 73 The idea is founded upon the 
recognition that every being will strive to persist (conatus),  and that to achieve this it ought 
to make rational, ‘adequate’ choices about those things and ideas useful to it, and avoid 
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emotions which deplete its power of action.
74
 In contrast with the relativism and subjectivity 
of much of his teaching, Spinoza proposed that memory of a ‘right theory’ or a ‘rule of life’ 
would support this endeavour, and constantly emphasised that one of his central ethical 
teachings must be part of this ‘rule’: 
 
For example, we have laid it down among the rules of life [....] that hatred is to be 
conquered by love or generosity, and not to be met by reciprocal hatred.
75
 
 
The adoption of his theory of adequate knowledge and understanding allowed him to assert 
an optimistic vision of a society where all men exercise a rational understanding about a 
‘common good’:  
 
Hence there is nothing more useful to man than man; nothing [....] more appropriate 
[....] than that all men should agree in all things, that the minds and bodies of all 
should compose as it were one mind and body, all at once [....] striving to preserve 
their being, and all at once seeking for themselves what is a common good to all.
76
 
 
The Ethics proposes that as part of our process of gaining more adequate ideas, ‘[....] 
we desire to form the idea of a man, which we may contemplate as an exemplar of human 
nature’77 and quotes with approval the proverb that the ‘God of man is man’,78 a proverb that 
would resonate with both Feuerbach and with Eliot.   A virtuous life must be founded on an 
intellectual process of increasingly clear understanding, one where human minds are in the 
process of becoming part of the ‘eternal and infinite intellect of God’,79 and where ‘our 
salvation or blessedness or liberty’ consists in the intuitive thinking which represents 
‘constant and eternal love towards God’.80 This rational and intellectual approach to right 
conduct also emphasises that:  
 
The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love wherewith God loves 
himself, not so far as he is infinite, but so far as he can be explained by the essence of 
the human mind considered under the form of eternity.
81
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Despite his clarity of presentation, and his attempt to analyse emotion and ethics as if 
they were ‘lines, surfaces or solids’, there is a tension between his objective, algebraic 
analyses of the relationships between different types of emotion and the subtleties of his 
demand for subjective judgement based on a process of  intellectual understanding. In 
addition, Spinoza’s concepts intrinsically create areas of ambiguity as to his precise meaning. 
For example, the human aspiration outlined in Part V to achieve an understanding which is 
‘our salvation or blessedness’, combines the book’s preceding advocacy of rationality and 
‘intuitive understanding’ as the highest mode of mental life with concepts drawn from 
theology and scripture. Their ambiguity and the earlier search for clarity of exposition in the 
Ethics may reflect the essential ambiguities of language itself or, possibly, Spinoza’s wish to 
disconcert his audience by advocating a rational, intellectual route to a state whose analogies 
and previous conceptualisations were metaphysical. 
 
The Views of Critics 
 
A number of interventions in relation to the influence on Eliot of Spinoza’s thought 
are responses to Dorothy Atkins’s thesis (1977) tracing the influence of Spinozan ideas on 
Adam Bede and the characters’ movement towards more ‘adequate’ ideas about each other, 
and from feeling the passive victim of someone else’s wrong towards an understanding of 
how that other is affected in turn. 
82
 Moira Gatens (2012) provides nuanced comment on 
Atkins’s claim that Eliot’s novels were secondary translations of texts such as the Ethics. She 
points out that Eliot’s ‘secular reinterpretation of the meaning and significance of religion’ 
although influenced by Spinoza, is critical of certain aspects of his thought,
83
  and argues that, 
while Spinoza’s concept of the role of imagination in cognition ‘remains a site of 
interpretative disagreement’, for Eliot the intellect was crucial but dependent on imagination 
and memory.
84
 Ted Zenziger (2012) supports Atkins’s view of the linkages between Eliot’s 
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and Spinoza’s thought, but, like Gatens, suggests that Eliot is also offering ‘a broader view of 
sympathy that [....] incorporates transformative pain and a key role for the imagination’.85 
V M Nemoianu considers Spinoza’s concepts of adequate and inadequate ideas, of 
active or passive modes of thought and emotion, and hence with either freedom or bondage,
86
 
and the way that these ideas are developed in Daniel Deronda. In the contested area of 
identifying Spinoza’s understanding of ‘imagination’ and ‘intuition’ in his theory of 
cognition, Nemoianu argues that intuition was intended to mean ‘imagination brought into 
one current with reason in intuitive synthesis.’ 87  
Isobel Armstrong’s intervention relates to Part III of the Ethics with its analysis of the 
emotions. She argues that this analysis is important ‘not simply at the thematic level but as a 
structural and organizing principle of the novels.’88 She cites Eliot’s presentations of 
Dorothea’s emotions after betrayal by Will, arguing that they have: 
 
[....] the immediacy of a writer who has internalized and lived [Spinoza’s] 
philosophical meaning, rather than abstracting it.
89
  
 
Armstrong concludes that Eliot’s works are evidence both of her criticism and her fascination 
with Spinoza’s ‘intransigent understanding of the intensity of the passions and the logic of 
their formative violence.’90 
Critical attention has focused on the way the novels interpret or reinterpret for the 
reader Spinoza’s ideas on determinism and on the adequacy or inadequacy of ideas and the 
transitions they make to more adequate knowledge. I will draw attention to the ways in which 
Eliot’s fictions translate other aspects of his thought. These include his ideas about the 
immanence of God and human interrelationship with Nature, recognised by intuitive 
knowledge; the nature of good and evil as a process in dialogue with subjective exemplars;  
the pain of transitions from active understanding to passive experience; the nature of the will 
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and its relationship with causality. In addition I will explore the influence of Spinoza’s own 
thematic language of concatenation, liberty and servitude, and of his own life as an 
expression of his intellectual system.  
 
The Influence of Spinoza’s Ideas on Eliot 
 
As pointed out by critics, it is overly simplistic to attribute Eliot’s novels about 
aspirations, mistakes, consequences, and maturing understanding to any one intellectual 
influence.  My argument has been that the process of translation, in its demand for both 
empathy and judgement, created a particularly intense relationship with the ideas of the writer 
being translated. The immediacy of some of the transference of idea and language is shown 
through the close translations of Spinoza’s own metaphors of concatenation and of bondage 
or servitude. In Middlemarch, concatenation, the chain of interconnectedness and causality, is 
translated into the recurrent metaphor of a web, the threads of each life woven into those of 
other lives, and determining their fates. In Daniel Deronda, it is translated into the metaphor 
of the invisible, interweaving pathways followed by stars and planets. Concerns with the 
interpretation of  liberty, bonds and bondage pervade Daniel Deronda, reflecting the famous 
headings to Parts IV and V of Ethics, ‘On the Servitude of Man and on the Power of the 
Passions’ and ‘On the Power of the Intellect, or, on Human Liberty’. Spinoza himself is a 
shadow presence in Daniel Deronda, as discussed later. 
  The influences of Spinoza, as well as of Feuerbach, on the formation of the most 
intimate voice representing that of the author – the narrator - are also significant. In Chapter 
2, I argued that the voice of the narrator was the voice both of the translator behind the 
translation and also of the ‘emotional intellect’, Eliot’s nuanced reversal of Spinoza’s 
intellectualising of emotion. Spinoza’s view of intuition also informs the narrator’s 
apparently intuitive understanding of characters and of the patterns of interrelated 
experiences and events traced in the novels. The reader is prompted to make connections, 
through formal echoes between linked narratives, between seemingly disparate characters and 
events, reflecting Spinoza’s vision of the interconnectedness of reality.    
Other aspects of Spinoza’s ideas in the Ethics permeate the psychological analyses of 
the novels. Eliot’s recurring analysis of the self-destruction resulting from delusory 
imagination unfettered by rational analysis reflects Spinoza’s ideas of its capacity to mutilate 
and confuse perceived reality. In Adam Bede, published only four years after her translation 
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of Spinoza, both Hetty and Arthur are in the grip of self-flattering or self-deluding visions of 
a possible future, and these prevent them from seeing clearly what consequences may flow 
from their actions. In The Mill on the Floss, the river journey’s powerful image of passive 
surrender conveys Maggie’s abandonment of her active moral intelligence to the lure of 
passive emotion.  The language Eliot uses conveys the pain of passivity for characters whose 
inadequate ideas have resulted in the stifling of their characteristic mode of action. This will 
be explored in relation to both Lydgate and Dorothea.  
I argue that the ideas of the Ethics were of great significance to her in her analysis of 
psychological states, and of their dynamics, what Spinoza called the ‘transitions’ of idea and 
feeling. By the time she wrote Daniel Deronda, Eliot’s fascination with and reservations 
about Spinoza’s conceptual approach had even woven themselves explicitly into the text of 
the novel. Deronda weighs ‘formulas for thinking’ produced by ‘unemotional intellect’ in the 
balance and finds them wanting in comparison with the ideas of Mordecai’s ‘emotional 
intellect’.91 The ‘transition’ to an ‘emotional intellect’ is exemplified in such lives as 
Dorothea’s, Mordecai’s and Daniel Deronda’s. It represents a fusion of feeling and 
understanding in Feuerbach’s terms, and of pleasure in the adequacy of intuitive knowledge 
in Spinoza’s terms. In Middlemarch, her novel of realism, and in Daniel Deronda, her 
experiment with causality, her engagement with the ideas of the Ethics may be seen to be 
continuing and developing in complexity most clearly. 
 Spinoza’s style of detached, mathematical precision and the translation of emotions 
into algebraic ‘formulae’ seems in tension with the ethical and emotional ambiguities of 
individual experience, and particularly with one of Eliot’s much used and approving 
adjectives, ‘ardent’, which signifies for her the active, emotionally engaged operation of 
ethical conviction. His dispassionate method is the subject of Eliot’s explicit critique in 
Daniel Deronda. But her 1849 analysis of the strengths of Spinoza’s ‘life and system’, the 
fusion and interplay of a life well-lived, with its roots in intellectual understanding, also 
became a crucial creative force in her novels, which include explorations of the connections 
and discontinuities between the personal ideology and conduct of her characters. Characters 
such as Lydgate, Dorothea, and Deronda, the Spinozan secular Jew who retranslates Judaism 
into geo-politics, aim to live lives informed by clear intellectual or spiritual purposes, but 
have to address their inadequate ideas in other respects. Where Eliot creates characters who 
fail to uphold or have no integrity of intellectual purpose – Bulstrode or Grandcourt – their 
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implicit judgement by the narrative, as well as the explicit evaluations of the narrator suggest 
the novel judges their failure with Spinozan clarity and detachment.  
I will focus first on Middlemarch and then on Daniel Deronda to demonstrate how 
pervasively Eliot has translated, and also transmuted, Spinoza’s concepts, infusing them with 
her own ideas about the supremacy of the ‘emotional intellect’.   
 
Middlemarch and the Ideas of the Ethics 
 
I have already noted Eliot’s narrator’s continual engagement in I-thou conversations 
with the reader. But as well as translating Feuerbachian lessons, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the conversations demand that the reader’s mind becomes conscious of its own cognition, 
amends ‘inadequate’ ideas, and makes a transition from the ‘we’ who are entertaining 
‘inadequate ideas’ to a ‘we’ thinking more ‘adequately’ with the narrator. I will once again 
use Middlemarch’s famous meditation about universal tragic experience: 
 
Some discouragement, some faintness of heart at the new real future which replaces 
the imaginary, is not unusual, and we do not expect people to be deeply moved by 
what is not unusual. That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, 
has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames 
could hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary 
human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and 
we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest 
of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.
92
  
 
Introducing the ideas is a sentence which, in ironic yet sympathetic language, translates into 
recognisably human terms Spinoza’s objective psychological ideas, the replacement of the 
‘imaginary’, inadequate mode of thought for a more adequate perception of reality, with its 
consequential transitional negative emotions and depletion of self. The narrator leads the 
reader on a voyage of intuitive understandings, where ideas are expanded and then qualified. 
Firstly, we are asked to embrace a comprehensive intuition about ourselves as part of and 
sharing in the natural world about us, as part of ‘natura naturans’, where unarticulated yet 
intense everyday human tragedy takes its place alongside – and as possibly no more 
important to an immanent understanding - other particular experiences veiled by silence, 
those of natural growth, ‘hearing the grass grow’, and the small fears and pains of other 
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creatures, ‘hearing [....] the squirrel’s heart beat’.  The reader is being asked to feel 
themselves as a ‘concatenated’, interlinked part of Spinoza’s ‘Nature’, but also to embrace 
something of the calm intuitive overview which Spinoza attributes to thinking ‘under the 
form of eternity’, a mode of thought he identifies with one of the attributes of God. Spinoza’s 
concept of a common consciousness available to human beings in relation to the world they 
live in is being suggested. 
 As well as this Spinozan idea, Eliot is demanding that the reader consider whether 
they could or should engage their ‘emotional intellect’ in an act of sympathy for the universal 
occurrence of ‘tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency’. The ambiguities of the 
narrator’s demands are ‘well-wadded’ with irony, but seem both to aspire to a sympathy 
which is recognised as impossible to achieve, and to judge the human inability and ‘stupidity’ 
which prevents its achievement. In this, Eliot is scarcely endorsing either Spinoza’s 
celebration of the ‘human intellect’ or his rejection of suffering as the pathways to an 
understanding of reality. Instead she seems rather to be suggesting that sympathy and 
suffering have intrinsic validity in driving the processes of change in human lives.  
The disappointment lying at the heart of the transition made by Dorothea’s mind from 
the imaginary future to an understanding of the real future parallels Spinoza’s analysis of the 
need for a transition from an inadequate type of cognition (of the first kind) towards a rational 
cognition (of the second kind). Yet although it is possible to see this Spinozan 
conceptualisation at work, it becomes infused by Eliot’s desire to make the reader share in the 
emotion involved in such a transition. Instead of dispassionate understanding, we are asked as 
readers both to share in the universal human suffering felt when imagination and ideals give 
way to a recognition of the infinite regression of causal constraints constituting reality, and 
also to realise our limited capabilities to do this.  
 
Determinism 
  
Spinoza frequently uses the word ‘concatenare’ (to link together) to describe the 
interconnectedness of the world, and the inexorable causality which imprisons people in a 
chain of action and reaction which they disguise as freewill. But Spinoza also uses a more 
organic metaphor of the interconnectedness of rationality, an optimistic vision of the 
possibilities for society arising from human understanding and co-operation:  
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[....] the minds and bodies of all should compose as it were one mind and body, all at 
once [....] striving to preserve their being, and all at once seeking for themselves what 
is a common good to all.
93
 
 
 
Darrel Mansell 
94
 argues that Eliot’s essay, ‘Notes on Form in Art’, echoes Spinoza’s 
metaphor, in its advocacy of an art which moved towards complexity, the disclosure of ‘new 
and newer relations’, and that:  
 
[....] the most varied group of relations bound together in a wholeness which again has 
the most varied relations with all other phenomena’ is ‘the highest organism.’95 
 
 
The linkages, both negative and positive, between the thoughts and actions of one 
person and the thoughts and actions of another are considered throughout Eliot’s narratives. 
Some of her metaphors reflect Spinoza’s interest in organic economy, but her metaphors of 
weaving and webs suggest a more flexible entrapment than Spinoza’s chains of causality. 
There has been critical interest in Eliot’s extended metaphor of Middlemarch communities as 
a web or a piece of cloth:  
 
I at least have so much to do in unravelling certain human lots, and seeing how they 
were woven and interwoven, that all the light I can command must be concentrated on 
this particular web, [....].
96
 
 
 
The metaphor of unravelling a whole to understand its connections, the narrator’s self-
proclaimed task in writing, reflects not only the Spinozan idea of multiple causes or linkages, 
with its relevance for the fates of Lydgate, Rosamond, Fred and Bulstrode, but also suggests 
Eliot’s own metaphors of linkages in ‘Notes on Form in Art’.  In addition, Spinoza’s 
metaphor of concatenation also embraces the way in which humanity positively generates a 
store of adequate ideas and emotions, and its reverse transition of inadequate understanding 
of emotions driving suffering.  
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The ‘unravelling’ metaphor is reflected in the activities of a number of the novel’s 
characters. Both Lydgate and Casaubon are each attempting to ‘unravel’, or discover, first 
causes in hugely ambitious projects. In Casaubon’s case, he is seeking the ur-revelation of the 
divine: in Lydgate’s case his aim is to discover ‘the primitive tissue’, the elementary building 
blocks of physical life. 
 
[Bichat] [....] first carried out the conception that living bodies [....] must be regarded 
as consisting of certain primary webs or tissues, out of which the various organs [....] 
are compacted. [....].  
This great seer did not go beyond the consideration of the tissues as ultimate facts in 
the living organism, [....]; but it was open to another mind to say, have not these 
structures some common basis from which they have all started [....]. Of this sequence 
to Bichat’s work, [....], Lydgate was enamoured; he longed to demonstrate the more 
intimate relations of living structure, and help to define men’s thought more 
accurately after the true order. [....]. What was the primitive tissue? 
97
  
 
 
 Lydgate’s aim is the pursuit of rational knowledge (the second type of Spinozan cognition) 
of the ‘primitive tissue’ which underlies all living forms, so that it could be used to benefit 
humanity.  The novel examines both these projects to identify ‘first causes’ and demonstrates 
how any such project becomes entangled in other webs of human causality operating in 
communities like Middlemarch, with its consistent failure ‘to agree in all things’, and its 
pursuit of less than ‘adequate’ purposes based on miscalculations and  illusions. 
 
Inadequate Ideas and Negative Transitions 
 
Spinoza’s proposal in Part IV of the Ethics that an exemplary approach to living a life 
for one’s own good and that of others is attainable - ‘all at once seeking for themselves what 
is a common good to all’,98 comes under scrutiny in Middlemarch. The narrative confronts 
the heavy dragnet of social, historical, and personal realities, where clarity of purpose 
becomes elusive and compromised by misjudgement, disillusion, grief, recrimination and 
doubt. Characters, such as Lydgate and Dorothea, with their noble aspirations, are shown to 
have failed to make ‘adequate’ allowance for the impacts on their lives of certain unalterable 
facts about human nature. The web of causality threatening Lydgate’s career stems from his 
miscalculation of Rosamond’s and Bulstrode’s essential natures. Eliot’s language shows how 
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Lydgate’s ‘inadequate’ thinking has enforced a Spinozan transition to a sense of himself as 
the passive object of externalities rather than as an active subject. 
 
Everything that had happened to him there [Middlemarch] seemed a mere preparation 
for this hateful fatality, which had come as a blight on his honourable ambition, and 
must make even people who had only vulgar standards regard his reputation as 
irrevocably damaged. In such moments a man can hardly escape being unloving. 
Lydgate thought of himself as the sufferer, and of others as the agents who had 
injured his lot. [....]. There are episodes in most men’s lives in which their highest 
qualities can only cast a deterring shadow over the objects that fill their inward vision: 
Lydgate’s tender-heartedness was present just then only as a dread lest he should 
offend against it, not as an emotion that swayed him to tenderness. For he was very 
miserable. Only those who know the supremacy of the intellectual life – the life which 
has a seed of ennobling thought and purpose within it – can understand the grief of 
one who falls from that serene activity into the absorbing soul-wasting struggle with 
worldly annoyances. 
99
 
 
 
Lydgate perceives too late the chain of consequences grown out of his misjudgements. 
Because he sees himself as the object of the actions of others or of impersonal forces 
(‘everything that had happened to him’ and ‘which had come as a blight’), a ‘sufferer’ rather 
than an actively reasoning agent, he can see no way out of the emotional suffering. For him 
the Spinozan negative transition has been a particularly bitter one; the calm of rational 
activity has been undermined by his discovery of his ‘impotence’, through imminent financial 
and marital ruin, and the possible loss of his reputation as a man of honour. Consistent with 
Spinoza’s analysis of emotions in Books III and IV of the Ethics, even his virtues, such as his 
‘tender-heartedness’, are under siege from the negations and pain of his emotions.  Spinoza 
had argued that: 
 
When the mind imagines its own impotence it feels pain.
100
 
 
and that: 
 
The power of any passion or emotion may predominate over the other actions or 
power of a man, so that the emotion may pertinaciously adhere to him
101
. 
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Lydgate’s experience is described in terms which give specific dramatic realisations of 
Spinoza’s analyses of the pains of perceived passivity. His virtue of tender-heartedness is 
shown to be at the mercy of his other emotions and only his intellectual recall of it prevents 
him from even further self-destruction.  
The inadequacy of Dorothea’s early assessment of Sir James Chettam and Mr 
Casaubon as potential suitors, and the relation this has with Spinoza’s first type of cognition, 
with its ‘mutilated, confused, unorderly’ impressions is wittily presented through one of 
Celia’s efforts to save Dorothea from choosing Mr Casaubon as her future husband: 
 
“I thought it right to tell you, because you went on as you always do, never looking 
just where you are, and treading in the wrong place. You always see what nobody else 
sees; it is impossible to satisfy you; yet you never see what is quite plain.”102 
 
 
Dorothea’s short-sightedness is emphasised over and over again in the novel, as well as the 
clumsiness to which it gives rise.  Even her ‘ready understanding of high experience’103 in her 
act of generosity, one of Spinoza’s virtues, towards Lydgate is qualified by her ignorance of 
other types of experience, the inadequate ideas of mundane, selfish calculation: 
 
(Of lower experience such as plays a great part in the world, poor Mrs Casaubon had 
a very blurred shortsighted knowledge, little helped by her imagination.)
104
 
 
 
Eliot’s analysis of the connections between Dorothea’s inadequate ideas and her sense 
of passive mental confusion on her honeymoon reflects Spinoza’s analysis of the interplay of 
emotions. The disorientation of her ambitions for her marriage and their transition to 
confused disappointment is suggested through her initial fragmented perceptions of Rome in 
the descriptions already considered in Chapter 2.  
 
[....] all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and spiritual, mixed confusedly 
with the signs of breathing forgetfulness and degradation, at first jarred her as with an 
electric shock, and then urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of 
confused ideas which check the flow of emotion. Forms both pale and glowing took 
possession of her young sense, and fixed themselves in her memory even when she 
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was not thinking of them, preparing strange associations which remained through her 
after-years.
105
  
 
 
There are a number of points of correspondence here with Spinoza’s analysis of the emotions 
in Part III of the Ethics. One of these is the passive mood of its verbs. Dorothea was ‘jarred’ 
by the juxtaposition of lost ideals and a confused sense of ‘degradation’. ‘Impressions urged 
themselves upon’ her, and ‘forms [....] took possession of her [....].’ In Propositions I and III 
of Ethics, Part III, Spinoza argues that: 
 
Our mind is both active and passive; so far, namely, as it has adequate ideas, it is 
necessarily active, and so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.
106
 
 
and:  
 
 
The actions of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; its passions only from 
inadequate ideas.
107
 
 
 
Her inadequate idea about her marriage finds metaphors in her impressions of Rome, 
all described in terms of Spinoza’s cognition of the first kind, the inadequacies of imagination 
and sensory impressions. The passage closes with a description of the mixture of feelings 
suggested by the conjunction of Rome’s spiritual symbolic role with its contemporary 
decline. For Dorothea this conjunction and its echoes within her own experience were 
‘preparing strange associations which remained through her after- years’. In Part III’s 
proposition XIV and in the demonstration of proposition XV, Spinoza analyses the ways in 
which parallel experiences haunt each other, so that the memory of one will elicit the memory 
of the other. 
 
If the mind has once been affected by two emotions simultaneously, when it is 
afterwards affected by either of them, it will be affected by the other also.
108
  
 
and: 
 
When the mind is [....] affected with the former emotion by its true cause, [....] it will 
always be affected with the other also [....], that is it will be affected by pleasure or 
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pain; and thus the former object, not in itself, but by accident, will be a cause of joy or 
sadness.
109
 
 
 
In addition, Dorothea’s uncomprehending impressions of Rome and their apparent fusion 
with her emotions about her recent marriage, has resonances with several propositions set out 
in Part III. In the demonstration to proposition LIX, Spinoza argues that:  
 
All emotions resolve themselves into desire, pleasure or pain, [....]. But by pain we 
understand that by which the mind’s power of thought is diminished or restrained 
[....].
110
 
 
 
The narrator’s observation that the wreckage and confusion represented by Rome ‘urged 
themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused ideas which check the flow 
of emotion’ also suggests Spinoza’s argument that it is the confusion of ideas about any 
emotion which causes suffering rather than the emotion itself, once clearly understood by the 
intellect. 
 
Prop. III. An emotion which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a 
clear and distinct idea of it.  
Dem. An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea [....]. If therefore we form a 
clear and distinct idea of such an emotion, this idea is not distinguished from the 
emotion, so far as it belongs to the mind, except by reason [....]; and thus [....] the 
emotion ceases to be a passion; [....].
111
 
 
 
Eliot’s analyses of the emotional and intellectual experiences of Lydgate and 
Dorothea, and also of Will and Rosamond, show the influence of Spinoza’s argument about 
the inadequacy of non-rational ideas, and how inadequate thinking leads to a loss of active 
control over life. Characters’ mental states move from ‘self-contentment’ towards a state of 
suffering or passion when external events reduce their ability to see themselves as active 
agents. Just as Eliot explored the constraints on achieving understanding of others through an 
I-thou relationship, she explores the practical difficulties of achieving an intellectual 
understanding of emotion, except through the experience of suffering. The lessons learnt this 
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way, she seems to suggest, lead to a more effective recognition of the interconnectedness and 
interrelatedness of ourselves as a dependent part of a greater reality.   
 
Good and Evil 
 
Spinoza’s radical teaching about what constitutes good and evil, (and consequently, 
what should be seen as Spinozan virtues) is examined and interrogated in a number of ways. 
‘Good’ is for Spinoza a subjective, intellectual process of increasing understanding and using 
experience to approach ‘nearer and nearer to that exemplar of human nature which we 
propose to ourselves’.112 Above all, however, it is active, whereas evil, for Spinoza, consists 
in experiencing a hindrance to and limitation of active pursuit of an exemplar good. His 
language about evil in the Ethics emphasises this negativity; its vocabulary is one of ‘limits’ 
and ‘impediments’ to the achievement of adequate understanding and the activity which 
might flow from that:    
 
By evil I understand that of which we certainly know that it hinders us from 
participating in some good.
113
 
 
 
A number of Middlemarch’s characters are shown to have failed to reach an adequate 
understanding of themselves or of others. The narrator and the text of the novel judge their 
failings by Spinozan criteria. The weaknesses of Mr Brooke, Fred Vincy, and Mr Bulstrode 
are the result of their passivity, negativity and inaction. Fred Vincy’s entanglement in 
speculation and debt provides an ironic commentary on the Spinozan model of knowing what 
you need and ought to do but allowing circumstances to override an inner judgement. Mr 
Brooke’s ability to assent to just causes and ignore their implications for his own actions also 
falls within this ironic view of people’s self-deceptions and wilful hypocrisies. However, 
Eliot’s portrayal of the ethical dilemma facing Bulstrode in relation to Raffles’ illness 
demonstrates a Spinozan typology of thought processes which lead to ‘evil’. Bulstrode’s 
inner decision not to rectify a failure in medication, and thus knowingly allowing a man to 
die, demonstrates both ‘certain knowledge’ and a failure to ‘participate in some good’. 
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Moreover, we, as the readers, understand that these decisions are the product of a desperate 
wish to hinder the truth about his past hypocrisies and deceptions being exposed. 
In contrast to these analyses of evil as a failure to act well, Mr Farebrother’s dealings  
with Mary Garth, whom he loves, and Fred Vincy, for whom, as his rival for Mary’s love, he 
might feel envy, demonstrate two of Spinoza’s highest ‘active’ virtues, ‘strength of mind’ 
demonstrated through courage and generosity.
114
 
 
“If there is a likelihood of that youngster doing himself harm, why should you 
interfere? Aren’t you worth as much as he is, [....]? If there’s a chance of his going to 
the dogs, let him – perhaps you could nohow hinder it – and do you take the benefit.” 
“But I had once meant better than that, and I am come back to my old intention. I 
thought I could hardly secure myself in it better, Fred, than by telling you just what 
had been going on in me. And now do you understand me? I want you to make the 
happiness of her life and your own, and if there is any chance that a word of warning 
from me may turn aside any risk to the contrary – well, I have uttered it.” 
[....]. Fred was moved quite newly. Some one highly susceptible to the contemplation 
of a fine act has said, that it produces a sort of regenerating shudder through the 
frame, and makes one feel ready to begin a new life. A good degree of that effect was 
just then present in Fred Vincy.
115
 
 
 
Farebrother’s ability to think rationally about how best to make the woman he loves happy, 
and how also to have regard to his own ‘exemplar of human nature’ in seeking to do right, 
lead him to take the initiative not only to do his best to secure Mary’s happiness, but also to 
prevent his rival, Fred, from indulging his ‘passive’ lack of determination to live up to, if not 
his own expectations and exemplar, then those of Mary Garth. In doing this, Farebrother 
becomes an active agent of his own self-sacrifice, but also an active agent in pursuing his 
own ‘exemplar’ of right conduct. In his own words, he refuses self-interested passivity and 
inaction because he ‘had once meant better than that’. 
In Spinoza’s analysis of the emotions in Part III of the Ethics116, he dissects the tangle 
of emotions surrounding love and jealousy, and in Parts IV and V he provides the potential 
solutions which will enable a human being take control of his or her life as an active agent 
and to behave virtuously. He argues that pain, such as that implicit in jealousy and hatred, is a 
transition from one state of mental being to a lower.
117
 To counteract such negative 
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transitions, human beings have to exercise their power to understand and then to act 
rationally on that understanding. In Part IV of the Ethics Spinoza sets out the case for 
combating painful emotions by reason. The Demonstration to Proposition XLVI is relevant. 
 
All emotions of hatred are evil [....]; and therefore he who lives according to the 
guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to prevent himself from <being> agitated 
by emotions of hatred [....], and consequently [....] he will strive to prevent another 
from suffering the same emotions [....].
118
 
 
 
The paragraphs from Middlemarch quoted above depict Farebrother’s rational (and 
dispassionate) analysis of his conflicting emotions, recognising his temptation to act jealously 
in his wish to have Mary choose him, and acting generously in showing Fred the depth of the 
obligation he is under to transform his understanding and life to win Mary. He makes clear 
the series of causes which have led to his decision so that Fred can think more adequately 
about the effect of his actions on both himself and on the lives of others. 
Farebrother’s self-sacrifice is designed to help Mary and Fred, but, despite its 
attention to a rational process, it demands Farebrother’s recognition and acceptance of a 
painful reality. Self-sacrifice finds no place in the Spinozan ethical system, and neither does 
compassion. However, if action to transform the life of the object of compassion can be 
regarded as a rational action, then it may be seen as a virtuous action.  
 
But the good we do in striving to free the man we commiserate from his misery we 
desire to do solely in obedience to the dictate of reason, and on no other ground than 
the dictate of reason can we do any thing which we certainly know to be good.
119
 
 
 
The final sentence in the paragraphs from Middlemarch quoted above outlines the impact of 
Farebrother’s transformative act on Fred’s life, and imbues it with suggestions of that 
‘blessedness’ or ‘salvation’ through rational conduct discussed in Part V of the Ethics.  
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Daniel Deronda and the Ideas of the Ethics and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
 
Eliot’s translation of the Ethics and of parts at least of the Tractatus would have made 
her aware of intellectual influences on Spinoza’s thought. Genevieve Lloyd traces the way in 
which Spinoza used and transformed established philosophical concepts:  
 
Themes from ancient thought – from the Stoics, Epicureans and Neoplatonists as well 
as from Plato and Aristotle – reverberate in the text. There are strong echoes too of 
medieval voices – of Maimonides, the twelfth century philosopher and commentator 
on biblical and Talmudic texts, and of St Thomas Aquinas’s thirteenth century 
appropriations of Aristotelian thought – as well as of his contemporaries, Descartes 
and Hobbes. 
120
 
 
 
This incidental introduction to Jewish philosophy in the 1840s and 1850s while translating 
Spinoza’s works must have played its part in the gestation of Daniel Deronda, published in 
1876, where the writings of Maimonides and the Kabbalah are mentioned, along with those 
of Jewish poets (Ibn-Gebirol, Judah Halevi), authors (Leopold Zunz), and philosophers 
(Salomon Maimon, Isaac  Luria, Ben Azai). It is clear from Eliot’s Berg Notebook that she 
had read these authors along with Talmudic, Mishnaic, and Midrashic texts and 
commentaries; and, from the Pforzheimer Notebooks, that she had made notes on Jewish 
practice including that of Cherem, the excommunication declared on the young Spinoza.
121
  
Any personal motives for Eliot’s profound immersion in ‘Jewish history and literature’ as 
evidenced by Daniel Deronda and her extensive research are unclear. In her 1876 letter to 
Abraham Benisch she alludes to a ‘deep impersonal historic interest’122 in Judaism. Gertrude 
Himmelfarb has described Eliot’s friendship from 1866 onwards with Emanuel Deutsch, a 
Talmudic scholar at the British Library, who gave her weekly lessons in Hebrew, Jewish 
philosophical writings and religion. Deutsch died in Alexandria on his way to Palestine/Israel 
in 1873,
123
 and in the same year, Eliot began to keep comprehensive notes on Judaism for the 
novel that was to become Daniel Deronda. In an 1875 letter, Lewes wrote to their publisher, 
John Blackwood: 
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You are surprised at her knowledge of the Jews? But only learned Rabbis are so 
profoundly versed in Jewish history and literature as she is – [....].124  
 
 
The only concerns explicitly mentioned in Eliot’s letters are those arising from a 
sympathy with the cultural disadvantages of minority groups, such as the Jews, in the face of 
English arrogance and ignorance of other cultures. After Daniel Deronda’s publication, Eliot 
wrote to Harriet Beecher Stowe:  
 
[....] precisely because I felt that the usual attitude of Christians towards Jews is – I 
hardly know whether to say more impious or more stupid when viewed in the light of 
their professed principles, I therefore felt urged to treat Jews with such sympathy and 
understanding as my nature and knowledge could attain to. [....]. There is nothing I 
should care more to do, if it were possible, than to rouse the imagination of men and 
women to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most 
differ from them in customs and beliefs. But towards the Hebrews we western people 
who have been reared in Christianity, have a peculiar debt and, whether we 
acknowledge it or not, a peculiar thoroughness of fellowship in religious and moral 
sentiment.
125
   
 
 
Eliot’s aim of rousing a ‘vision of human claims’ and ‘fellowship’, set out in the letter to 
Beecher Stowe, echoes the Spinozan ideal of the essential interconnectedness of the ‘one 
mind and body’ of humanity when thinking and acting rationally to promote ‘a common good 
to all’.126 More obviously, the novel can be seen to be testing out on its readers the Spinozan 
idea that understanding and knowledge provide a clearer basis for judgement and action than 
‘confused and mutilated’ conventional prejudices. In this novel, the reader is confronted with 
some of his or her own prejudices and failures to form adequate ideas about the practice and 
ideals of the Jewish community in their midst, and challenged to reformulate them to achieve 
a more sympathetic understanding of the ‘other’, and a more rational and objective 
understanding of ‘self’. Spinoza, the first recorded secular European Jew, an advocate of 
religious tolerance, and his exemplary, humane life, provided her with a model for the 
establishment of a society based on a Spinozan vision of mutual co-operation detached from 
the particularity of religious dogma. Deronda finds himself a Jew by birth, albeit a secular 
one, combining a Christian cultural sensibility with sympathies for Jewish religious history 
and Jewish political aspirations for the establishment of a Jewish state. 
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Described in its early stages by William Blackwood
127
 as a further ‘perfectly 
charming’ novel about ‘English Ladies and Gentlemen’, it is, in contrast, a novel where 
English upper class life, contrasted with other European and non-European cultures, is shown 
to be narrow, materialistic and Philistine. Gwendolen’s dismissive and hypocritical 
perception of Jews when trying to pawn her necklace in Leubronn after her losses at the 
casino (‘these Jew pawn brokers were so unscrupulous in taking advantage of Christians 
unfortunate at play’128) is overturned dramatically by her enforced recognition of superior 
talent in Mirah and Klesmer, and her final realisation that the man she had looked to for 
wisdom, sympathy and perhaps love had discovered his identity as a Jew, and, during the 
course of the novel made a transition from the perspective of an English gentleman to that of 
an aspirant Jewish leader: 
 
“A Jew!”, Gwendolen exclaimed, in a low tone of amazement, with an utterly 
frustrated look, as if some confusing potion were creeping through her system. 
[....] “What difference need that have made?”129 
 
 
 Eliot’s misgivings about Spinoza’s method and ideas are more explicitly articulated 
in this novel than in Middlemarch. Similar Spinozan motifs occur - the inexorable 
interconnectedness of cause and effect, the impossibility of alternative might-have-beens, the 
illusions and delusions of free will, utility to self and the formation of goodness, and the 
inadequacy of conceptions deriving from imagination. Rationality and its limitations and the 
capacity to deflect and transform hatred are amongst other Spinozan ideas examined more 
critically by the novel, and there is an explicit rejection of Spinoza’s conception of remorse 
and suffering as negative.  
 
Mordecai:  Spinoza’s Alter-Ego 
 
Apart from her evaluation of the validity of Spinoza’s ideas, it is clear that the model 
provided by Spinoza’s way of living his life continued to haunt Eliot’s imagination. In 
Mordecai she creates an alternative Spinoza, and the parallels and contrasts are consistently 
underlined. When Deronda first meets him he receives an impression of a: 
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[....] consumptive-looking Jew, apparently a fervid student of some kind, getting his 
crust by a quiet handicraft, like Spinoza [....].
130
 
 
 
If Mordecai represents Emmanuel Deutsch’s learning and vision, as argued by Gertrude 
Himmelfarb,
131
 he is also presented to the reader as a variant of Eliot’s perception of Spinoza 
set out in her 1849 letter to the Brays. He is an isolated intellectual, driven through that 
isolation into an alternative visionary world expressed only through an idiosyncratic 
language.
132
 Mordecai is described as feeling his own ‘spiritual banishment’ and ‘sentence of 
exclusion’,133 and expresses himself in a private, archaicised, visionary language, echoing the 
constructions of Hebrew syntax as well as the cadences of biblical prophecy. The antithesis 
of the rarefied, dispassionate language of the Ethics, it forms just as much a barrier to realist 
recognition and sympathy. The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus had famously attributed an 
‘unusually vivid imagination and not [....] unusually perfect minds’134  to biblical prophets, 
but argued that ‘in regard to the intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a par with the 
rest’.135 Mordecai therefore represents an effort to both embody and redress that assessment 
of prophets. Deronda’s initial concerns that Mordecai’s ‘visionary excitement’136 could be a 
form of ‘monomania’ give way to a judgement which seems explicitly to invoke and then 
reject Spinoza’s method of geometrical logic, his vocabulary of concatenation, and his 
intellectualisation of emotion, and to replace these with ‘the emotional intellect’ and its 
‘possibilities’.  
 
The driest argument has its hallucinations, too hastily concluding that its net will now 
at last be large enough to hold the universe. Men may dream in demonstrations, and 
cut out an illusory world in the shape of axioms, definitions, and propositions, with a 
final exclusion of fact signed Q.E.D. No formulas for thinking will save us mortals 
from mistake in our imperfect apprehension of the matter to be thought about. And 
since the unemotional intellect may carry us into a mathematical dreamland where 
nothing is but what is not, perhaps an emotional intellect may have absorbed into its 
passionate vision of possibilities some truth of what will be [....].
137
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In its explicit rejection of Spinoza’s method and universalising aspiration, Deronda’s analysis 
also reflects Lewes’s 1866 description138 of Spinoza as ‘a mystic whose mind moved in 
geometrical processes’. In the place of such geometrical intellectual processes, Mordecai is 
presented as the embodiment of a political mystic and of the ‘emotional intellect’. 
Through the debate in the Philosopher’s Club at the Hand and Banner, Eliot explores 
different interpretations of ‘rationality’.  Gideon, a member of the club, advocates a 
pragmatic future, where Jews make their ‘expectations rational’,139 gradually assimilating 
into Gentile culture.  Mordecai’s response to Gideon’s pragmatism is to claim for himself an 
alternative rationality which draws explicit and implicit comparisons with that of Spinoza.  
 
“I too claim to be a rational Jew. But what is it to be rational – what is it to feel the 
light of the divine reason growing stronger within and without? It is to see more and 
more of the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change [....]: the past becomes my 
parent, and the future stretches towards me the appealing arms of children.”140  
 
 
His question about the nature of rationality reinterprets Spinoza’s arguments that the 
rationality of adequate ideas enables men and women to view reality increasingly adequately 
and intuitively, but dispassionately ‘under the form of eternity’.  Mordecai’s excited, insistent 
questions produce a very different view of the ‘light of divine reason’.  His ‘emotional 
intellect’ reinterprets how human beings relate to and perceive reality. Spinoza’s advocacy of 
the highest knowledge being the intuitive perception of the relationships connecting all 
aspects of reality, and rationally working towards mutual co-operation, is reinterpreted as the 
specific bonds of human relationship, linking generations together. Spinoza’s ‘highest 
knowledge’ is translated into the acceptance of a sacramental linkage of a historical past with 
its future, and a consecration of human relationship. Mordecai finally invokes Spinoza as one 
of the ultimate justifications of his vision of a Jewish state to provide a home for the cultural 
and religious life of Jews. As he does so, he examines that separation of intellect and feeling, 
heart and head, which Eliot herself had rejected, and identifies tradition as the vehicle for 
emotional and intellectual continuity:  
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“Baruch Spinoza had not a faithful Jewish heart, though he had sucked the life of his 
intellect at the breasts of Jewish tradition. [....]. Yet Baruch Spinoza confessed, he saw 
not why Israel should not again be a chosen nation.”141  
 
 
Eliot depicts Mordecai, not as a stern prophet of righteousness, but as the ‘emotional 
intellect’ fusing reason, vision and conviction, and issuing a call to Jewish people to provide 
the ‘heart of mankind’.142  
  
“But it is true, as Jehuda-ha-Levi first said, that Israel is the heart of mankind, if we 
mean by heart the core of affection which binds a race and its families in dutiful love, 
and the reverence for the human body which lifts the needs of our animal life into 
religion, [....].”143 
 
 
In this, Eliot drew on a sentence of Jehuda Halevy, which she had noted in her research for 
the novel: ‘That Israel is the heart of Humanity & therefore feels more keenly’.144 Mordecai’s 
vision combines the imagery of mankind as an interdependent body found in Spinoza with 
that of transformative and sacramental ‘bonds’ between generations. The emphasis on bonds 
rather than bondage, also suggesting Feuerbach’s emphasis on sacred relationship, highlights 
the novel’s debate about Spinoza’s conceptions of servitude and bondage, embodied in the 
experience of characters such as Gwendolen and the Princess Halm-Eberstein. 
 
Determinism and Freewill 
 
In Daniel Deronda, as in Middlemarch, Eliot insisted on the entangled nature of cause 
and effect, which Spinoza had argued precluded any human pretensions to freedom of will: 
 
There is no absolute or free will in the mind, but it is determined to will this or that by 
a cause which is also determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so 
on in infinitum.
145
 
 
 
The much discussed motto for Chapter 1 of Daniel Deronda includes the following: 
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Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even Science, the strict 
measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, and must fix on a point in the 
stars’ unceasing journey  when his sidereal clock shall pretend that time is at Nought. 
[....]. No retrospect will take us to the true beginning; [....].
146
 
 
 
The analogy between the origins of human actions and emotions and the movement of stars is 
developed later in the novel to describe the complexity of causality at work. 
 
Men, like planets, have a visible and an invisible history. The astronomer threads the 
darkness with strict deduction, accounting so for every visible arc in the wanderer’s 
orbit; and the narrator of human actions, if he did his work with the same 
completeness, would have to thread the hidden pathways of feeling and thought which 
lead up to every moment of action, and to those moments of intense suffering which 
take the quality of action [....].
147
  
 
 
The replacement of the earth-bound metaphor of webs and threads in Middlemarch for the 
metaphors drawn from astronomy, suggests from the beginning of the novel that there are 
stricter laws governing the interweaving of human destinies, and that Middlemarch’s human 
frame of reference has been replaced by a cosmic apprehension of reality.  Conflicting 
understandings of reality as either driven by chance, or necessity, or freewill, or as directed 
by a more mysterious sacred source of good, provide a major thematic shaping. Deronda 
speculates on the dual perceptions of reality that he and Mordecai represent:  
 
What I can be to him, or he to me, may not at all depend on his persuasion about the 
way we came together. To me the way seems made up of plainly discernible links.
148
 
 
 
Events can be seen variously or simultaneously as accident, the convergence or 
divergence of characters’ own worlds of causality, or as the mysterious weaving together of 
destinies. The beginning of Daniel Deronda catapults the reader into the midst of the 
chronological events of its narrative ‘arc’, through the ‘hidden pathways of feeling and 
thought’, into the disorientating, alienated world of the Leubronn Casino, a world dedicated 
to the triumph of chance over necessity, and a world of detached, evaluating observation and 
misunderstanding, primarily of women by men. The novel proceeds to re-examine the 
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‘hidden pathways of feeling and thought’, the concatenation of thought and action in 
Spinozan terms, which led to the afternoon in the casino. The sequence of the narrative draws 
attention to the chain of causation, so that the reader is allowed to amend his or her 
understanding of both Gwendolen and Deronda, placing the reader in a position to appreciate 
the chasm of inadequate ideas between a character’s view of their own actions and behaviour 
and the view of it taken by the characters surrounding them.  The narrator herself exclaims 
against the imperceptible yet remorseless linking of cause and effect, which undermines men 
and women’s perceptions of a supposed freedom of action and destiny:  
 
And thinking of them [....] one is tempted to that futile sort of wishing – if only things 
could have been a little otherwise then, so as to have been greatly otherwise after!
149
  
 
 
In particular, the novel focuses on the antitheses between acts of will envisaged by 
characters as a way of shaping their own destiny and that of others, and their very different 
results in practice. Deronda’s mother sees her act of renunciation, both of her Jewishness and 
her bond with her child, as an assertion of her own strength of will, as her freewill rebelling 
against the ‘servitude’ of being a Jewish woman.   
 
“I meant to have my will in the end, but I could only have it by seeming to obey. [....]. 
And I never would risk failure.”150 
 
 
When asked for the reasons for her action, she uncovers a different and more complex truth, 
that of the difficulty of disentangling the significance of external pressures from the unique 
force of an individual nature: 
 
 “Oh - the reasons for our actions!” said the Princess, with a ring of something like 
sarcastic scorn. “When you are as old as I am, it will not seem so simple a question –
“Why did you do this?”. People talk of their motives in a cut and dried way. Every 
woman is supposed to have the same set of motives, or else to be a monster. I am not 
a monster, but I have not felt exactly what other women feel – or say they feel, for 
fear of being thought unlike others.”151  
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Persevering in Existence 
 
 
The presentation of the actions of Gwendolen, the Princess Halm-Eberstein, and 
Grandcourt explores not only Spinoza’s world of necessity and causality, but also reflects a 
preoccupation with ‘will’.  Spinoza defines will as the striving of ‘every thing [....] to 
persevere in its existence’,152 and argues that ‘mind strives [....] to imagine those things which 
increase [....] the power of action of the body’.153 An 1875 letter from Eliot to Mrs Henry 
Ponsonby, written while Eliot was writing Daniel Deronda, deals with the difficulties of 
‘conciliating’ ideas of necessity and of will: 
 
 I shall not be satisfied with your philosophy till you have conciliated necessitarianism 
– I hate the ugly word- with the practice of willing strongly, willing to will strongly, 
and so on, that being what you certainly can do and have done about a great many 
things in life [....].
154
  
 
 
The relationship between will and the chain of necessity is explored in a much more 
equivocal way in Daniel Deronda. The hero discovers an ability to will ‘strongly’ and to act 
‘strongly’ himself only once he understands his past and feels part of a chain of causality, 
experienced not as bondage but as human bonds of relationship. In contrast, both 
Gwendolen’s and the Princess Halm-Eberstein’s assertions of individual will are transformed 
from a striving to ‘persevere in existence’ into a belief in their ability to manipulate the fate 
of others. Their attempts to step outside their inherited ‘causalities’ unravel for each into 
either disappointment or discovery of their own servitude. 
Gwendolen, who imagines she can manipulate others to do as she requires, discovers 
in both Deronda and, particularly, Grandcourt , that her abilities have limits, and that, while 
she is judging their utility to her existence, she herself is being evaluated by them: 
Any romantic illusions she had had in marrying this man had turned on her power of 
using him as she liked. He was using her as he liked.
155
  
The parallels between Gwendolen’s actions and consequential predicament and those of 
Deronda’s mother, the Princess Halm-Eberstein, are strongly suggested by Eliot. Both 
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women adapt their behaviour to the ‘reality’ of their father’s or husband’s wills through 
concealing both their rejection of it and their determination to remain unsubdued in some 
inner area of their soul. In describing the predicament of both women, they or the narrator  
frequently use the terms as ‘bondage’, ‘servitude’, ‘slavery’, ‘tyranny’,156 terms used by 
Spinoza in analysing the hold of the passions over the reason, and in particular the sensations 
of victimhood which stem from an inability to take command of feelings and situations. In 
describing Gwendolen’s behaviour, the narrator assertively yet ambiguously demands the 
reader’s judgement of such a guilt-fuelled victimhood:  
 
Can we wonder at the practical submission which hid her constructive rebellion? The 
combination is common enough, as we know from the number of persons who make 
us aware of it in their own case by a clamorous unwearied statement of the reasons 
against their submitting to a situation which, on inquiry, we discover to be the least 
disagreeable within their reach.
157
 
 
 
Deronda’s mother analyses the cultural domination of men and the necessity for 
covert rebellion as she describes her relationship with Deronda’s orthodox Jewish 
grandfather: 
 
“A man [....], with an iron will. [....].But such men turn their wives and daughters into 
slaves. They would rule the world if they could; but not ruling the world, they throw 
all the weight of their will on the necks and souls of women.[....]. 
And when a woman’s will is as strong as the man’s who wants to govern her, half her 
strength must be concealment.”158  
 
 
The exercise of will displayed by Deronda’s grandfather is an austere and rigid realisation of 
Mordecai’s description of his own rationality: ‘the past becomes my parent, and the future 
stretches towards me the appealing arms of children.’159 Thus Mordecai’s emotional intellect 
and rationality, his advocacy of emotional bonds through generations is also revealed as one 
which implicitly demands submission or self-sacrifice of women. Women are the devalued 
‘makeshift links’160 in the concatenation of men’s theories of rationality and causality. In 
telling Mirah the story of the Gentile king and the Jewish maiden, Mordecai suggests that: 
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‘women are specially framed for the love which feels possession in renouncing, [....].’161 Eliot 
demonstrates that men’s self-defined rationality implies self-sacrifice or submission from 
women, just as Deronda sacrifices Gwendolen to Mordecai’s vision of rationality and to his 
own will at the end of the novel.  
 For both Gwendolen and the Princess, their vision of women’s lives as victims to the 
exercise of men’s wills or rationalities, capricious or principled, fills them with horror and 
distaste. Gwendolen’s perception of Lydia Glasher’s, and possibly her own, future as victims 
of Grandcourt’s capricious will to dominate is described in words which emphasise that she 
feels herself a passive object and that she has become dislocated from any active relationship 
with reality - ‘as if some ghastly vision had come to her in a dream and said, “I am a 
woman’s life.”162 Eliot’s language in such passages, with its emphatic passive tenses, echoes 
the relationship with Spinoza’s analysis of passive and active thought,163considered earlier in 
relation to Middlemarch. Her portrayal of this battle between wills competing to extinguish 
each other provides a disconcerting subversion of Spinoza’s vision of the rational society 
where human beings envisage their continuing existence as a symbiotic relationship with 
others, ‘all at once [....] striving to preserve their being, and all at once seeking for themselves 
what is a common good to all.’164 
 The nature of Gwendolen’s ‘ghastly vision’, that sudden moment of imaginative 
perception, also recalls Eliot’s definition of intuition –‘direct impressions of sensibility 
underlying all proof’,165 her parallel interpretation of Spinoza’s ‘intuitive cognition’, the third 
and highest type of thinking. Here Eliot infuses Spinoza’s intellectual understanding of the 
‘essence’ of reality with her own comprehension of the inherent emotional consequences of 
such thinking. The operation of the imagination which Spinoza was at pains to treat with 
discrimination, rejecting it where it failed to hold an awareness that it was unreal, receives a 
new evaluation by Eliot as part of the operation of the ‘emotional intellect’. Gwendolen’s 
dream-like warnings and Mordecai’s prophetic expectations function ambiguously as 
intuitive knowledge about consequences and as rejections of the rational world of 
appearance.  
                                            
161
 GE DD, VIII. 61. p.683. 
162
 GE DD, II. 14. p.137. 
163
 BdeS Eth, 3p1 and 3p3,  pp. 93, 99. 
164
 BdeS Eth, 4p18, Scholium, p.169. 
165
 GEL.VI, to Mrs H F Ponsonby, 19 August 1875, p.167. 
155 
 
The limits of the activity of human will, particularly of women’s wills, are explored 
throughout the book. Deronda’s role is to overturn his mother’s strategy of freeing him from 
what she perceived as the ‘bondage’ of the web of Jewish cultural enforcement.  
 
“And the bondage I hated for myself I wanted to keep you from. What better could 
the most loving mother have done? I relieved you from the bondage of having been 
born a Jew.”166  
 
 
Instead, he embraces his vision of Jewish identity in words and ideas which echo Mordecai’s 
words about the ‘hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change [....].’167 Deronda’s language 
invokes a metaphor of organic growth in relation to the purposes of a ‘stronger Something’, 
and suggests not Spinoza’s metaphor of concatenation but his immanent ‘Deus sive Natura’: 
 
“[....] my grandfather’s trust [....] - what you call his yoke – is the expression of 
something stronger, with deeper, farther-spreading roots, knit into the foundations of 
sacredness for all men. [....]. But that stronger Something has determined that I shall 
be all the more the grandson whom also you willed to annihilate.”168  
 
 
As the Princess shrewdly points out his embrace of a Jewish identity is dependent on loving a 
woman who ‘is not given to make great claims,’169 who is likely to be submissive in any 
loving relationship.  
 
Good and Evil 
 
Throughout Daniel Deronda, Eliot interrogates Spinoza’s definition of good as that 
which is useful in helping us to realise ‘that exemplar of human nature which we propose to 
ourselves.’170 Characters assess each other for their possible usefulness, and are forced to 
learn to redefine what they might or ought to mean by usefulness to self. In the case of 
Gwendolen, the sense of someone’s usefulness is initially bound up in a crude understanding 
of it. In her own quest for liberty, she has to discover, through a cataclysmic readjustment of 
her earliest ‘inadequate’ ideas, that materialistic ‘liberty’ is bondage when it is based on 
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mistaken, inadequate ideas. Her expectation of using Grandcourt ‘as she liked’ founders 
before her husband’s intention to use ‘her as he liked.’171 Her earliest moral equivocations 
between her mother’s needs and Lydia Glasher’s rights become her destroyer. In her 
dependence on Deronda’s combination of judgement and sympathetic understanding, she 
sees him as offering her an exemplar to emulate, so that ‘she would be continually 
assimilating herself to some type that he would hold before her,’172 the process of moral 
transformation advocated by Spinoza. She eventually discovers that she has to resign all 
claims to him, but still accept his demands of her as these are essential to her reclamation of 
her humanity: 
 
Mighty Love had laid his hand upon her; but what had he demanded of her? 
Acceptance of rebuke - the hard task of self-change – confession – endurance.173  
 
 
By the close of the novel, Gwendolen has been completely transformed. She is no 
longer a charming egotist who feels entitled to the worship of others, but a woman who has, 
with difficulty, sacrificed selfish desires and realised that her role must be to live so that other 
people’s lives are enriched. 
 
“You have been very good to me. I have deserved nothing. I will try – try to live. I 
shall think of you. What good have I been? Only harm. Don’t let me be harm to 
you.”174   
 
 
Other characters exemplify differing understandings of usefulness to self, and the 
moral consequences of those understandings. Grandcourt, Lush, and Lapidoth use other 
people unscrupulously, whereas Deronda finds himself questioning how far he is merely 
using Mordecai without considering his purposes and needs. Eliot’s description of Deronda’s 
understanding uses terms which suggest Spinoza’s definitions of intuitive knowledge and of 
good, and also a Feuerbachian consciousness of another human being: 
 
[....] he experienced, as was wont with him, a quick change of mental light, shifting 
his point of view to that of the person whom he had been thinking of hitherto chiefly 
as serviceable to his own purposes, [....].
175
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Equally the novel interrogates what could be understood as evil, and how that 
understanding relates to the Spinozan concept of evil set out in Ethics, as anything ‘which can 
impede understanding’,176 or ‘of which we certainly know that it hinders us from 
participating in some good.’177 Spinoza’s definition strongly suggests the passivity of evil, a 
failure to counteract forces ‘hindering’ the achievement of a subjective good through ‘that 
exemplar of human nature which we propose to ourselves.’ The opening of the novel 
introduces Gwendolen through a series of questions which interrogate Spinoza’s 
categorisation and the links he made between activity, passivity and ethics. 
 
[....] what was the secret of form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to her 
glance? Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those beams? Probably the evil; 
else why was the effect that of unrest rather than of undisturbed charm?
178
 
 
 
From the start of the book, Gwendolen is associated with action and dynamism, with 
the ability to exercise a power and fascination over others, but Eliot also creates the sense that 
her activity is ethically dubious, producing ‘unrest’ and ‘disturbance’. Her nemesis, 
Grandcourt, is also described as enjoying the exercise of power. The power he loves is a 
peculiarly Spinozan negativity or ‘evil’. It takes arbitrary forms but all are designed to hinder 
others in the achievement of their aspirations, or disabuse them of any sense that he has any 
bonds of obligation towards them; ‘there was no telling what might turn up in the slowly 
churning chances of his mind’,179 judges his aide, Mr Lush, emphasising Grandcourt’s 
freedom from causality or necessity.  The narrator identifies Grandcourt’s will to hinder as 
even greater than any sensation of jealousy in relation to Gwendolen and Deronda: 
 
He would have denied that he was jealous: because jealousy would have implied 
some doubt of his own power to hinder what he had determined against.
180
 
His initial allure for Gwendolen, apart from his wealth and position, is based on a 
wilful and doubly negative judgement that ‘there is less to dislike about him than about most 
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men’,181 a judgement which ironically comes back to haunt her and eventually fan her hatred 
of the ‘refined negations’182 which had attracted her earlier. She discovers that the man she 
had married had a capricious and undeflectable will, apparently bound by no causality or 
bonds with others: 
 
Grandcourt had become a blank uncertainty to her in everything but this, that he 
would do just as he willed, and that she had neither devices at her command to 
determine his will, nor any rational means of escaping it.
 183
 
 
 
Both he and Gwendolen justify their acts of capricious will not only by the public pretension 
that any other way would lead to ennui, but also, in Grandcourt’s case, to disconcert those 
around him . Grandcourt’s final action in taking out a small sailing boat is presented as a way 
of demonstrating this inexorable will whose only objective was to subdue and discomfort 
others: 
 
[....] he [....] carried out his purpose as something that people might not expect him to 
do, with the gratified impulse of a strong will which had nothing better to exert itself 
upon. 
184
 
 
 
Proscription of Hatred 
 
Despite the fact that most of the Ethics is devoted to an emphasis on clearer 
understanding and more rational thought processes leading to more adequate subjective 
evaluation, Spinoza makes a memorable exception in providing a ‘rule of life’ in relation to 
the emotion of hatred which is so closely linked to an understanding of good and evil. This 
‘rule’ sets down how to attain a rational understanding of hatred and how to conquer it, ‘by 
love or generosity, and not [....] with reciprocal hatred’185. It is an almost uniquely specific 
moral command within the Ethics, and Daniel Deronda explores the passion of hatred far 
more extensively than any other of Eliot’s novels. Gwendolen’s hatred of Grandcourt is 
partly a hatred of herself and the self-deceptions which led to her agreeing to marry him: 
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The embitterment of hatred is often as unaccountable to onlookers as the growth of 
devoted love, and it not only seems but is really out of direct relation with any 
outward cause to be alleged. [....]. And the intensest form of hatred is that rooted in 
fear, which compels to silence and drives vehemence into a constructive 
vindictiveness, an imaginary annihilation of the detested object [....]. The vision of her 
past wrong-doing, and what it had brought on her, came with a pale ghastly 
illumination over every imagined deed that was a rash effort at freedom, such as she 
had made in her marriage.
186
  
 
 
In describing the effects of her hatred of Grandcourt, Eliot identifies two possible 
accompanying emotions which transform hatred from an active emotion into a covert passive 
state of suffering – fear and self-reproach. The difficulties of securing a transition of this type 
of feeling from a passive to an active state -  to use Spinoza’s terminology - are examined in 
detail, and Gwendolen’s narrative becomes an alternative version of Crime and Punishment 
where actual crime and its aftermath are replaced by intention, imagination, guilt and their 
repercussions. In contrast to Spinoza’s objective and detached prescriptions for a ‘rule of 
life’, Eliot describes the impossibility of changing Grandcourt, and how impervious to ‘love 
and generosity’ he might be if made the subject of such a Spinozan experiment: 
 
She might as well have made angry remarks to a dangerous serpent ornamentally 
coiled in her cabin without invitation.
187
  
 
 
She also describes the intensity of spiritual suffering caused by hatred, where the self 
becomes the object of its own negations, and acts only to intensify pain: 
 
“I want not to get worse. [....]. I feel as if I should get wicked with hating people. 
[....].” 
She was hurting herself with the jewels that glittered on her tightly-clasped fingers 
pressed against her heart.
188
  
 
The descriptions of Gwendolen’s state of mind corroborate Spinoza’s analysis of the pain of 
passivity, (“Since then I have been wicked. I have felt wicked. And everything has been a 
punishment to me ”189) but they also make clear that escape from that state is not possible 
through a rational recall of a ‘rule of life’ with its generosity towards the object of hatred. 
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From Deronda, Gwendolen accepts ‘rebuke - the hard task of self-change – confession – 
endurance’.190 Eliot suggests that what makes this regime endurable for Gwendolen is both 
her love for Deronda, and her repulsion from her imaginative identification with a murderous 
impulse. 
Elsewhere in the novel, Eliot evaluates the application of Spinoza’s ‘rule of life’ with 
ambiguous results. While Mirah and Mordecai show ‘generosity’ to their feckless father, 
towards whom they could justifiably feel hatred, this secures no amendment of Lapidoth’s 
mind or conduct. The experiments of the novel seem to indicate that Eliot was more 
convinced of the power of suffering to effect change than she was of Spinoza’s belief in the 
power of generosity to transform.  
 
Abstraction and Negation 
 
 One other aspect of the novel seems to be enmeshed with the analysis of Spinozan 
thought considered earlier in relation to the character of Mordecai. As Deronda’s musings 
about Mordecai become fused with the narrator’s voice, Spinozan abstraction is depicted as a 
negation of reality: 
 
And since the unemotional intellect may carry us into a mathematical dreamland 
where nothing is but what is not, perhaps an emotional intellect may have absorbed 
into its passionate vision of possibilities some truth of what will be - [....].
191
 
 
 
The characters of Daniel Deronda are fascinated by ‘what is not’. Gwendolen and 
Grandcourt inhabit a world where ‘nothing is but what is not’, living lives driven by a desire 
for purposeless control and equally empty evasion of control. Grandcourt’s lack of human 
connection with others is summed up in Gwendolen’s moment of intuition during their 
‘courtship’: 
 
Grandcourt met her laughing eyes with a slow, steady look right into them, which 
seemed like vision in the abstract, [....].
192
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Elsewhere Mr Gascoigne resigns himself to Grandcourt’s aloofness by considering that ‘You 
would not expect him to be on intimate terms even with abstractions.’193 Deronda himself 
exists in the novel as an influence detected and demonstrated by the other characters but 
difficult for the reader to observe. To adapt Eliot’s own astronomical metaphors he is like a 
planet whose existence has to be hypothesised because of its impact on other observable 
planetary bodies.  
Daniel Deronda moves from Middlemarch’s exploration of Spinoza’s ideas towards a 
profound conversation with them. Their illuminations of the processes at work in human 
emotion and understanding penetrate the book, but Eliot explores the issues which arise from 
Spinoza’s model of human amelioration. His influence can be traced in the portrayal of 
psychological change, and particularly in the analysis of those states of mind where human 
beings are trapped and unable to extricate themselves. His view of humanity as a whole of 
which individuals are the parts and of human responsibility to strive for the good are echoed 
by Eliot, but she differed markedly from him in her judgements of how to achieve the ‘good’, 
to deal with hatred, and of the necessary role of suffering and remorse. The models of 
redemptive action which men hypothesise for society and individual alike are shown to 
demand boundaries on women’s aspirations and will, and their expression leaves them, like 
Gwendolen and the Princess, outside the net of interrelationship and fulfilment. However, 
while the novel distinguishes Mordecai’s emotional intellect from Spinoza’s abstract 
intellectualising of emotion, Deronda himself follows a path to self-discovery which is 
haunted by variant understandings and rejections of Spinoza’s ideas. Spinoza is possibly the 
first widely known example of a secular Jew, and his intellectual preoccupations with the 
establishment of a new kind of political society where there was greater religious freedom 
and tolerance is transformed through the character and ultimate purpose of Deronda into a 
search for a new fusion of religious tradition and communal loyalty. Deronda himself 
becomes a secular Jew, but one bound by intense respect for the traditions and religio-
political visions of Judaism and of his mentor, Mordecai. The novel presents Eliot’s own 
vision of the ways in which religious tradition and culture can still inform the creation of a 
secular, just and tolerant society.  Equally it reveals her sympathy for the multiple ways of 
understanding the world opened up by religious sensibility. Mordecai’s visionary perception 
of a world neither determined by chance nor by inexorable causality but by some more 
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mysterious intersection of the beyond-human with the human is never disputed either by 
Deronda’s awareness of contemporary religious debate or by the structure of the novel. It 
remains as a possible vision of reality. Deronda assents not only to Mordecai’s vision of a 
society bound by sacramental bonds where a ‘too [....] diffusive sympathy’194 can be 
channelled into purposeful living, but also to a refinement of Spinoza’s vision of a blessed 
human society where:  
 
[....] all men should agree in all things, [....], striving to preserve their being, and all at 
once seeking for themselves what is a common good to all.
195
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Chapter 4 
Ward’s Robert Elsmere: Amiel’s Language for ‘States of 
Soul’ 
 
In his dialogue, The Decay of Lying – An Observation, Oscar Wilde’s imaginary 
spokesmen caricature the ideas explored in Mary Ward’s second and most widely-read novel, 
Robert Elsmere (1888), as belonging to ‘the sort of conversation that goes on at a meat tea in 
the house of a serious Nonconformist family’,1 and go on to dismiss them as ‘simply 
Arnold’s Literature and Dogma with the literature left out’, or Green's philosophy, which 
‘very pleasantly sugars the somewhat bitter pill of the author's fiction’.2 
Wilde’s satirical deflation of Ward’s impassioned polemic is typical. But for Ward, 
the choice between differing ideas about Christianity, far from providing a worthy tea-time 
topic, had torn apart her parents’ marriage and, with it, her experience of childhood security. 
Her later life in Oxford reinforced her view of the drama and significance of ideas and an 
intellectual life, and the potentially devastating effects of their translation into everyday 
experience and relationships. Many of her novels, not just the early popular success, Robert 
Elsmere, explore the impacts of intellectual change, attitudes and choices on previously 
established relationships and careers: in Ward’s words, the ways in which ‘an intellectual 
process’ can provoke a ‘story’ and a ‘human and emotional crisis’.3   
Irony aside, Wilde’s point about her debt to Literature and Dogma is a serious one, 
and one to which she readily admitted in her Recollections.
4
 Her novels show her proud 
indebtedness to her uncle’s ideas and to his literary expression of them, and she made clear 
that Matthew Arnold’s humanist deconstruction of the Old and New Testaments in Literature 
and Dogma (1873), ‘threw out in detail much of the argument suggested in Robert Elsmere’.5 
Arnold’s extended essay had dismissed the eschatological, messianic aspects of both Judaic 
and Christian beliefs as ‘aberglaube’, superfluous narratives which would wither, and had 
argued that the essential lasting messages of both testaments were Judaism’s love of right 
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conduct and Jesus’s ‘method and secret’,6 that of ‘self-examination, self-renouncement, and 
mildness’.7  
In addition to this influence, Ward was indebted to a different discovery, that of 
Frédéric Amiel. The following chapters explore the ways in which Ward translated into 
fiction the ideas she had absorbed through the Arnold family’s engagement with religious 
issues, filtering it through Amiel’s sensibility and portrayal of the emotional ebb and flow of 
doubt, as it emerges from her translation of his Journal Intime. Ermarth describes Amiel’s 
Journal as a ‘painful, uncompromising expression of unrelieved religious despair’, and as ‘far 
more radical than any of the English novels of doubt’.8 Although the Journal is far from 
merely a record of entirely unrelieved spiritual despair, Arnold’s 1888 essay on ‘Amiel’ also 
objected to Amiel’s preoccupation with the infinite and his ‘morbid’ introspection.9 However, 
in many ways, they espoused similar attitudes theologically, although expressing them 
differently. Where Arnold’s essays were rational, witty, provocative and resolutely avoided 
his poetry’s exploration of personal doubt and uncertainty, Amiel is passionate, uncertain, 
introspective, oscillating between moods and ideas, fascinated by the ‘abyss’ as he termed it, 
the ‘buried life’ as Arnold might term it, of the subconscious and how it impinges on 
emotional and intellectual consciousness.  Ward’s debt is to both of them, to Matthew 
Arnold’s more robust management of doubt and proposals for what should compose the 
enduring elements of human belief, but also to Amiel’s language and psychology, his more 
passionate, plangent self-analyses of the ‘molecular whirlwind’10  of his life, and its 
translation of the emotional struggle involved in relinquishing religion’s structuring of 
experience.  
 
The Influence of her Translation  
 
Chapter 1 considered how and why Mary Ward was drawn to the translation of 
Frédéric Amiel’s Journal Intime. The language she used about it strongly suggests that she 
saw the act of translation as a contest of equals between the translator and the translated. The 
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‘spell’ it ‘laid on’11 her suggests an intense fascination with its matter and expression. 
Because the process of translation overlapped with the gestation of Robert Elsmere, the 
influence of the Journal Intime on the novel is profound and has been underestimated. 
Amiel’s psyche, psychological predicaments, and philosophical questionings were used as 
models for her own explorations of the emotional impacts of doubt and irreconcilable faiths. 
Amiel’s vocabulary, his psychological landscapes, his self-aware, questioning sensibility, his 
portrayal of the flux of ideas and ideology, and his depiction of a European intellectual 
hinterland are drawn into Ward’s imaginative armoury to portray the emotional dimensions 
of an intellectual process.  An article Ward wrote for Macmillan’s Magazine alludes to 
Amiel’s combination of mysticism and intellectualism with approval:  
 
Whereas a mind like Amiel’s, while intellectually it feels the force of the arguments  
urged by science, is yet practically persuaded  that beyond and below phenomena 
there is a ‘deepest depth’ in which love and duty have their source, a Divine 
consciousness which is the root of ours.
12
  
 
 
In translating Amiel she found the epitome of the contemporary spiritual dilemma, ‘so widely 
representative of the modern mind - of its doubts, its convictions, its hopes’,13 the experience 
of losing a religious faith and searching for a new set of symbols through which to experience 
the indissoluble emotions of a former faith and maintain a belief in human conscience. In the 
essay for Macmillan’s Magazine she also wrote:  
 
Many of his confessions of faith may well stand for typical utterances of that modern 
spirit which, in the midst of doubt, will neither sacrifice its knowing nor its believing, 
but clings passionately to both.
14
 
 
 
Peterson records one of Mary Ward’s confessions to a friend, Frances Power Cobbe, that she 
‘had never quite recovered from the strain of Robert Elsmere’, linking its emotional and 
psychological impact on her to the fact that Elsmere’s ‘religious dilemma’ was ‘the inner 
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struggle of her own conflicting tendencies towards rationalism and mysticism’.15 It is in the 
intersection of this conflict, which she had identified in Amiel’s Journal Intime, that Ward 
recognised the creative tensions and possibilities of her own irreconcilable needs ‘to know 
and to believe’.  
Amiel provided a prototype, or, because of his own sense of his variousness, a variety 
of prototypes, for a novel about the psychological, emotional and intellectual impact of 
contemporary thinking about religion; how it felt to experience doubt, lose a former faith, and 
struggle to find a way to live on the basis of new understandings. The Journal’s power over 
her moral imagination was such that she returned to it to find a quasi-religious authority and 
source of spiritual encouragement, as evidenced in a letter to her dying mother, Julia Arnold: 
 
I am so sorry, dearest, for your own suffering. This is a weary world, - but there is 
good behind it, ‘a holy will’, as Amiel says, ‘at the root of nature and destiny,’ and 
submission brings peace because in submission the heart finds God and in God its 
rest. There is no truth I believe in more profoundly.
16
 
 
 
Summary of the Journal Intime 
 
 Amiel’s book is a spiritual and intellectual journal covering his life from his late 
twenties in 1848 until his death in 1881, thirty three years later. Amiel’s attitude to the future 
status of the Journal is equivocal, sometimes emphasising that it is the record of a private 
internal dialogue, sometimes allowing the possibility of its worth to a world beyond: 
 
This mass of written talk, the work of twenty-nine years, may in the end be worth 
nothing at all; for each is only interested in his own romance, his own individual 
life.
17
  
 
Despite his ambiguity about whether his self-explorations were to be published or not, they 
are written in a poetic, lucidly expressive style. Edmund Scherer, his French editor, and 
Ward, his English translator, effusively described the expressiveness of his writing as 
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‘wonderful’,18 displaying a ‘magic of style’ and a ‘glow and splendour of expression’.19 
Ward’s introduction praises:  
[....] its poetical quality, its beauty of manner - that fine literary expression in which 
Amiel has been able to clothe the subtler processes of thought, [....] and Amiel, in 
spite of all his Germanisms, has style of the best kind.
20
 
 
 
Matthew Arnold, who had resolutely refused to fall under Amiel’s spell, other than as a 
literary critic, conceded that Amiel developed his ideas:  
 
[....] with great subtlety, but also with force, clearness, and eloquence, making it both 
easy and interesting to us to follow him.
21
  
 
 
Scherer’s introduction to the French edition of the posthumous Journal identifies the 
contrast between Amiel’s scanty published work and the style and contents of the Journal, 
and wrestles with the enigma Amiel posed to his friends and colleagues. He presents Amiel 
as a conjunction of opposing elements, yet as evading categorisation: 
 
[....] l’extrême objectivité de la pensée s’unissait en lui à l’extrême subjectivité du 
sentiment.
22
 [[....] extreme objectivity of thought united in him with extreme 
subjectivity of feeling.] 
Il [....] appliquait rarement les catégories vulgaires du bon et du mauvais, du vrai et du 
faux.
23
[He [....] rarely applied the vulgar categories of good and bad, of truth and 
falsehood.] 
Notre ami n’est ni orthodoxe, ni hérétique, j’allais dire ni croyant, ni incrédule; il se 
meut dans un région où ces oppositions n’ont point de place.24 [Our friend is neither 
orthodox nor heretic, I was going to say neither a believer nor an unbeliever; he 
inhabits a region where these oppositions have no place.] 
 
 
 The Journal’s entries themselves reveal a mind responsive to the natural world and 
sensitive to its effect on moods and thoughts. Ward’s article in Macmillan’s Magazine 
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commends their ‘Wordsworthian charm’.25 Amiel’s interior world of shifting moods, 
emotions and ideas, his consciousness of his consciousness is analysed. Most importantly for 
Ward, the book charts the changes in Amiel’s religious position as well as his views on the 
future of Christianity. He clung to beliefs in the primacy of conscience, and in the Christian 
conceptions of pardon, self-renunciation and the reconciliation of the individual soul with 
God, despite his fascination with a more pessimist philosophy of resignation of personal 
desire and search for annihilation of self. While he never relinquished his veneration for the 
figure of Jesus, his conception of God and human relationship with the divine were gradually 
transformed into an internal debate between binary oppositions: 
  
Are these oscillations between the personal and the impersonal, between pantheism 
and theism, between Spinoza and Leibnitz, to be regretted? No, for it is the one state 
which makes us conscious of the other. And as man is capable of ranging the two 
domains, why should he mutilate himself?
26
 
 
 
 Throughout his life, Amiel returned to the theme of his first statement in the Journal 
in July 1848: ‘There is but one thing needful - to possess God.’27 By 1863, he was exploring a 
position more focused on enduring human psychological needs than those of Church 
teaching, stating that:  
My creed is in transition. Yet I still believe in God, and the immortality of the soul. 
[....]; I believe in the redemption of the soul by faith in forgiveness. [....]. I believe 
even in prayer. I believe in the fundamental intuitions of the human race, and in the 
great affirmations of the inspired of all ages.
28
 
 
 
In 1868, he further explored his rejection of church and dogma, yet his reverence for the 
figure of Jesus: 
 
We may be suspicious of the clergy, and refuse to have anything to do with 
catechisms, and yet love the Holy and the Just, who came to save and not to curse.
29
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His later exploration of mystical and nihilistic conceptions of the Universe remained 
interpenetrated with a sense of a ‘holy will’: 
 
My creed has melted away, but I believe in good, in the moral order, and in salvation; 
religion for me is to live and die in God, in complete abandonment to the holy will 
which is at the root of nature and destiny.
30
 
 
 As he was dying however, his belief was in an immanent rather than a transcendent 
God.
31
 
 In the last weeks of his life, he affirmed both a sense of ‘universal metamorphosis’ 
within which ‘all particular convictions, all definite principles, all clear-cut formulas and 
fixed ideas, are but prejudices, [....]’, 32 where ‘religious psychology has become a simple 
phenomenon, and has lost its fixed and absolute value [....]’.33 But these continuing 
intellectual revaluations were combined with a continuing religious sensibility which could 
pray to retain faith in ‘ta volonté sainte ’34 [your holy will] a month before his death.  
 His Journal provided Ward with a model for contemporary attempts to distinguish 
between Christian dogma and spirituality, for intellectual doubt combined with religious 
sensibility, and a consideration of how ethical and psychological needs should continue to be 
met. Despite the metamorphoses of his own perceptions, Amiel identified the broad terms of 
the contemporary religious debate in an early 1851 entry as one between the competing 
values of ‘moral love’ and science:   
 
Now all that science gives is the amor intellectualis of Spinoza, light without warmth, 
[....]. Moral love places the centre of the individual in the centre of being. [....].
35
  
 
 
An 1869 entry restates the issue: 
 
The transference, however, of Christianity from the region of history to the region of 
psychology is the great craving of our time. What we are trying to arrive at is the 
eternal gospel.
36
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 The journal form allowed him to record the internal ‘drama’ of thought, which he 
describes as ‘a monologue, or rather an intimate debate between God, our conscience, and 
ourselves’.37 His phrases recall both Arnold’s ‘dialogue of the mind with itself‘,38 and also 
Feuerbach’s definition of thought: ‘Man thinks - that is, he converses with himself’.39 The 
Journal analyses the ways in which thought and perception shift endlessly, although, below 
this shifting, changing conscious self, Amiel was fascinated by and feared ‘the abyss’ and 
disintegration of the human unconscious: 
 
I am a spectator, so to speak, of the molecular whirlwind which men call individual 
life; I am conscious of an incessant metamorphosis, an irresistible movement of 
existence, which is going on within me.
40
 
 
 
and: 
 
 
For this abyss is within us; this gulf, open like the vast jaws of an infernal serpent bent 
on devouring us, is in the depth of our own being, and our liberty floats over this void, 
which is always seeking to swallow it up. Our only talisman lies in that concentration 
of moral force which we call conscience [....].
41
 
 
 
The Journal explores his views on current political and scientific development, and 
offers a scrupulously written and carefully judged analysis of other writers and the impact of 
their ideas upon him, as well as an unblinking analysis of his own failure to produce any 
work of worth. The names and ideas of other iconic European philosophers – including 
Spinoza and Feuerbach - critics, novelists, dramatists, poets, and historians spill out of the 
Journal’s pages, their ideas refracted through Amiel’s reactions to them.  His enthusiasms 
anticipated some of Ward’s own. He was an enthusiastic reader of early Spanish poetry, and 
mentions both the Cid and Rodogune, on which she had worked at an earlier stage in her 
career. Some of the Journal’s introductions and cross-fertilisations blossomed for her into 
longer lasting relationships of translation and reimagining, such as the 1898 translation of 
Joubert’s Pensées, considered in Chapter 5. 
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In relation to Amiel’s writing and its relationship to his cultural context, her introduction to 
Amiel’s Journal argues that he was a contemporary intellectual ‘everyman’: 
 
He speaks for the life of to-day as no other single voice has yet spoken for it; in his 
contradictions, his fears, his despairs, and yet in the constant straining towards the 
unseen and the ideal which gives a fundamental unity to his inner life, he is the type 
of a generation universally touched with doubt, and yet as sensitive to the need of 
faith as any that have gone before it; [....].
42
 
 
 
The Genesis of Robert Elsmere: Crisis, Translation and Creation 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the process of translation was intertwined with ‘the germ’ of 
a project which became Robert Elsmere, a project that had begun developing after Ward 
heard John Wordsworth’s 1881Oxford sermon on the ‘present unsettlement in religion’. 
Ward described the sermon in the Recollections. It connected: 
 
[....] the ‘unsettlement’definitely with ‘sin’. The ‘moral causes of unbelief’, said the 
preacher, ‘were (1) prejudice; (2) severe claims of religion; (3) intellectual faults, 
especially indolence, coldness, recklessness, pride and avarice.’43 
 
 
Her reaction to it is also described: 
 
[....] it was the shock of indignation excited in me by the sermon which led directly - 
though after seven intervening years – to ‘Robert Elsemere’.44 
 
 
Her Recollections describe her first thoughts about how to combat the argument and 
prejudice of the sermon: 
 
How could one show England what was really going on in her midst? Surely the only 
way was through imagination; through a picture of actual life and conduct; through 
something as ‘simple, sensuous, passionate’ as one could make it.45  
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Her first attempt at such a picture, appearing soon after the sermon, was a pamphlet 
called ‘Unbelief and Sin: a Protest addressed to those who attended the Bampton Lecture of 
Sunday, March 6
th.’46 In her Recollections, Ward recognised the pamphlet as a forerunner of 
Robert Elsmere. It presented opposing ideas dramatically as a ‘sketch’ of ‘two types of 
character’- A, an early version of Robert Elsmere, the character that fights its stormy way to 
truth, and C, who ‘knows no doubts or has suppressed them’. 47  
Ward wanted to find a written medium which would reach a wider public than the 
spontaneous Oxford ‘anti-Tract’. The tradition which she aspired to join was that of earlier 
Victorian novels of spiritual experience and of doubt, which had focused on either the 
process of loss or discovery of faith by the central character:  
 
There were great precedents - Froude’s ‘Nemesis of Faith’, Newman’s ‘Loss and 
Gain’, Kingsley’s ‘Alton Locke’ - for the novel of religious or social propaganda. 
And it seemed to me that the novel was capable of holding and shaping real 
experience of any kind, as it affects the lives of men and women. It is the most elastic, 
the most adaptable of forms.
48
 
 
 
She was unapologetic about her desire to write a novel of ideas, of ‘propaganda’, 
emphasising the novel form’s adaptability, its capacity to translate ‘propaganda’ into a 
satisfying artistic form.
49
 
The development of such a novel was interrupted in 1884 by her ‘strong wish’50 to 
translate Amiel’s Journal Intime, as described in Chapter 1. Her Recollections identify the 
moment in March 1885 when her translation metamorphosed into a plan of how to write 
Robert Elsmere: 
 
[....] I had nearly finished the translation of Amiel, which appeared in 1885, and in 
March of that year some old friends drove me up the remote Westmoreland valley of 
Long Sleddale, [....]; and from that day onward the early chapters of ‘Robert Elsmere’ 
began to shape themselves in my mind. [....]. Elsmere was to be the exponent of a 
freer faith; Catherine had been suggested by an old friend of my youth; while 
Langham was the fruit of my long communing with the philosophic charm and tragic 
impotence of Amiel.
51
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She began work on Robert Elsmere during the summer of 1885, and its conceptualisation and 
composition thus grew organically out of the translation of the Journal Intime, completed in 
April 1885.
52
  Her work over this period therefore brought together her intention to respond 
to Wordsworth’s sermon, her translation of the journal of a man in the grip of an agonising 
process of loss of faith, and a book which could portray the loss of a traditional faith as an 
evolution into an ethically driven, secular, humanist creed. To do this she created a character 
who would, in combining his loss of faith in traditional religion with continuing commitment 
to a human Jesus and his ethics, demonstrate that John Wordsworth’s equation was invalid.  
The book would also show that relinquishing a faith was no facile or ‘sinful’ experience, but 
the culmination of a complex emotional and intellectual struggle. In February 1888, almost 
three years after the publication of Amiel’s Journal, Robert Elsmere was published.   
 
Reviews of the Journal Intime 
 
 Chapter 1 analysed Arnold’s review of Amiel’s Journal, published almost two years 
after the appearance of the book. The review made it clear that the translation had made 
Amiel’s life and ideas better known in England:  
 
In speaking of Amiel at present, after so much has been written about him, I may 
assume that the main outlines of his life are known to my readers: [....].
53
 
 
 
Despite his personal misgivings about Amiel’s psychology, Arnold’s essay pays tribute to 
Ward’s translation, ‘at once spirited and faithful’.54 In her Recollections, Ward quotes 
Benjamin Jowett’s appreciation of her translation of Journal Intime. It identifies some of the 
qualities which had made Amiel’s book so appealing to her, as well as suggesting the 
advantages of portraying a life compared with an analysis of ideas: 
 
It catches and detains many thoughts that have passed over the minds of others, which 
they rarely express, because they must take a sentimental form, from which most 
thinkers recoil. It is all about "self," yet it never leaves an egotistical or affected 
impression. It is a curious combination of scepticism and religious feeling [....]. 
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But, after all, commentaries on the lives of distinguished men are of very doubtful 
value. There is the life; - take it and read it who can.  
Amiel was a great genius as is shewn by his power of style..... His Journal is a book 
in which the thoughts of many hearts are revealed [....].
55
 
 
 
His emphasis on its ‘combination of scepticism and religious feeling’, on its expression of the 
process of thinking (‘catches and detains many thoughts’),  and on its portrayal of emotion 
without sentimentality were all aspects of Amiel’s writing significant to Ward and, as I will 
show, used by her in her novels.  
Other later reviews of the work, such as H W Mabie’s, were appreciative of the skill 
of the translator, and of the aspects of Amiel’s writing which Ward herself had valued, his 
emotional articulacy and variousness: 
 
The translation of Amiel’s “Journal Intime”, [....], was of such admirable quality that 
it effected a real transference of thought and feeling from one language to another, 
and added a work of deep and permanent interest to the literature with which this 
generation lives and by which it has been deeply influenced. The introduction gave 
Amiel a welcome which was at once gracious, and, in a rare degree, interpretative of 
his temper and spirit. There were moods in the meditations of the Swiss professor 
which were more significant of his temperament and of his age than were his 
thoughts, and these moods Mrs Ward divined and defined with sympathetic insight 
and skill.
56
 
 
 
Peterson singles out Walter Pater’s Guardian review of Robert Elsmere as ‘part of a 
curious dialogue between the authors of the two most famous religious novels of the 
Victorian period’. Ward’s earlier review of Marius the Epicurean had argued that Marius 
should not have paid ‘lip service to a creed which he rejected intellectually’.  Pater’s response 
was to criticise Elsmere’s rash decision to leave the Church of England’.57 Their conflict was 
resolved by Ward’s later novel, The Case of Richard Meynell, where the eponymous hero 
stays within but seeks to change the Church.  
However, Robert Elsmere received one further significant, dissenting review. 
Gladstone’s review in The Nineteenth Century focused on the novel’s aim: 
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To expel the preternatural element from Christianity, to destroy its dogmatic structure, 
yet to keep intact the moral and spiritual results.
58
 
 
 
In particular, he attacked what he saw as Ward’s inadequate presentation of any Christian 
defence: 
 
There are abundant signs in the book that the negative speculatists have been 
consulted if not ransacked; but there is nowhere a sign that the authoress has made 
herself acquainted with the Christian apologists, old or recent; or has weighed the 
evidences derivable from Christian history [....]. If such be the case, she has skipped 
lightly [....] over vast mental spaces of literature and learning [....].
59
 
 
 
So gravely did he view the possible impact of the book that he and Ward had a private 
audience in Oxford, where she was staying as her mother was dying. She sent Humphry 
Ward an account of their meeting and concluded that:  
 
[....] the new lines of criticism are not familiar to him [Gladstone], & they really press 
him hard. He meets them out of Bishop Butler & things analogous but there is a sense 
I think that the question and answer don’t fit, & a vast development of interest & 
sometimes irritation produced by it.
60
 
 
 
She also noted the emotional impact upon Gladstone of the intellectual issue which they were 
debating:  
 
He was very charming personally, though at times he looked stern & angry & white to 
a degree, so that I wondered sometimes how I had the courage to go on – the drawn 
brows were formidable.
61
 
 
 
The publicity which the disagreement secured may have been one factor in the book securing 
a far wider audience than that which could be reached through a propagandist tract. As a 
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novel exploring the emotional dimension of radical thought it became a ‘best seller’, with 
translation into ‘most foreign tongues’ and international publication.62 
 
A Language for the Experience of Doubt 
 
In the introduction, I considered Davis’s argument that in shedding the old religious 
ideas: 
 
[....] the old ways have to linger, and have to be banished, alternately, until a new 
language of symbols and associations can serve as a replacement.
63
 
 
 
Davis goes on to argue that:  
Nowhere is this complicated process of learning a new language better shown than in 
Mrs Humphry Ward’s Robert Elsmere. Published in 1888, it stands as the great 
culminating recapitulatory novel of the century’s religious experience.64 
 
 
In writing Robert Elsmere, Ward set herself a number of formidable theoretical tasks. She 
wanted to move towards a language which could translate new ideas but find an emotional 
equivalence to that associated with the former ideas. To do this she had to find a language 
resembling a translation between a way of thinking and a way of feeling. It would have to 
demonstrate how an abstract, ‘intellectual process’ can irreparably alter the emotions and 
events of human lives. The novel’s characters and narrative would focus on the ‘human and 
emotional crisis’ resulting from thought, imagining, as it were, the never-provided ‘back 
story’ of Amiel’s meditations on the various manifestations of his psycho-spiritual 
experience: 
 
But in my case, what provoked the human and emotional crisis - what produced the 
story – was an intellectual process.65 
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Stephen Gwynn identifies Mary Ward’s approach to the creation of a novel as 
follows: ‘She plans the thing in terms of spiritual anatomy, and then proceeds to clothe them 
with flesh’.66 Ward saw herself as working backwards from a conflict which would 
dramatically expose an intellectual position towards a moment, such as that in Long Sleddale, 
where she had found or created suitable protagonists to explore or resolve that conflict. She 
herself argues in the Recollections that her fiction had to encompass the scope and stages of 
intellectual analysis through ‘suggestion’ both to provide the essential basis of an argument 
but also to explore the force of its human impacts: 
 
The problem then, in intellectual poetry or fiction, is so to suggest the argument, that 
both the expert and the popular consciousness may feel its force. And to do this 
without overstepping the bounds of poetry or fiction; without turning either into mere 
ratiocination, and so losing the ‘simple, sensuous, passionate’67 element which is their 
true life.
68
 
 
 
Amiel’s Journal was important to her in securing this ‘simple, sensuous and 
passionate’ account of thought, rather than ‘mere ratiocination’.  If Robert Elsmere partly 
translated the ideas of Matthew Arnold’s Literature and Dogma into a re-understanding of 
religious conviction, the language Ward used for that translation was Amiel’s passionate, 
introspective language rather than Arnold’s witty, ironic, urbane intellectuality. What she 
achieves is the translation of ideas into the variety of emotional and psychological states to 
which they give rise, the emotional corollaries of thought.  
 
The Influence of Amiel’s Style and Language 
 
 After her death in 1920, Ward’s friend, André Chevrillon, wrote appreciatively of 
her work:  
 
I do not know of any novelist that gives one to the same degree the feeling that Ideas 
are living forces, more enduring than men, and in a sense more real than men – forces 
that move through them, taking hold of them and driving them like an unseen, higher 
Power.
69
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The sense that Ward’s characters are the victims, willing or not, of ideas that seize their 
minds and shake their lives, and that this is the intellectual and emotional undertow of a 
ceaseless process of change and renewal, echoes a number of Amiel’s themes and recurrent 
images. Some of his most characteristic words are ‘metamorphosis’, ‘whirlwind’ and ‘abyss’, 
each conveying that sense of constant change, the power and physical intensity of thought 
processes and the lure and menace of the sub-conscious world. I argue that Ward identified 
with Amiel’s style and psyche to such an extent that not only his style but his vocabulary, as 
translated by her, influenced her own style. Her novels continued to be haunted by it so that 
the occasional direct echo is still traceable in Eleanor (1900), the latest novel considered in 
this thesis.  
One of Amiel’s recurrent images is of the abyss. Amiel himself used the word ‘abîme’ 
[abyss] twenty seven times in his Journal, but he also used the word ‘gouffre’ [gulf] eighteen 
times. On a number of occasions he uses the phrase ‘l’abîme insondable’ (measureless abyss, 
or, as translated by Ward, ‘fathomless abyss’). The image of an abyss is used in a number of 
ways. It is used of the hidden depths of the subject’s unconscious mind: 
 
 [....] in my theory of the inner man, I placed at the foundation of the Self, [....], a 
lowest depth of darkness, the abyss of the Unrevealed [....].
70
 
 
 
It is used of the process of surrendering life, finite and individualised, to the infinite and 
eternal: 
 
We are spectators of the eternal duel between the two great forces, that of the abyss 
which absorbs all finite things, and that of life which defends and asserts itself [....].
71
 
 
 
It is also used in connection with the religious emotion experienced when confronted with the 
immeasurable: 
 
By the vastness of the abysses into which she penetrates, in the effort – the 
unsuccessful effort – to house and contain the eternal thought, we may measure the 
greatness of the divine mind.
72
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Ward draws on Amiel’s usage of ‘abyss’ to convey the incomprehensible forces 
which surround men and women, and which lie within them. Like his, her usage emphasises 
the mystery and irrationality of the unconscious mind and the unknowability of the universe 
and those powers which seem to impinge on men’s lives.  Amiel sometimes uses other words 
in conjunction with words such as ‘abyss’.  Such words include ‘vast’ or ‘vastness’, which 
the Journal uses forty seven times, and ‘veil’ or ‘veiled’, used nine times, three of those in 
conjunction with the image of Isis, the mystery of reality.   
Ward’s recognition that her response to Amiel’s fusion of ‘conflicting tendencies 
towards rationalism and mysticism’73 echoed her own influenced her transference of Amiel’s 
language for his mystical apprehensions of the ‘beyond-human’ and the unknowable; even 
when Amiel’s original usage is part of a physical description, it acquires in Ward’s reuse of it 
some of the mystical suggestiveness of his use of the word in other contexts. I have used 
examples from both Robert Elsmere and from Eleanor, written almost fifteen years later, to 
show how closely Ward echoed the phrases and ideas of the Journal. The following are 
parallels from Robert Elsmere. Each is compared with a passage it echoes from Amiel’s 
Journal. 
Newcombe, the priest who has refused to entertain more liberal ideas, attempts to 
warn Elsmere against the Squire’s ideas by describing a path through metaphysical 
temptations – ‘I see life always as a threadlike path between abysses along which man 
creeps.’74 The image itself can be traced back to Amiel’s description of a day climbing the 
Sparrenhorn, along a ‘path which runs between two abysses’.75 A word, which in the 
particular context of the Journal provided only a romantic description of mountainscape, is 
infused by Ward with the understanding of ‘abyss’ as Amiel used it elsewhere in his Journal , 
as a description of precarious psychological or spiritual states, transforming it into an allegory 
of the menacing temptations besetting the religious life. 
Ward’s descriptions of the ways in which both Robert and Squire Wendover face their 
deaths, without any religious faith, uses Amiel’s mystical vocabulary of abyss, vastness and 
veil. Mortality is described as the ‘common abyss’, and it is combined with the image of the 
rending of the ‘veil’ which had protected men from too much knowledge: 
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The veil which hides the common abyss, in sight of which men could not always 
hold themselves and live, is rent asunder, and he looks shuddering into it.
76
 
 
 
It reflects one of Amiel’s uses of the image of the veiled Isis to describe the mysteries of 
death, resignation and ultimate knowledge: 
 
[....] the old belief that to raise the veil of Isis or to behold God face to face brought 
destruction on the rash mortal who attempted it.
77
 
 
 
Ward had described Wendover’s initial apprehension of his death’s inevitability in terms 
reminiscent of Amiel’s conjunction of ‘abyss’ and ‘vastness’ (‘the vastness of the abysses’) 
noted earlier:  
 
His eye seems to be actually penetrating the eternal vastness which lies about our life. 
[....]. The awe, the terror which are at the root of all religions have fallen even upon 
him at last.
78
 
 
 
Ward’s use of Amiel’s terminology carries with it the associations with psychic terror of the 
infinite found in Amiel’s usage of it elsewhere. The immensity of death’s mystery negates 
Wendover’s lifetime commitment to rational inquiry, which is left impotent before the 
vastness and the abyss, Ward’s and Amiel’s words for those processes which swallow human 
life or reduce its significance.  
Ward also uses the word abyss to describe moral horror. Robert’s shock at the 
infidelity he is invited to by Mme de Netteville is described as a ‘moral abyss’ over which he 
hangs on a ‘single thread’: 
 
The sensitive optimist nature [....] felt itself wrestling in the grip of dark implacable 
things, upheld by a single thread above that moral abyss which yawns beneath us all 
[....].
79
 
Elsewhere, in the novel, a similar image is used of an emotion produced by a purely physical 
response of human insignificance compared with the inhuman sublime of Nature: 
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[....] the sense it produced in the spectator of hanging dizzily above the lake, with the 
infinite air below him, and [....] leav[ing] the eye of the watcher face to face across the 
fathomless abyss with the majestic mountain mass, and its attendant clouds, as though 
they and he were alone in the universe.
80
 
 
Both seem to owe their impact, either emotional or moral, to Amiel’s originating image of 
human nullity compared with the enormity and mystery of the universe, where human 
individuality seems irrelevant: 
 
What is our life in the infinite abyss? [....]. It seems to me that I am hanging by a 
thread above the fathomless abyss of destiny.
 
Is this the Infinite face to face, an 
intuition of the last great death?
81
  
   
Even in Eleanor, written fifteen years after the translation of Amiel’s Journal, Lucy’s 
unwitting wish to create an air of normality during a dinner where Manisty’s unstable sister, 
Alice, is spreading a natural sense of gothic disquiet, is described as follows: 
 
But her pleasant girlish talk seemed to float above an abyss of trouble and discomfort, 
which threatened constantly to swallow it up.
82
 
 
 
Lucy’s sense of an abyss is, apparently, trivial compared with Amiel’s originating, much 
darker, and more fatalistic image of the abyss within:  
 
For this abyss is within us; this gulf, open like the jaws of an infernal serpent bent on 
devouring us, is in the depth of our own being, and our liberty floats over this void, 
which is always seeking to swallow it up.
83
 
 
 
The allusion to Amiel’s image acquires a premonitory power as the narrative unfolds the 
hidden abysses of the insanity of one member of the diners and the heartbreak and incurable 
illness of another.  
 The image of a whirlwind occurs thirteen times in total in the Journal Intime. Amiel 
uses it in relation to the violent flux of ideas,
84
 feelings,
85
 and impressions.
86
 He describes his 
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own sense of inner disintegration through its suggestion of random violence: ‘Instead of 
being single, [....] I become legion, multitude, a whirlwind – a very cosmos’.87 He uses it to 
describe his sense of being caught between the will to live and his expectation of death:  
To live is to die partially - to feel oneself in the heart of a whirlwind of opposing 
forces – to be an enigma.88 
  
 Ward uses ‘whirlwind’ in two significant places in Robert Elsmere. The first is in her 
description of Robert’s reaction to reading the Squire’s book, where it is used to suggest the 
destructive power of his new ideas and the way in which they have swept up and absorbed 
previous impressions: 
 
Over the young idealist soul there swept a dry destroying whirlwind of thought. 
Elements gathered from all sources [....] entered into it, and as it passed it seemed to 
scorch the heart.
89
 
 
 
The second incidence is during Robert’s fevered anticipation of his own death after that of 
the Squire, thus reflecting Amiel’s use of it in facing up to his death: 
 
The strangest whirlwind of thoughts fled through him in the darkness, [....]. Death 
here! Death there!
90
  
 
 I suggest that Amiel’s metaphorical language was an influence on Ward’s own 
descriptions of certain states of mind. She used it to suggest the penumbra of emotions which 
Amiel’s own use of it had established in his own particular context, as if it were also a 
private language between herself and him, where she understood the imaginative loading of 
the word and transferred that loading to her own descriptions of emotional states. The private 
language of an intimate Journal which Ward translated becomes her own private language 
for particular psychological and emotional experience, and adds an intensity and dynamism 
to her descriptions. 
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The Influence of Amiel’s Language for Thinking and Feeling 
 
Jowett’s response to Mary Ward’s translation of Amiel’s Journal Intime singled out 
the Journal’s achievement of ‘catch[ing] and detain[ing] many thoughts that have passed over 
the minds of others, [....].
91
 Amiel’s own assessment of what the journal form could offer was 
as follows: 
 
Or sometimes it is the idea itself which has to be turned over and over, that I may 
know it and apprehend it better. [....]. Evidently the corresponding form of style 
cannot have the qualities which belong to thought which is already sure of itself, and 
only seeks to communicate itself to others. The function of the private journal is one 
of observation, experiment, analysis, contemplation; [....].
92
 
 
 
Elsewhere Amiel described the circumscriptions of thought and its articulation:  
The chief part of the drama is a monologue, or rather an intimate debate between God, 
our conscience, and ourselves. Tears, griefs, depressions, disappointments, irritations, 
good and evil thoughts, decisions, uncertainties, deliberations, all these belong to our 
secret, and are almost all incommunicable and intransmissible, even when we try to 
speak of them, and even when we write them down. What is most precious in us never 
shows itself, never finds an issue even in the closest intimacy. Only a part of it 
reaches our consciousness, it scarcely enters into action except in prayer, and is 
perhaps only perceived by God, for our past rapidly becomes strange to us.
93
 
 
Amiel’s analyses emphasise the inconclusiveness and tentativeness of the experience of 
thought, its emergence into consciousness and then its submergence back into half-articulable 
or unconscious processes. He confronts his: 
 
 [....] habit of watching myself feel and live, with my growing incapacity for 
practical action, with my aptitude for psychological study.
94
 
 
 
His sense that the truth about belief was provisional and mutable was reflected in his style 
and in his choice of form. His practice has an impact on the way in which Ward 
‘demonstrates’ the experience of thinking, its internal dialogue and its mysterious 
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subconscious under-life. Her descriptions of Robert’s thought patterns include his 
explorations of his emerging beliefs through self-interrogations, whose answers change as his 
traditional faith gives way, and those moments where subconscious processes become 
conscious and clear.   
 The Journal also influenced Ward’s depictions of inner experience through its use 
of metaphor and description drawn from Nature to suggest parallel processes of thought and 
emotion taking place in the mind. Amiel’s perception that ‘every landscape is, as it were, a 
state of soul’,95 expresses the romantic fusion of idea, mood and description which he 
achieves.  
 
Once more I feel the spring languor creeping over me, the spring air about me. This 
morning the poetry of the scene, the song of the birds, the tranquil sunlight, the breeze 
blowing over the fresh green fields - all rose into and filled my heart. Now all is 
silent. O silence, thou art terrible! - terrible as that calm of the ocean which lets the 
eye penetrate the fathomless abysses below. Thou showest us in ourselves depths 
which make us giddy, inextinguishable needs, treasures of suffering. Welcome 
tempests! - at least they blur and trouble the surface of these waters with their terrible 
secrets. Welcome the passion blasts which stir the waves of the soul, and so veil from 
us its bottomless gulfs! In all of us, children of dust, sons of time, eternity inspires an 
involuntary anguish, and the infinite, a mysterious terror. We seem to be entering a 
kingdom of the dead.
96
 
 
 
The sequence of description and thought moves from that of a familiar, life-filled spring 
landscape, rendered ambiguous by the writer’s ‘languor’, to its ultimate transformation by 
silence into an experience of psychological terror and an anticipation of death. Amiel reverses 
the conventional associations of spring, of silence, and of the calm of an ocean to find 
through them intimations of the ‘fathomless abysses’ of the human mind, and the need for 
movement, for tempests to ‘blur and trouble’ the surface to conceal their ‘terrible’ ocean 
depths, and its psychic corollary of ‘mysterious terror.’ These descriptions and ideas are 
linked together by intimations of their emotional source in the writer’s moods, which shift 
from languor to the demand for passion ‘to veil the bottomless gulfs’ of the psyche.  
 Ward made use of these two aspects of  Amiel’s writing, his sense of hesitation and 
provisionality in the experience of thought, combined with descriptions or metaphors rooted 
in Nature, to suggest the emotional corollary of thought, and their function in signifying a 
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‘state of soul’. Robert’s journey from Christian conviction to renunciation of his faith is 
depicted by Ward as a series of irreconcilable assertions at war within him and with the 
emotional bedrock of his life.  The pendulum of intellectual challenge is followed by 
emotional retreat as Robert’s loss of faith slowly stalks him: 
 
“The fairy tale of Christianity” - “The origins of Christian Mythology.” [....]. Could 
any reasonable man watch a life like Catherine’s and believe that nothing but a 
delusion lay at the heart of it? [....], he seemed to hear Mr Grey’s answer: “All 
religions are true, and all are false. [....]. The spirit in them all is the same, [....]; it is 
but the letter, the fashion, the imagery, that are relative and changing.”   
 He turned and walked homeward, struggling, with a host of tempestuous ideas as 
swift and varying as the autumn clouds hurrying overhead. And then, through a break 
in the line of trees, he caught sight of the tower and chancel window of the little 
church. In an instant he had a vision of early summer mornings – [....] all the soft stir 
of rural birth and growth, of a chancel fragrant with many flowers, [....], of the 
kneeling form of his wife close beside him, [....]. The emotion, the intensity, the 
absolute self-surrender of innumerable such moments in the past - [....] - came 
flooding back upon him.
97
 
 
 
Robert’s internal tension between intellectual doubt and emotional faith is externalised and 
translated by the language and ideas of one revered figure, Mr Grey, and the life of faith of 
his wife, Catherine. Grey’s imputed argument begins with a dismissal of Christianity’s 
supernatural aspects as a work of the imagination, of ‘fairy tale’ or ‘myth’; Robert counters 
this by his perception of the reality as well as the intensity of his wife’s faith. This small 
emotional victory is again countered by imagining a fuller, more finely argued response from 
Grey which no longer attacks the very foundation of Catherine’s faith, but considers it as one 
amongst many human translations of the religious impulse. The urgency and violence of 
Robert’s internal debate and its involuntary, unpredictable movement towards some sort of 
final dissolution is then suggested through natural imagery, emphasising its restless, 
evanescent and autumnal aspects: ‘tempestuous ideas as swift and varying as the autumn 
clouds hurrying overhead’. The landscape of change ‘hurrying’ to a close is interrupted by his 
glimpse of his church and a reassertion of a train of feeling which merges his vocation and 
his love for his wife into a natural cycle of growth and fertility. However, the words identify 
this vision of natural, spontaneous religious fellow-feeling, of ‘self-surrender’, as a moment 
‘in the past’. The movement of metaphor swings backwards and forwards from underlining 
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chaotic change and dissolution, to emphasising serenity and natural regeneration, and then 
finally an equivocal, rational withdrawal from emotion to face its loss. 
 The earlier analysis of Amiel’s use of landscape and metaphors drawn from nature 
demonstrated the complex movements of thought and feeling which it traces. I will use two 
more examples which show how Amiel uses description of nature to suggest shifts of thought 
and feeling, as well as a steady infiltration and elucidation of the nature of ideas by feeling. In 
two sequential entries, Amiel uses the idea of spring to emphasise two contradictory 
movements of thought and feeling. The first records:  
 
The vulture of regret gnawed at my heart, and the sense of the irreparable choked me 
like the iron collar of the pillory. It seemed to me that I had failed in the task of life, 
and that now life was failing me. - Ah! how terrible spring is to the lonely! 
98
 
 
 
The slow cadences of the earlier sentences, and the repetition of the metaphor and simile of 
Promethean suffering, reflect his sense of exclusion from life’s opportunities and the 
bitterness of his life’s disappointments, but distanced, objectified by its literary expression. 
The brevity and simplicity, the sudden and lateral switch to a contra-conventional perception 
of Spring as a hostile and hope-negating force, intensifies and dramatises the inner experience 
of being excluded from the normal course of annual regeneration.   
 In the subsequent entry, however, he uses the idea of spring to dramatise an urgent 
sense of unanticipated renewal, and uses the same type of modification of idea and metaphor, 
from assertion of a response through increasingly self-distrusting modifications of it.   
 
The Alps are dazzling under their silver haze. Sensations of all kinds have been 
crowding upon me; the delights of a walk under the rising sun, the charms of a 
wonderful view, [....] and a thirst for joy, hunger for work, for emotion, for life, 
dreams of happiness and love. [....]. O ye passions, a ray of sunshine is enough to 
rekindle you all! The cold black mountain is a volcano once more, and melts its 
snowy crown with one single gust of flaming breath. It is the spring which brings 
about these sudden and improbable resurrections, the spring [....], sending a thrill and 
tumult of life through all that lives, [....].
99
 
 
The initial sentences, with their simple repetitions, convey an uncomplicated response to the 
delights of springtime nature. Only as the passage progresses do the hints of self-doubt and 
cynicism begin to reassert themselves –‘a ray of sunshine is enough to rekindle you’.  Instead 
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of likening himself to Prometheus, his image of the changes being wrought in himself is 
violent, disturbing and inhuman. He is the ‘cold black mountain’ which ‘is a volcano once 
more’. In the final sentence, the idea of ‘spring’ has accumulated not only the conventional 
ideas of joy in the resurgence of life, but also a sense of its recurrent battle against violence 
and difficulty. The language is dynamic, violent, emotional (‘gust, ‘thrill’, ‘tumult’). The 
phrase ‘these sudden and improbable resurrections’ links the reader back to the recent 
association with bitter regret, but also reinforces Amiel’s constant oscillation between faith 
and doubt, intimating that such resurrections and possibly the idea of the Resurrection itself  
are evanescent and scarcely to be trusted.     
 As well as charting the movements of his mind between faith and despair, Amiel 
uses descriptions of landscape and the emotions it symbolises as a basis for a meditation that 
reveals ‘a state of soul’.100 In the following entry from the Journal the pattern he creates is 
complex, full of ambiguous suggestions and readjustment of significance, the combination of 
descriptive adjectives in the first sentence modifying the effect of the subsequent sentences, 
and being modified in turn by the amendments to an anticipated process of thought: 
  
What message had this lake for me, with its sad serenity, its soft and even tranquility, 
in which was mirrored the cold monotonous pallor of mountains and clouds? That 
disenchanted, disillusioned life may still be traversed by duty, lit by a memory of 
heaven. -  I was visited by a clear and profound intuition of the flight of things, of the 
fatality of all life, of the melancholy which is below the surface of all existence, but 
also of that deepest depth which subsists forever beneath the fleeting wave.
101
 
 
 
The description of the lake contrasts its ‘sad serenity’ and ‘soft and even tranquillity’ with 
what it reflects, a ‘cold monotonous pallor’ of the mountains and sky above. Yet, in his 
meditation on the image’s significance for him, the metaphors shift ambiguously. The lake’s 
‘sad serenity’ metamorphoses into an analogy for a ‘disenchanted, disillusioned life’ and its 
‘cold monotonous’ reflections are transformed into ‘duty, lit by a memory of heaven’. The 
final sentence introduces a further metaphorical adjustment, transforming the initial mood of 
‘sad serenity’ and ‘even tranquillity’ into a piercing perception of the ‘melancholy’ lying 
below the appearances of the world, and of the depths of the subconscious ‘the deepest depth’ 
below the shifting world of appearance. 
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The ways in which Amiel’s Journal represents complex and sometimes oppositional 
thought processes and their emotional dimension through nature imagery are adopted by 
Ward to analyse what is happening within Robert’s mind during the intellectual upheaval of 
his loss of faith. The language she uses in relation to the processes of intellectual change and 
growth show how she followed Amiel in ‘catching’ and ‘detaining’ the experience of 
thinking, and suggesting the subconscious forces at work. This is how she describes Robert’s 
first encounter with Squire Wendover’s iconoclastic ideas in his notorious book, The Idols of 
the Market-place: 
 
Robert began to read vaguely at first, then to hurry on through page after page, still 
standing, seized at once by the bizarre power of the style, the audacity and range of 
the treatment.  
Not a sound in the house. Outside the tossing moaning December night; 
inside, the faintly crackling fire, the standing figure. Suddenly it was to Robert as 
though a cruel, torturing hand were laid upon his inmost being. His breath failed him; 
the book slipped out of his grasp; he sank down upon his chair, his head in his hands. 
Oh, what a desolate intolerable moment! Over the young idealist soul there swept a 
dry destroying whirlwind of thought. Elements gathered from all sources [....] entered 
into it, and as it passed it seemed to scorch the heart.
102
 
 
 
The writing emphasises the concentrated suddenness and violence of the process of 
intellectual struggle and conviction (‘hurry on’, ‘seized at once’, ‘bizarre power’, ‘audacity’, 
‘suddenly’, ‘torturing’), the physical and emotional effect of thought through the contrasts of 
standing and sinking (‘standing’, ‘he sank down’, ‘torturing’, ‘seemed to scorch the heart’), 
the fusion of imagery of wildness and disorder, the tempest within mirroring the tempest 
without, with imagery of silence and the almost-suspension of life’s or faith’s processes at the 
moment of  intellectual upheaval (‘outside the tossing moaning December night, inside the 
faintly crackling fire, the standing figure’). The narrator switches from portraying how Robert 
appeared from the outside to a series of metaphors which portray the processes taking place 
within ‘his inmost being’, from being the object of a ‘cruel torturing hand’ to experiencing 
himself the crisis of thought and feeling where a ‘dry destroying whirlwind of thought’  
‘seemed to scorch the heart’. The syntax of this passage begins in a conventional narrative 
style, which gradually transforms its rhythm and structure to become a series of impressions 
or images flashing by, and then reverts to a series of short statements about action, which 
intimate that Robert has been convinced by the arguments of Wendover’s book.   
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The Tensions between New and Old Languages 
 
  ‘How are sensitiveness of feeling, the sense of sin, the desire for pardon, the thirst for 
holiness, to be preserved among us [....]?’103 asked Amiel. A similar clinging to the old 
language of Christian belief and its recognisable emotional resonances can be seen at work in 
the way that Ward clothes the new religion, of a human Jesus rather than a divine Christ, in 
the allusive language of orthodox devotional writing, transforming Robert’s journey towards 
disbelief in orthodox Christianity into a type of spiritual pilgrimage, and then martyrdom, 
through her text’s allusions to the alternative Christian journeys of  Bunyan, Dante and to the 
thoughts of St Augustine.  
As well as this sense of personal displacement from a symbolic framework and 
language for enduring human emotions, Amiel also felt himself excluded from a community 
sharing a language of emotion and value. He saw himself as the outsider forever waiting for 
the ideal Church to come into being. ‘Ah! when will the Church to which I belong in heart 
rise into being?’104 he asked in an 1852 entry in the Journal Intime. Ward herself had felt a 
personal need to reconcile her need for intellectual honesty with her need for communal 
devotion. A letter to Stopford Brooke, whose career outside the Church resembled Elsmere’s, 
apart from in its fashionable location, expresses this sense of exclusion: 
 
I feel with you the loss of old association, of connexions with the great past of the 
whole of the ancient church and its formulary.
105
 
 
 
Her aspiration for a transformation of the national Church, rather than a gradual obliteration 
of the religious impulse, was also reflected in her equivocal approach to the symbols and 
sacraments of religion. Elsmere replaces communion with a ritual meal of remembrance,
106
 
and Friedland, in Helbeck of Bannisdale, demands that the new religion of the free mind find 
a symbol of equivalent power to the Mass. For Ward, words expressing intellectual 
apprehension had to change; but an equivalent sacramental language of symbols had to be re-
instituted.  
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In her introduction to Amiel’s Journal, Ward had presented Amiel as the translator of 
his generation’s religious needs and intellectual doubts, comparing him with earlier religious, 
psychological and spiritual writers who represented the ideas and feelings of their generation: 
 
Both as poet and as psychologist, Amiel makes another link in a special tradition; he 
adds another name to the list of those who have won a hearing from their fellows as 
interpreters of the inner life, as the revealers of man to himself. He is the successor of 
St Augustine and Dante; he is the brother of Obermann and Maurice de Guérin.
107
 
 
 
A fictional exploration of the new religious language, expressing an equivalent passion and 
emotional commitment to that of the beliefs being displaced, a language for a church to 
which her characters ‘could belong in heart’,108 as Amiel had wanted, takes place in novels 
such as Robert Elsmere, and its later sequel, The Case of Richard Meynell,
109
 which imagines 
ministers and congregations giving the lead in rethinking forms of worship. Robert’s 
experience of doubt, followed by conversion to a humanist rethinking of the teachings of 
Christianity, and commitment to living out its moral implications, are all described and 
presented through the vocabulary of the Christian literature of religious experience, devotion, 
faith, and eventual martyrdom.  
  Chapter 1 considered how Eliot’s use of metaphor to analyse the relative values of 
translation and origination betrays an inability to resolve the relationship between the two 
acts. Mary Ward’s aims in writing Robert Elsmere and Helbeck of Bannisdale also reflect a 
simultaneous search for both equivalence and difference; and the interplay of language and 
structure within the novels reflects the tensions which she was trying to resolve. Ward wanted 
to portray the ‘modern spiritual problems’ of doubt and discouragement, the agonised internal 
fluctuations of hope and despair which she had recognised in Amiel’s writing, the ‘catching’ 
and ‘detention’ of ‘the dialogue of the mind with itself’, but she also intended to ‘dignify’ – 
one of her favourite words - and portray the human spiritual and emotional victories possible 
once faith in the old creeds had been rethought and re-imagined, as in the case of Amiel. Her 
need to affirm the elevated ethical and spiritual validity of the new faith of the free mind is a 
measure of the depth of her sense of loss of the consolations of the old language.  
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Pilgrimage 
 
Amiel describes his Journal as ‘the itinerary of an obscurely conditioned soul’, and, in 
the same entry, declares that ‘the pilgrim has marked his stages in it; he is able to trace by it 
his thoughts, his tears, his joys’. 110 He represents it as the contemporary religious journey 
and as the Journal proceeds it emerges that it is a journey from faith to doubt. Robert 
Elsmere’s narrative also draws heavily on established metaphors for and allusions to 
pilgrimage and temptation, but searches for a redefinition and retranslation of faithfulness 
and the search for truth. In place of the traditional religious journey, where temptations are 
resisted and spiritual peace and enlightenment are achieved, it becomes a narrative of self-
discovery, an intellectual ‘bildungsroman’, in which Elsmere works out his own beliefs and 
their relationship with tradition. Its parallels with traditional hagiography underline Elsmere’s 
self-sacrifice and martyrdom in order to establish a demythologised, humanist Christianity.  
Amiel’s concept of his Journal as the record of a spiritual pilgrimage, his depictions 
of the hesitation of thought between the language and feeling of faith and its slow eradication 
by intellect, and his use of use of natural imagery to convey the emotions accompanying the 
experience of thought, influence Ward’s description of a crucial scene in the process of 
Robert’s loss of traditional faith. These movements in thought take place as Robert returns 
home through the woods from the Squire’s house, having realised he no longer felt convinced 
by the apologetics of faith. It fuses the conventions of pilgrimage literature with descriptions 
of landscape which become an allegory for his internal experience.  
 
As he gained the shelter of the wooded lane beyond the gate it seemed to Robert that 
he was going through, once more, that old fierce temptation of Bunyan’s – [....]. 
Was this what lay before the minister of God now in this selva oscura of life? The 
selling of the Master [....] for an intellectual satisfaction, the ravaging of all the fair 
places of the heart by an intellectual need! And still through all the despair, all the 
revolt, all the pain, which made the summer air a darkness, and closed every sense in 
him to the evening beauty, he felt the irresistible march and pressure of the new 
instincts, the new forces, which life and thought had been calling into being. The 
words of St Augustine which he had read to Catherine, taken in a strange new sense, 
came back to him [....]. Was it the summons of Truth which was rending the whole 
nature in this way? Robert stood still, and [....] went through a desperate catechism of 
himself.  
Do I believe in God? [....]. Do I believe in Christ? [....].  
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But in the Man-God, the Word from Eternity, [....]? 
He waited, conscious that it was the crisis of his history, and there rose in him, 
as though articulated one by one by an audible voice, words of irrevocable meaning.  
“Every human soul in which the voice of God makes itself felt, enjoys, equally 
with Jesus of Nazareth, the divine sonship [....].” 
All these years of happy spiritual certainty, of rejoicing oneness with Christ, to 
end in this wreck and loss! Was not this indeed “il gran rifiuto” – the greatest of 
which human daring is capable? The lane darkened around him. [....]. The only 
sounds were the sounds of a gently-breathing nature, sounds of birds and swaying 
branches and intermittent gusts of air rustling through the gorse and the drifts of last 
year’s leaves in the wood beside him. He moved mechanically onward, and presently, 
after the first flutter of desolate terror had passed away, with a new inrushing sense 
which seemed to him a sense of liberty – of infinite expansion.111 
 
 
Ward translates the debate between the liberating new ideas and the lost faith through the 
language and experience of the rejected former faith. Layers of literary allusion and 
suggestion – ‘translations of translations’ in Paz’s phrase - create an emotional context for 
Elsmere’s experience of mental transformation, and suggest its part in a historical religious 
tradition. Both explicitly, and by suggestion and echo, Ward invokes the great works of 
European Christian literature to describe how Robert might view his moment of decision, 
both as a loss of a traditional Christian perspective, and also as a continuation and 
development of it, rather than its negation. The allusions to Bunyan draw parallels between 
his journey and that of The Pilgrim’s Progress, those to St Augustine to a re-understanding of 
his injunction to the primacy of Truth. Dante’s images of spiritual confusion and revolt (selva 
oscura, il gran rifiuto) also recall Ward’s argument that Amiel’s depiction of his spiritual and 
psychological experience made him ‘the successor of St. Augustine and Dante’. 
The language, like Amiel’s, emphasises the violent and dynamic nature of the 
processes of mental change and spiritual loss, of intellectual and emotional struggle.  They 
are represented through the juxtaposition of  the phrases ‘intellectual satisfaction’ and 
‘intellectual need’ with his recall of the former twin emotional certainties of  his faith and his 
marriage, and through the violence of the judgement he considers delivering on himself in 
words such as ‘ravaging’ and ‘revolt’.  The violence of this vocabulary modulates to that 
emphasising the power rather than violence of his innate response in its description of the 
‘irresistible march and pressure’ of the new ‘instincts’ and ‘forces’ generated by thought.  
This language in turn modulates into descriptions of the gentler movements and sounds of 
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nature, of ‘swaying’, ‘rustling’, and then to the inspiration and liberation of ‘a new inrushing 
sense which seemed to him a sense of liberty – of infinite expansion.’  
Elsmere’s transition from traditional belief to a new form of living without any 
transcendent authority, emphasises the dialogue taking place in his mind, through questions 
he sees as an alternative ‘desperate catechism’, not of faith but of its loss.112 (Was this [....]? 
Was it [....]? Do I believe [....]?) To these questions he provides a number of types of answer, 
some relating to his past faith, some to his emerging intellectual convictions.  Interwoven 
with Elsmere’s self-questioning are descriptions of the natural world beyond but reflective of 
the interior world of intellectual ferment. As in the passages about Spring from Amiel’s 
Journal Intime considered earlier, the descriptions emphasise the transition taking place in his 
thoughts, and underscore the translation of the old mental language into new. Nature at first 
exacerbates his mental struggle or reinforces his sense of loss. Its beauty is closed to him 
(‘closed every sense in him to the evening beauty’) and his pain cuts him off from it, making 
‘the summer air a darkness’.  But Ward goes onto describe the transformation of these earlier 
categorisations of the emotional impact of loss of faith into the new categorisation of 
experience which flows from the ‘irresistibility’ of ‘intellectual need’ as one aspect of the 
calm and harmony of ‘gently breathing nature’. Rather than as temptation, it is described as 
what makes us human – ‘new instincts, [....] new forces, which life and thought had called 
into being’, an assertion of the inevitability, rather than the culpability, of mankind’s thirst for 
knowledge, understanding, and ‘search for truth’. The ‘new forces’ are affirmed through the 
changes they are effecting amongst his old ideas (‘intermittent gusts of air rustling through 
[....] the drifts of last year’s leaves).  ‘Gently breathing nature’ finally ushers in ‘a new 
inrushing sense [....] of liberty- [....].’  
  The final descriptions of nature emphasise their parallels with the religious experience 
of tradition. The transformation taking place within Robert’s mind is from an external source, 
a contemporary, scholarly, ‘Pentecostal’ experience, ’a new inrushing sense which seemed to 
him a sense of liberty – of infinite expansion’,  translating the language and emotions of the 
former faith into the language and emotions of the new. The ‘new inrushing sense [....] of 
liberty’ echoes the ‘sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind’113 described in the 
account of Pentecost in Acts, Chapter 2. Elsmere’s state of ‘desolate terror’ at the loss of his 
belief in the ‘Man-God’ and its transformation into a new ‘sense [....] of infinite expansion’  
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take place, not in a house as with the first Pentecost, but in a ‘selva oscura’, a ‘darkened’ 
wood, as in the start of Dante’s spiritual journey out of crisis. The ecstatic nature of his sense 
of intellectual freedom, its verbal parallels with the Pentecostal transformation and gift of 
expression, and the consequential promise of a language which can translate the experience 
and ideas to others, is held in tension beside the poetic conception of an interplay between the 
human mind and the world of nature, emphasising the natural sequence of renewal, and 
recalling the fusion of mood, idea and nature in Amiel’s writing. Ward’s transition from 
reinterpretation of the older language and literature of faith to a sensitive awareness of the 
continuous natural processes taking place around Robert suggests that a new language for the 
new religious understanding may surround him and be effecting its own irresistible 
Pentecostal language. 
 
Amiel and the Characters of Robert  Elsmere 
  
 In his Journal, Amiel offered Ward a complex palette of perceptions from which 
she repeatedly borrowed to construct characters who were to face similar psychological and 
intellectual dilemmas to those he had described. Amiel experiences personality as an infinite 
range of possibility, a flux of experiences over time rather than a single entity. He is also 
continuously conscious of a detachment from his own life, and of watching as a ‘spectator’ as 
experience happens: 
 
I feel myself a chameleon, a kaleidoscope, a Proteus; changeable in every way, open 
to every kind of polarization; fluid, virtual, and therefore latent - latent even in 
manifestation, and absent even in presentation. I am a spectator, so to speak, of the 
molecular whirlwind which men call individual life; I am conscious of an incessant 
metamorphosis, an irresistible movement of existence, which is going on within 
me.
114
 
 
 
His sense of his own variousness, his lack of a finite self, and the depth and terror of his self-
analysis also suggests his personality as source material for many possible human types: 
 
There are ten men in me, according to time, place, surrounding, and occasion; and in 
their restless diversity I am forever escaping myself. Therefore, whatever I may reveal 
of my past, of my Journal, or of myself, is of no use to him who is without the poetic 
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intuition, and cannot recompose me as a whole, with or in spite of the elements which 
I confide to him.
115
 
 
 
Ward saw him as a prototype of modern doubting man. 
 
What, then, do I believe in? I do not know. And what is it I hope for? It would be 
difficult to say.
116
  
 
In her introduction to the Journal Intime, she described him, without identifying her own 
position, as ‘the type of a generation universally touched with doubt, and yet as sensitive to 
the need of faith as any that have gone before it’,117 but she also made use of the 
opportunities presented by his ‘plurality’, his analyses of differing psychological states and 
differing intellectual and spiritual dilemmas, and rather than intuitively reaggregating them 
into a complex whole, she disaggregated them to provide the psychological profiles of many 
of her characters. The variety of the manifestations of doubt and despair, described by Amiel, 
but with alternative, hypothetical ‘human and emotional crises’ supplied by Ward, helped to 
produce characters as various intellectually as Langham, Elsmere, Wendover, and Grey. In 
her Recollections, Ward had identified T H Green’s ‘traits [....] of thinker and teacher’118 as 
important in her depiction of Grey,
119
 but his liberal and tolerant views could equally well be 
identified with some of Amiel’s musings about the need for a humane religion detached from 
the specificities of dogma. Indeed, Ward makes the connection between Amiel and Green 
explicit in her introduction to Amiel’s Journal: 
In many respects there was a gulf of difference between the two men. [....]. But the 
ultimate creed of both, the way in which both interpret the facts of nature and 
consciousness, is practically the same.
120
 
 
 
The character of Langham, in Robert Elsmere, is closely modelled on Ward’s 
description of Amiel’s life in her introduction to Journal Intime. The descriptions of his 
character and its failings are reflections of those of Amiel, both ‘his philosophic charm and 
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tragic impotence,’ as she summarised it in the Recollections.121 Langham re-embodies 
Amiel’s distrust of emotional involvement with women, his constant self-destructive analysis 
of motive, and his intellectual solitariness. Here she sets the scene for the ‘tragi-comedy’ of 
Langham’s intellectual and psychological history: 
 
[....] one would have thought that a brilliant and favourable mental development was 
secured to him. Not at all. [....]. The uselessness of utterance, the futility of 
enthusiasm, the inaccessibility of the ideal, the practical absurdity of trying to realise 
any of the mind’s inward dreams; these were the kind of considerations which 
descended upon him, slowly and fatally, crushing down the newly springing growths 
of action or of passion.
122
 
He could not be simple, he could not be spontaneous; he was tormented by self-
consciousness. [....]. His lectures, which were at first brilliant [....] became gradually 
mere dry, ingenious skeletons, without life or feeling.
123
 
 
 
The biographical notes on Amiel’s life which she provided in her introduction compare 
closely with her outline of Langham’s character set out above, in the early brilliant 
expectations, the failure to live up to them, and the self-distrust and isolation: 
 
[....] he wore his knowledge lightly, his looks were attractive, his conversation 
animated, [....] – the whole effect, indeed, was of something brilliant and striking. 
[....]; one would have said that the future was all his own.
124
 
 
In Geneva itself he had been commonly regarded as a man who had signally 
disappointed the hopes and expectations of his friends, whose reserve and indecision 
of character had in many respects spoiled his life, and alienated the society around 
him; while his professional lectures were generally pronounced dry and unattractive, 
[....].
125
  
 
[....] he proudly resigned himself to an isolation and a reserve which, reinforcing, as 
they did, certain native weaknesses of character, had the most unfortunate effect upon 
his life.
126
  
 
 
The introduction to Amiel’s Journal goes on to elaborate the paralysis that Amiel inflicted on 
himself, analysing the essence of his own and Langham’s tragedy: 
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[....] this tyranny of ideal conceptions, helped by the natural accompaniment of such a 
tyranny, a critical sense of abnormal acuteness, - stood between him and everything 
healing and restoring. ‘I am afraid of an imperfect, a faulty synthesis, and I linger in 
the provisional, from timidity and from loyalty.’- ‘As soon as a thing attracts me I 
turn away from it; or rather, I cannot either be content with the second-best, or 
discover anything which satisfies my aspiration. The real disgusts me, and I cannot 
find the ideal.’127 
 
 
How did Ward transform Amiel’s characteristic modes of thinking about himself and 
about the great contemporary religio-philosophic questions into a narrative where those 
intellectual processes became aspects of a narrative exploring the ‘human and emotional 
crisis’ which gave rise to them? Langham and Robert Elsmere are each antitheses of the 
other. The narratives of their intellectual and spiritual choices, as well as their love stories, 
are interwoven by the novel so that they highlight the variety of reactions human beings can 
entertain in relation to similar external forces and internal predicaments. Langham sows the 
first seeds of scepticism about the historical validity of Christian sources in Robert’s mind. 
But it is his disbelief in himself and the possibility of his providing anything of value, 
including love, which contrasts with Robert’s self-belief, and makes Langham into so close a 
fictional realisation of Amiel. In contrast, even though he becomes a man stricken by doubt, 
Robert averts the collapse of meaning in his marriage and goes on to transform his doubts 
into humanitarian convictions.  
The self-destructive, nihilistic power of Langham’s personality is explored through 
his rejection of Rose’s love for him, who feels that ‘like David, she was pitting herself and 
her gift against those dark powers which may invade and paralyse a life’.128 The narrative of 
Rose’s failure to retrieve Langham from his emotional ‘paralysis’ is contrasted with Robert 
and Catherine’s capacity to recreate their love despite the loss of their earlier spiritual unity. 
Like Amiel, Langham renounces his human instincts, whereas Catherine overcomes her 
spiritual distress to assert the primacy of her human instinct to continue to love her husband 
despite the spiritual division that faced them; ‘He kissed her, and in that kiss, so sad, so 
pitiful, so clinging, their new life was born.’129 It was, of course, the opposite of what had 
happened in Ward’s parents’ marriage.  
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The ‘protean’ spiritual and intellectual possibilities of Amiel’s memoir informed 
Ward’s depiction of other characters in Robert Elsmere. The debate between faith and doubt, 
between feeling and rationality, internalised by Amiel, is externalised in the characters of 
Robert and Squire Wendover.  ‘I say know, you say feel,130 says the Squire in his last 
conversation with Elsmere. Wendover’s intellectual position is representative of European 
historical and theological scholarship, and his yet-to-be-completed magnum opus ‘A History 
of Testimony’ offers uncanny echoes of Ward’s own work on the West Goths for Wace’s 
Dictionary of Christian Biography, work which generated her own interest in ‘sources-
testimony’,131 and led to her loss of faith. The Recollections link her own work on sources 
with Robert and Langham’s discussion of ‘what is the nature and virtue of testimony at given 
times’132 and the implication this has for religious orthodoxy, with Langham arguing that ‘the 
whole of orthodoxy’ depends on the historical context of assertions. 
Wendover himself represents both the influence of German Higher Criticism and of 
Renan.  
 
Fresh from the speculative ferment in Germany and the far profaner scepticism of 
France, he had returned to a society where the first chapter of Genesis and the theory 
of verbal inspiration were still regarded as valid [....].
133
 
 
 
Ward’s Recollections publicly repudiated suggestions that Mark Pattison, the Rector of 
Lincoln College and another mentor, was the basis for Wendover’s character, apart from in ‘a 
few personal traits, and two main facts of great learning and a general impatience of fools’.134 
Elsewhere in the Recollections, however, shades of Wendover hover round her description of  
Pattison as ‘learned, critical, bitter, fastidious’.135 Pattison had written to Scherer early after 
the publication of the French edition of the Journal Intime claiming his empathy with 
Amiel’s psychological self-portrait:   
 
[....] I can vouch that there is in existence at least one other soul which has lived 
through the same struggles, mental and moral, as Amiel.
136
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The Squire’s grim, detached character, rejecting human ties and responsibilities, horrified by 
his sister’s loss of sanity and fearing that his own fate may echo that of his father, suggests a 
further darker interpretation of Amiel’s reluctance to forge close ties of relationship and 
strongly recalls the darker aspects of Amiel’s Journal’s mental voyage and his interpretation 
of one of his Protean manifestations as a self-protective detachment, possibly from madness: 
 
[....]; I am depersonalized, detached, cut adrift. - Is this madness? No. Madness means 
the impossibility of recovering one's normal balance after the mind has thus played 
truant among alien forms of being, and followed Dante to invisible worlds.
137
 
Independence has been my refuge; detachment my stronghold. I have lived the 
impersonal life, - in the world, yet not in it, thinking much, desiring nothing. It is a 
state of mind which corresponds with what in women is called a broken heart; and it 
is in fact like it [....].
138
  
 
 
  Like Amiel, Wendover has a horror of commitment to any belief which may prove 
unfounded. At the dinner party where he first crosses swords with Robert’s idealistic religion, 
he says, ‘The one thing necessary in life [....] is - not to be duped’.139  In his Journal Intime, 
Amiel returns repeatedly to his fear of being ‘duped’ by life:  
 
The deepest reason for my state of doubt is that the supreme end and aim of life seems 
to me a mere lure and deception. The individual is an eternal dupe, who never obtains 
what he seeks, and who is forever deceived by hope.
140
 
 
 
This  rational detachment and refusal to be the ‘dupe’ of feeling precipitate human tragedy 
for those who depend on the squire, and reveal a character resembling, in his pride and 
apparent indifference, Amiel’s own assessment of his contemporary thinker, Schopenhauer. 
Just as Robert Elsmere is both intrigued and repelled by Wendover, Amiel describes the 
mixture of admiration and distaste he feels for Schopenhauer and his writings: 
 
What I still like in the misanthrope of Frankfort, is his antipathy to current prejudice, 
[....]. Schopenhauer is a man of powerful mind, who has put away from him all 
illusions, who professes Buddhism in the full flow of modern Germany, and absolute 
detachment of mind in the very midst of the nineteenth-century orgie. His great 
defects are barrenness of soul, a proud and perfect selfishness, an adoration of genius 
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which is combined with complete indifference to the rest of the world, in spite of all 
his teaching of resignation and sacrifice. He has no sympathy, no humanity, no 
love.
141
 
 
 
 The ideas and fictional life of Robert Elsmere himself intersect with those of Amiel. 
Elsmere has none of Amiel’s self-doubt, but his intellectual position in relation to the renewal 
of the church and the strands of miraculous narrative within Judaeo-Christianity echoes such 
words as these in the Journal: 
 
The whole Semitic dramaturgy has come to seem to me a work of the imagination. 
The apostolic documents have changed in value and meaning to my eyes.
142
  
 
 
Robert’s search for a church based neither on miracle nor mystery, but revering the ethical 
teachings and compassion of Jesus, reflects Amiel’s search for a church based on the 
unchanging essence of Jesus’ teaching, what he called ‘the Eternal Gospel’.143  
 
We may hold aloof from the churches, and yet bow ourselves before Jesus. We may 
be suspicious of the clergy, and refuse to have anything to do with catechisms, and yet 
love the Holy and the Just, who came to save and not to curse. Jesus will always 
supply us with the best criticism of Christianity, [....].
144
  
 
 
Robert’s ministry to the people who came to hear him speak at Elgood Street reflects Amiel’s 
search for a Church. He offers what Amiel sought, the veneration of the example of Jesus’ 
life, his embodiment of love combined with justice, an absence of traditional dogma: 
 
“A little while ago scores of these men either hated the very name of Christianity or 
were entirely indifferent to it. To scores of them now the name of the teacher of 
Nazareth, the victim of Jerusalem, is dear and sacred; his life, his death, his words, are 
becoming once more a constant source of moral effort and spiritual hope.”145 
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Ward’s use of the Journal in scene setting  
 
A number of other aspects of the Journal were clearly useful to Ward in her creation 
of a complex background to the main dramatic action of the novel. Amiel’s emphasis on 
books, their ideas and their impacts on lives finds a parallel world in Ward’s novels where 
characters read, write and expect books to change people. Elsmere’s project of writing a book 
on ‘a history of Gaul during the breakdown of the Empire and the emergence of modern 
France’146 introduces him to the Squire’s library and, inevitably, to the Squire’s two ‘famous 
books’,147Essays on English Culture and The Idols of the Market–place, the latter shattering 
his faith. The title is taken from Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620), which addressed 
the errors of thought which could result from using words without understanding the 
imprecision of their range of meaning, their roots in fallacious theory, or how far they 
function as substitutes for thought.
148
  Adopting this title for Wendover’s work reflects 
Ward’s own sense of the importance of rationality, the pivotal role of context in informing 
understanding of words, and her sense of their untrustworthiness as signifiers of meaning. 
The Squire’s library encloses and preserves scholarly European thought; he has spent time in 
Germany and France acquainting himself with the Higher Criticism and undertaking his own 
major work on testimony, which is intended to make a significant addition to the weight of 
argument against supernatural religion.  
As well as the depth of Amiel’s psychological portrait of the agonies of a wavering 
faith in God and self, and the breadth of his picture of the intellectual ferment of nineteenth 
century Europe, Ward used her own experience of a European intellectual milieu to give 
subtlety and shade to her depictions of a society of thinking people, who respond to ideas and 
make life-changing choices.  Her admiration for and absorption into a European intellectual 
world, is reflected in a number of ways in her early novels. In Robert Elsmere the characters 
of Squire Wendover and Mme de Netteville create the connections between Robert’s English 
orthodoxy and the European ideas which were threatening it. Mme de Netteville, who had 
been the ‘centre of a small salon, admission to which was one of the social blue ribbons of 
Paris’,149  and who has recreated a venue for intellectual discussion in her London Friday 
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evenings, creates, like the Squire, feelings of fascination and repulsion. Intellectually daring 
and morally damaged, they are Mary Ward’s concessions to John Wordsworth’s arguments 
linking ‘unsettlement in religion’ with moral corruption and emotional bankruptcy.  
 The geography of Amiel’s Journal is also imported into Robert Elsmere, along with 
its personal significances for life and death. Much of the Journal was written in Geneva and 
that is where Elsmere and his wife retreat to explore how their lives should change after his 
loss of faith. They stay at Les Avants, a village above the lake and above Clarens, where 
Amiel received the diagnosis of the illness from which he died and where he was buried.  The 
novel’s association of Clarens with death is confirmed by the Squire’s visit there before his 
death.  
 Amiel’s variousness, his depictions of intellectual and emotional upheaval, were 
translated into Ward’s novels.  I have already referred to André Chevrillon’s appreciation of 
her literary heritage, referred to earlier. It identifies the restlessness of intellectual portrayal in 
her novels and their sense that the most important human obligation is towards intellectual 
honesty: 
 
The events in her novels were those of the soul [....]. The main forces that drove the 
characters like Fate were Ideas. She could dramatise ideas. I do not know any novelist 
that gives one to the same degree the feeling that Ideas are living forces, more 
enduring than men, and in a sense more real than men – forces that move through 
them, taking hold of them and driving them like an unseen, higher Power.
150
 
 
 
His metaphors of ideas as ‘living forces’, driving humans ‘like an unseen, higher Power’ 
recall Ward’s own metaphors of Pentecostal transfigurations of thought in Robert Elsmere. 
His estimate recognises how far Ward fulfilled her early ambitions of showing how ‘an 
intellectual process’ can provoke a ‘human and emotional crisis’.151 Robert Elsmere’s array 
of men and women struggling with doubt in the traditions of their faith and its culture reflect 
not only the earnest and intellectual milieu of her life, but also draw on Amiel’s sense that: 
 
There are ten men in me, according to time, place, surrounding, and occasion; and in 
their restless diversity I am forever escaping myself.
152
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His fluctuating moods, his reversals of feeling, his examination or rejection of different ways 
of thinking about the individual, and about how that individual recognises in their lives a 
sense of the depths of their consciousness and the infinitely unexplored beyond them, and the 
implications of these sensibilities for their ethical or religious lives provided her with a model 
of that sense of intellectual response, growth, and change with which she endows her 
characters. 
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Chapter 5 
Ward’s Helbeck Of Bannisdale And Eleanor: 
Intransmissable  Thoughts And Unorthodox Confessions 
 
Amiel’s Journal Intime, with its depiction of an idealist’s failure to compromise, 
express his deepest longings, construct a life, or find a liberal community of belief, continued 
to influence Mary Ward’s earlier novels specifically focused on religious ideas, Helbeck of 
Bannisdale  (1898) and Eleanor (1900). The Journal is also a record of refuges from 
disappointment; an analysis of the ideas of major contemporary writers, together with a 
pursuit of meaning in the natural world. Ward’s early works chart a similar engagement on 
behalf of her characters: they encounter the revolutionary world of ideas through reading, and 
work them out within landscapes which mirror and interact with their thoughts. Squire 
Wendover’s encyclopaedic library and iconoclastic books in Robert Elsmere (1888) may be 
reduced in scale in David Grieve’s printers and bookshop (The History of David Grieve, 
1892), but the radical books are still there.  
Eleanor retains as its milieu a literate, intellectual world. Two of the principal 
characters, Eleanor and Manisty, have the latest European books of philosophy, theology and 
politics at their disposal as they work on his project to defend Catholicism’s moral bastion 
against free-thinking, liberal decadence. However, their own individual and irreconcilable 
emotional needs enforce another type of confrontation, one with their own moral natures.  
Manisty is obsessed with Lucy Forster, with her distaste for Catholicism and her emphasis on 
the primacy of the individual conscience. Eleanor has to find a way of accepting her 
displacement from his affections, and a faith, as she faces death, which is able to provide her 
with a reconciliation of her intellectual needs and her emotional losses. Her despair and her 
search for value and meaning reflect those of Amiel, but the faith she ultimately finds 
resembles the faith in self-renouncement of Arnold’s Literature and Dogma.  The gains and 
losses to the individual of the irreconcilable struggle between rational secularism and the 
demands, traditions and authority of the Catholic Church, and the personal struggles involved 
in finding a new faith, are explored through the lives of the main characters, Eleanor, Lucy, 
Father Benecke and Manisty.  
Though not substantively considered in this thesis, The History of David Grieve 
considers the development of liberal religious ideas as just one of a range of emotional and 
political influences on the life of her protagonist, where David’s religious understanding is a 
206 
 
fusion of Arnold’s and Amiel’s ideas about the essence of a reformed Christianity. Like 
Amiel, David discloses his shifting, developing religious perceptions to the reader through 
entries in a Journal. His reactions to personal crisis are, like Eleanor’s, expressed through 
Amiel’s words in his last entry in the Journal before his death: ‘Que vivre est difficile, ô mon 
coeur fatigué!’ [how difficult it is to live, o my exhausted heart!].1  
Only in Helbeck of Bannisdale (1898), have the books of philosophy and liberal 
thinking, the academic world of Dr Friedland’s Cambridge and of Laura Fountain’s dead 
father, been set to one side, excluded from Bannisdale’s austere spiritual environment in 
favour of books of devotion. The austerities of Bannisdale’s landscape and way of life 
provide no escape from the narrative’s focus on the conflict between human love and a 
demanding faith, between emotional loyalty to an intellectual principle and sexual passion. 
The agnostic Laura Fountain fails to reconcile herself to a marriage to Alan Helbeck, or 
rather to his passionate Catholicism, choosing death instead. The novel focuses on the gulf 
between the symbols of faith and the absence of symbolic structure to the ‘new faith’ held by 
Laura, one celebrating sacrifice, the other rejecting the language but ultimately embracing 
sacrificial action.  
The reading and writing of books may both be fraught with dangers, but so too, is a 
lack of intelligent engagement with their ideas. Laura Fountain, just like Catherine Elsmere, 
is cut off from any but a limited understanding of her role in the nineteenth-century 
intellectual religious debate, and Ward shows the tragic impact of her ignorance on her own 
and other lives. 
This chapter will consider the influence of Amiel’s Journal and Ward’s other shared 
translation project, Joubert’s Pensées on both Helbeck of Bannisdale and Eleanor. 
 
Symbols 
 
 The replacement of the Gospel narrative sequence, vulnerable to the deconstructive 
efforts of the Higher Criticism, by an exploration of the emotional and psychological 
significance of those events viewed symbolically preoccupied Amiel, as it had done Strauss 
and Feuerbach. In the Journal, he wrote: 
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The transference, however, of Christianity from the region of history to the region of 
psychology is the great craving of our time. What we are trying to arrive at is the 
eternal gospel.
2
  
 
 
The translation, or transference as Amiel termed it, of history into symbol, and symbol into 
its emotional and psychological significance was one of Ward’s key concerns. Her pursuit of 
the emotional significance of an intellectual process is, in Robert Elsmere, invested with 
symbolic ‘pentecostal’ significance through her descriptions of the natural cycles of death 
and rebirth. Both Helbeck of Bannisdale and Eleanor continue to explore how intellect and 
emotion interact, and to analyse the human crises that result.  
 Reversing the process, retranslating human psychological need into symbols which 
resonate with human need and express new intellectual understandings, is at the heart of both 
Amiel’s search and Dr Friedland’s analysis of the inadequacies of the ‘religion of the free 
mind’3 in Helbeck of Bannisdale.  Amiel had written that: 
 
The new faith must have its symbols too. [....] How are sensitiveness of feeling, the 
sense of sin, the desire for pardon, the thirst for holiness, to be preserved among us, 
when the errors which have served them so long for support and food have been 
eliminated?
4
 
 
 
Friedland is both spokesman for and constructive critic of the ‘new faith’, the ‘religion of the 
free mind’. His challenge to the emerging religion to provide for ‘the needs of the soul’5 
through a symbolic representation equivalent in emotional significance to the sacrifice of the 
Mass (‘[....] that brings God to Man, that satisfies the deepest emotions of the human heart!’6) 
is central to the novel. The importance of symbolic structure to belief, to living, and to 
communication is explored through the contrast between Helbeck’s life, based on his 
response to the imperative sign of Christ’s Crucifixion, and Laura’s ambivalence towards the 
constraints and power exercised by signs. 
 Related to this exploration of the human need for symbols is Amiel’s analysis of the 
mismatch between the signs of his outward life and his deepest longings: 
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But, as always happens, the appearance is exactly the contrary of reality, and my 
outward life the reverse of my true and deepest aspiration [....].
7
 
 
 
He offers the following reasons for deflecting or disguising his emotional needs: 
[....] I have always avoided what attracted me, and turned my back upon the point 
where secretly I desired to be.
8
 
 
The perception anticipates Laura’s actions, where her ‘signs’ at critical moments are designed 
to withhold any translation of her shifting emotions and decisions, whose conflict can only be 
expressed through death. Her suicide letter, the clearest explanation or ‘sign’ of her decisions, 
reflects Amiel’s perception that human words at death take on a symbolic importance, 
illuminating the life of the dying person:  
 
Such words and looks are a kind of testament. They have a solemn and sacred 
character which is not merely an effect of our imagination. For that which is on the 
brink of death already participates to some extent in eternity.
9
 
 
 
 Laura’s letter assumes just such a symbolic importance for the reader, and the letter itself 
explores how far signs born out of human relationship continue to conceal as well as expose 
the truth. Its significance is withheld from Helbeck, but guide the reader towards an 
understanding of her death as a symbolic self-sacrifice arising from her internal conflict 
between human love and intellectual loyalty.   
 
Biographical Influence 
The potential variations of Amiel’s oscillations between faith and doubt, and what 
might replace faith, is a recurrent theme of Ward’s religious novels. But in Helbeck of 
Bannisdale and Eleanor, there is a further thread of religious conflict to unpick, one with 
biographical resonance. The engagement of these books with Catholicism’s demands on the 
individual and the consolations it offered in return was a response to her father’s conversion, 
which left him on one side of the Oxford debates and the remainder of the Arnold clan on the 
other side, most notably the celebrated stance of Ward’s grandfather, Thomas Arnold, and of 
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her uncle, Matthew Arnold. Amiel had written relatively little about his views of Catholicism 
in his Journal, but reflections of his short critique can be traced in both Helbeck of 
Bannisdale and in Eleanor. Helbeck had explored the idea that belief and doubt are 
irreconcilable rather than reverse aspects of some pivotal experience, because they represent 
antagonistic attitudes of mind and soul – affirmation of independent thought opposed to a 
conviction that translates its intellect through a religious ‘framework’,10 as Ward 
characterises Helbeck’s religious sensibility. This analysis and the conflict between Helbeck 
and Laura rework aspects of Amiel’s perceptions of Catholicism’s irreconcilable conflicts 
with both individual conscience and a philosophic approach. His views set out in the Journal 
were a specific response to Eugene Pelletan’s Profession de foi du dix-neuvième Siècle, 
which celebrated Pelletan’s optimism about humanity’s future development. Amiel, a 
Protestant, was unconvinced: 
 [....], always the same absence of moral personality, the same obtuseness of 
conscience, which has never recognised sin present in the will, which places evil 
outside of man, moralises from outside, [....]. What is at fault is the philosophic 
superficiality of France, [....] due to a life fashioned by Catholicism and by absolute 
monarchy. 
Catholic thought cannot conceive of personality as supreme and conscious of 
itself. Its boldness and its weakness came from one and the same cause - from an 
absence of the sense of responsibility, from that vassal state of conscience which 
knows only slavery or anarchy, which proclaims but does not obey the law, because 
the law is outside it, not within it. Another illusion is that of Quinet and Michelet, [....] 
whose idea is to fight Catholicism by philosophy - a philosophy which is, after all, 
Catholic at bottom, since it springs from anti-Catholic reaction.
11
 
 
Ward’s dialogue with such ideas was nuanced in both Helbeck of Bannisdale and in 
Eleanor. Friedland’s monologue in Helbeck seems on one level to respond to Amiel’s 
arguments. Friedland too rejects ‘the personal abjection of Catholicism’ and celebrates the 
individual responsibility for conscience, ‘seen in the best moderns’: 
[....] the old terrors and eschatologies are no more. We fear evil for quite different 
reasons; we think of it in quite different ways. And the net result in the best moderns 
is at once a great elaboration of conscience – and an almost intoxicating sense of 
freedom.
12
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His championship of the historicist and philosophic cause reflects Amiel’s argument that the 
terms of the religious critique are determined by its rejection of Catholicism’s demands. 
However, Ward has added to Friedland’s arguments a sense that the new religion cannot yet 
replicate what Catholicism offers, a symbolic language for the human relationship with God. 
In other ways too, the novel is distanced from Amiel’s critique of Catholicism.  Even while 
using the terms  of the ‘old eschatology’, Helbeck himself paints a very different picture of 
the internality of the individual Catholic attitude to sin and the human conscience from that 
identified by Amiel’s Protestant antipathy: 
 
[....] what must that sin be that demands the Crucifixion? Of what revolt, what ruin is 
not the body capable? I knew – for I had gone down into the very depths.13 
 
In Eleanor, the critique of Catholicism centres around its political function as a 
conservative moral force implicated in absolutist government and opposed to liberal values. It 
focuses on Amiel’s criticism of ‘that vassal state of conscience which knows only slavery or 
anarchy, which proclaims but does not obey the law,’ and his identification of this aspect of 
Catholicism with ‘absolute monarchy’. As in Friedland’s monologue, the aspects of 
Catholicism perceived as addressing  human psychological and emotional needs, Amiel’s 
‘eternal gospel’, are disentangled from their Catholic context and transfigured by the 
narrative into new, unorthodox rites where humans fulfil priestly functions for each other.  
The increased emphasis on an analysis of the validity and influence of Catholicism’s 
claims was, no doubt, a result of Ward’s efforts to understand her father’s fluctuating 
commitment to the Catholic Church, and the effect these had on family. Janet Trevelyan’s 
account of her mother’s work on Helbeck suggests that Ward’s apparent fascination with 
Catholicism was the object of some conjecture. Ward wrote to George Trevelyan (her son-in-
law): 
 
Catholicism has an enormous attraction for me, - yet I could no more be a Catholic 
than a Mahometan.
14
  
 
 
However, John Sutherland hypothesises that Ward’s intense interest may have reflected a 
further stage in her own spiritual quest:  
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Although Mary Ward masked it as ‘research’, it is clear that, while writing Helbeck of 
Bannisdale, she was studying Catholicism with a view to possible conversion. [....]. 
What finally stopped her (and Laura) going all the way was confession. This 
‘uncovering of the inner life and the yielding of personality’ constituted a last step she 
could not take. There was something buried deep in her that no other person must 
know.
15
 
 
 
Ward’s letter to William Addis (a Catholic convert and Professor of Theology at Oxford) 
quoted above by Sutherland suggests that as well as commenting on the accuracy of her 
depiction of Catholic practice and faith, Addis may well have probed how far her interest was 
purely daughterly or professional. Trevelyan quotes a letter from Ward to her father which 
identifies ‘the terror of confession’ and the ‘yielding of personality’ as the points ‘on which 
Laura’s final breach with Helbeck would turn’.16 Ward’s attitude to Catholicism’s practice of 
confession was complex. At one point in Helbeck, she analyses Laura’s longing for, yet 
repulsion by Catholicism as follows, in an echo of her response to Addis, quoted above: 
 
It was what seemed to her the spiritual intrusiveness of Catholicism, its perpetual 
uncovering of the soul—its disrespect for the secrets of personality—its humiliation 
of the will—that made it most odious in the eyes of this daughter of a modern world, 
which finds in the development and ennobling of our human life its most 
characteristic faith.
17
 
 
 
Her distaste for Catholicism’s ‘uncovering of the soul’ contrasts intriguingly with her 
attitude towards other people’s spiritual confessionals, most notably the often mentioned St. 
Augustine, Obermann, and the author with whom she compares these spiritual works, 
Frédéric Amiel. Her introduction to her translation of the Journal Intime emphasises the 
importance of the confessional aspects of Amiel’s work as a way of understanding human 
psychology and the psychology of his era, reflecting her interest in the context of any 
testimony, explored in the previous chapter. The Journal was: 
 
[....] the confidant of his most private and intimate thoughts; [....], the voice of grief, 
of self-examination and confession, [....].
18
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He is the successor of St Augustine and Dante; he is the brother of Obermann and 
Maurice de Guérin. What others have done for the spiritual life of other generations 
he has done for the spiritual life of this, [....] and the wealth of [....] psychological 
faculty which he has brought to the analysis of human feeling [....].
19
  
 
 
Yet, as Peterson shows, she considered that: 
 
[....] as a nation we are not fond of direct ‘confessions’. It is in books like Sartor 
Resartus [...] or Marius [....] that the future student [....] will have to look for what is 
deepest, most intimate, and most real [....].
20
 
 
 
Her fascination with confessional writing as a tool to probe psychology, yet distaste for its 
potential personal application, and her ambivalence towards Catholicism produce a 
convoluted variant of confession in Eleanor. Eleanor’s unorthodox confession to Fr Benecke, 
an excommunicated priest, secures her redemptive acts towards Lucy and Manisty, and 
allows Fr Benecke to retrieve his dignity as a priest. Through it Eleanor finds her own 
unorthodox route to unorthodox faith before she dies. Yet it is a confession which explicitly 
negates its sacramental role because Eleanor is not a Catholic and Fr Benecke is an apostate. 
 In addition to Amiel’s language of doubt and self-distrust, there is one further 
recurrent idea within Amiel’s Journal which finds echoes in Ward’s religious novels. Amiel 
returns frequently to a consideration of whether doing right or knowing right is the most 
important of human activities: 
 
[....]; man becomes man only by the intelligence, but he is man only by the heart. 
Knowledge, love, power, - there is the complete life.
21
 
 
 
His contrast between the intellectual and the emotional is one that resonated for Ward 
personally, and its influence can be seen at work in Helbeck of Bannisdale, where Laura’s 
actions are determined by her heart, both in her loyalty to her father and to Helbeck, without 
her knowledge and intelligence having been able to shape the debate between herself and her 
lover. In Eleanor, Manisty is portrayed as a thinker lacking any emotional commitment to his 
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thoughts, whereas Eleanor and Lucy both combine shaping intelligence with loyalty to the 
causes they espouse and the people they love.  
The Influence of Amiel’s Journal on Helbeck of Bannisdale  
While continuing to portray the experience of doubt in traditional understandings of 
Christianity derived from Amiel’s Journal Intime, Helbeck of Bannisdale and Eleanor shift 
their focus to the mysterious gaps which open between people where belief and unbelief 
confront each other. The incommunicability of deepest human experiences is a theme 
emphasised by Amiel:  
 
[....] all these belong to our secret, and are almost all incommunicable and 
intransmissible, even when we try to speak of them, and even when we write them 
down. What is most precious in us never shows itself, never finds an issue even in the 
closest intimacy.
22
 
 
 
The human challenge of overcoming this perception, of translating each other, is a major 
subject of these novels. Incomprehension of cultural background, or rejection of the alteration 
to a former joint understanding intensify the challenge. In Robert Elsmere, Robert and 
Catherine’s relationship survived the collapse of its foundation of a joint faith. Helbeck of 
Bannisdale explores how far it is possible to bridge an even more profound chasm between 
the dogmatic demanding faith of Catholicism and none.  
The book revisits Robert Elsmere’s conflict between orthodoxy and a new liberalism, 
with a change in the protagonists’ positions, reflecting the conflicts of Thomas Arnold’s 
marriage, where it was the male who was the defender of orthodoxy and the female who 
opposed it. Laura, the heroine of the novel, becomes the female vehicle for Amiel-like 
fluctuations of attitude, self-interrogation, and refusal to compromise with ideals to secure a 
loving relationship. Her conflict lies between her loyalty to her father’s advocacy of freedom 
of conscience and her love for Helbeck, and recognition of the seductive appeal of his austere 
Catholicism.  
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Ward’s Letters to her Father during Revisions of Helbeck of Bannisdale 
 Trevelyan was convinced that no unbridgeable gaps in understanding affected Ward’s 
relationship with Thomas Arnold: 
 
She loved to discuss these matters with her father, from whom she had no secrets, in 
spite of their divergencies of view; [....].
23
 
 
However, letters between them during the writing of Helbeck of Bannisdale show how 
anxious Ward was about her father’s likely reactions. As she was trying to finalise the text of 
Helbeck in the spring of 1898, her letters reveal her sense that the book confronted the gap 
between his beliefs and her own, an attempt to find an acceptable mutual translation of their 
separate positions, an acceptance and resolution of their differences. They express her 
passionate need to secure his assent, not only to the justice of her portrayal of Catholicism’s 
demands and practice, but also to the validity of the rationalist intellectual positions she had 
adopted.  The words ‘anxiety’ and ‘violence’, and their variants occur repeatedly. The letters 
reveal a woman waiting ‘anxiously’ for her father’s letters or those of Catholic family 
friends, such as Addis or Lord Acton (a politically liberal Catholic and historian), with their 
comments and reactions:  
I am anxiously expecting Mr Addis’s last letter. There are many points of Catholic 
practice in Books IV and V in which I may have made mistakes, [....].
24
 
 
 
Ward reveals a vigilant sensitivity to what she perceived, on re-reading the proofs of 
her novel, as the emotional violence hovering behind and within her dramatisation of the 
argument between Catholicism and rationalism, and a wish to soften this to make it more 
acceptable to her father. Her representations of Laura’s position and that of Dr Friedland, the 
articulator of the ‘religion of the free mind’ are beset with concerns about the ‘violence’ of 
their views.
25
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I have been anxiously softening down a number of passages that seemed to me too 
violent. As I told you [....] I felt bound [....] to let the other side of thought 
[Friedland’s] have here and there its full and even fierce expression.26 
But I have softened Friedland’s paragraph about Scaliger and the Jesuits [....]. And I 
have all but cut out Fountain’s remark about the Oratory church [....]. It might have 
given pain, and it is only a piece of violence.
27
 
 
 
As well as cutting out earlier draft passages and sentences, and ‘softening’ the 
language, she tried to redress the balance of the novel through more positive assessments of 
Catholicism, and total rewriting of certain sections:   
 
I have cut out another violent sentence or two, and put in a passage about the 
“treasures of Catholic experience”, and now I think there is no harm in it, [....].28 
[....], the tone of violence is out of place and unnatural in the scholar [Friedland] and 
that I felt at once as soon as I saw the pages, [....]. I have now completely rewritten 
them, and I am sure that at any rate they are mellowed and softened; [....].
29
 
 
 
Her concern about her representation of the rationalist cause through Friedland is 
mentioned repeatedly in the letters, as are her efforts to make the arguments and actions of 
both Friedland and Laura reflect their characters, while also representing their cause fairly: 
  
I have been at work again on Friedland’s talk which does not please me at all. [....]. 
But it is not so much unjust to Catholicism – that can take care of itself! – as to 
Friedland, who is meant for a genial old person, and [....] not a mere railer.
30
 
As to the “personal abjection” par. which I have modified, “abjection” is of course a 
word of Catholic devotion itself, and I think that Friedland is here expressing one of 
the strongest feelings of non-Catholic minds.
31
 
But I don’t think you need be troubled about Laura’s outburst on p.142. It is simply in 
keeping with her training and temper. Of course Grandpapa could never have 
expressed himself so – nor could I – [....]. But there would be no story, if these 
touches of violence in Laura’s character were softened away.32 
 
 
As well as revealing the emotional ‘violence’ glimpsed in the act of suppression  
through these letters, the novel was for her a hazardous search for a father-daughter 
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relationship which transcended differences of belief. The letters reveal Ward’s determination 
to confront issues which might distance her from her father, and to secure an explicit 
understanding built on mutual respect, “through all our difference”:33 
 
But especially do I want to know dearest what you think of it. I should like it if you 
felt – through all our difference – that I had tried to get at some of the finest things in 
Catholicism, so far as an artist may.
34
 
 
 
The letters interweave her responses to her father’s criticisms with invitations to share 
memories of the Arnold family’s Westmoreland inheritance: 
 
Tell me how you like Daffady, and the Westmoreland scenes generally. Browhead 
Chapel is Cartmel Fell, though of course the lie of the valley is altered.  Do you 
remember the old window? I wonder whether you went with me?
35
 
 
 
The book’s Westmoreland setting is a reminder of the father’s and daughter’s familial 
inheritance of childhoods spent at Fox How, ‘the joy of three generations’36 of Arnolds, as it 
is lovingly described in the Recollections. It provided a way for Ward to involve her father in 
joint memories, but also provided her with a confirmation of her own radical place within the 
Arnold family tradition of liberal Anglicanism. The sense of family tradition and her own 
relationship to it forms a mysterious but dynamic component of Helbeck’s plot, where the 
family tradition under consideration, that of a marginalised Catholic family, is the reverse of 
that of the Arnold family’s Broad Church Anglicanism. The Helbeck family’s marginal status 
does, however, reflect Thomas Arnold’s unique position in relation to the very public 
position of the other Arnolds. The story of Helbeck’s family allowed her to embrace yet 
critique her father’s intellectual position, and it is perhaps significant that amongst the many 
autobiographical reverberations of the novel’s plot and characterisation, Ward portrayed 
Helbeck’s family line as doomed to extinction.  
Ward’s need to secure her father’s acceptance of the way in which she treated issues 
which underlined the intellectual differences between them, so obvious in the letters, 
camouflages any explicit joint consideration of the emotional dynamic of the novel, the 
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possibilities and pains of passionate love between two people with irreconcilable beliefs, the 
issue which had destroyed her parents’ marriage. Where she does allude to it obliquely, it is 
with a distancing, archaising [‘alack’], and the purported focus of the comment is on the 
emotional thrust of the narrative: 
 
I am afraid the story will have struck you as very painful. Certainly it does not add to 
the gaiety of nations, - alack! – and I myself have been quite haunted by it [....].37 
 
and: 
Now I think it is a fairly faithful picture of jarring minds, - of religion in that aspect 
alack! which brings not peace but a sword. It is a tragedy, in which as it seems to me 
the beau role is Helbeck’s. 38 
 
 
 In her Recollections, she described the genesis of the novel as deriving from an 
almost impersonal interest in the marginalisation of older Catholic families.  
 
The relation between [....] a family, [....] with its own [....] inherited consciousness of 
an unbroken loyalty to a once persecuted faith – and this modern world of ours [....].39   
 
 
But as work on the novel progressed and the painful, personal implications of the novel 
became unavoidably clearer, she wrote on a later page of the Recollections that: 
 
My first anxiety was as to my father and [....] I was seized with misgivings lest certain 
passages in the talk of Dr Friedland, who [....] is made the spokesman in the 
intellectual case against Catholicism, should wound or distress him.
40
 
 
 
The measured memories of the Recollections translate the ‘anxiety’, ‘pain’ and ‘violence’ of 
the letters into ‘misgivings’, but even this more anodyne word reflects Ward’s concern about 
the cost of translating ideas into a form which could engage or challenge feeling, the ‘human 
and emotional’ cost of an ‘intellectual process’,41 the very issue which had been the catalyst 
for Robert Elsmere ten years earlier.  Helbeck of Bannisdale provides a proof of how 
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seriously Ward engaged with her father’s ‘intellectual process’. The conclusion of the novel 
in Laura’s death is testimony to her intention to be unflinching in portraying the ‘human and 
emotional’ cost of intellectual difference. 
  According to the Recollections, she was ‘softening’ and ‘improving’42 the proofs of 
the novel during April and May 1898, but, according to a letter to her father as she was 
travelling back from Italy for the publication of the book, she was rewriting it ‘almost 
entirely’: 
 
Well, now, dearest, you must promise not to mind the completed form. For I have re-
written it almost entirely for your dear sake – though now I am sure that what I have 
done is also a literary improvement.
43
  
 
 
Several letters seem to take up and respond to issues raised either by Thomas Arnold 
or by friends about the presentation of Catholicism in the book. Ward distanced herself from 
the narrator’s apparent criticisms of Catholicism by re-attributing them to characters such as 
Laura or Friedland, but defended her characters’ statements as an integral aspect of their 
characters, and as essential to the novel’s plot. Her protests reflect the anxiety felt perhaps on 
her father’s side and certainly by Ward herself about the justice of her portrayals: 
 
The entourage of Bannisdale, Father Bowles, the Sisters may be thought to be too 
unfavourably drawn. But I have tried to shew it is as Laura sees them. When she is no 
longer indirectly in conflict with them she can make friends with them and see them 
more justly. And the effect they produce upon her prejudice is necessary to the 
story.
44
 
 
 
 Her final letter states that she has had to finalise the proofs without having received his ‘last 
suggestions’. ‘Perhaps you hardly realise how anxiously I have been waiting for what you 
have to say’,45 she wrote as she prepared to return home for publication.  
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The Translation of Signs and Symbols 
In Helbeck of Bannisdale, the lives of Helbeck and Laura are shown exercising 
Amiel’s ‘inevitable and silent propaganda’46 for each other, despite their incomprehension or 
rejection of each other’s emotional and intellectual positions. The agnostic Laura perceives 
the seductive virtues of Helbeck’s life of austerity and faith; but articulation of that faith and 
veneration of its symbols antagonise her. Unable to fully articulate her commitment to 
rational secularism or her emotional rejection of Catholicism, her silence as she listens to 
Helbeck seems to be reacting to something other than what is being said  - ‘absorbed in a 
passionate prescience of things more vital yet to come [....].’47 She is forced to fall back on a 
language of symbolic action. Her death, rather than her life, becomes her obscure ‘unspoken 
sermon’,48 and a sign to compete, within the novel, with the power of the image of the 
Crucified Christ. For both characters, the weight of emotion attached to their individual 
intellectual positions, and the familial loyalties which fuel and define such emotions, are 
untranslatable, and provide yet another autobiographical resonance within the novel. 
Attempts at communication are disrupted by incommunicable emotion. The gap is filled by 
obsessively watching and attempting to decode each other’s ambiguous signs and gestures:  
 
Laura stood opposite to Helbeck [....]. Once [....] he lifted his head and found that she 
was looking at him and not at Augustina. Her expression was so forlorn, and difficult 
to read, that he felt a vague uneasiness.
49
 
 
The attempt to find ways to communicate, relying on the making or translation of  obscure 
‘signs’, or on a search for a symbolic expression, forms one of the most powerful motifs of 
the novel. Christ’s crucifixion provides proof, for Helbeck, of God’s love and initiated and 
explains his passionate, mystical adherence to his faith: 
 
‘Laura, since that night I have been my Lord’s. It seemed to me that He had come 
Himself – come from His cross – to raise two souls from the depths of Hell.’50 
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On the secular side of the debate signs are absent. Friedland demands, but cannot 
identify, a symbol for the new free faith with an equivalent power to that of the sacrifice of 
the Mass. For Laura too, her step-mother’s death is a sign of a negation of meaning and 
significance, either in the efficacy of prayer, or the mercy of God. The signs that human 
beings give each other are beset by misapprehensions. Mistranslated or untranslatable minute 
movements, facial expressions, and cryptic utterances assume immense, but sometimes 
misleading significance for both main characters, and their translations into assumptions of 
dominance or disengagement prove tragically unreliable. This reliance on fragile momentary 
interpretation also poses questions about the immutable significance given to the Crucifixion 
of Christ and the ambiguous human parallel which Laura’s self-sacrifice assumes at the close 
of the novel. The difficulties of translating emotion or experience into actions or words, and 
retranslating personal meaning from other people’s signs underlie the argument of the book, 
whose ending suggests the limits of translation in its equivocal and contradictory 
interpretations. Laura cannot translate and refuses to learn Helbeck’s language for 
understanding emotional and intellectual experience: Helbeck cannot reach out for a 
significance beyond the symbols of his own language. Friedland’s paradoxical statement at 
the end of the novel that Laura’s death is ‘a blind witness to august things’ suggests the 
failure to understand the significance of emotional truths confronting them both.   
As considered earlier, Amiel had argued a ‘new faith must have its symbols too’.51 
Laura appears to reject the sacrificial symbols of Helbeck’s faith without having any 
alternative symbols to structure a resolution of the competing claims of her loyalties. 
However, the conclusion of the novel reveals that she has internalised Helbeck’s sacrificial 
symbol, even while her last letter attempts to obscure her suicide’s significance as a sacrifice 
to a human love.   
 
The Two Monologues: Helbeck 
 
In one of the letters to her father, Ward had implied that she wanted to achieve a 
balance between two ‘conversations’ in sequential chapters of the novel.  
 
As I told you [....] I felt bound [....] to let the other side of thought [Friedland’s] have 
here and there its full and even fierce expression.
52
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The first conversation is between Laura and Helbeck (Book 4, chapter 4), where he traces his 
spiritual history, and the second, Friedland’s conversation with an academic colleague (Book 
5, chapter 1), an analysis of the history of Catholicism and objections to it, is also directed at 
Laura. Both Helbeck and Friedland each present their arguments in a virtual monologue, with 
only the most minimal interjection from their interlocutor. Helbeck’s monologue recounts a 
passionate, almost visionary spiritual experience, framed by the ‘facts’ of sin, guilt and 
forgiveness. Friedland’s monologue is transformed from an academic analysis into a 
‘prophetic’ anticipation of spiritual adjustment as humanity abandons the narratives of the 
Fall and Redemption, and adopts the religion of the free mind and conscience. Both reflect 
the entry in Amiel’s Journal, quoted again below, in their conceptualising of self, the process 
of thought, its monologic nature, and the problems of communication, particularly in relation 
to Ward’s depiction of Laura’s reactions:  
 
In all the chief matters of life we are alone, and our true history is scarcely ever 
deciphered by others. The chief part of the drama is a monologue, or rather an 
intimate debate between God, our conscience, and ourselves. Tears, griefs, 
depressions, disappointments, irritations, good and evil thoughts, decisions, 
uncertainties, deliberations, all these belong to our secret, and are almost all 
incommunicable and intransmissible, even when we try to speak of them, and even 
when we write them down. What is most precious in us never shows itself, never 
finds an issue even in the closest intimacy. Only a part of it reaches our 
consciousness, it scarcely enters into action except in prayer, and is perhaps only 
perceived by God, [....].
53
 
 
 
Amiel’s perception that the deepest truths of spiritual experience are incommunicable is 
translated by Ward into descriptions of the misunderstandings and mistaken expectations 
which result from each of the monologues. The balance of the two chapters typifies the way 
in which the novel deals as justly as possible with the position of both a Catholic and a free-
thinker, even if Laura, the silent participant in each conversation, remains an enigma.  
 In describing Helbeck’s attempt to win Laura’s assent to Catholicism’s claims, 
Ward drew parallels between Helbeck’s response to Christ’s crucifixion and Laura’s 
subsequent decision that their love is impossible and that suicide is the only possible, though 
tragically ironic, response. While Helbeck wrestles to persuade Laura of Catholicism’s 
emotional truth, she perceives, in his account of his spiritual agony, the impossibility of being 
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persuaded. Helbeck’s catechism to her and to himself on the proper response to the 
crucifixion also emphasises the doubts and hypotheses underlying faith:  
 
Is the world under sin — and has a God died for it? All my nature — my intellect, my 
heart, my will, answer “Yes.” But if a God died, [....] what must that sin be that 
demands the Crucifixion? [....] And if He died, are we not His from the first moment 
of our birth—His first of all? [....]. All these mortifications, and penances, and self-
denials that you hate so, [....] spring from two great facts—Sin and the Crucifixion. 
But, Laura, are they true?" 
[....] Laura knew well that his life was poured into each word. She herself did not - 
could not - speak. But it seemed to her strangely that some spring within her was 
broken—some great decision had been taken, by whom she could not tell.54 
 
 
Laura’s response to this catechism is obscure even to herself, and seems to rob her of any 
autonomy in determining her fate. Her unwillingness and inability to communicate are 
emphasised ‘she [....] did not - could not speak’. She appears as a passive victim of her own 
thought processes: things ‘seemed’ to her, through an indeterminate apprehension of 
something ‘broken’, and a ‘great decision [....] taken’ by an unidentifiable agency. The 
narrator withdraws from interpretation or translation, and the reader is left to infer that the 
process of decision makes Laura an alien to herself, and to Helbeck’s hopes.  The sentence 
echoes an earlier description of the impersonal power of her ‘instinct’ to subvert her human 
longing to love Helbeck: 
 
Simply a revolt and repulsion that seemed to be more than and outside herself —
something independent and unconquerable, of which she was the mere instrument.
55
 
 
 
The ‘great decision’, unattributable and mysterious, and the image of the broken inner spring 
consolidate the cumulative language of Laura’s passivity and victimhood before a conflict of 
ideas, which can for her only be translated into a conflict of tenacious emotions, a process 
which ends in her suicide.  
 The mismatches between intention, expectation, appearance and inner reality also 
reflect one of Amiel’s psychological perceptions about the signs which people use to conceal 
their emotions as well as to reveal them to each other: 
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But, as always happens, the appearance is exactly the contrary of the reality, and my 
outward life the reverse of my true and deepest aspiration [....]. Pride and delicacy of 
soul, timidity of heart, have made me thus do violence to all my instincts and invert 
the natural order of my life. It is not astonishing that I should be unintelligible to 
others. In fact I have always avoided what attracted me, and turned my back upon the 
point where secretly I desired to be.
56
 
 
 
The earlier quotation lamented the limits of self-expression and self-understanding. The latter 
quotation suggests the self-destructive psychological manoeuvres used by the mind to 
obscure itself and its motives. The decision which is imposed by some unwilling part of 
Laura’s psyche echoes Amiel’s grief at his self- destructive ‘violence’ to instinct. Throughout 
Helbeck’s recital of his spiritual history, the narrator describes Laura’s ambiguous, minimal 
outward physical reactions, leaving both the reader and Helbeck to infer a ‘reality’ of thought 
and emotion to Laura which may be revealed or disguised by her ‘appearance’.  Helbeck’s 
exposure of his intense inward life is interspersed with the narrator’s descriptions of Laura’s 
unnoticed or misinterpreted reactions:  
 
But Helbeck did not notice the sudden tremulous movement of the hands lying in 
his.
57
 
 
 
Her responses are described as either minimal or as negatives of a response: ‘She moved 
imperceptibly, but she did not speak.’58 They reveal only her anticipation of something other 
than the immediate reality of Helbeck’s self-revelations and demands that she respond: 
 
She herself neither moved nor spoke; she was all hearing, absorbed in a passionate 
prescience of things more vital yet to come.
59
 
 
The way in which Ward describes Laura’s body language is neutral; the signs disguise 
or merely designate possibilities. As in Amiel’s analysis, the ‘appearance’ is inconsistent with 
‘the reality’, and ‘the reverse of [her] true and deepest aspiration’. Throughout the description 
of Helbeck’s spiritual history, the complex movements of Laura’s mind and emotions are, as 
in Amiel’s assessment of his own behaviour,  ‘unintelligible’ and left for the reader to infer. 
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The description of her actions emphasises a growing distance and negation (‘she slowly drew 
away, she shook her head, her eyes were full of tears, she shrank before it’60).  Where she 
does offer a response it is indirect and unintelligible, emphasising the anxieties both to be 
understood and also to withhold meaning, which later reach their climax in her suicide letter.  
 
Without any direct answer to his appeal or his threat, she lifted to him a look that was 
far from easy to read – a look of passionate sadness and of pure love.61 
 
 
The implications of her mysterious look are withheld and uninterpretable. While Helbeck’s 
language deals explicitly with his emotions, Ward’s evocation of Laura’s state of mind is 
through negation. There are no comments from the narrator to suggest whether Laura’s 
reactions stem from sympathetic understanding, rejection, or grief. It is only through this 
absent interpretation that the reader can infer that Laura’s reactions thwart both Helbeck’s 
and her own desires. As in Amiel’s analysis, her unintelligibility reflects a nature unable to 
evade passivity and to lay claim to what it ‘secretly desires’. Even the nature of the passive 
decision which takes place within Laura’s mind during the one-sided conversation remains 
unarticulated until Laura is alone.  
The reader is only made aware through the cumulative impact of silences and evasion 
of corroboration that Helbeck’s interpretation of her responses is based on misapprehension.  
As with Amiel, the reader is not astonished that Laura remains ‘unintelligible to others’, and 
infers that Laura’s reactions are to the unspoken undercurrent of emotional assumption below 
the surface of Helbeck’s spiritual history. The elusiveness and mystery of their interaction, 
and its revelation of the significance of the unspoken creates a sense of the fatality 
determining Laura’s reactions and actions. Helbeck’s ‘strange look of power – almost of 
triumph’62 is based, ironically, on an assumption that ‘the appearance is exactly the contrary 
of the reality’, and that her ‘outward life [is] the reverse of [her] true and deepest aspiration’. 
His hypothesis that her rejection of Catholicism is due to its having ‘gained some footing’63 
in her heart and the narrator’s brief sentences describing Laura’s outward reactions suggest 
his misapprehension to the reader, but Laura’s movements of feeling and thought remain 
obscure – unintelligible - until her final pronouncement to herself at the end of the day: 
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‘‘It would be a crime - a crime - to marry him”, she said, with a dull resolve that was 
beyond weeping.
64
  
Her conclusion re-echoes Amiel’s perception that ‘the appearance is exactly the contrary of 
the reality’, and a ‘reverse of my true and deepest aspiration’.  It is also based on an analysis 
which is never shared with either Helbeck or the reader.  
 
The Two Monologues: Friedland 
 
In the following chapter, the narrator describes Friedland’s normal academic style as one of 
‘paradox and ellipse’,65 a form of verbal obscurity parallel to the indecipherability of visual 
signs which characterises the previous chapter’s description of Laura’s reactions to Helbeck’s 
spiritual history. The narrator then identifies Friedland’s mutation of tone into the 
‘prophetical, pontifical’66 when he embarks on what is presented as a monologue, an 
impassioned analysis of Catholicism’s weaknesses and strengths, along with an apologia for a 
new ‘religion of the free mind’.67 The narrator also suggests that Friedland’s performance is 
directed at Laura’s confusion of mind and emotion: 
 
 And often, as Molly [his daughter] noticed, with a slight instinctive gesture – a 
fatherly turning towards that golden spot made by Laura’s hair among the shadows.68 
 
 
The narrator’s comments continue to emphasise the indirectness of the communication being 
undertaken between Friedland and Laura, the disguises of tone and ostensible audience which 
he adopts, and Laura’s enigmatic withdrawal from both eye contact or even passive 
participation. The intermediary, his daughter Molly (‘Friedland went on enlarging, with his 
hand on Molly’s head- looking into her quiet eyes’69) and Molly’s sensibility as the translator 
and go-between for her friend and her father becomes the substitute for the narrator. It is 
Molly’s memory of her father’s conversation which takes over from the narrator’s 
presentation as the monologue progresses. Her reactions translate Laura’s possible reactions 
to Friedland’s arguments. Laura’s reactions themselves are not described. She is even more 
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enigmatic in this scene than in the previous chapter where her indecipherable physical 
reactions to Helbeck’s history were described. She is a suppressed presence, yet she is the 
focus of both Friedland’s and Molly’s consciousnesses: 
 
Laura, in her dark corner, had almost disappeared from sight. Molly, [....], turned now 
and then from her friend to her father. She would give Friedland sometimes a gentle 
restraining touch – her lips shaped themselves, as though she said, ‘Take care!’70 
 
Friedland’s meditations, supplying the perspective and arguments which Laura cannot 
provide, focus, in their apologia for the new ‘religion of the free mind’, on a missing ‘sign’, 
one not yet determined but which must be of equivalent emotional power to the sacrifice of 
the Mass:    
 
‘Catholicism would have disappeared long ago but for the Mass. [....].  
What will the religion of the free mind discover to put in its place? Something, it must 
find. For [....] the needs of the soul remain the same.....
71
 
 
 
His monologue reflects some of Amiel’s reservations about Catholicism’s diminishment of 
individual conscience. He rejects ‘the personal abjection of Catholicism’ and dwells on the 
transformation of moral ideas which, he argues, is happening throughout the world beyond 
the Catholic Church:  
 
[....] what one sees going on in the modern world is a vast transformation of moral 
ideas [....]. Beside the older ethical fabric — [....] - a new is rising. [....]. And the net 
result in the best moderns is at once a great elaboration of conscience — and an 
almost intoxicating sense of freedom.
72
 
 
 
While he dwells on the historical context for a changing ‘ethical fabric’, and the hold of the 
symbolic ritual of the Mass, he celebrates the emerging conceptions of an ‘elaboration of 
conscience’ and ‘intoxicating sense of freedom’, reminiscent of Elsmere’s Pentecostal 
experience of a ‘new inrushing sense [....] of liberty – of inward expansion’.   
His ideas echo, but redefine and reformulate more optimistically those of Amiel’s 
meditation considered earlier, on the needs of the ‘new faith’ for symbols to interpret the 
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deepest and most serious needs of mankind.
 
Where Amiel sees the symbolic language of the 
Christian narrative of the Fall and Redemption as an expression of psychological reality, 
‘sensitiveness of feeling, the sense of sin, the desire for pardon, the thirst for holiness’,73 
Friedland defines the new religion of the free mind as one which must dispense with the 
narrative of the Fall and original sin, even while it retains some symbol of sacrificial power 
analogous to the Mass. Where Amiel locates the need for symbols in sin’s need for 
forgiveness, Friedland locates the same mystical need in the facts of ‘pain and death’.74 But 
he goes on to argue that a solution to these ineffable needs will be found, his words 
suggesting that the unknown and transcendent can only be approached through symbols: 
 
But all the secrets and formulae of a new mystical union have to be worked out. And 
so long as pain and death remain, humanity will always be at heart a mystic!"
75
 
 
It is during these closing thoughts about the new freedom of human conscience and 
rejection of the narrative of the Fall, that Laura is described emerging from her seclusion: 
 
[....] the head among the shadows had emerged. The beautiful eyes, so full – 
unconsciously full - of sad and torturing thought, rested upon the speaker. Friedland 
became sensitively conscious of them. [....]. The negations of his talk began to trouble 
him – in sight of this young grief and passion. [....]. 
When Friedland and his wife were left alone, Friedland said with timidity: 
‘[....] I would willingly brace that poor child’s mind a little. And it seemed to me she 
listened.’ 
 
 
Just as Laura’s reactions to Helbeck proved unreadable to him, her reactions remain 
enigmatic to Friedland, and open to his misconstruction. To both men her repressed signs of 
emotion or thought prove misleading. Following the conversation with Helbeck, which he 
thought promised so much, her decision was to reject a life framed by Catholicism’s powerful 
symbolic language. After his bravura rhetoric and analysis, Friedland discovers that, rather 
than finding her mind braced, Laura sought out the comforts of the Benediction service, the 
experience Helbeck would be having at Bannisdale. The interplay between perception of 
Laura’s feelings and their actuality echoes again Amiel’s experience of ‘appearance’ being 
the ‘contrary of reality’.  
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Last words 
The sign that Laura ultimately decides to give the Friedlands in her suicide letter 
demonstrates her difficulties in explaining her own predicament, and predicting the 
repercussions of her action on others, except in sudden moments of emotional perception. 
Amiel enunciated what seems to have been a widespread Victorian concentration on the 
drama and significance of final words as an unequivocal truth: 
 
Such words and looks are a kind of testament. They have a solemn and sacred 
character which is not merely an effect of our imagination. For that which is on the 
brink of death already participates to some extent in eternity.
76
 
 
 Laura’s message from beyond death is, in contrast, a withholding of meaning from 
her lover, and an ambiguous explanation for her friends. Its broken, jerky syntax, its 
repetitions and non-sequiturs, not only represent her in a moment of tragic anguish but also 
typify her inability to present a coherent argument to her friends and lover. 
 
‘[....]— I sit here like a coward—but I can't go without a sign. - You wouldn't 
understand me—I used to be so happy as a little child—But since Papa died—since I 
came here—Oh! I am not angry now, not proud—no, no.—It is for love—for love.’77 
 
 
The letter is the most explicit statement of her state of mind and reasons for action in the 
novel. The narrator provides no further elucidation, and so it is left again to the reader to 
disentangle the ambiguities of her actions.  Laura’s aims in writing it are to provide ‘a sign’ 
and not a coherent ‘explanation’, and yet she hopes that this incompletion will still gain 
understanding. She demands from the Friedlands a leap of understanding analogous to that 
required to link a religious symbol or signifier with its ‘signified’ emotional and intellectual 
experience. 
Laura’s letter and Ward’s description of its aftermath focus on the demand people 
make of each other for ‘signs’, both personal individual signs, which the novel emphasises 
are intrinsically mutable and unreliable, and religious symbols, which have the resonance of 
significance accumulated over time. Even in this last opportunity to communicate her anguish 
and intentions, Laura is also haunted by the need to conceal, and a fear that her words or 
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actions may allow too much understanding. The very ambiguity and secrecy of her act of 
self-sacrifice create a mysterious space for unverifiable interpretation. Her letter refers to 
‘signs’, their absence, their pre-emption, and their necessity. The sign which is absent is that 
of allowing her step-mother to hear of her marriage to Helbeck before her death. The letter 
also emphasises Laura’s fear of providing signs to Helbeck himself: 
 
‘He must always think it was an accident  - [....] But I am afraid of saying or doing 
something to make the others suspect.’78 
 
 
In relation to the Friedlands and to Molly, Laura writes that her letter is ‘for you three only’, 
because ‘[....] I can’t go without a sign. – You wouldn’t understand me.’ 79 Laura’s fear of 
articulating ‘the voice of [her] own life, only far stronger and crueller [....]’80, and her need to 
evade detection and understanding in trying to navigate her competing intellectual and 
emotional loyalties leave her with an ambiguous re-enactment of Christianity’s self-sacrificial 
central sign. She cannot ‘live a lie’,81 but her death becomes a substitute, protective lie, an 
ambiguous final act of self-sacrifice, a ‘sign’ designed only for the Friedlands, and excluding 
Helbeck.  
The interchange between Dr Friedland and Helbeck the morning after Laura’s death, 
moves through Helbeck’s attempt to understand, one he realises will be unsuccessful (‘He 
approached the doctor with an uncertain step, like one finding his way in the dark’82), and 
culminates in a series of refusals to enlighten by one or to react by the other, underlining the 
complexity of the human motives which prevent understanding and enforce isolation.  
 
‘You had a letter,’ he said. ‘Is it possible that you could show it me—or any part of it? 
[....].’ 
Dr. Friedland grew pale. 
‘My dear sir,’ he said, [....] ‘that letter contained a message for my daughter which 
was not intended for other eyes than hers. I have destroyed it.’ 
And then speech failed him. The old man stood in a guilty confusion.
83
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 Helbeck’s final action, as he ‘lifted his deep eyes with the steady and yet muffled gaze of 
one who, in the silence of the heart, lets hope go’,84 emphasises the conjunction of his 
capacity to see (‘lifted his deep eyes’) with his concealment of his own bitter comprehensions 
(‘steady and yet muffled gaze’). From describing the limits of the sense of sight, the imagery 
of the sentence moves to that of hearing, where sense is denied even to internal interrogation 
(‘in the silence of the heart, lets hope go’). The passage ends with two short statements 
emphasising the inadequacies and impossibility of sharing meaning either of Laura’s action 
or Helbeck’s reaction, and the mutual loneliness of those left behind: ‘Not another word was 
said. The doctor found himself alone.’85 
Laura’s action, forbidden by Catholic teaching, accumulates through her account 
some of the attributes of martyrdom. As well as recognising the finality of her death and its 
closure of the emotional turmoil of their relationship (‘because death puts an end’), she sees 
her suicide as a death-transcending, self-sacrificial symbol (‘it is for love - for love’), but its 
significance is withheld from her Catholic lover and revealed only to the agnostic Friedland 
family.  
 
The Impact of Laura’s Withheld Voice 
 
It is left to the three men of the novel - the lover, dead father and surrogate father to 
suggest the arguments which may or may not illuminate Laura’s decisions and actions.  
Stephen Gwynn quotes from Ward’s account of her rationalised perspective on a novel, 
whose plot, characterisation and language all suggest the tensions and ambitions which lay 
behind her decision to write so personally:  
 
Suppose, therefore, [....] this triumphant weakness, this ‘dying to live’ were given to 
the woman, who yet, as standing for modern civilisation, and the ideas on which it is 
built, would have in truth the strong and conquering rôle? Suppose to her were 
assigned the same instinctive loyalty to something greater than herself, which she 
cannot expound or analyse, but which she feels, for which she can die,- as that which 
made the tragedy and the greatness of the Catholic story? [....]. Let her represent the 
same dumb clinging, a clinging of the heart – to an idea; place on her lips that same 
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pitiful cry of tortured but inexorable loyalty [....]; but let it be in the interest of that 
order of thought which is opposed to Catholicism in a life-and-death struggle [....].
86
 
Ward’s analysis of the impulses of the inarticulate religious martyr (instinctive, dumb 
clinging [....] of the heart, inexorable loyalty) is transferred to Laura, raised as a critic of 
religion and of its demands on the individual conscience. As in Robert Elsmere, intellectual 
revolt is transmuted by the analogies of language, allusion and metaphor into an experience 
similar to Christian spiritual aspiration, experience, and self-sacrifice. It is also haunted by 
echoes of Amiel’s psychological predicament both in the divisions within the consciousness 
of each of the protagonists, and in Laura’s case, the terror of the psychic self-destruction 
entailed in any self-surrender. In Ward’s hands, it becomes a narrative of whether the 
independent, instinctively agnostic Laura can renounce such instincts to become a Catholic. 
Like most of Ward’s heroines in her religious novels, Laura refuses to change her beliefs for 
love, and chooses to renounce both Helbeck and her own life. The ambiguities of Laura’s 
sign of suicide are reflected in the comments which the narrator chooses to include. In 
Friedland’s eyes, Laura’s death becomes, in its internal contradictions, and even in its self-
incomprehension, a symbol of the transcendent, ‘a blind witness to august things.’87 In 
relation to Helbeck, Ward describes Laura’s death as ‘a last irrevocable submission’,88 an 
ambiguity which embraces the sexual and the spiritual.  
 Laura’s inarticulate resistance to Catholicism reflected Julia Arnold’s ‘instinctive 
dread of Catholicism [....] ancestral and historical’.89 Laura’s character was also, in some 
ways, Ward’s own. Her descriptions of her own and Laura’s self-education are hauntingly 
similar. Laura’s, in Cambridge, was ‘a thing of shreds and patches, managed by herself 
throughout’:90 Ward’s, in Oxford, was ‘a great voyage of discovery, organised mainly by 
myself’.91 Ward’s decision to place an explicit articulation of her own intellectual position at 
one remove from the novel’s foreground narrative, the conflict between Helbeck and Laura, 
suggests the complex tensions she herself experienced in reconciling her attitudes to her 
father’s faith, to her mother’s emotional rejection of it, and to her own more nuanced 
intellectual rejection.  Like Amiel, the novel suppresses its author’s views and makes her 
                                            
86
 Mary Ward, quoted in Stephen Gwynn, Mrs Humphry Ward, p.64. 
87
 MW HB, V. 4. p.389. 
88
 MW HB, V. 4. p.386. 
89
 MW Rec, Ch.I, p.21. 
90
 MW HB, I. 2. p.56. 
91
 MW Rec, Ch.VI, p.102. 
232 
 
emotions ‘unintelligible to others.’92  Even the narrator’s role becomes ambiguously 
suspended or emphatically absent during the monologues. The depth of Ward’s views can 
perhaps be detected through Laura’s suicide, and the anxiety about the revelation of pain and 
violence betrayed by her letters.  
Her approach means that the case for her father’s Catholic faith is advocated and 
Laura’s critique suppressed, and expressed only through an alternative father figure, Dr 
Friedland, and his interpretation of the views of Laura’s dead father.  Laura, deprived both of 
an intellectual understanding which would reinforce her emotional commitment to ‘the 
religion of the freedom of the mind’, and unable to free herself of her instinctive, inherited 
rejection of the ‘great visible system’ of Catholicism and its symbolic language, is left 
without the means to bridge the chasm between herself and her lover.  
Ward presents Helbeck’s and Laura’s positions in ways which echo Amiel’s 
resolution of the dichotomies of intelligence and feeling faced by human beings: man 
becomes man only by the intelligence, but he is man only by the heart.’93 Here is Ward’s 
description of Helbeck’s intellectual and emotional nature, emphasising the framework for 
thought provided by Catholic tradition and its interplay with feeling: 
 
Helbeck [....] had been trained by Jesuit teachers; he had lived and thought; his mind 
had a framework. [....]. But he was governed by heart and imagination no less than 
Laura. A serviceable intelligence had been used simply to strengthen the claims of 
feeling and faith.
94
  
 
In contrast, Laura’s valuation of freedom from such constraints is described as having no 
roots in any knowledge of rationalist criticism, but motivated by an emotional loyalty to it: 
 
[....] Laura [....] represented forces of intelligence, of analysis, of criticism, of which 
in themselves she knew little or nothing, except so far as they affected all her modes 
of feeling. [....]. But when in this new conflict—a conflict of instincts, of the deepest 
tendencies of two natures — she tried to lay hold upon the rational life, to help herself 
by it, and from it, it failed her everywhere.
95
 
 
 
                                            
92
 HFA JI, 12 September 1861, p.81. 
93
 HFA JI, 7 April 1851, p.12. 
94
 MW HB, IV. 3. pp.276, 277. 
95
 MW HB, IV. 4. Ch.3, p.277. 
233 
 
Laura represents a secularising prioritising of reason and intellect, which, ironically, she 
cannot analyse in order to justify her position in any explicit way. She has been brought up by 
her father to believe in reason feelingly, a problematic education described by Friedland as 
follows: 
‘He makes of Laura a child of Knowledge, a child of Freedom, a child of Revolution 
– without an ounce of training to fit her for the part, [....].’96 
And: 
‘Her reason refuses them [Catholic claims] – but why? She cannot tell. For Heaven’s 
sake, why do we leave our children’s minds empty like this? If you believe, my good 
friend, Educate! And if you doubt, still more – Educate! Educate!’97 
 
Because of the sensitive nature of the novel’s theme, and in advance of the alterations 
to the second draft already considered, Ward had altered the first draft to avoid causing her 
father any pain. John Sutherland argues that the sensitive personal issues included: 
 
[....] a gallery of gullible, ignorant, and sinister Catholics in her cast. Even more 
sensitive was the love-relationship at the core of the novel; the generation gap and the 
strong hint of incest were suggestive of a father-daughter passion. It was not 
something to make a Catholic father with a famous free-thinking daughter easy – 
especially as that father had recently married a younger woman.
98
 
 
 
However it is clear from Ward’s letters that her overt concern was to be just to her father’s 
intellectual position and her own, without causing pain or rupturing the relationship. What is 
intriguing is the deference to the passion of her father’s beliefs which the novel’s structure 
creates. The personal, familial nature of Ward’s project intersects with a tragic vision of the 
fatality of ideas. The book is a statement of the irreconcilability of the two positions 
intellectually, but, there is, I would argue, a subtext, not of incest, but of submission to the 
suppression of emotional  pain expected of her, and made explicit through the repeated 
‘alacks’ of Ward’s letters, and through her placatory hopes: 
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 [....] I do not think that [....] there is anything in it which should now give offence. In 
fact I believe that it will be all the other way! - and so does Humphry who is 
dreadfully afraid that it will be taken as a catholic plaidoyer by half the world!......
99
 
 
Presentation of the Catholic case 
 
Ward presents the Catholic case so that the reader feels the human force and attraction 
of the uncompromising claims of Catholic doctrine and tradition as well as understanding 
Ward’s reservations about its potential damage to individual identity and human relationship. 
Laura feels the attractions of Helbeck’s austere and passionate spirituality, and of the 
sensuous beauty of Catholicism itself. She finds the idea of having Helbeck as her spiritual 
director a seductive one. Ward’s language suggests the fusion of the sensual longing with the 
spiritual: 
 
Oh! to be guided, loved, crushed if need be, by the mystic, whose first thought can 
never be for you – who puts his own soul [....] before your lips, your eyes! Strange 
passion of it! – it rushes through the girl’s nature in one blending storm of longing and 
despair.
100
 
She could recall — with trembling — many a strange moment in Helbeck's presence, 
or in the chapel, when she had seemed to feel her whole self breaking up, dissolving 
in the grip of a power that was at once her foe and the bearer of infinite seduction. But 
always the will, the self, had won the victory, had delivered a final "No!” [....].101 
 
 
Ward’s description of Laura’s emotions as she contemplates what her love for Helbeck would 
bring her appeals to the violent, ambivalent and self-destructive nature of the lure of 
conversion. Metaphors of conquest and destruction fuse the sexual with the spiritual, in an 
analogy of Catholicism’s demands with those of a demanding lover. The wording suggests 
the dualities of Amiel’s psychological world, in particular his fascination with the divisions 
of his consciousness. As discussed in the previous chapter Amiel’s use of the word ‘abyss’ 
suggests the conflict engulfing Laura. For Amiel, ‘abyss’ suggested the hidden depths of the 
unconscious mind which lie below consciousness itself, and the forces which caused the 
surrender of  individualised life to the infinite: 
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For this abyss is within us; this gulf [....] is in the depth of our own being, and our 
liberty floats over this void, which is always seeking to swallow it up. Our only 
talisman lies in that concentration of moral force which we call conscience [....].
102
 
 
In contrast, Helbeck’s attraction to her and his longing for her to convert is also revealed as 
being part of a male need to ‘conquer’ the object of his sexual desire (‘to conquer the woman 
and pierce the sceptic’103), as shown in his early thoughts about their possible relationship: 
She would sooner die than obey. Unless she loved! Then what an art, what an 
enchantment to command her!
104
  
 
 
In Helbeck of Bannisdale, no compromise is possible for the two protagonists, drawn 
together by human love and separated by the gulf between their beliefs. The agnostic, 
independent Laura dies for the sake of the man she loves and also prevents him from having 
any understanding of why she has chosen that path.  Several critics have commented on 
Ward’s sympathetic and moving portrayal of both Laura’s and Helbeck’s predicaments. 
Rosemary Ashton’s introduction to the book praises ‘‘the extreme delicacy’ with which Ward 
portrays: 
 
[....] the yoking of attraction and resistance between the lovers’ characters and beliefs, 
and finally expresses the tragic wisdom, the true insight which makes Helbeck of 
Bannisdale an important work which achieves what is rare even in major novels: 
[....].
105
 
 
Earlier critics also celebrate this novel in particular. Stephen Gwynn praises its 
characterisation
106
 and Q D Leavis argues that:  
 
The situation, the conflict, and the insoluble deadlock have stature from being 
representative, [....].
107
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In Helbeck of Bannisdale the subtlety of Ward’s technique allowed the cases for both the 
Catholic and rationalist viewpoints to be made forcefully. The structure of the novel places 
the Catholic case in the foreground, but its symbolic language poses questions about the 
legitimacy of that case. The letters considered earlier reveal the personal pressures she was 
under to portray the riches of Catholicism’s spiritual heritage, while still wishing to analyse 
its authoritarian framework and the clash with her own more liberal understandings of 
Christianity.  
The novel weaves into its thought and structure thematic material drawn from Amiel’s 
Journal. As in the Journal, the significance of religion as a psychological phenomenon and 
framework is explored, along with the power of symbols, the ambiguity of human signs, the 
power of religious signs to shape action and thought, and the need to illuminate how 
humanity should live even through the mutability and fragility of the signs which it evolves. 
Catholicism is subjected to aspects of Amiel’s critique of it, although Ward is far more 
sympathetic to its appeal, and Amiel’s debate about the balance necessary between heart and 
intelligence shapes the presentation of Helbeck’s and Laura’s characters. 
 
The Influence of Amiel’s Journal on Eleanor 
Ward’s subsequent book, Eleanor (1900), returns to some of the thematic material of 
the earlier religious novels. The highly personal arguments for and against Catholicism, 
rehearsed in Helbeck of Bannisdale, are transformed into a more detached consideration of 
the importance of a religious authoritarian tradition in informing social morality, and the 
difficulties of reconciling religious authority with social democracy, liberal political values, 
individual reason and individual conscience. It echoes Amiel’s Journal’s concerns with the 
nature and place of personal religion in a scientific age, with the impacts of democracy on 
education and culture, and with personal spiritual predicaments arising from disappointment 
and doubt, explored in characters such as Eleanor herself and Father Benecke, the Bavarian 
liberal theologian excommunicated for his historicist and scientific Christian critique. The 
novel also considers the more personal issues of the psychological function of confession and 
direction, even when stripped of their sacramental role.  
 Ward had identified one of the ideas which interested her as a novelist as the conflict 
between old and new ideas: 
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It is in these conflicts between old and new, [....], that we moderns find our best 
example of compelling fate, [....].
108
  
 
 
One of the principal themes of Eleanor, a version of the story of Châteaubriand and Mme 
Pauline de Beaumont, concerns just such a conflict, the usurpation of roles and the violent 
emotions such usurpation can engender. Ward uses the story of the sacrificial replacement of 
one priest by another at Nemi as a symbol not only for changing political and religious 
narratives – the process of replacing the influence of the Church by that of the new secular 
State, or of supplanting former religious beliefs by a more liberal understanding of 
Christianity -  but also for the pain of displacement in human relationships, as one ‘muse’ is 
replaced by another.  
 
Joubert and Mme de Beaumont 
 
 Ward’s interest in the story of Joubert, Châteaubriand and Mme de Beaumont, and the 
germ of the idea of the displacement of one woman by another, must have been suggested to 
her during her translation of the Journal Intime, with its analysis and criticism of the works 
and lives of Joubert and Châteaubriand.  Matthew Arnold’s 1856 essay on Joubert may also 
have had its own emotional and familial influence. A further indication that the idea had been 
gestating for some time can be detected in the character of Mme de Netteville in Robert 
Elsmere. Squire Wendover’s assessment of Mme de Netteville dwells on her intelligence, 
comparing her with Pauline de Beaumont, friend of Joubert and mistress and source of 
inspiration for Châteaubriand: 
 
[....] one of the best persons ‘to consult about ideas’, like Joubert’s Madame de 
Beaumont, [....]. One suspects her of adventures just enough to find her society 
doubly piquant.
109
 
 
Ward’s Recollections confess that during the summer of 1898 she had ‘jotted down on 
a sheet of notepaper’ ‘some suggestions gathered from the love-story of Châteaubriand and 
Madame de Beaumont’ which led ‘to the writing of Eleanor’.110 However, Sutherland notes 
that in April 1898 she had told her brother Willie that she intended taking a villa the next 
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spring ‘[so] that I may write an English story in a Tuscan setting’.111 She had also 
commissioned or encouraged her daughter Dorothy’s friend, Katharine Lyttelton, to translate 
Joseph Joubert’s Pensées, which were published in England in 1898 as Joubert: Selected 
Thoughts, with an introduction provided by Ward herself. Peter Collister points out that in 
practice it was a joint translation, quoting one of Ward’s letters at the time which claimed that 
‘Katharine and I are doing Joubert 6 hours a day and there is no room for anything else.’112 
Such exacting partnership anticipates Eleanor’s partnership with Edward Manisty in the 
writing of his contentious book. Lyttelton’s translation builds on the translations of Joubert’s 
thoughts provided in Matthew Arnold’s essay, a double enfoldment within the Arnold 
family’s literary oeuvre.  The writing of Eleanor was therefore interwoven with the Lyttelton 
translation of Joubert, and her own introduction to it, in a similar way to the twin geneses of 
Amiel’s Journal and Robert Elsmere.  There are a number of parallels and linkages between 
the two projects.  
  Amiel himself had written about Joubert at length as if, in some way, he was aware of 
the comparisons between his emerging Journal and the Pensées, and that Joubert was one of 
those writers against whom his own work might in future be measured. In 1853 he had 
published - as pensées - some extracts from his Journal in ‘Grains de Mil’.113Typically 
critical in his initial thoughts about Joubert’s Pensées, he revised his estimate after reading 
Joubert’s Correspondance. He admired its style for its ‘grace, delicacy, atticism and 
precision’,114 but more ambiguously identified Joubert’s limitations of approach (‘He wants 
bone and body: timid, dreamy and clairvoyant, he hovers far above reality
115
) and of content: 
 
The place of Joubert seems to me then, below and very far from the philosophers and 
the true poets, but honorable among the moralists and the critics.
116
 
 
And a few days later he wrote dismissively: 
 
The pensée-writer is to the philosopher what the dilettante is to the artist.
117
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 Arnold’s essay on Joubert and Ward’s introduction to the Lyttelton translation 
highlight some of the parallels between the circumstances of Amiel’s and Joubert’s lives as 
writers. Joubert’s fragments, which had been published in France in 1838, ranged, as did 
Amiel’s, over religion, philosophy, social life and art. Arnold’s essay on Joubert argued that, 
although he had a relatively secluded life and had not produced any definitively great written 
oeuvre, he should be considered as one of those writers who had influenced the ideas and 
culture of their time. His description of the way in which the Pensées came to be published 
anticipates the posthumous emergence of the Journal Intime.  
 
Joubert’s papers were accumulated in boxes and drawers. He had not meant them for 
publication; [....]. But, as her own [Mme Joubert’s] end  approached, the natural desire 
to leave of so remarkable a spirit some enduring memorial [....], made her [....] allow 
the printing, but for private circulation only, of a volume of his fragments.  
 
Châteaubriand edited it; it appeared in 1838, fourteen years after Joubert’s death.118 In 
her introduction to Lyttelton’s translation, Ward defers to the critical estimate of Joubert in 
Arnold’s essay, but also quotes from Amiel’s estimate of him: 
 
‘His philosophy’, says Amiel of him in 1851, ‘is merely literary and popular; his 
originality is only in detail and in execution..... All that has to do with large views, 
with the whole of things, is very little at Joubert's command; he has no philosophy of 
history, no speculative intuition.’ But within his own limits, as Amiel confesses 
abundantly, Joubert is still among the first and choicest. [....]. [....] he is one of those 
men who are ‘superior to their works, and who have themselves the unity which these 
lack.’119  
 
 
Ward’s critical judgements of Joubert underline the ways in which she saw his life and 
literary writing foreshadowing that of Amiel: 
 
He did write indeed; there are the Pensées—sure of their modest but enduring place in 
French literature. But this writing of his was infinitely slow and scanty. It was the 
quiet, life-long deposit of himself. Drop by drop the thoughts fell, crystallising and 
taking shape in a gentle and tranquil obscurity.
120
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Apart from critical estimates of Joubert’s place in French literature, Ward’s introduction 
focuses much more on his life and, in particular, his relationships with Châteaubriand and 
Madame de Beaumont. In terms of intellectual influence, Ward casts Joubert in the role of 
midwife to Châteaubriand’s representations of the turbulent intellectual cross-currents of his 
era. Her words about Châteaubriand could equally apply to her own perceptions of the ebb 
and flow of religious argument within Victorian society and her own experience: 
 
[....]; he helped Châteaubriand to give voice and expression to that new and stormy 
life of Europe which was none the less conscious of all that it had conquered because 
it returned so passionately, so remorsefully, to much that it had overthrown; [....].
121
 
Joubert’s role in supporting Châteaubriand’s religious revisionism cast a light on her own 
interest in her father’s advocacy of Catholicism and the schisms within her own family. 
And when the new and all-conquering talent threw itself into the service of the old 
Church, and of the expelled faith, which was now flowing back upon France like 
some great river upon its ancient channels, Joubert made himself alternately the 
herald and the guardian of the new force.
122
 
 
Amiel’s analyses of both Joubert and Châteaubriand had, in contrast, confined 
themselves to the work of both men and what that revealed of their character, rather than 
considering their private lives and relationships with Mme de Beaumont. His judgement of 
Châteaubriand as a man was severe: 
 
[....] - a nature at once devoured with ambition and unable to find anything to love or 
admire in the world except itself, - [....].
123
 
 
 
His judgement of Châteaubriand’s René grudgingly admired its style’s ‘terseness’ and 
‘marvellous vigour’, but assessed the principal character as ‘a pathological case’, rather than 
a hero.
124
 His evaluation of Châteaubriand, and Ward’s analysis of Châteaubriand’s 
intellectual role combine to define her portrait of Manisty. In the novel, he is cast in the role 
of egoist, contrarian and revisionist, aware of the impact of modernism but determined to 
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defend the cause of authoritarian conservatism. It is a softened and camouflaged version of 
Amiel’s critical assessment of Châteaubriand: 
 
I saw in him a great artist but not a great man, [....] - indefatigable in labour and 
capable of everything except of true devotion, self-sacrifice, and faith. Jealous of all 
success, he was always on the opposition side, that he might be the better able to 
disavow all services received, and to hold aloof from any other glory but his own. 
Legitimist under the empire, a parliamentarian under the legitimist regime, republican 
under the constitutional monarchy, defending Christianity when France was 
philosophical, and taking a distaste for religion as soon as it became once more a 
serious power,  - the secret of these endless contradictions in him was simply the 
desire to reign alone like the sun,—[....].  
[....] Châteaubriand from the beginning was inspired by [....] the passion for 
contradicting, for crushing and conquering. [....]. Rousseau seems to me his point of 
departure, the man who suggested to him by contrast and opposition all his replies and 
attacks, [....]. Always a rôle to be filled, cleverness to be displayed, a parti-pris to be 
upheld and fame to be won,—his theme, one of imagination, his faith one to order, -
but sincerity, loyalty, candour, seldom or never! Always a real indifference simulating 
a passion for truth; always an imperious thirst for glory instead of devotion to the 
good; always the ambitious artist, never the citizen, the believer, the man.
125
 
 
The narrator of Eleanor describes Manisty as one of the ‘intellectual soldiers of 
fortune’.126 His cynical espousal of the Catholic cause is exposed as an aspect of a 
conservative political strategy rather than as a sincerely held personal belief, an incarnation of 
Amiel’s judgement above, ‘always a real indifference simulating a passion for truth’. Eleanor 
perceives it as follows: 
 
‘Of course I sometimes wish that it were conviction with him and not policy. [....]. If 
instead of this praise from the outside, this cool praise of religion as the great 
policemen of the world, if only his voice [....] spoke for one moment the language of 
faith.’127 
 
The ambivalence and moral limitations of its principal champion allow Ward to interrogate 
Catholicism’s claims and practice with less scrupulous sensitivity to her father’s possible 
reactions than in Helbeck of Bannisdale.  
The elements of the story of Joubert, Châteaubriand and Mme de Beaumont that was 
to become the plot of Eleanor are identified in Ward’s introduction to Joubert’s Pensées. 
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Ward’s description of  Madame de Beaumont’s pre- and post-revolutionary life informs her 
characterisation of Eleanor as a European intellectual, the equal of analytical and creative 
men, who has had to struggle with private despair and loss of faith. 
 
 Pauline de Beaumont was a person in whom the intellectual and aristocratic traditions 
of eighteenth century Paris were equally strong. [....] when Joubert first saw her he 
found her buried in the study of philosophy, especially of Kant. The agony she had 
suffered and witnessed had produced two marked effects. Her religious faith was 
gone; the world in her eyes had neither God nor justice. On the other hand, her 
intelligence had revived with passionate force. [....]. She read, therefore, incessantly—
literature, history, philosophy. And what she read she discussed with Joubert. After 
her death, Joubert wrote to a friend:—‘Madame de Beaumont understood everything. 
You and I will never find her like again ….. She was excellent to consult about ideas. 
She judged them admirably, and one might be sure that what had charmed her was 
exquisite indeed—if not for the crowd, at least for the elect.’128 
 
 
Just as Eleanor helps Manisty to formulate his critique of the new Italy’s secularism 
and advocate a return to a Catholic state, Pauline had become the muse and mistress of 
Châteaubriand during the writing of La Génie du Christianisme: 
 
[....] she threw herself heart and soul into the completion of the Génie du 
Christianisme, listening, inspiring, criticising, copying for him in the morning, 
walking with him in the afternoon, writing letters to Joubert and others in quest of the 
books he wanted, [....].
129
 
 
 
Her subsequent abandonment  by Châteaubriand, and their reconciliation before her death  
provided Ward with the plot of her novel; Eleanor’s displacement in Manisty’s affections, her 
illness, their reconciliation, her discovery of a faith, and death. She describes Mme de 
Beaumont’s death thus: 
 
During her last hours he seems to have given her full assurance of a devotion which 
could no longer embarrass either himself or her; and her poor heart was comforted. 
‘As she listened to me,’ he says, ‘she seemed to die, désespérée et ravie’ [without 
hope and in rapture]. [....]. But the Catholic also shows to advantage in these last 
scenes. [....].But as death approached, Châteaubriand prevailed upon her to send for a 
priest. A good French priest arrived, and heard her confession; afterwards 
Châteaubriand and her two old servants received the Sacrament with her.
130
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 Ward’s depiction of Eleanor as a woman of ability and intelligence, who understood 
and was engaged by the main European intellectual debates of the age contrasts with her 
earlier portrayal of a de Beaumont figure in Mme de Netteville. Mme. de Netteville’s sensual 
charms are as remarkable as her intelligence, according to Squire Wendover. Eleanor, in 
contrast, is depicted as a charming, intelligent and vivacious woman, rather than as an 
amorous corsair. Her spiritual and intellectual role of muse and adviser is recognised by Fr 
Benecke: 
 He understood that she had been of assistance to Mr Manisty: but that it had been the 
assistance of a comrade and equal – that had never entered his head. 131 
[....] for Eleanor he gradually became - like Manisty — the intellectual comrade, 
crossing swords often in an equal contest, where he sometimes forgot the 
consideration due to the woman in the provocation shown him by the critic.
132
 
 
 
Unfulfilled Lives: Heart and Head 
 
Eleanor’s role as judge and translator of male ideas and energies is contrasted with her 
judgement of them as human beings. Ward again focuses on the balance between intelligence 
and emotion, ‘the complete life’ as Amiel defined it:  
 
[....] man becomes man only by the intelligence, but he is man only by the heart. 
Knowledge, love, power, - there is the complete life.
133
 
 
 
Eleanor admires Manisty’s intellect, and longs for his love, but she also longs to see his 
unification of head and heart in an emotional commitment to the religious ideas he is 
exploiting. Equally, although she can provide intellectual stimulus to Benecke, what she 
wanted of him was the spiritually and emotionally charged role of ‘the priest, the Christian, 
the ascetic.’134 Women’s roles in this novel are portrayed as sacrificial, they make possible 
the work of men like Manisty and Benecke. In a subordinate narrative, Alice, Manisty’s 
unstable sister, is ready to sacrifice her fortune to the man she loves. What they receive in 
return is limited. Towards the end of the novel, Benecke asks himself if engineering a 
                                            
131
 MW El, Ch.18. p.352. 
132
 MW El, Ch.18. pp. 353, 354. 
133
 HFA JI, 7 April 1851, p.12. 
134
 MW El, Ch.18. p.354. 
244 
 
rapprochement between Lucy and Manisty has been wise. Ward provides an ambiguous 
answer through the judgement of this unworldly man himself: 
 
In his Christian stoicism – the man of the world might have called it a Christian 
insensibility - he answered for Lucy.  
Why suppose that she would shrink, or ought to shrink? Eve’s burden is anyway 
enormous; and the generous heart scorns a grudging foresight.
135
 
 
  If Eleanor’s plot stems from Ward’s introduction to the translation of Joubert,  which 
in turn was influenced by Amiel, Eleanor’s character draws both upon her outline of Mme de 
Beaumont’s life, and upon Amiel’s perceptions of a life he felt was unfulfilled and, in terms 
of human relationships and of professional achievement, a disappointment. However, for 
Eleanor, Ward introduced a variation on Amiel’s despair over his life. Her life does not end, 
as Langham’s does in Robert Elsmere, in an ever-deepening retreat from religious faith and 
engagement with the world, but goes on to explore how it might be possible to find a faith of 
sort, which allows even a tragic and unfulfilled life to close in acceptance. Ward saw in 
Eleanor’s predicament parallels with Amiel’s emotions as he observed his life slipping by 
without any relationships or literary achievement to place between himself and the ‘abyss’. 
Here is how she depicts Eleanor assessing her life: 
 
She [....] was in the mood to see her whole existence as a refused petition, a rejected 
gift. She had offered Edward Manisty all of her sympathy and intelligence [....]. Her 
inmost sense of identity was shaken.
136
  
 
To die with this cry of the heart unspent, untold for ever! Unloved, unsatisfied, 
unrewarded – she whose whole nature gave itself – gave itself perpetually, as a wave 
breaks on a barren shore. How can any God send human beings into the world for 
such a lot?  There can be no God. But how is the riddle easier, for thinking Him 
away?
137
 
 
 
There are many parallels of these emotions and thoughts and their expression in the Journal 
Intime: 
 
[....], I feel I cannot do without affection, and I know that I have no ambition, and that 
my faculties are declining [....]. So that there is no deceiving myself as to the fate 
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which awaits me:  - increasing loneliness, mortification of spirit, long-continued 
regret, melancholy neither to be consoled nor confessed, a mournful old age, a slow 
decay, a death in the desert!
138
 
 
I whose whole being - heart and intellect - thirsts to absorb itself in reality, in its 
neighbour man, in Nature and in God,  - I, whom solitude devours and destroys, - I 
shut myself up in solitude and seem to delight only in myself and to be sufficient for 
myself.
139
 
 
 How hard it is to grow old, when we have missed our life, [....].
140
 
 
 
 The Journal entries emphasise his need for affection, and his need to reach out to 
other human beings and to God, and contrast this with his enforced solitude which creates an 
illusory appearance of self-sufficiency. Eleanor also contrasts her sense of her own emotional 
and spiritual generosity with the bitter reality of her rejection by Manisty. In both Eleanor’s 
and Amiel’s accounts there is a stark contrast between their perception of their inner 
emotional reality and the circumstances of their lives which dictate that their needs can never 
be expressed or understood. It is Ward’s reworking of the mismatch between appearance and 
reality discussed earlier in the chapter in relation to Helbeck of Bannisdale. In addition, 
echoes of the expression, rhythms and hiatuses of Amiel’s style can be detected in Ward, for 
example in the repetitions and vocabulary of Amiel’s ‘I whose whole being – heart and 
intellect – thirsts to absorb itself in reality’ compared with Ward’s description of Eleanor’s 
despair, ‘she whose whole nature gave itself – gave itself perpetually, as a wave breaks on a 
barren shore.’  
 
The function of Confession 
 
 Eleanor’s impending death and the way in which she finally takes up Benecke’s 
challenge to confront her desperation and sense of loss enable Ward to challenge the 
pessimism of Amiel’s despair over a ‘wasted life’. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Ward 
had an ambivalent attitude to confession. She dismissed its ‘spiritual intrusiveness’ for 
herself, yet recognised the importance of works such as Amiel’s, with their unflinching 
exposure of emotional and spiritual desolation. Amiel’s despair over his unfulfilled life and 
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his ‘melancholy neither to be consoled nor confessed’141 may have found a type of 
confessional catharsis in the semi-privacy of his Journal. In Eleanor, Ward provided her 
main character with another human being to whom to confess her grief and bitterness, a 
Feuerbachian homo homini deus, in the figure of Fr Benecke. The instigator of what proves to 
be an exceptionally unorthodox confession is Eleanor herself: 
 
‘Father’, she said, bending towards him, ‘you are a priest – and a confessor?’ 
 [....]. 
‘Yes, Madame – I am!’ he said at last, with a firm and passionate dignity. 
‘Yet now you cannot act as a priest. And I am not a Catholic. Still, I am a human 
being – with a soul, I suppose – if there are such things! – and you are old enough to 
be my father, and have had great experience. I am in trouble – and probably dying. 
Will you hear my case – as though it were a confession – under the same seal?’  
[....]. 
 ‘I cannot refuse’, he said uneasily. [....]. But let me remind you that this could not be 
in any sense a true confession. It could only be a conversation between friends.’  
[....]. 
‘I must treat it as a confession or I cannot speak. I shall not ask you to absolve me. 
That – would do me no good’ [....]. ‘What I want is direction – from someone 
accustomed to looking at people as they are – and – and to speak the truth to them.’142 
 
 
Ward defines Eleanor’s need for spiritual direction in terms of what it is not. The repeated 
negatives of the dialogue create a movement towards an understanding of what the 
transaction could and might be ([....] you cannot act as a priest. And I am not a Catholic. I 
cannot refuse, [....] this could not be a true confession. [....]. I must [....] or I cannot speak. I 
shall not ask you. [....] What I want is direction [....])  Its intricate deconstruction of the 
purpose of the Catholic confessional strips away its sacramental nature and substitutes a 
sacred transaction between two human beings, one ‘in trouble’ and one with ‘great 
experience’. As discussed in chapter 2, Feuerbach and Eliot attempted to find in human 
relationship all the gravity of the sacred, but divested of the divine. Amiel’s Journal also 
considers the priestly function of one human being to another: 
 
Every man is the centre of perpetual radiation like a luminous body; [....]. Every man 
is a priest, even involuntarily; his conduct is an unspoken sermon which is forever 
preaching to others; [....].
143
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Eleanor explores in a variety of ways the sometimes ‘involuntary’, inspirational nature of 
human relationship, and the ways in which people can and do take on quasi-priestly functions 
for each other, and therefore bring about change in each other’s lives or perceptions. Eleanor 
receives direction from Benecke, and finds a faith which enables her to die reconciled to the 
losses of her life. Benecke provides direction, but also he receives an insight into the 
possibilities of spiritual response from Eleanor: 
 
But here, beneath his eyes, in this dying woman, was another certainty; [....]; a 
certainty of the spirit.
144
 
 
 
 In her treatment of Eleanor’s death, just as with Laura’s death, Ward portrays the 
manner or choice of death as a ‘sign’ to other characters either of ‘august things’ or of 
spiritual certainties which transcend conventional religious expectations. These deaths also 
reflect Amiel’s argument considered earlier that: 
 
Such words and looks are a kind of testament. They have a solemn and sacred 
character which is not merely an effect of our imagination.
145
 
 
 
Eleanor’s discovery of a way through her bitterness draws heavily on both Amiel’s and 
Arnold’s beliefs in the necessity of Christ-like self-renunciation as the only ‘method’ of 
achieving peace. Challenged by Father Benecke’s spiritual direction, Eleanor is reconciled to 
her loss of Manisty’s affection and to his relationship with Lucy, but her death-bed 
reconciliation is not through a Catholic understanding of grace and forgiveness, but through a 
change in her own perceptions: 
 
The “grace of God”, you think? – or the natural welling back of the river, little by 
little, to its natural bed?[....]. But what are “grace” and “nature” more than words? 
There is a Life, - which our life perpetually touches and guesses at - like a child 
fingering a closed room in the dark. What else do we know?
146
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Eleanor’s questioning of how far the signifiers ‘grace’ and ‘nature’, which categorise human 
psychological experience in religious terms, reflect the truth of humanity’s deepest 
experiences is an idea considered by Amiel: 
 
The divine life is a series of successive deaths, in which the mind throws off its 
imperfections and its symbols, and yields to the growing attraction of the ineffable 
centre of gravitation, the sun of intelligence and love.
147
 
 
His thought here suggests that what is understood through symbols and signs transcends its 
translation and that mutable signs of language and religious symbols are only approximate 
expressions of an ‘ineffable’ reality. The importance of signs to Amiel and to Ward, explored 
earlier in this chapter, must be seen as an approximate and provisional step towards 
emotional and intellectual understanding.   
 Eleanor’s discussion with Father Benecke about the nature of her spiritual 
transformation reviews the capacity of the languages of faith or of poetic or literary 
metaphor, with their apparent specificity or imaginative penetration, to elucidate elusive and 
indefinable personal experiences. 
 
‘Don’t quarrel with me – with my poor words. He is there – there!’ - she said under 
her breath. 
 And he saw the motion of her white fingers towards her breast. [....].
148
 
[....] here, beneath his eyes, in this dying woman, was another certainty; [....]; a 
certainty of the spirit.
149
 
 
 
Eleanor’s explanation of the change in her understanding reflects Arnold’s identification of 
the essential teaching of Christ, rather than Amiel’s bleaker vision: 
 
[....] - what is true – is the “dying to live” of Christianity. One moment, you have the 
weight of the world upon you; the next, as it were, you dispose of the world and all in 
it. Just an act of the will! – and the thing verifies itself like any chemical 
experiment.
150
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The phrasing echoes the positive and challenging tone of Arnold’s description of the ‘secret 
of Jesus’, of following conscience and practising ‘self-renouncement’, a phrase which Arnold 
perhaps felt implied a more positive and active mental state than self-renunciation. He 
describes his formula in a number of places in Literature and Dogma: 
 [....] the method and secret of Jesus, that is to say, conscience and self-renouncement, 
are righteousness, bring about the kingdom of God or the reign of righteousness, - 
this, [....], is best impressed, for the present at any rate, by experiencing and showing 
again and again, in ourselves [....] that it is so; [....].
151
 
 
 
Eleanor’s strange analogy between ‘an act of will’ with its results and the observation of ‘any 
chemical experiment’ may also have drawn on Arnold’s metaphor of ‘experiment’:  
 
Now, as we say that the truth and grandeur of the Old Testament most comes out 
experimentally, - that is by the whole course of the world establishing it, and 
confuting what is opposed to it – so it is with Christianity. Its grandeur and truth are 
far best brought out experimentally [....].
152
 
 
 
 Arnold’s challenge to experience the internal and social proofs of experimental ‘self-
renouncement’ is generously life-affirming in tone, and this affirmative tone is echoed in one 
place early in the Journal, where Amiel defines the ideal type of renunciation as having the 
character of: 
 
Mâle résignation, [....]; ‘manly’ – that is to say, courageous, active, resolute, 
persevering, - resignation, [....]. Energy in resignation – there lies the wisdom of the 
sons of earth, [....].
153
 
 
 
In later entries however, his idea of renunciation becomes more passive and despairing. In an 
entry in his Journal for August 1856, when he was thirty five, he discusses the need for 
recognition of the inevitable process of renunciation of human ‘hopes’, but still hoping in 
‘this nothingness’ to find ‘the divine spark’:  
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We must learn to look upon life as an apprenticeship to a progressive renunciation, a 
perpetual diminution in our pretensions, our hopes, our powers, and our liberty. [....] 
and then we have to [....] throw ourselves upon God for all, recognizing our own 
worthlessness, and that we have no right to anything. It is in this nothingness that we 
recover something of life - the divine spark is there at the bottom of it. Resignation 
comes to us, and, in believing love, we reconquer the true greatness.
 154
 
 
 
As he was suffering his last illness he records his nihilist resignation to the destruction of 
personality:  
This vague intermediate state, which is neither death nor life, has its sweetness, 
because if it implies renunciation, still it allows of thought. [....]. Selbst–bewusstsein 
[consciousness or awareness of self] becomes once more impersonal Bewusstsein 
[consciousness or awareness], and before personality can be reacquired, pain, duty 
and will must be brought into action. 
Are these oscillations between the personal and the impersonal, between pantheism 
and theism, between Spinoza and Leibnitz, to be regretted? No, for it is the one state 
that makes us conscious of the other.
155
 
 
 
The apparent journey towards nihilism is countered by one of his final journal entries a 
month before his death. It counterpoises the assertion of faith which began the journal in 
1848: ‘There is but one thing needful – to possess God’ with a resignation of himself to the 
‘necessary’ and an appeal to that sense of a ‘holy will’ to which Ward had commended her 
dying mother: ‘Garde en mon coeur la foi dans ta volonté sainte’ [Keep in my heart faith in 
your holy will].
156
 
  
The role of Joubert 
 
 The roles of both Father Benecke and Reggie Brooklyn combine to provide a 
composite Joubert figure to Eleanor’s Pauline de Beaumont. Through them she receives the 
just estimate of her spiritual heroism. In the figure of Father Benecke, Ward returns to 
thematic material from earlier books: the necessity of change to the Church’s teaching in the 
light of contemporary biblical studies. He embodies a more gradualist approach to the 
transformation of Christianity from within. Alive to the implications of contemporary biblical 
scholarship like Robert Elsmere, Benecke sees himself acting as a catalyst in a slow process 
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of recognition and transformation of the Catholic Church. His defiance of the Church is 
described in similar terms to Elsmere’s, as ‘a marvellous liberation of the soul’157 and Ward 
compares him with David Strauss: 
 
His intelligence had much the same acuteness and pliancy as that of another and more 
pronounced doubter – a South German also, like Father Benecke, - the author of the 
‘Leben Jesu’.158 
Benecke’s excommunication leaves him in a similar predicament to that of Amiel, waiting for 
a Church to arise that matches his spiritual needs: ‘Ah! When will the church to which I 
belong in heart rise into being?’159 
Individual Conscience and Public Morality 
 
 In Eleanor, the Catholic Church is portrayed in a struggle with individual freedom 
and conscience, manipulating the uneducated, and ostracising and punishing individuals who 
dare to import ideas which question prevailing dogma. Manisty supports its actions against 
individuals, even friends such as Benecke, partly in horror at the cultural dislocation and loss 
which any revolution in thought brings in its train, and partly to reinforce authority even if 
that authority is refusing to address intellectual developments in the world beyond its 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the emergence of a secular state is given sympathetic spokesmen and 
women, such as the Contessa.  
 Eleanor presents a more overt hostility to Catholicism as an impersonal 
authoritarian force compared with Helbeck of Bannisdale’s sympathetic balance. Ward 
admired Italy’s nascent, secular democratic state, and she dedicated Eleanor to Italy ‘the 
beloved and beautiful, instructress of our past, delight of our present, comrade of our 
future’.160 The novel’s Catholic characters, apart from the apostate Father Benecke, are 
portrayed as committed to protecting an institution rather than its religious values. Lucy 
Forster perceives it as a tyrannic force, just as does Laura in Helbeck of Bannisdale: 
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The priest’s crushed strength and humiliated age - what a testimony to the power of 
that tradition for which Mr Manisty was working – its unmerciful and tyrannous 
power.
161
 
 
 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Amiel had identified Catholicism not just as the enemy of 
freedom of conscience but of individual conscience itself. Elsewhere in the Journal he had 
discussed the impact of ‘socialist and non-socialist democracy’ on culture and on 
individualism.  
The age of great men is going; the epoch of the ant-hill, of life in multiplicity, is 
beginning. [....]. 
Is this indeed the fate reserved for the democratic era? May not the general well-being 
be purchased too dearly at such a price? [....]. Or rather, above the economic and 
political equality to which the socialist and non-socialist democracy aspires, taking it 
too often for the term of its efforts, will there not arise a new kingdom of mind, a 
church of refuge, a republic of souls, in which, far beyond the region of mere right 
and sordid utility, beauty, devotion, holiness, heroism, enthusiasm, the extraordinary, 
the infinite, shall have a worship and an abiding city?
162
  
 
 
Amiel saw threats to culture, freedom of conscience, and individual thought arising from 
authoritarian regimes and utilitarian liberal democracy alike. His solution was expressed 
through language which suggests visionary, biblical hope in an ‘abiding city’, but one which 
embraces both equality, ‘a republic of souls [....] far beyond the region of mere right and 
sordid utility’, and the supremacy of the individual in ‘a new kingdom of mind’. Such a 
visionary – and scarcely practical – demand was not likely to be incorporated in Ward’s 
novel. However, Amiel’s Journal frequently expresses his longing for the spiritual and 
unattainable to be present within human community:   
 
Ah! when will the church to which I belong in heart rise into being? [....]. Alas! Well 
understood, this place is the earth, this country of one's dreams is heaven, and this 
suffering is the eternal homesickness, the thirst for happiness.
163
  
 
 
Finding a community within which to find an echoing response to the continuing spiritual 
needs of those who have dispensed with what they perceive as untenable dogma is the search 
embarked upon by Robert Elsmere and by Fr Benecke. Elsmere founded his own community. 
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But by the time she wrote Eleanor, Ward was less radical. Benecke’s loss of communion 
within the Catholic Church is translated into acceptance within a community of Old German 
Catholics, a Church then in communion with the Anglican Church, the Anglican Church to 
which Ward remained emotionally identified, even if intellectually sceptical of its thirty nine 
articles. 
 In Eleanor’s invitation to Benecke to act as her spiritual director, the mechanism for 
the resolution of the novel, it seems that Ward has brought together a number of her intensely 
personal themes – the need for a spiritual renewal of the Church and its dogma, the 
recognition of the power which certain rites of Catholicism still exercised for her because 
they were grounded in human psychological need, the shadowy presence of a father-figure 
behind this recognition, and the need for those spiritual transactions to be recognised as the 
‘needs of the soul’, but liberated from authority and dogma. Amiel’s influence can be seen  
very clearly in the way she constructed the characters of Eleanor and Manisty in order to 
explore these ideas, over the shaping of the ideas themselves and over the way she depicted 
the ‘human and emotional crisis’164 following from ‘an intellectual process’.   
 In Eleanor, Ward introduced a variation on Amiel’s despair over his life. Her life 
does not end, as Langham’s does, in an ever-deepening spiritual retreat from religious faith 
and engagement with the world.  Half way through the novel, as she senses her displacement 
from Manisty’s affection as his fascination with Lucy grows,  Eleanor, is given the last words 
in Amiel’s Journal Intime, as he faced his imminent death, ‘Que vivre est difficile, ô mon 
coeur fatigué!’165 [How difficult it is to live, o my exhausted heart!]. This identification with 
the experience and words of Frédéric Amiel demonstrates very clearly his continuing 
influence over how she imagined and presented emotion and ideas, but Ward goes on to 
explore, through Eleanor, how it might be possible to find a faith of sort, which allows even a 
tragic and unfulfilled life to close in acceptance, a faith in self-renunciation as Amiel 
described it early in his Journal at the age of thirty one: 
 
Mâle resignation, [....]; ‘manly’ – that is to say, courageous, active, resolute, 
persevering, - resignation, [....]. Energy in resignation – there lies the wisdom of the 
sons of earth, [....].
166
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Eleanor’s courageous resignation is demanded at a similar age, ‘not very far from thirty’,167 
and it is in Eleanor’s resignation to her loss of love and death, that Ward portrays a fusion of 
Amiel’s concept with that of another of Ward’s major influences, her uncle, Matthew Arnold, 
who for her represented the continuity of her family’s tradition of liberal, radical thought 
about Christianity.  
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 MW El, Ch.1. p.11. 
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Conclusion 
If art translates the existential anxieties, as well as the values of its time, then Eliot’s 
and Ward’s novels indicate how deep were the anxieties about the value of human life and 
thought, when their age-old external validation through beliefs that God both existed and ‘so 
loved’1 his creation seemed deluged with philosophic, scientific and scholarly amendments. 
The fictional projects of both Eliot and Ward were to demonstrate that human lives, both their 
internal and external dramas, had an intrinsic value, and that moral or intellectual decisions 
had a significance beyond the personal, even if they were not significant in any 
eschatological sense. They both aimed to show that freedom from belief in Judaeo-Christian 
dogma did not entail a less valuable or valued life, nor a less morally aware life, but rather 
liberated individuals to reflect more fully on the reality of the way their own and others’ lives 
inter-related. Both writers were deeply aware of the rethinking taking place in European and 
British intellectual life, and this rethinking is a backdrop which permeates and conditions the 
moral context for the lives of their fictional protagonists.    
This is, to an extent, well known. What this thesis has demonstrated is that both 
writers’ thinking about the mechanisms of translation, and their actual undertaking of it in 
practice had broader and deeper implications for their intervention in this debate than has 
hitherto been recognized. Translation in the nineteenth century was experienced and 
envisaged as a responsibility to enter the mind of the non-English-speaking writer with 
sympathy and an analytic understanding of the contextual and cultural influences on his, or 
sometimes her, work. The intensity of the effort to maintain a combination of sympathetic 
identification and objective analysis provides in itself a formative influence on Eliot’s 
concern with sympathy and judgement in her fiction, and provides Ward with a model of 
intellectually able and emotionally committed protagonists, aware of European scholarship 
and thought. Recent models of translation have stressed the role of conflict, and of the 
explicit cultural alienation between translator and subject. In contrast, the priorities of 
faithfulness to text and textual intention, so important to these two Victorian writers, 
redirected towards an inclusive vision of human beings and of humanism the conventions of 
biblical translation, concerned as it was with finding workable mechanisms that embraced 
expectations of accuracy and fidelity, rather than conflict and anxiety. My contention in this 
thesis has been that we need to read Eliot’s and Ward’s engagement with models of 
                                            
1
 The Gospel of St John, 3.16.  
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translation (and the way they then deployed and developed these models in their fiction) 
much more in their own spirit. 
Eliot’s and Ward’s novels reflect and explore, through the narrative and its characters, 
the challenges of understanding and translating the language used by other people; they also 
represent secondary translations and evaluations of the ideas found in their source works. The 
primacy of making ideas accessible was seen as a justification for this secondary translation 
into fiction, but the choice of realism as the convention within which to write also emphasises 
their philosophic concerns with evidence and the reality of human experience - with, as Eliot 
put it, a ‘picture of life’.2 It allowed them to demonstrate that fictional individuals and 
communities recognisable as part of English nineteenth century experience would continue to 
live recognisably similar lives and face recognisable predicaments without dogmatic 
Christianity’s ‘aberglaube’.3 Despite Oscar Wilde’s world-weary strictures about the 
intellectual anachronism of Robert Elsmere’s loss of faith, Gladstone’s reaction shows that it 
seemed, at the time, a significant attack on the bases of Christianity and, by extension, on the 
ethical underpinnings of English society. The convention of realism adopted by both women 
offers  pre-emptively a vision of how such radicalism could be absorbed and even welcomed 
by a society undergoing the nineteenth century’s wide-ranging political and economic 
change.  
Reflecting on the novel’s use for ‘religious or social propaganda’ by Froude, Newman 
and Kingsley, Ward insisted that the novel was capable ‘of holding and shaping real 
experience of any kind, as it affects the lives of men and women’, provided that in doing so it 
created ‘interest’ and ‘beauty’.4  However, within their explicit considerations of how they 
intended to expose the ideas found within their translations to the simulated realities of their 
fiction, both women allude to an uneasy apprehension that fictionalised life had to have its 
own internal self-justifying intensity of vision of human experience to avoid the charge that it 
was a reduction to theory, formulae or propaganda. 
Through their translations, both women entered not only into a human search for 
significance that transcended national cultures and philosophies, but also into the debate 
about how to replace old ideas about human duties to each other with ideas that reflected 
more fully the new spiritual and intellectual reality of human responsibility. For them, the 
                                            
2
 George Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’ in Selected Essays, Poems and Other Writings, ed. by  
Byatt and Warren, p.110. 
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 Matthew Arnold, ‘Literature and Dogma’, in Vol 6, Dissent and Dogma, ed. by Super, p.212. 
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movement from translation of works of philosophy to creation of fictions to embody these 
ideas represented a different type of translation, one which could not only find ways of 
dramatising ideas, but could involve the reader in thinking through their implications.  
George Eliot called her novels ‘experiments in life’5, and they test out the ideas of the 
philosophers she translated in fictional simulations of ‘real’ human situations, and the 
potential for translation itself to provide models for thinking about those situations. Norman 
Vance argues that both Eliot’s and Ward’s fictional creations were intended to be ‘secular 
scriptures’, resolutely grounding their radical ideas about the basis for a good life through 
examining recognisable human situations and characters.
6
 This is to put translation at the very 
heart of their fictional practice. The conventions of realism, embraced by both authors, 
parallel the rejection of the miraculous and supernatural elements of religion, advocated by 
Spinoza, Strauss, and Feuerbach, and agonised over by Amiel. Ideas had to be grounded in 
what could be agreed as a shared human reality, where supernatural explanation had given 
way to scientific observation and theory. The search for an authentic, ‘human’ Jesus beyond 
or beneath the layers of the supernatural in religious tradition and gospel narrative, and 
religion’s answering debate about whether pre-eminent authenticity and authority lay in 
scripture or tradition, cross-fertilised art forms which sought authenticity in realist convention 
and went on to use that ‘realism’ to test out and advocate new ideas.  
Eliot’s and Ward’s novels became above all, attempts to develop a new language for 
talking about how to live a good life, how to translate anew the ‘needs of the soul’7 and to 
retranslate the significance previously attached to the sacred and what it might mean, when 
there was no longer a traditional, validating religious conception of God to which to appeal. 
Eliot’s tentative transfigurations of human interaction are subject to the inherent difficulties 
and even contradictions of creating that sense of otherness demanded by the sacred while 
rejecting the truth of any other than the natural world of un-illusioned reality, difficulties she 
found in the works that she translated, particularly Feuerbach’s. The tension applies equally 
to Arnold’s demands for reverence for the ‘Eternal Power, not ourselves, which makes for 
righteousness’,8 and Ward’s demands for a language which could address the continuing 
‘needs of the soul’, once dogmatic Christianity had been abandoned. In both women’s fiction 
the language for new ideas uses the poetic, metaphorical language of Judaeo- Christianity to 
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 GEL.VI, to Dr Joseph Frank Payne, 25 January 1876, pp. 216-217. 
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7
 MW HB, V. 1. p.333. 
8
 Arnold, p.298 
 258 
 
suggest the penumbra of emotional resonance which was to be transferred to secular 
humanism and the new freedom of thought. The difficulties of articulating and translating 
humanity’s deepest emotional and intellectual needs as its symbolic frameworks were in 
transition are addressed by both writers. In Ward’s fiction, allusiveness to the former 
language and experience of religious thought and emotion is retained, while at the same time 
insisting that its substructure of dogma be removed. In the introduction, I referred to Lukács’ 
description of the modern novel’s purpose as being to see ‘where God is to be found in a 
world abandoned by God,’9 and as a response, therefore, to the contradictory demands of 
reason and feeling. What remains to be sought in a world without God is a meaning which the 
characters experience as an external validation of themselves, their human aspirations, 
suffering and despair, but a validation that also demands from them intellectual, moral or 
emotional understanding and change. Eliot’s characters find this most often through 
sympathy, Ward’s through a developing personal conviction. 
 
How did this particular type of novel - attempting to transfer existential validity to 
human lives and minds alone - respond to the ethical chaos of the twentieth century? The 
twentieth century philosopher, translator, and novelist, Iris Murdoch, whose translator hero, 
Jake Donaghue, opened this thesis, has written compellingly about the relationship between 
philosophic ideas and the capacity of the novel form to explore them in a particular and 
nuanced way. At the end of Under the Net, Jake intends to become a novelist rather than a 
translator. The move to fiction from translation perhaps signals his move to a more just and 
attentive relationship with reality. In this move he also had some parallels with his creator.  
Murdoch’s career also reveals some parallels with those of Eliot and Ward. Like 
them, she had translated, in her case Raymond Queneau’s Pierrot Mon Ami in 1949, although 
the translation was not published. She dedicated Under the Net to Queneau, and Queneau’s 
Pierrot is one of the books which Madge, Jake’s reluctant landlady, ensures he takes with 
him on his eviction from her flat at the beginning of the novel.
10
  Murdoch had written to 
Queneau inviting him to fulfil the role of her ‘maître’, a ‘master’ or mentor, describing this as 
a ‘problème important et dangereux’ [an important and dangerous problem].11  Peter Conradi, 
                                            
9
 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel,  p.92. 
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 Iris Murdoch, Under the Net, p.16. 
11
 Peter Conradi, ‘Holy Fool and Magus, The Uses of Discipleship in Under the Net and Flight from the 
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Murdoch’s biographer, suggests that she was also in love with Queneau. It underlines the 
potential complexity of the relationship between translator and translated, its emotional 
undertow submerged below its apparent intellectualism. Eliot’s language in relation to 
Strauss hints only at her ironic awareness of those undercurrents surrounding the process of 
sympathetic identification, and of close and ‘faithful’ attention to the ‘products of another 
man’s mind’, of that particular intensity of the I and thou relationship which Feuerbach 
argued subsisted between man and woman.
12
 
Like Jake, and like Eliot and Ward, Murdoch moved from translation and from 
engagement with philosophy to become a novelist, although she never relinquished her 
professional involvement as a philosopher.  She thus becomes the inheritor of a tradition both 
Eliot and Ward had developed: the translation of European – and, in Murdoch’s case, Anglo-
American – philosophic debates and the cultural milieu for them into a novel form.  Her 
novels, like theirs, invoke symbolically the emotional and intellectual complexity of 
European religious and philosophic tradition and those artistic movements which translate 
them. They are full of references to European philosophers, quotations from European poets, 
descriptions of European paintings, and dialogues with religious figures, representing the 
intellectual traditions and crises of European Christianity, as well as the sensibilities of 
Judaism.
13
 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1993), Murdoch claimed that the novel is an 
ethical form dedicated to truth of seeing,
14
 and in Sartre, Romantic Rationalist (1953) she 
recognised that the novel form translates ideas both through fiction or dramatised exploration, 
and also sets up an independent language of ‘dispute with philosophy as a mode of knowing, 
understanding or discovering’.15 
 
The novel, after all, is itself a typical product of this post-Hegelian era; [....]. The 
novelist proper is, in his way, a sort of phenomenologist. He has always implicitly 
understood, what the philosopher has grasped less clearly, that human reason is not a 
single unitary gadget the nature of which could be discovered once for all. The 
novelist has his eye fixed on what we do, and not on what we ought to do or must be 
presumed to do. [....]. He has always been, what the very latest philosophers claim to 
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be, a describer rather than an explainer; and in consequence he has often anticipated 
the philosopher’s discoveries.16 
 
 
The novel form was, for her, ‘more important, in the sense of being more influential,’17 than 
philosophic endeavour, in that it made ideas nuanced, vivid and accessible. Yet paralleling 
Eliot’s distaste for theory or formulae, and Ward’s ambivalence about ‘propaganda’, she too 
is uneasy about fiction’s relationship with philosophy, describing her ‘absolute horror of 
putting theories or “philosophical ideas” as such into my novels’.18 Conradi interprets her aim 
as that of re-articulating philosophic ideas as a human struggle, a position which, we can see, 
bears close resemblance to Ward’s and to Eliot’s: 
 
Ideas-in-art, she would say, must suffer a sea-change, and so at the heart of a good 
novel, she felt, should be a vital spiritual struggle implicating both writer and reader: 
[....]. Without such struggle, literature proper would give way to propaganda.
19
   
 
 
The objective of involving the reader in ‘a vital spiritual struggle’ recalls Eliot’s narrator’s 
attempts to entrap the reader, through continuous ironic adjustments of our view of ourselves 
as well as of the novel’s characters, into reassessing our reactions, and gaining a more just 
perception of the novel’s characters and predicaments, and of our internal and external 
worlds. As with Eliot’s insistence on her ‘endeavour to see what our thought and emotion 
may be capable of’ and on her novels as a ‘set of experiments in life’,20  Murdoch claimed 
that she focused on ‘what we do, and not on what we ought to do or must be presumed to 
do’.21   Yet, her novels address similar issues and hypotheses about how to live despite the 
absence of God, but with a new conception of the dangers of living when spirituality has no 
mooring in the search for the good.  
Parallels can also be detected between her ‘skeptical and loving’22 handling of 
character and Eliot’s narrator’s sympathy combined with ironic, thinking judgement. In her 
essay ‘The Sublime and the Good’, Murdoch argued that: 
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Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. 
Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality.
23
 
 
 
The parallel between this idea and the ideas explored by Feuerbach and Eliot of the 
relationship between consciousness of the other, self-conscious thought and sympathy for 
other people, in a joint translation of self and other-than-self, reflects Murdoch’s obvious 
admiration for Eliot’s apprehensions and their novelistic expression. In her critique of 
Sartre’s novel L’Etre et le Néant [Being and Nothingness], she argues that ‘if we are to be 
touched or terrified there must be that concrete realisation of what George Eliot called ‘an 
equivalent centre of self from which the shadows fall with a difference,’ and, later in the 
paragraph, called Middlemarch ‘that brilliant study of being-for-others’. Only in one of 
Sartre’s portrayals does she find ‘the flicker of a real ‘I-Thou’’, 24  so consistently realised by 
Eliot.  
Also like Eliot and Ward, Murdoch was interested in finding a language for those 
aspects of experience which had, in the past, been tethered to religion and to mysticism. Her 
project was to continue to assert the language both of morality and the mystical, in a world 
that no longer has religion as a way of translating and unifying them.
25
 Her concern with the 
‘good’ illuminates Eliot’s search for a language which can translate or suggest Feuerbach’s 
‘sacred’, another type of reality penetrating that of scientific observation and explanation. If 
Murdoch dismissed the sort of transcendental reality postulated by religion, she was also 
dissatisfied by the exclusion of any other language than that of scientific rationalism as valid 
translations of experience. The language she aspired to create was one which could 
effectively translate ‘all that meets the gaze of a just and loving moral perceiver,’26 who may 
experience, or may not, an intermeshed world where transcendental good can be perceived.  
The just and loving moral perceiver of Murdoch’s novels is the narrator. The narrator 
is also the quizzical, disturbing, ironic presence which we note in Eliot’s narrator. Unlike 
Eliot’s and Ward’s novels, apparently so deeply rooted in realism’s reassuringly recognisable 
world, but so explicitly challenging of the reader’s assumptions about it, Murdoch’s twentieth 
century novels include magus-like characters, hallucinatory or surreal events, erotic 
delusions, the discovery of ‘love’ – or another person’s ‘reality’ - in unexpected and absurd 
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conjunctions. The world, as she indicated, of Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre,
27
 has displaced 
nineteenth century perceptions of reality, but what that reality consists of is still the subject of 
exploration and the search for new translation.  What Knoepflmacher described as the 
‘religious yearning without a religious object’, 28 a yearning for a new translation of human 
significance, has been transformed in a variety of ways, and not only by Murdoch’s 
symbolism and surrealism.  This genre of novel,  addressing the anxieties about how to live 
and how to determine the significance of human life, remains one of fundamental importance, 
despite changing narrative methods, moral imperatives, and ideological contexts.  
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